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Stellingen behorende by het proefschrift Planting Power. The Afforestation of the 
Commons and State Formation in Portugal door A.R. Brouwer. 
1. Voor het overleven van het Portugese publieke bos en bosbeheer is de daadwerkelijke participatie van 
dorpsgemeenschappen in het beheer van de beboste baldios van cruciaal belang (dit proefschrift). 
2. Erkenning van de mogelijkheid van de participatie van lokale gemeenschappen in het beheer van natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen vormt een belangrijke optie voor het ontwikkelen van bestuur op afstand met name in het geval 
van de 'weak states' in het Zuiden. 
3. Effectieve machtsuitoefening door de overheid berust op de mobilisatie van voldoende 'medeplichtigheid' 
onder de objecten van die machtsuitoefening. Effectief staatsbosbeheer vraagt derhalve om de creatie van een 
maatschappelijk draagvlak door het bieden van voldoende voordelen aan de elite en/of de armen in de 
betrokken samenleving. Het steunen van geen van beide groepen is een garantie voor mislukking (dit 
proefschrift). 
4. Verbetertag van het bosbeheer op de baldios vraagt onderzoek naar de omvorming van het huidige, 
oppervlakte-gewijze bosbeheer in de richttag van boom-gewijze uitkap-systemen (dit proefschrift). 
5. De wetenschappelijke waarde van het concept legal pluralism is dat het de beperktheid van de roi en de macht 
van de Staat in de samenleving zichtbaar maakt en de onderzoeker confronteert met het feit dat regelgeving en 
normhandhaving geen exclusieve activiteiten zijn van de Staat, maar plaatsvinden binnen alle sociale verbanden 
(dit proefschrift). 
6. De wetenschappelijke waarde van het concept legal pluralism wordt beperkt indien men normatieve praktijken 
slechts begrijpt in termen van recht en 'ander recht'. In dat geval wordt het begrip onderdeel van de post-
moderne discours en verhult het gebruik ervan zowel het politieke karakter van het recht als de hieraan 
verbunden machtsrelaties. 
7. Technici hanteren observaties ten aanzien van bijvoorbeeld bodemkwaliteit als basis voor het doen van 
aanbeveltagen voor hervonntagen van landrechten en voor andere politieke en maatschappelijke veranderingen. 
Binnen de sociale wetenschappen is deze strikt materialistische variant van het marxistische gedachtengoed reeds 
emge tijd geleden als simplistisch terzijde geschoven (n.a.v. het WRR-rapport Grond voor Keuzes en het 
UNDP/FAO project Land Use Planning for Rational Utilization of Land and Water Resources, Swaziland). 
8. Het belangrijkste voordeel van een conséquente invoering van het angelsaksische model voor het 
wetenschappelijke onderwijs is gelegen in de maatschappelijke besparing op promoties: de instellingen van 
wetenschappelijk onderwijs en onderzoek hoeven nog slechts twee in plaats van vijfenzeventig exemplaren van 
het proefschrift te subsidiëren, en de promovendus wordt niet langer op overbodige kosten gejaagd voor het 
huren van een smoking. 
9. Het feit dat de auteur van dit proefschrift de helft van zijn leven in een woongroep heeft gewoond vormt een 
grotere ondersteuning voor de zaak van common-pool resource management dan het in dit proefschrift 
aangedragen materiaal. 
10. Het gebruik van het prisoners dilemma als verklaring voor het uitblijven van wijziging in het tadividuele, 
milieu-onvriendelijke, (reis-)gedrag is, hoewel vrij algemeen, niet gerechtvaardigd. 
11. Degenen die sociale wetenschappers verwijten zieh op te sluiten in de universiteit vergeten dat vakgroepen 
geschikte objecten zijn voor het bestuderen van sociale Processen door middel van partieipatieve observatie. 
12. De Stelling 'in een historisch perspectief is alle bezit diefstal', implieeert niet dat misdaad altijd moet worden 
bestraft. 
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Preface 
The history of Portugal is, like that of many other countries in Europe, one of 
deforestation and reafforestation. Until the eighteenth century, the reclamation 
of land for agriculture, the expansion of animal husbandry (often on communal 
grazing grounds or baldios), and the increased demand for wood and timber 
resulted in the gradual disappearance of forests and woodlands. This tendency 
was reversed only in the nineteenth century, when planting of trees became a 
scientifically guided and often government-sponsored activity. The reversal was 
due, on the one hand, to the increased economic value of timber (the market's 
"invisible hand" raised timber prices and made forest plantation economically 
attractive), and to the realization that deforestation had severe impacts on the 
environment. It was no accident that the idea of sustainability, so much in vogue 
today, was developed by early-nineteenth-century foresters. 
Such is the common perspective on forestry history in Europe and Portugal. 
Within this perspective, social phenomena are translated into abstract notions 
like agricultural expansion, the invisible hand of the market, and the public 
interest in sustainably-used natural environments. In such accounts, trees can 
become gifts from the gods to shelter, feed and warm the mortals (for an 
example, see: O Vilarealense, (Vila Real), 12 January 1961). However, a closer 
look makes it clear that such a detached account misses one key aspect: forests 
serve not only public, but also particular interests, and these particular interests 
correspond to specific social groups. For example, timber consumers may have 
welcomed the increase in wood production resulting from the afforestation of 
communal "waste" lands, but the pastoralists or farmers who depended on these 
baldios were less satisfied. The enclosure of their commons and the concomitant 
reduction of the grazing areas, was looked upon by them as an act of theft, 
rather than a gift. 
Afforestation was not the result of natural evolution, but the outcome of social 
struggle. The rapid progression of afforestation from the nineteenth century 
onwards indicates that this struggle was between unequal parties. The active 
participation of the state in the afforestation process, either by planting its own 
estates, by nationalizing waste lands for this aim, or by sponsoring afforestation 
by private landowners, shows that the history of European forests should also be 
read in terms of the development of and change in the power of the state. 
Portugal is merely one example of the general European forestry history. I 
came in contact with the Portuguese afforestation for the first time in 1982 
when, as part of my graduate course, I left for Vila Real in Tr£s-os-Montes. 
Together with Gommert Mes and guided by Joao Bento, I participated in an 
attempt to build mathematical models for the identification of sites for 
"reforestation" on communal "waste" lands or baldios in that area. Our main 
task was to formulate indicators that, once processed in a calculation model, 
would result in a ranking of sites according to their "suitability" for afforest-
ation. Suitability was determined by climatological data, soil characteristics, 
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present land use, etc. The results were intended to help the State forestry 
administration in Vila Real to identify the localities in which it should concen-
trate its afforestation efforts. 
The contact with Portugal and its people was an inspiring experience, and, in 
a way, the processes of data gathering and model building were themselves 
inspiring as well. For amidst the areal photographs I discovered that the present 
afforestation programme was part of a much broader process which - as far as 
this particular part of Portugal was concerned - was closely related to similar 
efforts by the undemocratic regime that had governed the country until 1974. 
The nationalization of communal pastures on behalf of forestry had been highly 
criticized and after the 1974 revolution, left-wing politicians had inverted the 
previous policy and returned the commons to the people. In this manner, 
working on a mathematical model made me realize that forestry is part and 
parcel of social and political struggle, and that technocratic approaches to social 
reality, on the one hand, hide that struggle and, on the other hand, tend to side 
with one of the parties, in this case the state. 
The present book is the final result of that realization. After eight years of 
wandering which brought me among other things to an afforestation project in 
Cape Verde and a (ex-)squatters' restaurant in Wageningen, I returned to 
Portugal. Early in 1990,1 received a grant from NESRO, the Dutch Foundation 
for Legal Research, which allowed me to develop the perspective on forestry 
that I had glimpsed eight years earlier. This book is the result of that invest-
ment. In it, I seek to expose forestry as a political rather than a technical 
enterprise, and show how one particular example of afforestation was a theft — 
albeit with positive aspects - rather than a gift. It is aimed at an audience of 
technicians (foresters) and social scientists, who share an interest in the position 
of the weak in relation to the powerful. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The Baldios and the Battle for Alternative Futures 
O Fim do Mundo (The End of the World) by Joao Manuel Grilo, is one of the 
latest products of Portuguese cinema. I saw it for the first time at the 1994 
Rotterdam Film Festival. Grilo's motion picture portrays the final stages of the 
dying process of Gesteira, a rural community high up in the Serra de Lousa 
near Coimbra. It begins with a shot of a woman's corpse lying on the ground. 
The woman, Maria da Conceicao, and her widowed sister had been irrigating a 
field downstream when suddenly the water flow stopped. They immediately 
realized that Ant6nio, the only other inhabitant of the hamlet, had closed the 
channel and was re-directing the water to his own land. Infuriated, Maria went 
to see him and screaming and scolding she demanded that the water be allowed 
to flow. In the ensuing struggle, the man hit her with his hoe and killed her. 
When he understood what he had done, he went home. There, he washed his 
face and hands, put on his best suit, and combed his hair. Then he went 
outside, closed the door behind him and descended the mountain track through 
the forests in order to present himself to the police down in town. 
After Maria's sudden death, her sister left the village and went to live with 
relatives elsewhere. Ant6nio was convicted and sentenced to fourteen years in 
prison. With Ant6nio behind bars, the village became uninhabited. Ant6nio gave 
his house key to his sole relative still living in the country, a nephew, whom he 
asked to visit the hamlet and to look after the houses and properties that his 
emigrated neighbours had entrusted to his care. One year later, Ant6nio was 
allowed a few days off because of good behaviour and he decided to go back to 
Gesteira to see how his fields were doing. To his surprise, he discovered mat 
during his absence his house had become occupied by foreigners. His nephew's 
wife had insisted that the house be sold in order to finance her beauty parlour. 
The sale meant the end of the village as an agrarian community. It became a 
tourist resort. At the film's closing, Antonio walked away down a road through 
a juvenile pine forest that had emerged where pastures had formerly grown. It 
was "The End" of his world. 
Grilo's film portrays in a beautiful way what has been happening to the 
Portuguese countryside: the disintegration of communities, the departure of their 
inhabitants, and the degeneration of farming. This process has deep historical 
roots. It can be traced back to the nineteenth century, when the Portuguese 
government started to liquidate communal "waste lands" (baldios), promote 
afforestation to combat erosion, improve watersheds, and balance the timber 
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deficit. In addition, the government believed that the new forests would fuel a 
new model of economic development based upon wood processing and tourism. 
This development model was geared to urban interests. Villagers who were 
robbed of their pastures often had no other option than to leave and look for a 
better future elsewhere (Monteiro 1985). Even though departures were 
frequently meant to be temporary and many migrants hoped to use savings made 
abroad to rebuild their farms at home, most never returned. Thus, with the 
dissolution of the baldios, a world came to an end. 
Although the word "end" suggests a certain predestined evolution that leads to 
an inevitable "death", the evolution of the Portuguese countryside was not part 
of a natural course. It was the outcome of the subjection of one development 
path by another, the "stealing" of one possible future and its replacement by 
another (see Van der Ploeg 1977 on Peru). In the film the "theft" is literal. The 
nephew turned the village into a holiday camp by illegally selling his uncle's 
property to finance a symbol of urban consumerism: a beauty parlour. In 
reality, like the nephew in the film, the Portuguese state and its Forestry 
Service robbed the countrymen's universe, superimposing their own in order to 
realize particular development programmes to the detriment of the local 
populations (Baptista 1978a: 178). Similar to O Fim do Mundo my book 
summarizes the impact of modernization on rural communities and their 
subordination to urban, state interests. 
O Fim do Mundo laments the end of the countrymen's world, but it does not 
fall into the trap of idealizing it. The blow that directly caused the village's 
extinction was not given by an external actor such as a policeman or a forest 
guard, but by the main character himself, who in this manner resolved a long-
standing conflict with his fellow-villagers over land and water. Gesteira's last 
three inhabitants had not been on speaking terms for more than fifteen years. O 
Fim do Mundo does not present the peasant community as a bucolic past, an 
idealized "Golden Age", but clearly shows the destructive power of the fissures 
that divide villagers. Similarly, in this book I describe the roles of local actors 
in the changes that occurred in the villages I studied. 
Along with the similarities, there also exist some important differences 
between this book and Grilo's motion picture. The film portrays a short episode 
of the "dying" of Gesteira. I present a historical review covering more than a 
century of communities which lose their commons and autonomy. In the film, 
outsiders, the nephew and his wife, "steal" the hamlet and sell their uncle's 
house. In my book, this part the thieves are the Portuguese state and its 
Forestry Service. The state used forestry as a means to filch the commons from 
the commoners communities. The result has been that before 1974 control over 
almost all baldios has been transferred to the state forestry bureaucracy. 
The film portrays a hamlet in the Serra da Lousa, close to Coimbra. The 
communities which I investigated are located in the district of Vila Real in the 
north of Portugal. The most important one is Campea, a parish located on the 
district's western border in the Serra do Marao. All of these communities 
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possess communal lands (baldios), that had been subjected to intervention by the 
state. Thus, the baldios became "battlefields" and stakes in a war of attrition 
between the state and the communities. Initially, the state was victorious. 
Consequently, the form of exploitation to which the baldios were subjected 
changed; timber production replaced animal husbandry. This change in 
exploitation not only implied a profound transformation of the local economy -
some claim that it even caused its complete collapse - but it also had political 
implications. The change was closely related to the redefinition of the normative 
framework that regulated the baldios' use. Locally created and designed rules 
were nullified and replaced by regulations that had been formulated by the state 
and its Forestry Service. 
In 1974, the authoritarian regime, which after 1938 had intensified the efforts 
to afforest the baldios was brought down by a coup d'itat. The government that 
emerged from the revolution published a decree by which it revoked the earlier 
policy and reinstalled the communities as the owners of the commons. As a 
result, the Forestry Service was suddenly confronted with the demand to modify 
its attitude towards the commoners and adapt itself to the new, democratic 
conditions. Whether this transformation also meant a revitalization of the rural 
communities' autonomy is one of the questions addressed in this book. 
This brief description of the relationship between the baldios, the state, and 
the state Forestry Service indicates that the issue of afforestation of the 
commons in Portugal should be approached from three different perspectives: 
economic, political, and legal. The first perspective is related to changes in land 
use and the concomitant transformation of the local economy and its relations 
with the national economic system. The second perspective concerns the power 
relations and administrative institutions that are connected to the use of a 
resource and the distribution of the benefits derived from that resource. The 
legal perspective embraces both aspects, for law reflects (and shapes) the 
exploitation of resources and the distribution of profits as well as the use of 
power by and the form of the political-admmistrative institutions. Law regulates 
land use and defines, reflects, and regulates political power. In the concrete 
case of the baldios, changes in the legal status of the commons and the balance 
between the different normative frameworks that regulated their exploitation 
corresponded to the way in which the central state tried (or failed) to increase 
its control over die countryside. 
The Structure of the Book 
The central question examined in this book concerns the roles of the state 
Forestry Service and the afforestation of the baldios in the process of state 
formation. Before being able to address this question, one has to define the key 
concepts. Thus, in chapter 2 I will answer and discuss fundamental questions 
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such as what is a baldiol What is forestry, and how is it related to the state? 
What is the state, and what is the meaning of the concept of state formation? 
The way in which these concepts are circumscribed and operationalized defines 
the position of this book in relation to more general discussions on forestry, the 
state, local communities, and common property regimes. It also has implications 
for the way in which the research was carried out. The restatement of the 
original research problem produced heuristic guidelines and methodological 
implications. These methodological implications led towards concrete research 
questions which, in their turn, defined the research methods. These implications 
are dealt with in chapter 3. In mat chapter, I also give a general description of 
my research area, the parish of Campeâ in the district of Vila Real. 
In chapter 4, I review the process of state formation in Portugal and connect 
this process to the development of the state forestry administration. I analyze 
the latter's evolution from ancien régime institutions for wood and game 
management into a fully fledged "Weberian" bureaucracy which was adapted for 
the imposition of direct rule on the countryside. I show how the Service's 
expansion during the twentieth century was related to the occupation of the 
baldios and how the foresters "robbed" their future from the commoners. I also 
discuss the impact on the Service of the revolution of 1974 and the integration 
of Portugal into the European Community. The Forestry Service, which until 
then had a "custodial-paramilitary character" (cf. Peluso 1992 on Indonesia), 
was suddenly confronted with the demand to change into a supportive and 
customer-oriented organization. 
In the next chapters I focus upon the development of the relations between the 
Portuguese state and rural communities. In chapter 5, I describe examples of the 
interaction between the Forestry Service and civil society during afforestation 
projects. The main point in this chapter is that for successful implementation of 
its afforestation projects, the Service had to depend upon a certain amount of 
support from specific sections within the local society, notably the municipal 
and parish authorities. In chapter 6, I examine the evolution of the peasantry in 
Campeâ and show that, contrary to what many anthropologists have argued, this 
parish had been thoroughly influenced by the evolving, wider capitalist 
economy. In chapter 7, I discuss the gradual loss of control by the local 
communities and the parish council over the baldios in the parish as a result of 
growing interference by municipal authorities and central state agencies like the 
Junta da Colonizaçâo Interna and the Forestry Service. 
In the chapters 2 to 8 the emphasis lies on the period prior to 1974. In the 
subsequent chapters the attention is focused upon the years following the 1974 
revolution. In chapter 8, I analyze the dispute among bureaucrats and politicians 
of different creeds and tenets that took place in the capital after the 1974 coup 
d'état. Chapter 9 deals with the acceptance of the revolution by the population 
of Vila Real and Campeâ and the implementation of the 1976 law on the baldios 
in this parish. Chapter 10 discusses the current role of the commons in local 
and national politics. Drawing on parliamentary debates and on case studies 
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from several villages in the neighbourhood of Vila Real, I show how, under the 
present conditions of a multi-party system, the foresters lost the boMios to the 
politicians; how the commons became "political capital". 
In the last two chapters I give a more general evaluation of the afforestation of 
the commons in relation to state formation. In chapter 11, I analyze the impact 
of afforestation on the economic development of Campea and the district of Vila 
Real (the prohibition of sheep and goat herding, the creation of alternative 
employment opportunities, etc.). The chapter's main point is that the 
afforestation of the baldios fitted in with the re-positioning of the region of Vila 
Real in the national and international economic system: from a predominantly 
agricultural area it became a producer of raw material for timber industries 
located in other parts of the country. Finally, in chapter 12, I argue that my 
inquiry has shown that afforestation is more than mere tree planting. It is a 
political enterprise: the implantation of power. And as with all powers, that of 
the Forestry Service is constantly endorsed and contested by different elements 
in society. 

Chapter 2 
Baldios, Forestry, State and Law 
The Baldios 
The Baldios as a Legal Category 
The word baldios (singular baldio) is the term currently used in Portuguese 
administrative language to mean "the commons". These commons are stretches 
of land that were traditionally administered by village communities and used by 
the local populations for grazing their animals, collecting fuel wood, etc. The 
word covers a variety of social relations, usufruct and property rights, 
entitlements and forms of land use which will be elaborated below. Literally, 
the term means "naked" or "uncultivated" and is etymologically akin to the 
Arabic word baladi or to bald (JCI 1939:1; Velozo 1953:23; Castro 1971; 
Soares 1968; Rodrigues 1987:18; Gralheiro 1990:20)'. The use of a word 
meaning "uncultivated" for common property has given rise to a confusion of 
the use of a certain area and its property status. However, this conflation of 
communal and waste land is misleading: in 1985, 70% of all uncultivated 
grounds (approximately one million ha) were privately owned; whereas as a 
result of the state afforestation efforts, 75% of the baldios (circa 380,000 ha) 
were actually covered by forests! In addition, the qualification of the commons 
as waste land suggests that the land was unused and, hence, available for 
exploitation. This argument was actually used in defense of afforestation. In 
reality, the wild moors served as pastures and were also used as outfields from 
which farmers collected the brush they used to fertilize their cultivated infields 
(Taborda 1932:99, 111; Nunes & Feij6 1990). The baldios were neither unused 
and uncultivated nor abandoned and dispensable. 
The term baldio does not imply a particular form of land use. The baldios are 
a legal category consisting of certain stretches of land. This legal category 
involves the organisation of access, usufruct, and management of these lands 
and the resources on and in them. They are what popular language calls the 
montes do povo. A literal translation of this definition would be "the people's 
hills". Indeed, in most cases these montes were (and are) situated on highlands. 
However, in this phrase the word monte does not have the ordinary significance 
of "hill". Instead, it is etymologically connected to the word montado, which 
refers to forest pastures and which is still used for the stands of cork and stone 
1 See Vassberg (1975:631-632) for the use of the word baldio in Spain. 
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oaks in the south of Portugal. The expression monte bianco meant a communal 
thicket (Neves 1964). In the past, the term montado was also applied to the 
commons in the north of the country. In the 1515 charter of the municipality of 
Vila Real, the phrase montado de gado defora ("livestock montado'') was used 
to denote the communal grazing grounds in the area (ANTdT, Casa do 
Infantado, Livro 215). In 1886, the parish council of Torgueda in the 
municipality of Vila Real used monte and montado as synonyms in its by-laws. 
Apparently, the popular term does not connect the commons to waste highlands, 
but to open forest areas. 
The origin of the baldios as a legal category can be traced back to the period 
immediately following the conquest of the Iberian peninsula from the Moors, 
the so-called reconquista, and the foundation of the Portuguese kingdom in the 
twelfth century. The Crown claimed the dominium directum or dominium 
eminens over all land in the realm and handed out certain grants to nobles, to 
the Church and religious orders, and to peasant communities. These grants 
resulted either in the private appropriation of that land or its subjection to 
certain forms of communal exploitation, such as grazing, the collection of brush 
for fertilizer, and the gathering of wood for construction and fuel. As a result, a 
situation emerged in which collective rights were executed on three types of 
land: on land owned by the Crown (the reguengos), on land held by nobles or 
corporations (maninhos), and on common property (baldios) (Gralheiro 
1990:24) 2. In the eighteenth century, the lawyer Tomaz Vila Nova de Portugal 
reinterpreted earlier royal ordinances and formulated a distinction between 
maninhos (private land under communal exploitation), bens do concelho (land 
owned by the municipality), and the logradouros comuns or the "true" baldios, 
which belonged to the povos (village communities). In 1772, a new law 
explicitly separated these "true" baldios from the property of the concelho (JCI 
1939:1; Velozo 1953:23-25; Rodrigues 1987:19-20; Gralheiro 1990:24-27). 
In the nineteenth century, legal theorists formulated a new approach to the 
concept of property. They distinguished between four categories. The first 
category, the res communes, consisted of objects that concerned humanity in 
general, like the air or the sea. The res publicae was composed of things that 
pertained to the nation, such as rivers and harbours. The third category, the res 
universitatis, were things that involved only a part of the nation (a community 
or municipality). For example, theatres, stadiums, and the commons belonged 
to this category. The last category, the res singulorum, were things that 
2 According to Hespanha (1980:219-224) (he feudal conception of law was 'realist': it presupposed 
a general order in which things and men are integrated, The relations between men and things are 
derived from the functions that these things would or could have in that order (ex parte ret). Each of 
the alternative uses corresponded to a type of appropriation or dominium. Such a conceptualization 
can be opposed to the modern idea of dominium plenum, which conceives the object as a whole, and 
which sees property not as the domination of one function, but of all existing and possible functions. 
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pertained to private individuals. It was identical with private property (Velozo 
1953:26; Soares 1968:27-31). 
This approach was very influential on the civil code that was created in 1867 
and maintained for almost a century, until 1966. In articles 379, 380, 381, and 
382 a distinction was made between public things, communal things, and private 
things (coisas ptiblicas, coisas comuns, and coisas particulares). The first and 
third category referred to public and private property (res publicae and res 
singulorum), whereas the second category referred to communal property, the 
res universitatis (as something different from shared property or corporate 
property). Communal property was defined in article 381 as follows: 
Communal are natural or artificial things which are not individually 
appropriated, and of which only the individuals living within a certain 
administrative circumscription or forming part of a certain public 
corporation are allowed to take profit within the confines of 
administrative regulations. (Quoted in Velozo 1953:28; as in all cases 
of sources written in a language other than english, the translation is 
mine). 
These "communal things" expressly included the baldios. Article 473 equated 
the commons to "any municipal or parochial land" and incorporated them in the 
property of municipalities or parishes (Soares 1968:51). Thus, the civil code 
placed the commons within the category of res universitatis and firmly 
consigned them to the state and its institutions. 
The changes in the way in which the concept of the commons was translated 
into a legal text has a specific relevance which can be grasped by perceiving 
law as a way of portraying or mapping normative structures. Like geographic 
maps, laws can be drawn in different ways, according to different methods of 
projections, on different scales, and with different symbols (Santos 1987). The 
projection method applied in the distinction of res communes, res publicae, res 
universitatis and res particulares is the hierarchy in the state. These categories 
refer to different, ranked social aggregates on different "scales" that correspond 
to levels within the state apparatus. Individuals are not aggregated in families, 
village communities, or professional categories, but, rather in administrative 
units; the parish, the municipality (res universitatis), or the state itself (res 
publicae). The inevitable consequence of this type of projection is the 
concealing of certain features of social reality outside the state's administrative 
order which might also be important for the mapping of the normative 
structures that govern the use of land. Similar to ordinary Mercator maps, 
where Africa appears deformed and smaller in relation to Europe than it is in 
reality, the method of projection chosen in the 1867 civil code disfigured or 
obscured forms of social organization that were not identical with levels in the 
state. Such deformations are not accidental. The general use of the Mercator 
projection is certainly the result of the metropolitan view of the world expressed 
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in it (Woods 1993:57-61) 3. Similarly, the distortions and incongruities in legal 
maps are connected to certain societal conditions, like the power of the state. 
The confusion in the 1867 civil code of community property with municipal or 
parish property facilitated the dissolution of community control over the baldios, 
and in doing so reflected the attempts to impose state control on the community 
and dissolve or take away the commons. 
The attempts to abolish the baldios appear clear from the various measures 
taken since the end of the eighteenth through the nineteenth and twentieth 
century. The reviews by the JCI (1939:1-12), Rodrigues (1987:32-48), 
Gralheiro (1990:32-36), and Nunes & Feij6 (1990:65-74) demonstrate that there 
has been a constant tendency in legislation to legitimize or stimulate the 
privatization of the commons. In particular, since the end of the nineteenth 
century, there has been a tendency to promote their transfer to the state. After 
the downfall of the monarchy in 1910 the new republican regime continued in 
the same vein. (Relevant legislation is summarized in appendix 2.) However, it 
was only after the military coup of 1926 that the state acquired enough power to 
impose its policy with force. Several measures were taken to promote division, 
settlement, and afforestation of the commons (see appendix 3). In 1966, this 
policy culminated in the eradication of the concept of communal property in the 
civil code. As a result, the baldios were included in the private property of the 
administrative bodies, municipalities, and parishes, although they still could be 
subjected to certain collective usufruct rights (logradouro comum). As long as 
these rights were maintained, the law placed certain limits upon the local 
authorities' liberty to alienate the land or to attribute other uses to it. But, as the 
(administrative) law also contained stipulations that enabled the lifting of these 
collective rights, it was clearly geared to the disappearance of the commons 4. 
The authoritarian regime which reformulated the civil code in 1966 was 
brought down in 1974 by a military take-over. One of the coup's effects was the 
restoration of the commons. Although the concept of common property did not 
return to the civil code, it was implicitly re-created by certain articles in the 
new constitution which defined the types of property legally existing in the 
country and by a special decree which reinstated community control over the 
baldios (Decreto-Lei 39/76). 
3 For this reason, NGO's like the World Council of Churches, Oxfam, and NOVIB (in the 
Netherlands) have promoted the equal area Peters projection which depicts the continents according 
to their relative geo-areas (Woods 1993:57-61). 
4 Article 390 of the Administrative Code distinguished between dispensable and indispensable areas, 
and areas available and/or suitable for forestry. The first category had to be divided among the 
commoners (art. 397), whereas the last one had to be afforested (art. 401, 402 and 403) (PaMo et 
al. 1983; Caetano 1991:947-948). 
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The Commons under Attack 
The 1976 decree resurrected only those baldios that had survived until 1926. 
These baldios represented but a fraction of the original area. Today, the baldios 
are concentrated in the mountainous regions in the north, but in former days 
they were a common feature in the entire country. Historical evidence shows 
that in the south (Alentejo), in the north-west (Minho), and in the north-east 
(Tras-os-Montes) many commons disappeared during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century either through division among the commoners or usurpation 
by local landlords (Taborda 1932; Dias 1953:14; Cutileiro 1971:19-20; Silbert 
1978 (volume II); Neta 1982; Ribeiro 1987:80; Nunes & Feij6 1990) 5. 
The reduction in the area of the baldios in Portugal paralleled developments in 
other European countries. In most European societies, farmers had maintained 
collective areas which they used for grazing or the collection of brush or other 
resources (Slicher van Bath 1960:67, 283). Generally, these areas fell victim to 
encroachment by private landowners, to enclosure, or to the amortization of 
public debts. In Britain, between 1470-1530 and 1760-1830, large tracts of 
communal land were privatized by landlords as well as by general agreement of 
the tenants in order to intensify agrarian production (Slater 1907:266; Yelling 
1977:21; Thompson 1980; Cox 1985:51; Turner 1986). Only in some small 
tracts, such as the New Forest in Hampshire (Edlin 1969; Stover 1985) and the 
villages of Eakring and Laxton in Nottinghamshire (Tate 1967:175-176) have 
communal exploitation rights survived this movement and remain today6. 
The commons were also threatened by divestment. The core of this policy was 
the sale of commons and Crown land in order to improve public finance and 
promote reclamation for agriculture or forestry. This policy was followed in 
several continental states; France (Soboul 1956; Larrere et al. 1980; Kalaora & 
Savoye 1986), Spain (Vassberg 1975; Gilmore 1980:21-28; Fernandez 1987; 
Perez-Dfaz 1991:46), and the Netherlands (Blink 1929; Buis 1985, 1993:12). In 
the nineteenth century, the Portuguese government followed the same policy by 
adopting the Lei da desamortizagao dos baldios (Tengeirinha 1994, Lei da 
desamortizagao of 6 September 1869). 
5 Cutileiro (1971:23) argues that the political agitation and the strong support of communist political 
movements in the area can be traced back to the usurpation of the commons by the latifundists (see 
Bennema 1992 for a different perspective; see also chapter 9). 
6 Sometimes the apparently 'dead' commons suddenly seem to revive and exert their call over a 
community (see Fernandez 1987). Even in the Netherlands, they may resurface in a certain manner. 
In 1932, the village of Loenen in the municipality of Apeldoorn sold its land to the municipality. 
When in February 1992 the villagers found out that the municipality intended to alienate their 
former property, they tried to buy it back and restore their communal property. As the municipality 
decided not to respond to the villagers* demand, these tried to separate their village from Apeldoorn 
and transfer it to neighbouring Brummen (NRC-Handelsblad, (Rotterdam), 18 February 1992, 
Zutphens Dagblad, (Zutphen), 6 February 1993). I owe this example to John van der Ven. 
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Finally, the baldios that were not enclosed by or sold to private landowners, 
were threatened by afforestation. This process of afforestation was assigned to a 
specific branch within the state administration, the Forestry Service, and implied 
the transfer of ownership to this state body. In Portugal, the afforestation of the 
commons reached its zenith during 1933-1974 period, when the country was 
governed by the autocratic Estado Novo (New State) regime. During these years 
large parts of the baldios were covered by trees as part of the Piano de 
Povoamento Florestal (the national forestry plan). The local communities 
objected to this government intervention as they saw themselves robbed of their 
communal grazing and brush lands. In 1961, the state Forestry Service admitted 
that it had faced "true rebellions that demanded the deployment of the police" 
(Mendonca 1961a: 122). 
Presently, the expansion of the forest area in Portugal has become part of the 
European Community's attempts to reduce the European timber deficit, to bring 
down agricultural surplus production through the elimination of economically 
marginal farms, and to modernize viable segments within the agricultural sector. 
Since the middle of the 1980s Portugal has received credits from Brussels for 
afforestation (European Commission 1986:4). In addition, the EC has financed 
forest plantation and management through the European Development and 
Guaranty Fund for Agriculture and the Integrated Programmes for the 
Mediterranean Regions within the Community. Portugal was entitled to apply 
for these funds as well after its admission to the EC in 1986. 
Earlier in this chapter I pointed to the conflation of land use and property 
regime characterizing the discussions over the baldios. That conflation makes it 
difficult to draw a reliable image of the quantitative evolution of the commons 
in Portugal. The earliest available data concern the waste lands. They date from 
the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1868, the Instituto Geogrdphico 
(Geographic Institute) published an inventory of the different types of land use 
in the country. This inventory identified about 4.3 million ha of "unproductive 
waste land", i.e. uncultivated land that according to the Institute did not serve 
any productive aim (Instituto Geogrdphico 1868). Seven years later, P6ry 
reviewed the results to get a better impression of the agrarian structure. He 
corrected the earlier figures and estimated the amount of waste land at almost 
4.2 million hectares or 47% of the country's total surface (P6ry 1975). He did 
not attempt to distinguish privately owned wild lands from communal baldios. 
The most frequently used figures today are derived from an inventory published 
in 1939 by the Junta da Colonizagao Interna (Internal Resettlement Board, JCI), 
which estimated a total of 407,500 hectares of common land (JCI 1939:50-51). 
Since the nineteenth century's statistics did not distinguish between private and 
communal waste lands, Gralheiro's (1990:73) claim that between 1875 and 1939 
90% of the original communal area vanished is probably exaggerated. However, 
it is certainly true that during this period large communal tracts disappeared. 
Presently, about 0.5 million ha can be considered baldio land. Devy-Vareta 
(1993a: 161) recently concluded from the 1939 inventory and other inventories 
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by the JCI and the Forestry Service that the total area of baldio land existing 
today in the country amounts to 507,000 ha. In the 1980s the Forestry Service 
registered over 600 village communities that had legally organized themselves 
for the administration of their commons (Rodrigues 1987:61, 98; Duarte 1990). 
There, management of the baldios still is practised. 
Within Portugal, the present regional distribution of the baldios is closely 
connected to the differentiated impact of the enclosure movement under the 
regional political and economic conditions of the nineteenth century. When 
market conditions for the expansion of wheat cultivation became more 
favourable at the end of the nineteenth century, landowners or their tenant-
entrepreneurs in the south of the country were able to enclose the waste lands in 
that area. The Portuguese government yielded to their demands for protection of 
domestic wheat production against cheap import from the Americas (Castro 
1971:281; Medeiros 1978:50; Ribeiro 1987:80). During this time, in the north, 
the commons disappeared in specific pockets. In parts of the district of 
Bragança this development was linked, as in the south, to the expansion of 
commercial wheat and olive production and possibly also to the export of 
cabbage to Porto (Taborda 1932:155-161; Estêvâo 1983:1166; Jacob 1989:166). 
In the Douro valley the disappearance of the commons was the result of the 
reclamation of the baldios for commercial viticulture (see also chapter 6). The 
success of the enclosure movement was related not only to market but also to 
political conditions. In the south, for instance, a class of wealthy landowners 
existed which could easily quench resistance from peasant communities. In the 
north, like in France (see Soboul 1956), the power balance between the 
peasantry and the nobility was generally in favour of the former; thus, the local 
landlords found it more difficult to enforce enclosure. 
Strong State or Strong Communities: Local Autonomy and Legal Pluralism 
Before 1976, many rural communities resisted the Estado Novo's afforestation 
efforts and other government measures that undermined the commons and the 
communities' autonomy. After the publication of a new law in 1976, one could 
observe the same tendency. The new law had only a limited impact. According 
to that law, the population could claim its commons back if it constituted itself 
into an assembleia de compartes (commoners' assembly) and elected a five-
member conselho directivo (management commission). This management 
commission would administer the baldios and the revenues of the forests on 
them on behalf of the commoners. Decreto-Lei 39/76 created two variants. In 
the first type, "modality A", the commission consisted of only commoners, 
whereas in the second one, "modality B", it consisted of four commoners and 
one representative of the state (art. 9). In practice, this representative would be 
the local forest guard. Many villages did not create these new commissions and 
the Forestry Service did not pay much attention to the commissions that were 
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established. Communal land management commissions complained about illegal 
forest planting by the Service (Jornal de Noticias, (Porto), June 1983, 
Proclamaçâo, (Vila Real), 17 June 1990) and accused the Service of frustrating 
the election of new commission members and withholding revenues from timber 
sales (Jornal de Noticias, (Porto), 30 March 89, 11 July 1989). Moreover, the 
legal status of the commons and the management commissions was far from 
settled: the right wing parties in parliament produced a continuous flow of 
enactments aimed at the abolition of these commissions (see chapter 10). 
In the past, the baldios were important for the communities' economic and 
political organization. The communities used their baldios as part of their 
traditional farming system and managed them according to their own customs 
and by-laws. Observance of the rules was looked after by a conselho (the 
village council) and elected officials (mordomos or zeladores). The conselho 
which consisted of all vizinhos (literally "neighbours", the (generally male) 
heads of household), decided about the management of communal possessions. 
These of course included the baldios, but could also encompass a central oven, 
a common grain storage, (water) mills for grinding rye and maize, threshing 
floors, etc. In order to use these communal resources community members had 
to satisfy certain obligations such as working on the communal fields, in the 
mill, or doing other jobs to benefit the community. Labour could also be pooled 
and administered by the community, as in the case of herding. Cattle was kept 
in communal herds (vezeiras or vtgias) by shepherds who were appointed by the 
village council (for example: Dias 1953:79-83; Bennema 1978:48-52, 67-68, 
73). 
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the state led the attack on the 
baldios and promoted either their privatization or their transfer to state 
administration. In the light of these attacks, the fact that some commons 
persisted until today can be seen as an expression of resistance: their endurance 
shows that the commoners were able to defy the central state. The persistence 
of the commons can be read as an indication of the autonomy of commoners' 
communities in relation to the central state. 
Under the ancien régime, the two essential levels of administration and 
governance were the Crown and the concelhos or municipalities (not to be 
confused with conselhos, the commoners' assemblies). The municipalities and 
their ruling councils, the Cdmaras Municipals (Municipal Chambers) were the 
formalized expression of self-government. The inhabitants elected their own 
administrators to sit on the council. These admimstrators were not only charged 
with internal governance but could also act as the municipality's representatives 
in negotiations with neighbouring municipalities, the nobility, or the Crown. 
Formally, the state was solidly centralized. Since the fourteenth century, the 
king had expanded his control over the municipalities by the appointment of 
judges who acted as royal representatives (corregedores and juizes de fora). 
According to Moreno (1986:79), this formally implied the end of municipal 
autonomy. Yet, the municipalities were able to retain a great deal of their 
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independence, because, in reality, the state was barely capable of exercising the 
power it lawfully held. The exercise of power, that is influencing people's 
behaviour, is conditioned by communication. In one way or another the state 
has to "tell" the people what they should and what they should not do. During 
the ancien régime, modern means of communication did not yet exist and power 
had to be exercised essentially by physical presence. Consequently, distance and 
accessibility determined to a large extent how far and how deeply state power 
was able to penetrate into society. In a country with poor infrastructure that 
presence was not always possible or equally strong in all places. In the fifteenth 
century, for example, the representatives of the city of Guimarâes lodged a 
complaint at the king's court that the corregedor of that area had stayed eight 
months within the city walls instead of the permitted two weeks. The citizens of 
Braga expressed similar grievances and argued that instead of staying in the city 
their corregedor "should visit other towns and villages of municipalities without 
fortresses or walls. There he has to look for robbers and criminals and not in 
the cities" (Moreno 1986:83-4). Thus, it is easy to imagine that in the absence 
of royal representation the inhabitants of these towns and villages did not need 
to heed the Crown's authority. Clearly, in the fifteenth century a wide gap 
separated the central government's formal authority and the real presence of its 
power. 
Two hundred years later, the organization of public administration was still 
characterized by the absence of representatives of the Crown in the countryside. 
According to a list made in 1640, there existed 11,585 royal, lordly, or local 
officials in the 900 concelhos (municipalities) and 32 comarcas (jurisdictions) in 
the country. Only a small minority of these officials (1,059 or 9%) was directly 
dependent upon the Crown, whereas the majority (11,319) were local officials. 
The latter were nominated by the municipalities and generally belonged to the 
"old men, great men" of that region. Consequently, these local officials did not 
represent the central state. Instead, they were exponents of a "patriarchal-
communitarian form of local administration" (Hespanha 1986:37-38, 46). As the 
number of the royal officials was rather low in relation to the size of the 
territory and to the number of inhabitants (1.8 millions), and as infrastructure 
was not yet very well developed, the central state was almost incapable of 
replacing local rule with its own, centralized government. The Crown's 
difficulties in gaining control over the kingdom's interior were exacerbated by 
the royal officials' regional concentration: 12% of the Crown's administrators 
worked in Lisbon. Outside the capital, control was exercised by the juizes de 
fora, by the customs, by the military, and by fiscal officials. Nevertheless, the 
numbers of officials suggest again that royal power was rather limited: only 8% 
of the concelhos had a jutz de fora, only 14 out of the 32 comarcas had customs 
officials, and only 11 comarcas had a chief commander of the militia who was 
appointed by the king. This means that in 21 comarcas, the Crown did not even 
have control over the military and police. 
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The distribution of the Crown's officials shows that in the seventeenth century 
the central state contented itself with symbolic power over the country, and with 
effective power over the borders. The reason for this form of state organization 
was related to the state's tax base. Between 1527 and 1680, the share of the 
state's revenues derived from internal taxation (generally sisas, or sales taxes) 
decrased from 55% to 11%. The borders were the main loci of tax collection 
and the taxation on commodities passing through the borders was the state's 
most important source of income. Hence, "contrary to what happened in France 
or in Prussia, [in Portugal] the realm's interior was not decisive from the 
Crown's financial point of view" (Hespanha 1986:58). As the central state could 
obtain the money it needed by supervising the in- and outflow of commodities at 
the border and the harbours, it paid little attention to the administration of the 
realms interior. 
In spite of its centralized image, the Portuguese state allowed for a strong 
autonomous local organization. Many zones of patriarchal-communitarian rule 
remained virtually untouched by the central state's power until the nineteenth 
century and some have even survived up to the twentieth century (ibid, 60). 
With his representatives being absent rather than present, the king did not 
command a centralized state, but a conglomerate of nearly independent 
municipal republics that governed themselves according to their own principles. 
This situation changed in the nineteenth century. The independence of the 
Portuguese colony of Brazil in 1821 cut off the flow of gold to the Portuguese 
treasury. This forced the government to look for other sources of income and to 
develop its internal resources. The advent of liberalism after the French 
revolution, the subsequent invasions by Napoleon's armies in 1807-1810, and 
the defeat of the defenders of the absolute monarchy after the 1830s civil war 
opened the way for a radical reform in various areas of the state such as the 
state's finances, its bureaucratic organization, the property regime, and the 
juridical system. In 1832, the state tried to enlarge its hold on local 
administration. A new post was created, the provedor, which was nominated by 
the central government and was to take over many responsibilities which up to 
that time belonged to the municipal councils. In 1835, the balance of power was 
shifted again in favour of the local rulers. The government's representative to 
the municipalities was renamed administrador. This administrador had less 
powers than the provedor and was nominated out of a list of five candidates 
proposed by the Câmara Municipal (Barrata 1988:122). Nevertheless, the 
central state was now more powerfully present in each concelho than before the 
reforms of the nineteenth century. 
The position of the povos (local communities) within the municipalities under 
the ancien régime is not very clear. It seems that their "best men" or "elders" 
did participate in municipal administration (Dias 1953:30; Bennema 1978:48-52; 
Hespanha 1986:46). Otherwise, they were apparently left alone. To the central 
state they were little more than 'black boxes', with their own governing bodies 
and their own elected officials like judges and overseers, and their own by-laws. 
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Sometimes a community would be identical with the religious parish, which, 
although formally only an ecclesiastical unit, presumably played an important 
role as a social structure (see Soboul 1956 on France). Thus, the priest became 
the most important representative of a higher authority at the local level, but he 
would be more loyal to his bishop than to the king. It was only in the 1830s that 
the central state acquired a more direct access to these parishes through the 
institution of the regedor (Caetano 1991:344). Like the provedor and 
administrador to the municipality, the regedor was a delegate of the central 
government who oversaw the functioning of local administration. He was also 
responsible for public order in the parish7. In 1878, after unsuccessful attempts 
in 1830 and 1835, the ecclesiastical parish was finally included as a secular unit 
in the state administrative organization (Rodrigues 1987:40-41; Gralheiro 
1990:32-33; Caetano 1991:342; Pinto 1993). Taken together, these 
developments demonstrate the intent during the nineteenth century to become an 
effective ruler over the country's internal resources and affairs. 
This rapid appraisal of Portuguese municipal history shows that, although the 
Crown had the formal power to control the local administrations through the 
appointment of representatives to key positions, in reality, it failed to do so. In 
most cases, the king's "representatives" were not of his choosing, but selected 
and appointed by the local administrators themselves. Under such conditions it 
was difficult for state law to penetrate into the municipalities and rural 
communities which were then able to make their own set of rules (the posturas 
or by-laws), and to create or maintain their own usages and customs. 
Consequently, at least until the nineteenth century, the functioning of the central 
state allowed for a great deal of local autonomy and created an environment for 
the persistence or emergence of multiple local legal systems. Only when 
economic conditions changed and the Portuguese state had to expand its internal 
tax base, did the central government start a reform aimed at undermining local 
autonomy. This reform not only influenced the admimstrative order, but also 
affected definition of property relations, which, among other things, included 
the classification of communal rights in terms of private and public categories. 
Despite the state's attempts to gain control over the rural communities, the 
latter continued to enjoy a large amount of autonomy. A 1910 study of the 
village of Rio de Onor showed that rural life was totally controlled by the 
village assembly (conselho) (Taborda 1932:161). A re-study in the 1940's led to 
similar inferences (Dias 1953). Community rule by the conselho and elected 
officials (mordomos or zeladores) embraced a local legal system which 
paralleled official law; and, among other things regulated access and 
7 After the revolution of 1974, the regedor and administrador disappeared. 
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The Baldios and the Emergence of Capitalism 
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries' enclosure of the commons in Britain is 
considered one of the social changes which led to the emergence of capitalism 
in this country (Marx 1973:103-118). These enclosures began to undermine the 
livelihood of the poorest community members thereby provoking or reinforcing 
the rural dwellers' proletarianization (Thompson 1980; Humphries 1990). 
Similar inferences have been drawn from the impact of afforestation of the 
Portuguese baldios. This afforestation accelerated the proletarianization of the 
local peasantry since the lack of employment opportunities in their home areas 
forced the peasants to emigrate (Baptista 1978a: 178). In this manner, 
afforestation sacrificed the pre-existing peasant economy to the development of 
capitalism. Whether such a deduction is correct, will be investigated in this 
book. 
The development of capitalism is also related to the reformulation of the 
baldios' legal status. The reformulation of property by state law and the 
imposition of the new formula on commoners' communities caused the 
submission of pre-existing definitions of property relations to those of the 
central government. In that manner, the development of capitalism led towards 
the expansion of political control by the state over local societies. This 
reformulation is also related to changes in the economy. The issue of property 
rights is particularly relevant because, as Brandao & Rowland (1980:178, 196) 
note, the laws that regulate access to resources (property) and the transfer of 
that access to others including the next generation (inheritance) are essential, 
although not determinative or decisive, for the reproduction of a production 
process and of differences in wealth, power, and prestige, that is, the class 
character of society (see MacPherson 1975; Renner 1979.) 
Brandao & Rowland (1980) see the 1867 civil code as the cornerstone in the 
process of the creation of bourgeois property in Portugal. Hespanha (1980) goes 
much further. He perceives it as part of a bourgeois revolution. This bourgeois 
revolution entailed the destruction of feudal rent by creating the dominium 
plenum. It included (1) the abolition of ties that impeded the mobility of labour, 
(2) the separation of the labourer from the means of production, (3) the 
Interesting examples include the tenacity of the Rio de Onor community to maintain a married 
priest notwithstanding outside pressure and inside opposition: the ruling assembly even punished the 
minority that objected against the priest's appointment (Dias 1953:316-317). In another village, 
Vilarinho da Fuma, Dias called the elected zelador the executive and the six men council the 
legislative. The zelador judged all crimes except the gravest, "which belonged to the competency of 
the courts" (Dias 1948:86-96). 
exploitation rights to the community's common resources such as mills, 
threshing floors, ovens, and baldios (Dias 1948) 8. 
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mobilization of land in order to allow the creation of economically viable 
production units as well as the investment in agriculture of capital acquired 
either in commerce or industry, and finally (4) the abolishment of feudal forms 
of exploitation that impeded the development of capitalist production and 
reproduction. These ideas about the transformation of the country's economy 
were already immanent in the royal charter of 7 March 1810, which demanded 
the revision of feudal rents (foros)9. 
In short, the reformulation of the legal status of the commons during the 
nineteenth century should be seen as an essential part of a bourgeois revolution 
and the emergence of capitalism. Whether similar inferences can be made 
regarding the afforestation of the baldios of Campea during the twentieth 
century will be discussed later in this book 
Forestry, the State and the Baldios 
The Historical Connection between Forests and the State 
In Europe, forestry is linked to the state in several ways. First and foremost, in 
many countries a specific branch within the bureaucracy is responsible for 
adniinistering state-owned forests and for supervising private forest 
management. The existence of such a body is rooted in the specific history of 
states and forestry in Europe. In that history, the forests started as the domains 
wherein the kings and nobles exercised their hunting privileges. 
Historically, forestry and hunting have been related. For example, in Portugal, 
the supervision of wildlife management (i.e. hunting), is still attributed to the 
same organization as the administration of forests in general. State control over 
trees and game goes back to the foundation of sovereignty in the early Middle 
Ages. The Merovingian kings claimed paramount ownership over the territories 
they had inherited and conquered. The central concept of this paramount 
ownership (dominium eminens) was the notion of forestis. It is from this notion 
that the present term "forest" is derived (Harrisson 1992). At that time, 
however, it was not specifically related to wooded areas, but denoted a juridical 
concept which can be compared to a "bundle of rights" (Stein & Shand 1974, 
9 The transition to a bourgeois concept of property took more than fifty years. The 1867 Civil Code 
was drawn up by Luis de Seabre on the basis of his winning contribution to a contest held in 1822. 
Although his proposal underwent some modifications, especially concerning the organization of 
common property (including the baldios), it finally became the code ruling civil affairs in 1867. 
The ambivalence of state legislation since the last quarter of the eighteenth century and the fact 
that the changes in property law took so many years can probably be explained from the dependence 
of the political class itself on land ownership (Hespanha 1980:228-231). 
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quoted by Van den Bergh 1988:80-81)'°. The sovereign held all rights but 
could decide bestow some of those rights to his vassals. However, the right to 
hunt he would generally keep for himself. Even when the land itself was no 
longer under his direct control, the sovereign still held game rights in specific 
reserves. In England these areas were called forests; in the Netherlands, 
foreesten or banwouden; and in Germany, Wildbannen or Bannforsten (Blink 
1902, 1:180; Eckardt 1976:23-25; Buis 1985, 1:25 ff., 1993; Harrisson 
1992)". 
The evolution of the sovereign's hunting rights paralleled the disintegration 
and re-aggregation of sovereignty. In the Netherlands, they ended up with either 
the Provincial Estates assemblies as in the province of Gelderland, or, as in the 
province of Holland, with the Steward (Buis 1985, 1:25 ff., 1993). In other 
countries, such as France and the German states, the hunting rights remained in 
the hands of the kings and the rest of the aristocracy. 
Hans Wilhelm Eckardt (1976) has written an interesting account of hunting in 
western Germany. He explains the nobility's eagerness to monopolize hunting 
rights in terms of their desire to secure their social position as warriors, since 
hunting was also a way to practice combat techniques. In this manner, the 
monopolization of hunting rights helped to perpetuate the aristocracy's war-
based charisma in times of peace (Eckardt 1976:26). Despite peasant opposition 
to the royal and aristocratic hunting prerogatives, these privileges continued 
virtually unmitigated until the eighteenth century (Eckardt 1976:34). Only after 
the French Revolution (14 July 1789), did the powerful aristocracy begin to 
loose terrain. In France, the privileges of the king and the aristocracy were 
abolished in August 1789. A law was issued that made hunting rights dependent 
on landownership. As a result, the nobles were no longer allowed to hunt on 
land they did not own while the common landowners gained the right to hunt on 
their own properties. Thus, hunting "became bourgeois". When the French 
1 0 According to Stein & Shand, common law has been more ready to analyze ownership in terms of 
bundles of rights, obligations, and interpersonal relationships than civil law. The latter tends to 
identify ownership with the thing owned (in Van den Bergh 1988:80). 
" Eckardt assumes that originally the Germanic tribes maintained communal tenure relations (the 
mark) and mat hunting privileges were foreign elements introduced by the Franks during the 
foundation of the Merovingian/Carolingian Empire in the eighth and ninth centuries. However, his 
interpretation of the historical sources upon which these assumptions are based (Tacitus and Julius 
Caesar) is debatable. The image of mat society as an egalitarian community of free individuals 
holding all property in common cannot be founded in either Tacitus or later sources. Early sixth 
century legal texts show that the Germanics knew a restricted type of private ownership of houses, 
gardens, farm land, and parts of forests. They also confirm the existence of social stratification, not 
only between the serfs and the free, but also within the class of free itself (Perrin 1966:27-30). 
Further, Eckardt overlooks me fact that the Merovingian kings were not Gauls (Celts), but 
Germanics, just like the tribes mey overpowered. This means that the concept of forestis is just as 
indigenous to the Germanic legal system as the mark. 
Harrisson (1992:69-75) defends a view similar to Eckardt's on the imposition of royal hunting 
rights after the Normandy invasion of England. 
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occupied Rheinland in 1801, the same law was applied there. In the other 
German states, the ruling aristocracy was able to exercise its prerogatives until 
the revolution of 1848 (Eckardt 1976:169-86, 232-64). 
Eckardt's work exposes the political role of hunting: by hunting privileges the 
aristocracy could distinguish itself from the common people. Eckardt also shows 
that the role of hunting changed over time. By connecting hunting to the king's 
war charisma he discloses its role in the foundation and continuation of royal 
sovereignty (see Weber 1964:78-79, 251-252). Because during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries hunting lost its function for military training, Eckardt, 
in his discussion of this period no longer connects hunting and the constitution 
of political power. Instead, he approaches the hunting privilege as a status 
symbol: hunting became a flight from the modern world; a means against what 
he calls "existential boredom"; and a "substitute praxis" (Eckardt 1976:271-
272). However, the material presented in his work indicates that the hunting 
privilege still had a political function. It enabled the aristocracy to control the 
unarmed population through the monopolization of weaponry. During the 
troubled years immediately following the French revolution, the Duke of 
Württemberg and his Privy Council objected to an extension of the hunting 
rights to common people since the consequent arming of the latter would 
possibly threaten not only game stocks but also "public peace and order". 
Compelled by political events in France the Duke ceded the right in 1791. 
However, he took care to limit the number of guns to two per community, to 
ensure that the communities would have only the less accurate weapons 
(Kugelbücksen instead of Schrotflinteri), and to place the people under the direct 
supervision of forest officials (Eckardt 1976:177-179). 
The second historical connection between state and forestry concerns the 
administration of Crown land. Under the ancien régime, this task was attributed 
to specific departments within the royal household. After the separation of the 
king's household from the state, the administration of these often forested 
properties went into the hands of the state. This succession was most direct in 
France. There, the end of the ancien régime entailed the transformation of the 
administrations of the royal hunting reserves and domains into state 
bureaucracies. Thus, in 1801 France became the first European state to found a 
state Forestry Service (Buttoud 1981). In other countries the development of 
state forest administrations took much longer. The Forestry Service in Portugal 
emerged in 1824, three years after the separation of royal and public 
administration. The Dutch state Forestry Service was created in 1899, fifty 
years after the state reform which introduced constitutional rule and eleven 
years after the Heidemij corporation had organized private initiative to 
systematically create new forests. Until then the government had been quite 
reluctant to engage in forestry, even when pressured by local authorities (Buis 
1993:96-98). Between 1822 and 1840 the government actually sold large parts 
of the state domains in order to balance the national budget. After 1890, the 
government's attitude changed and it started to buy land again (Blink 1929:201-
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215). In Britain, the Forestry Commission was created only in 1919 (Whetham 
1977:169-70). 
To a certain extent the date of the creation of a state Forestry Service seems 
to be connected to the size of the estates the state inherited from the Crown. In 
France about 2,000,000 ha were royal domain (4% of the country's present 
area), which, in absolute and relative terms, is much more than the dominions 
with which the Forestry Services in other countries had to start: in Portugal the 
original area of the state Forestry Service amounted to 15,000 ha (0.2% of 
Portugal's present area), in Holland 13,000 ha (0.3%), and in Britain the 
Crown estates that constituted the core of the Forestry Commission covered 
only 49,000 ha (0.2%) 1 2 . But the fact that Portugal created a Forestry Service 
much earlier than the Netherlands whilst its Crown estates were smaller in 
relation to the country's total area, shows that the moment when state 
intervention occurred was also contingent upon other factors. Such factors were 
the contemporary political conditions (the existence of a group of private cash-
rich investors, the financial situation of the state), and the profitability of 
afforestation at that moment. 
The states that emerged from the ancien régime did not always immediately 
undertake forest administration. This depended upon, among other things, 
whether they could be convinced of the necessity to do so. In their bid for state 
support, foresters and other interested parties developed two lines of argument. 
The first concerned the nature of the economics of forestry, and the second was 
related to the societal functions of forest management. 
The first line of argument pointed to a key characteristic of the economics of 
forestry. This feature is that an enormous initial investment is required to plant 
a forest, but the returns on that investment cannot be realized for years. Such an 
economic burden is carried more easily by those who have a great deal of 
capital at their disposal than by small individual landowners. This argument can 
be traced back to at least the beginning of the eighteenth century. Already in 
1701 the French architect and fortress builder Oisivetés de S. de Vauban argued 
"[t]hat the plantings of new forests are the kings' enterprises": 
The time that one needs to wait until the cutting will be too long for 
private persons to accommodate easily, as their [long term] vision 
does not extend until the [necessary] four or five generations beyond 
their own, and their commodities do not give them the means to 
make such advances for such enterprises; I conclude that the planting 
of these new forests are the work of the kings, the wealthy princes, 
of the public, and of the large monastic communities with good 
incomes; they cannot be undertaken but by these, as well as because 
of the impotency and the limited view of private persons as well as 
1 2 In 1921, the area controlled by the British Forest Commission totalled 327,100 acres (151,000 ha) 
of which 104,100 acres were owned, 103,000 acres were leased and 120,000 acres were crown 
estates (Whetham 1977:169-170). 
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because of the navy, fortifications and public buildings for which 
they are of interest. (Quoted by Guillard 1981:283). 
The second economic argument for state involvement was related to the societal 
functions of forests. In their bid for increased state support, foresters have 
pointed to various public benefits: the protection of watersheds; the prevention 
of floods and the sanding of river-mouths, estuaries, and harbours; the 
protection of international borders against invasions; the purity of the air; and 
the existence of green spaces for recreation. Moreover, foresters have pointed 
to the strategic value of wood reserves in the event that international conflicts 
impede imports of this important raw material and fuel. The argument for state 
involvement was further strengthened since most of these public functions were 
not compensated by the market. These functions did not represent monetary 
values. Therefore, these public benefits made state involvement in forestry 
almost self-evident. (See for instance Min de Agr 1940:18-24; Alves 1961:155; 
Madas 1984; Westoby 1989:13-32). 
The foresters' awareness and aspiration that their work would transcend 
private interests is reflected even in the way they define their profession: 
Forestry is "the aggregate of activities directed to making the forest useful for 
the satisfaction of certain societal needs" (Van Maaren 1982:348). This 
definition connects two elements: the aggregate of activities in the forests, and 
the goals for which the forests are exploited. It is striking to note that these 
goals are not those of the individual forest user, administrator, or proprietor, 
but of the community. Forestry is defined as an activity geared to the 
satisfaction of societal needs. 
In addition to the lines of arguments presented by the foresters themselves, a 
third reason for state involvement in forestry can be formulated. This reason 
concerns the nature of forestry technology. The rationalization of forest 
management was accompanied by the systematization of knowledge and the 
development of forestry as a science. If one reviews the history o f the 
development of scientific forestry, it appears that forest management 
technologies were always geared towards the large estate holders - the state 
being the largest of all. 
The root of systematized forestry is found in the Hausväterliteratur or 
Hausbücher (the Books of Husbandry) (Mantel 1980:568-570; Buis 1985:567). 
This genre consisted of books full of practical advice to the pater familiae in 
charge of the management of manors or estates1 3. The first of this type of text 
book was written by Petrus de Crescentiis from Bologna, who lived in the late 
1 3 Petrus de Crescentüs's Opus Ruralium Commodorum Libri XII was translated into German in 
1493 and reputedly the second printed edition after the Gutenberg Bible. Other examples of this type 
of literature are: Praedium Rusticum (1554) by the Frenchman Estienne; De Re Rustica (1570) by 
Conrad Heresbach, who worked for the dukes of Kleve and Gullik in north-west Germany; and 
Oeconomia Ruralus et Domestica by Johannes Colerus, from Brandenburg (Germany) (Mantel 
1980:580-86, 615; Buis 1985:568-72). 
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Middle Ages. Petrus de Crescentiis continued a much older tradition, which had 
already been developed during the Classic Era by among others, the Greek 
Theophrastus who lived between 372-288 BC, and certain Roman authors 
(Mantel 1980:562-566; Buis 1985:565). 
Another origin of systematized forestry is the management of the king's or 
landlord's domains (Mantel 1980:615). Noe Meurer and Claude de Mauvillee 
were two important authors on this subject. In 1560, both published books on 
the administration of their respective employer's and sovereign's forests - the 
kings-elect of Baden-Württemberg and Sachsen and the king of France. By 
contrast with the Hausväterliteratur, this work had little influence (Mantel 
1980:615; Buis 1985:570-573). 
The last step towards systematized forestry was made in Germany by Von 
Carlowitz. In 1713, he published a book called Sylvicultura Oeconomia in which 
he approached the forest as an object of scientific reflection and of rational 
economic thought. Van Carlowith was also pointed to the non-monetary values 
of forests (Mantel 1980:638-639; Buis 1985:574-576). His approach was 
developed further by Wilhelm Gottfried von Mosed through the publication of 
the Grundsätze der Forst-Ökonomie in 1757. In 1788, the first chair in forestry 
was created within the university of Freiburg (Buis 1985:579-580). This date is 
the acknowledged birth date of forestry as a recognized scientific enterprise. In 
Tharandt near Dresden, the first independent forestry school was created in 
1816 (Van Maaren 1993:3-5). Many people from other European countries 
attended these two schools and returned to their native countries with German 
ideas on scientifically based forest management. 
The techniques developed in Freiburg concerned systematic tree planting and 
the renovation of stands, and the development of methods that would it make 
possible to achieve "sustainability" by balancing of harvest and regrowth. The 
central concept, the "Normal Forest", was developed in 1821. This concept 
assumes uniform growth and an equal distribution of age classes over a stand's 
area in correspondence to the time a tree needs to reach maturity. In its most 
primitive form, it implies that each age-class of a species occupies the same 
acreage (Speidel 1972:100). If it takes sixty years for a tree to mature, one-
sixtieth of the total area is annually harvested and replanted. Based on the 
concept of Normal Forest, a broad spectrum of silvicultural management 
systems has evolved, from rotative clear-cutting with artificial regeneration 
through partial fellings and induced natural regeneration (shelterwood systems) 
to selective felling and full natural regeneration. In addition to these high forest 
techniques, coppice systems evolved that allowed a more rapid production cycle 
(Troup 1951; Windhorst 1978:93-102; Alves 1988). The Normal Forest is 
highly sensitive to scale advantages. It is only economically viable if one 
controls large enough areas. This again makes forestry - practised along this 
technological principle - primarily suited to large landowners such as the state. 
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Forestry and the Implantation of State Power 
State involvement in forestry is historically connected to the role of the Crown 
in the feudal tenure system and to the economic and technical characteristics of 
forestry. In regard to the theme of this book, the struggle between the state and 
the rural communities over the baldios, an analysis of forestry as an 
admmistrative and economic activity points at another possible connection: the 
suitability of forestry and a state forestry bureaucracy in enhancing the presence 
and power of the state over the countryside. 
First, forestry often involves the administration of remote areas where the 
state is notably absent. The advancement of forestry science produced the 
technology that was needed to plant or seed forests in areas that had become 
stripped of vegetation. Such areas included the sand dunes along the coast, and 
the deserts and waste lands (such as the baldios) in the mountains. At the end of 
the nineteenth century, governments in France, Portugal and the Netherlands 
undertook afforestation of these waste lands. By using the new afforestation 
techniques, the state Forestry Services were able to go beyond the former royal 
domains, penetrating into these additional areas. Thus, these new techniques 
allowed the expansion of the state bureaucracy into domains that until then had 
been relatively inaccessible. It became possible for the state to intervene actively 
in land use in remote corners of the country. 
Second, forestry was (and is) not an ephemeral activity. It remained a long-
term project which demands continual monitoring. Hence, forestry entailed the 
settlement of forestry technicians and guards who could look after the trees and 
supervise their development. Moreover, land uses, which in one way or another 
might threaten the development of the trees had to be excluded. Therefore, 
forestry interventions were accompanied by special state legislation. In the 
tradition of those regulations under the ancien régime that protected game and 
timber in the royal preserves, the bourgeois state formulated a set of stipulations 
which were based on the technological demands of forestry. Violating these 
stipulations, for example by allowing grazing animals into the forest, was 
considered a "forest crime". A specific police force, the forest guards, had to 
watch over the woods and to persecute trespassers. The result was that the 
forestry bureaucracy acquired the custodial-paramilitary posture mentioned by 
Peluso (1992) for the Indonesian case of an army which invaded and occupied 
an area and defended it against intruders. This connection of forestry with state 
law and the forceful imposition of that law confirms the close ties between 
forestry and state sovereignty. 
Third, the state's forestry project could appeal to two politically powerful 
sentiments among the population. Foresters claimed that the lands in which the 
state intervened had previously been covered with forest. This original forest 
cover had disappeared because of unwise exploitation of these lands. In this 
way, the foresters presented their enterprise as an act of healing or restoration. 
The political load of such a claim is obvious. Anybody opposing "reforestation" 
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automatically defended an "unhealthy", "distorted" situation14. Further, the 
introduction of state forestry was presented in terms of the nation's wellbeing, 
and, thus, it was assumed that the local population would accept the alleged 
public benefits as a common good. By accepting the state's claim that the 
forests served a public goal, the population accepted the regime's ideological 
point of view. This made forestry an interesting area of state intervention as it 
served the ideological integration of the people in state and nation. In getting the 
public to believe the government's ideas about what was good for the people, 
hegemony was achieved. 
The geography and ideology of forestry also explain why the baldios were the 
Portuguese Forestry Service's preferred area of action. Baldios were considered 
land that was waste or wastefully exploited. Furthermore, the baldios were 
neither private nor state property. They represented a third category that, in the 
eyes of nineteenth and twentieth centuries politicians, had become obsolete and, 
thus, had to be dissolved and transformed into either private or public property. 
In their view on economic development, the transfer of these lands to the state 
Forestry Service was logical and beneficial to the public. 
This economic dimension of afforestation points at a fourth element that could 
explain that forestry plays a special role in the development of the state. The 
introduction of forestry in a region changes both that region's own economic 
organization and the relations between the regional and the national economies. 
From a largely autarkical system, the region's economy is turned into the 
producer of raw materials for a specific national industry, and as such becomes 
dependent upon its integration in the national economic and political system. 
Forestry involves the re-positioning of a region in the national economy, long-
term administration of remote areas, an appeal to hegemonic values, the 
transformation of property relations, forest management related imposition of 
specific (state) regulations at the detriment of local rules, and surveillance by a 
special forestry police. These elements give the Forestry Service a peculiar 
position as a bureaucracy within the state. They turn the Service into a 
governmental structure which can contribute to state formation. 
State and State Formation 
In the previous sections I have shown that forestry is linked in a particular way 
to the state and to state formation. It has specific features which make it capable 
of transfiguring the state's relation to the citizens and their communities. 
However, the key concepts "state" and "state formation" have remained unclear. 
In this section I would like to clarify their meaning. These concepts are not 
1 4 The claim mat afforestation is an act of healing, is the reason why I have avoided the term 
"reforestation" in this book. In my opinion, this term is political. 
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limited to twentieth century Portugal, but address broader phenomena both in 
historical and geographical terms. Therefore, in this chapter, I do not confine 
myself to the Portuguese case, rather I approach state and state formation from 
a broader, European perspective. This broader panorama serves as an 
introduction to the more specific discussion of forestry and state formation in 
Portugal in chapter 4. 
State, State Apparatus and Territory 
Thus far, the discussion involving the state has been complicated because the 
word "state" refers to different objects in social reality. In its broadest sense, it 
denotes a social and territorial community defined in relation to similar social 
and territorial communities. States are part of a system. Each state or segment 
in that system constitutes a social entity or "polity" (a state) and recognizes 
(defines) the others segments in terms of territory and sovereignty as fellow 
states. Sovereignty is the key characteristic of each of these states. Within a 
state's territorial confines, authority over the population is formally vested into 
one institution: the government and its executive apparatus (Giddens 1984:246-
7; Stuurman 1984:19). In its most limited meaning, the "state" is precisely 
identified with the body that exercises this authority. It means a political 
institution, the State with a capital "S". For example, in an often quoted 
definition, Max Weber describes the State as "a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a 
given territory" (Weber 1964:77, my emphasis). In a concrete case, that 
community is equated with clearly defined societal institutions like the 
government, the bureaucracy, the army, etc. It is "a set of administrative, 
policing and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated 
by, an executive authority" (Skocpol quoted by Held 1983:42-3). In practice, 
State and state are often used indiscriminately. This interchanging is partly 
because the State, in the sense of the ruling administrative community or 
apparatus, is often presented as being representative of the social community of 
citizens living within the territory under its command. 
Weber's definition assumes a straightforward connection between State and 
territory. This connection rests upon the blend of "State" as an administrative 
apparatus or political society and "state" as a polity. However, although it is 
true that States are linked to geographical spaces, their jurisdiction transcends 
international frontiers. By the same token, the State's power within its own 
territory is restricted by the jurisdiction of other States. Citizens living abroad 
are subject to the administration of their host country but may also retain certain 
rights and obligations to the government at home, such as suffrage or military 
service. The vehicle for this transcendence of geographic borders is the concept 
of nationality. Through this concept, modern citizenship perpetuates the feudal 
personal ties of the serf to his lord in those between the subject to his 
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sovereign. It is the State's incarnation in its citizens that enables governments to 
act beyond their territorial limits. An example of how this vehicle may function 
was the Federal Republic of Germany's policy to grant to citizens of the Soviet-
Union who could prove German ancestry preferred access to German territory 
and German citizenship (Eriksen 1993:114). By giving some Soviet citizens a 
particular, more privileged position in relation to the German state than their 
next-door neighbours, German State sovereignty transcended its geographical 
borders and penetrated into the Soviet Union's territory. 
The de-territorialization of the State is particularly relevant in the case of 
Portugal because of the social and economic significance of emigration. When 
many Portuguese departed (temporarily) to other countries, the Portuguese State 
consciously developed a policy to maintain the bonds that tied its subjects 
abroad to the homeland. 
Migration has become important since the late nineteenth century. Between 
1862 and 1873 more than 24,000 people emigrated from the harbour of Porto 
alone to Brazil in particular. Most of these migrants were male proletarians, 
many of whom were boys younger than 14 who left in order to avoid 
conscription. Remittances sent back to their families at home supported the local 
economy. Those who returned invested their money in, among other things, the 
building of houses: "Almost all the best properties one can find, and the new 
ones that are being constructed belong to these returned migrants, who in Brazil 
are called Portuguese and here Brazilians" (Morais 1974, originally published in 
1873). In 1892, Alberto Sampaio, an eminent social scientist at that time, 
indicated that as a result of massive emigration to Brazil, "[t]he international 
bills of exchange ... have turned themselves into the point of support on which 
everything rests" (Sampaio 1984). Emigration has remained important during 
the twentieth century. In 1973, the remittances sent home by Portuguese 
working abroad equalled almost 0.4% of the Gross National Product (Brouwer 
1994:163) 1 5. Emigration had demographic effects as well by slowing down the 
growth of the population. During the 1960s so many people left that the 
population of Portugal decreased. 
In response to the demographic impact of emigration and the economic weight 
of the concomitant remittances, the concept of the Portuguese nation was de-
territorialized and redefined as "a boarded nation" or a "nation-ship". One no 
longer needed to live in Portugal to be considered a Portuguese citizen 
(Feldman-Bianco 1993). Such a definition enabled the Portuguese government to 
bind the Portuguese abroad to their motherland and make them continue to 
contribute to the country's balance of payments. A specific post within the 
cabinet (the Secretaria de Estado das Communidades Portuguesas) was created 
to develop the necessary policy measures. The government supported courses on 
Portuguese culture and the installation of radio and television broadcasts in the 
" According to an inquiry among emigrants returned from European host countries, 71 % of the 
respondents sent half or more of their salaries back home (Amaro 1985b:355). 
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Portuguese language in countries hosting a large community of emigrants (see 
for an example: O Vilarealense, (Vila Real), 27 April 1972). In this manner, 
together with the nation, the (S/s)tate was liberated of its territorial limits. 
State and Sovereignty 
The actions of the State within and beyond its territorial borders are based upon 
the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty consists of the claim that all authority 
within the geographical space that defines the state can be traced back to one 
singular body. Within these spatial confines, the state (in the sense of an 
organization or ruling community) has a formal monopoly on the legitimate use 
of violence, taxation, the production and enforcement of law, and the definition 
of monetary currencies. In a restricted sense, the State is the social 
materialization of that sovereignty in a specific institution. 
Sovereignty is a claim to power and legitimacy (a "will to power") which 
persists as long as at least the claim itself can be reproduced. Sovereignty does 
not necessarily entail the actual exercise of the powers that are claimed. But it 
does mean that the claim that these powers can potentially be exercised is 
effective and perpetuated. Sovereignty has two additional aspects. One is 
monism: the claim that all other powers within the State (i.e., within its spatial 
confines) are derived from it. For example, even if someone other than the 
sovereign raises taxes, the right to do so is at least formally derived from the 
sovereign and dependent upon his approval. In this manner, the fact that the 
State does not actually exercise its sovereign power, the claim to that power 
remains reproduced. The other aspect involves the claim to a specific mythical 
genealogy. The European monarchs of the ancien régime rooted their dominion 
in divinity, i.e., they ruled "by the Grace of God". With the advance of 
secularization, God's place as the foundation of political power, was replaced 
by other, similarly abstract notions, such as "Society" or "Nation". 
The state's sovereignty is founded upon a (fictitious) treaty with a deity or 
with the public. According to Hobbes, the state is based on a "contract" each 
citizen implicitly agrees to and by which he surrenders his individual 
sovereignty to a higher authority that will protect him against his fellow 
citizens. Hobbes's state is at the same time an ambition and a condition for 
mankind's survival. Hobbes believes that the state, this "mortal god", or the 
"Great Leviathan", is the only common power capable of salvaging humanity 
from the disastrous consequences of the war of all against all: "...during the 
time men live without a common Power to keep all in awe, they are in the 
condition which is called Warre; and such a Warre, as it is of every man, 
against every man" (Hobbes 1914:64; Hobbes in Held 1983:68). 
The perception of sovereignty as either a divine or a social contract is 
mythical in the sense that it has no material grounds in history, but is socially 
accepted and therefore "real". However, the claims that it would put an end to 
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warfare or transcend human egoism are false. Basil Davidson (1992), a critic of 
Western colonialism explains today's horrors in Liberia, Somalia, and former 
Yugoslavia as a direct result of the State's existence. In Davidson's opinion, in 
these regions the State is not the result of a contract between the members of 
these particular societies as Hobbes suggests, but an exogenous model of social 
organisation without the roots in local society that enable popular participation. 
The State functions as a legacy of colonialism, an instrument for elite (and 
imperialist) exploitation of the masses. Here, Hobbes's "mortal god" is "the 
black man's burden", little less than the devil himself. Hayek, in a liberal 
tradition, mistrusts the State because he fears its hunger for power and its 
inefficiency. The State should remain as "minimal" as possible. He is 
particularly concerned with the possibility that when the economically 
disenfranchised masses take over the State, they will rob the élite of its wealth. 
In his opinion this would retard economic development and therefore ultimately 
act against the general good (Hayek 1978; Hayek in Held 1983) 1 6. Marxists 
reproach the State for the opposite reason. They see it as a means for the ruling 
class to perpetuate exploitation of the proletariat. Consequently, Lenin argues 
that the (bourgeois) State should be destroyed and replaced by a popular 
democratic model (Poulantzas 1978:76, Lenin in Held 1983:118-119) 1 7. 
Hayek and Lenin have opposite political views. But they also have at least one 
very basic assumption in common; they share an instrumentalist approach in 
which the State is perceived as a tool in the hand of whoever is able to master 
it. The difference between them is essentially the question who should be 
admimstering the State. Lenin believes it should be the proletariat, whereas 
Hayek places his hope in the bourgeoisie. Their common basic assumption, 
however, is incorrect. By conceptualizing the State as an instrument of class 
rule, they disregard the fact that a class not a given, but has to be constituted 
socially and politically. They also do not acknowledge that, to a certain extent, 
a State can act autonomously from, or even contrary to the interests of the 
allegedly dominant class. These ideas are not alien to Marxism. Marx and 
Engels have already mentioned the political rule of the landed aristocracy on 
behalf of capital in nineteenth century Britain and the relative autonomy of the 
French state under Louis Bonaparte (Jessop 1983:15; Held 1983:27-28). Instead 
of perceiving the State as a tool, one should approach it simultaneously as an 
arena and as an object of the (political) struggle between the different sectors of 
society, and acknowledge that the State and the people who compose it have 
1 6 See in particular the essays, "The Atavism of Social Justice,' (pp.57-50), 'Whither Democracy' 
(pp.152-162), and 'Economic Freedom and Representative Government,' (pp.152-162) in Hayek 
(1978). 
1 7 Anarchists totally reject the state. They see it as the oppressor of all: According to Guerin "of all 
presumptions that have blinded mankind since unmemorable times, the State is the most disastrous" 
(Guerin 1981:15-16). Bakunin calls the State "a cannibalistic abstraction of daily life" (Gu6rin 
1981:17). 
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their own dynamics and are not a mere superstructure or reflection of the rest of 
society. Consequently, although control over the State is politically important as 
it implies a certain control over its material and authoritative resources, the 
State is not an instrument which can be wielded freely by those who are 
politically in command. 
Contradictions within the State 
As previously stated, sovereignty has roots claimed in mythical contracts. Also 
alleged and mythical are the sovereignty's unity and singularity. As far as 
Hobbes is concerned, there is only one Leviathan in the state. This idea of the 
State as a monolith runs through the work of many theorists. Weber (1925:650 
ff.), focuses upon the bureaucracy's role in realizing unity of state 
administration thus suggesting that this admimstration is rationally structured 
(Gouldner 1952; Held 1983:39; Jessop 1990:342). However, in reality, the 
State is internally divided and contradictory. As Jessop puts it in his summary 
of Marxist flunking about the (capitalist) State: "the [S]tate comprises a plurality 
of institutions (or apparatuses) and their unity, if any, far from being pregiven, 
must be constituted politically" (1983:222). Within the State, one can discern a 
centre, generally located in the capital, where political power is concentrated, 
and a periphery consisting of institutions often dispersed over the territory under 
the State's command that are at least nominally subordinate to and coordinated 
by the central State. Weber's ideal type perhaps does not deny the underlying 
reality that coordination may be incomplete and ministries and departments 
within a state may act according to different or even conflicting lines, but it 
certainly obscures that, in reality, the state does not match the ideal. 
Portuguese forest policy provides several examples of competition and 
conflicts between bureaucracies within the state. During the 1940s and 1950s 
the baldios were a bone of contention between two branches within the Ministry 
of Economy, the Junta da Colonizaçâo Interna (JCI, Internal Resettlement 
Board), and the Forestry Service. The JCI defended the reclamation of the 
commons for agricultural aims and the creation of new villages, while the 
Forestry Service vindicated the forestation of the baldios. Both institutions 
sought and found support in different sections in the civil society. The JCI 
relied upon agrarian interests and upon support of the country's artificial 
fertilizer giant, the CUF, whereas the Forestry Service aligned itself with 
general industrial interests including, in particular, those of the paper pulp 
sector (Estêvâo 1983). More recently, the state's internal incoherence is 
exemplified by the institutional conflicts between the Ministries of Economy and 
Environment over environmental policies. The Portuguese government has been 
concerned with the protection of the environment, as in the cases of pollution by 
the paper industry and the rapid increase of the area covered by eucalyptus 
trees. But out of all the state owned paper pulp plants, only one satisfied the 
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Ministry of Environment's norms (Publico, (Lisbon), 25 March 1991). 
According to the Secretary of State of Environment eucalyptus trees were "an 
ecological infelicity", even though European Community funds channelled 
through the State's forestry directorate were used to subsidize their planting 
(Diario de Notfcias, (Porto), 12 March 1990) 1 8. 
Delineating the State 
Within this chapter, the State has been approached as a set of institutions, an 
apparatus instead of a polity. Even though this implies a restriction of the object 
in question, it is hardly a simplification. How can the State be delineated from 
its Non-State exterior? It is obvious that the government, being the incarnation 
of sovereignty, is part of the State. But can the same be said about the 
bureaucracy, about representative bodies of local administration such as 
municipal and parish councils, or about political parties (cf. Poulantzas 
1976:624-625)? In other words, having limited the understanding of the State to 
an apparatus, the delineation of State and Non-State still has to be made both 
analytically and empirically. 
Dividing the State from its Non-State environment is not an easy task. For 
instance, one can assume that analytically the distinctive feature of the State is 
that it is comprised of the political relations between people but not of the 
economic relations between them. However, in reality, politics and economics 
are always interwoven. This was particularly clear under the feudal regime, 
when political sovereignty could not be abstracted from economic property. 
Political and economic power were identical: the baron controlled both the 
means of coercion (army, weaponry, public offices, and the legal system) and 
the means of production (land and labour) and exchange (markets and roads). It 
was only after the abolishment of these feudal principles that the separation of 
State and civil society could make sense. 
The idea of an impersonal and sovereign political order, i.e. a legally 
circumscribed structure of power with supreme jurisdiction could not 
predominate while political rights, obligations and duties were closely 
tied to property rights and religious tradition. Similarly, the idea that 
human beings as 'individuals' or as 'a people' could be active citizens 
of this order - citizens of their state - and not merely dutiful 
subjects of a monarch or emperor could not develop under such 
conditions (Held 1983:1). 
Even today it is impossible to strictly separate between these two spheres 
because economic relations always entails control over resources, labour, and 
profits and, hence, always have an economic dimension. 
1 8 This was changed in 1989 (Expresso, (Lisbon), 17 February 1990). EC policies and paper pulp 
industries are discussed in the chapters 4 and 11 (pp. 80-84 and pp. 260 ff.). 
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The interlacement of politics and economics points to the general difficulty in 
distinguishing State and the Non-State civil society. There is not a clear 
empirical division between the two spheres, but as Gramsci has argued, they are 
organically related (Jessop 1983:146). At the level of the individual, the people 
who compose the State (politicians, civil servants, military men, etc.) are also 
civilians. In addition to being officers, they are consumers, parents, and voters. 
Thus, each individual element of the State is also part of the civil society. At 
the institutional level the distinction between State and civil society is also 
blurred. First, the State sometimes appears as a private citizen. Similar to 
ordinary individuals, the State owns corporations and undertakes economic 
activities. State forestry is a case in point. Forestry Services are simultaneously 
State bureaucracies and economic agents that produce a commodity; timber. 
Second, through law and taxation, the State influences the shape of certain 
institutions which are not under its formal control such as trade unions and 
enterprises. Even the (family) household can in not be conceptualized 
independently from State regulations with respect to matrimonial rights, 
tutorship over children, income policy, immigration policies, etc. (Zaretski in 
Held 1983; De Swaan 1993:191-192; Van Walsum 1994) 1 9. Third, the State 
can decide to privatize certain activities. Presently, the Portuguese State is 
withdrawing from direct interference in the economy. It delegates social and 
economic regulation to civil society. For example, it makes workers' and 
employers' organizations responsible for the definition of labour conditions. The 
State is also withdrawing from organizing health care, thereby reinforcing and 
re-shaping pre-existing civil organisations such as the Catholic Church and the 
Misericdrdias (religious corporations). In the past, these Misericdrdias had 
played an important role in the provision of health care (Santos in collaboration 
with Hespanha 1990) 2 0 . Finally, the State itself can be "privatized"; it can be 
used by the individual actors who populate it for their particular objectives. The 
massive appropriation of public funds and offices for private aims and benefits 
in Italy (Volkskrant, (Amsterdam), 20 November 93) and India (Mooij 1992) 
shows that States can be subordinated by (elements of) civil society. 
" Also important is the international dimension of the particular way in which the state 
(co-)organizes civil society: Van Walsum (1994) points to the relevance of Dutch immigration law 
to the way in which Surinamese immigrants constitute households and Santos (1985, 1986) argues 
that the organization of Portuguese "informal" social security is connected to the country's semi-
peripheral position in the world system. 
2 0 Santos (1990:222) calls this process the creation of a "secondary civil society". While civil society 
"creates" the state, in the case of secondary civil society the relations are inverted: the State 
"creates" civil society. In my view, this idea of secondary civil society assumes that primary civil 
society is not (re-)shaped by State intervention. As I have pointed out in the text, this is untenable. 
Santos's idea helps only to underscore Gramsci's observation that State and civil society are 
organically related and that the effects and functions of state apparatuses are influenced by their 
links to civil society (Jessop 1983:146). 
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A mutually exclusive empirical separation between State and Non-State seems 
impossible for the simple reason that empirically both are "societies". 
Analytically singling out the specific part of social life called "the State", 
requires finding ways to distinguish State from Non-State and to define which 
societies or institutions should be included in the State. Bob Jessop's The 
Capitalist State contains an iUuminating and critical account of Marxist theories 
of the state. But he does not limit himself to summarising the work of others. 
Leaning upon Poulantzas, in particular, Jessop develops his own approach. Part 
of that is an effort to divide State and Non-State from each other using ruling 
law. Jessop (1983:222, in Held 1983:272) considers the State those institutions 
that are mentioned as public entities in public or administrative legislation. 
The advantage of such an approach is that it rests neither upon normative 
assumptions with respect to a" separation between State and civil society, nor 
upon instrumentalist or functionalist suppositions, nor upon an ideal type. In this 
manner, Jessop is able to overcome the limitions of Hobbes's, Hayek's, Lenin's 
and Weber's approaches. Jessop's approach is also worthwhile because by 
taking statutory law as a starting point it takes into consideration the form-
determined variation in and between states in regard to their internal structure 
and relations with their environment through different forms of intervention and 
representation. The shape of the State as designed by the law is included as an 
analytically relevant feature (Jessop 1983:228-234). 
Notwithstanding these merits, this approach has two problems. The first 
problem is, as Jessop himself admits, "...that the legal distinction between 
'public' and 'private' is in one sense 'tainted': for it is a distinction internal to 
bourgeois law and it develops most fully only with the dominance of the liberal 
laissez-faire stage of capitalism" (1983:223). Jessop's definition includes the 
State only within very specific conditions and, hence, can only be applied with 
difficulty to other situations such as the ancien régime. The second problem is 
that this approach is tautological. The norm used for the definition of the State 
is produced by that State itself and not by something else. That which Jessop 
(1983) would call "the State" is defined by the State law; it is created by the 
State. This means that the theoretical or scientific definition is tied to those who 
dominate the State and determine its legislative activities2 1. An example 
2 1 In 1990, Jessop turns to a functional definition: 
"The core of the state comprises a distinct ensemble of institutions and organizations 
whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions 
on the members of a society in the name of their common interest or general will" 
(Jessop 1990:341). 
The advantages here in comparison with his previous institutional approach are (1) its non-
tautological nature, (2) its disjunction from a certain stage in capitalism and (3) the stress on the 
need to create consent and support. However, I prefer the earlier definition because of the newer 
one's vagueness. The newer definition mentions, for instance, "the core of the state" without 
providing an instrument for distinguishing that core from its periphery. Furthermore, it is biased 
towards the hegemony theorists like Laclau & Mouffe (1985). As Jessop mentions, the "claims 
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of the limitions of Jessop's approach, which is particularly relevant to Portugal, 
is the position of the single party in a one-party system. 
Between 1931 and 1945, Portugal had only one political party, the Uniao 
National (UN, National Union). According to the law and the party's statutes, 
the Uniao National was a private institution existing completely independently 
from the state and the government. Actually, it was created by the government 
itself in order to mobilize popular support. The regime controlled the party's 
direction and financed its organization (Cruz 1988:130-133, 180-181). If one 
follows Jessop's (1983) reasoning and takes the ruling state law as the criterion 
that defines the state, one would have to consider the Uniao National as a civil 
organisation. But, as it was so overtly an instrument of the government, it 
seems rather odd to exclude it from the State. Although formally independent, it 
was actually an executive apparatus of the State's sovereignty. One cannot 
understand the Portuguese State if one sees the Uniao National as the civil or 
private institution as it was defined by ruling law at that time. 
The difficulties posed by the application of Jessop's approach demonstrate 
once more that a strict separation of State and Non-State seems impossible. This 
means that the actual delineation of the state cannot be made a priori but has to 
be identified empirically. In abstract terms I defined the State as the social 
materialization of sovereignty. Because law is one of the forms in which mis 
sovereignty materializes the self-definition of the State by its law is meaningful. 
However, instead of limiting oneself to the law one should return to the root, 
sovereignty, and draw the division between State and Non-State accordingly. 
For instance, in the feudal system, the vassals should be included in the state as 
far as their actions are derived from the sovereign, disregarding whether in a 
contemporary perspective these vassals and actions would be considered political 
or economic in nature. A similar argument can be made for single parties like 
the Uniao National. If they are an executive of the state's sovereignty rather 
than a representative of an alternative authority, these parties should be 
approached as part of the state and not as civil organizations. In short, the State 
has to be defined and delineated analytically by examining empirically whether 
actors, relations, and institutions are materializations or elongations of the 
sovereignty that constitutes the state's foundation. 
Taking sovereignty instead of law as a means to delineate the State makes it 
possible to overcome some of the historical and logical limits of Jessop's 
approach. Yet, this instrument is not conclusive either. Sovereignty is a more 
abstract concept than law, but similar to law, it is subjected to the way in which 
it is defined by the State itself. Moreover, there is a formally regulated overlap 
about general will or common interest are a key feature of the state system and distinguish it from 
the straightforward political domination or violent oppression" (ibid). Unfortunately, blunt 
oppression is too general a practice to be defined outside the scope of political or state theories. For 
a critique of the concept of hegemony and its implications of a "false consciousness" see: Scott 
1990:70-107). 
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of State and civil society. Certain institutions (parliament, municipal and parish 
councils), are public by law and, hence, part of the state apparatus. But the 
persons who serve on them have the explicit task to represent their 
constituencies — demarcated along party or geographical divisions —, the State's 
"exterior". These institutions play an important role in the constitution of state 
power. Nevertheless, the institutional employees are in ambivalent positions, 
because as office holders they also have certain administrative responsibilities. 
The duality of their positions is particularly clear at the level of local 
administrations; on the one hand they have to represent their population to the 
higher echelons in the state's administrative order, while on the other hand, they 
have to implement the plans made at those higher levels and try to convince the 
public of the acceptability of those plans. 
State Formation 
State and Non-State overlap at specific sites within what is legally circumscribed 
as "the State. Examples of such sites are parish and municipal councils. Within 
these councils, representation of local interests and administrative 
responsibilities are merged. On the one hand, these councils defend the local 
interests and autonomy against interference by the central state, and on the other 
hand, they represent the same central state in its relations with the population. 
The mixed nature of these bodies gives them an important role in the process of 
state formation. They are "outreach structures" which establish the connection 
between local communities and the central state. These outreach structures may 
be government structures, associational structures, educational structures, and 
residual traditional structures of authority or symbolism (Coleman 1977:3, 8). 
In the case of the Portuguese communities discussed here, these traditional 
structures included the conselho (village council) and the elected zelador 
(overseer). Marcelo Caetano (1991:335), who was at the time intensively 
involved in the drawing up of the Estado Afovo's administrative law, explicitly 
states that between 1936 and 1940 the format for the adrninistration of the 
parishes tried to copy and absorb these traditional institutions. 
In general it could be said that there are three types of state formation. First, 
there are situations in which state-less societies turn into States. This means that 
sovereignty develops and is accomplished within and over a certain geographical 
space and its population (Giddens 1984:244-256). The second type of state 
formation entails the absorption or ejection of social and geographic spaces by a 
State and their submission to or liberation from its sovereignty. An example of 
this type is the submission of communities, which like Elias's "village states" 
(1974:22) have always autonomously organized their own affairs, to growing 
interference by State legislation and intervention. This type of state formation 
has two ranges: outwardly the conquest (or loss) and submission (or liberation) 
of territory and people under jurisdiction and control of other States or non-
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states, and inwardly the intensification (or reduction) of State control over 
subjects or citizens. The third type of state formation concerns changes in 
existing States. Examples of this type are changes in statehood (the transition 
from the ancien régime to bourgeois state), and changes in state form (internal 
structure, form of representation and form of intervention, see Jessop 1983:228-
234). 
The term "state formation" has a strong evolutionist connotation. It is 
generally used for the process leading towards the expansion of the state and the 
intensification of state control and not for the reverse. In order to avoid this 
evolutionist bias, I return to the term's literal meaning: "giving form to the 
(S/s)tate". In this manner, I want to avoid attributing a direction to the process. 
The process of state formation can include all of the different types of changes 
in statehood and state form, and all transfigurations in the relations between 
individuals and the centres of political control. However, I do not want to 
expand the concept of state formation so far that it includes the (S/s)tate's 
dissolution as well. It does not make sense to see the changes as element of the 
state formation process of the original (S/s)tate at the moment when the initial 
polity is dissolving into separate parts. Instead, one has to approach this process 
as part of the formation of the new polities and bearers of sovereignty, the 
daughter (S/s)tates. 
The second type of state formation (expansion or contraction) is the central 
theme of Elias's (1982) inquiry into the European civilization process. Elias 
describes state formation as the outcome of balancing centripetal and centrifugal 
forces. The centripetal force emerges from the competition among 
interdependent political entities and warlords, which ends in the weaker being 
subdued and absorbed by the stronger (Elias 1982, 11:112-114). The centrifugal 
force originates in the aspirations of dependent rulers looking for opportunities 
to escape from central control (Elias 1982, 11:140 ff .) 2 2 . If the centripetal force 
is stronger than the centrifugal, the small, competing, and interdependent social 
units dominated by feudal warlords gradually merge into larger states. As a 
result people get to live in larger configurations which leads to increased self-
control, discipline, and civilized behaviour. The concomitant monopolization of 
violence by the victorious State enables general pacification (Elias 1982, 11:239-
50). 
Elias's work is certainly an achievement within the field of sociology. 
However, it is a pity that it focuses so much on a normative and eurocentric 
concept like civilization. It would have greatly benefited from a study of the 
way in which people are made to accept and internalize the state and its power, 
and from an inquiry into the role of ideology and nationalism. (See Giddens 
1984:251-2 for factors contributing to state formation and Hobsbawm 1993, 
2 2 This occurred in France and Germany after the death of Charlemagne, and more recently in the 
former Soviet-Union where the Moscow power-struggle offered local rulers in Soviet republics such 
as the Ukraine or Georgia the opportunity to declare themselves independent. 
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chapter 4, for the way in which nationalism can be used to resolve social [class] 
conflicts.) 
The process of state formation described by Elias has consequences for the 
state's internal structure. As an unintended consequence of the larger unit 
swallowing the smaller, the realm's administration becomes more complicated. 
Hence, the rulers delegate tasks to officials. In the end these officials evolve 
into autonomous bureaucracies which start to place certain boundaries upon the 
monarch's rule (the "king's effect" or koningseffect). The ruler becomes 
separated from the means of administration (Elias 1982, 11:171-212). These are 
transferred from the ruler to professional politicians and a specially trained 
officialdom. Seigniorial arbitrariness is abolished and the orders are 
"rationalized" (Breuer 1993:200 on Weber). 
Examples of this process have been traced in Britain and France. In the 
eleventh century a class of functionaries arose to administer royal justice and the 
royal treasury. These administrations developed into full bureaucracies during 
the absolute monarchy (Tout 1952; Jacoby 1973). The liberal (or bourgeois) 
revolutions of France and Britain completed the separation of the ruler from the 
means of administration: 
...the state apparatus of the absolute monarchy was perfected and 
brought to its logical conclusion under the First Empire. When the 
crowned heads fell, the real sovereignty was transferred to this 
apparatus. But it works in the background, unobtrusively, 
anonymously, remote from all publicity and almost in secret: a 
monarch, a monarch whose only surviving driving principle is 
routine. It is not so much a state within a state as the real state 
behind the façade of the democratic state (Herbert Luethy 1955:19-20 
quoted by Tilly, Tilly & Tilly 1974:25). 
Related to this bureaucratization process, is the transition from indirect to direct 
rule. Whereas under the ancien régime the Crown had to content itself with 
delegating powers to vassals who were able to act to a large extent 
independently, under the new bourgeois state, a policy of closer supervision of 
dependent officials was implemented which led to a stronger entrenchment of 
the State in society. 
This transition from indirect to direct rule forms one of the core issues of 
Charles Tilly's (1992) book Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-
1990. As the title suggests, Tilly sees state formation resulting from the 
interaction of structures of coercion and structures of capital. State formation 
occurs within two spheres: the political and the economic. In the political sphere 
it is the concentration of the means of coercion in the hand of the sovereign 
against challengers from inside and outside his dominion. This concentration of 
the means of coercion is combined with the successful extraction of the 
resources needed for the creation and maintenance of these means by tapping 
the accumulation of capital in the economic sphere. State evolution is 
accompanied by the loss of autonomy and bargaining capacities of local lords 
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and communities (particularly cities) in relation to the central authorities. It also 
involves the direct supervision of social life by officials who are controlled by 
the central state. 
Like Elias, Tilly pays little attention to the establishment of state dominance 
over the population and the internalization of power structures by the subjects, 
which are so prominent in the work of Gramsci, Poulantzas, and Laclau & 
Mouffe. In this book I argue that in addition to capital and coercion there is a 
third component of state formation, namely complicity. Complicity is included 
in state formation because the realization of the State's sovereignty and power 
depends to a large extent upon the cooperation it receives from people, who, out 
of a certain understanding of their own interests, help the state realize its 
projects by using their position within the local society. 
State and Law 
Sovereignty constitutes the core of the state; it is the origin of its authority. It is 
also the foundation of its law, and as already argued by Hobbes, it is 
unthinkable that the sovereign would be subjected to that law. He is the source 
of law: Auctoritas non Veritas facit legem (Von Trotha 1987:68 quoted by Von 
Benda-Beckmann 1993:49-50). According to the founding myth of sovereignty, 
in each State there is only one valid legal system. The sovereign holds the 
monopoly of law. This is why Hespanha (1986:59) could describe the formal 
situation of Portugal under the ancien régime by saying that "[a]U lower 
jurisdictions have recourse to the royal jurisdiction. The necessity of royal 
œnfirmation and the delegated character of the powers of all officials are two 
manifestations of this principle". 
The concept of single sovereignty is actually a mythical claim that helps to 
integrate other power practices into a single, at least apparently coherent, 
system. Beneath this umbrella of unique and unified sovereignty, many sources 
of power and authority exist. In the absence of single sovereignty, the monopoly 
of law does not exist either. Within a state there is "legal pluralism" (see: Von 
Benda-Beckmann 1991; Merry 1988; Griffiths 1986, 1991. For legal pluralism 
in Dias's work see Ruivo & Marques 1982). 
The concept of legal pluralism is quite helpful in understanding the continuing 
existence of the baldios until the end of the twentieth century. The baldios 
persisted despite the transference of the administrative responsibilities over the 
commons from the village communities to the parish and municipal councils by 
the civil code of 1867. They even survived the formal abolition of the concept 
of common property by the civil code of 1966. As Gralheiro writes: 
Over the baldios, there continued to exist two parallel powers: on the 
one hand a formal, legal power of the local state institutions [parish 
and municipal councils, RB], and on the other, the actual, real 
40 Planting Power 
power, exercised by the populations through its assemblies of 
commoners (1990:36). 
In this manner, small scale national law coexisted with large scale normative 
systems at the local level (Santos 1987, Nunez Palomino 1995). 
The existence of legal pluralism within a context of proclaimed unity has three 
consequences. The first effect is that the State may try to absorb the normative 
systems that are formulated outside its domain into its own law. In this manner, 
it can salvage the myth of single sovereignty and claim that all authority within 
the State is ultimately derived from the sovereignty that constitutes its core. 
Until now, I have already given three examples of such a strategy. The first one 
concerns the juridical status of the baldios. After the reconquista, the kings 
claimed paramount ownership over all resources in the country through the 
model of dominium eminens or dominium directum. All other dominions, like 
that of communities over their baldios, were at least nominally derived from 
this royal privilege even if they predated the Portuguese monarchy's foundation. 
A second example concerns the religious parishes. The parishes were originally 
ecclesiastical units and hence rooted in a different source of authority, which to 
a certain extent can even be understood as a substitute sovereignty, mat of the 
Church. During the nineteenth century when the religious parishes were 
integrated into the State system as the lowest level of public administration, that 
alternative source of authority became subject to the state. The third example 
concerns the organization of the parishes under the Estado Novo between 1936 
and 1940. Their administration was modelled according to pre-existing 
structures such as the village conselho and zelador. In all of these cases the state 
absorbed (in a modified form) elements of an earlier or alternative sovereignty 
to establish its monopoly. 
The central State's attempts to absorb and integrate alternative legal 
frameworks to establish its supremacy means that the submission or substitution 
of local law by state law is am indication of the second form of state formation: 
the absorption or expulsion of social and geographic spaces by the State and the 
subjection or liberation of these spaces to or from its authority. 
The second consequence of the existence of legal pluralism is that, 
notwithstanding claims to the contrary, state power — i.e., the power of the 
state to change its subjects behaviour and/or thinking - is always limited. State 
power runs against the fact that social units or fields develop and maintain their 
own normative structures. In the daily lives of the individual actors constituting 
these "semi-autonomous fields", these normative structures may be as important 
as the official laws of the state (Moore 1978:55-57). 
Illustrative for the limits of the State's power during the ancien régime is 
Alexis de Tocqueville's (1988) comments on the situation in France prior to the 
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1789 revolution2 3. The limits of modern state power are well reflected in 
literature on the discrepancy between policy formulation and implementation and 
the "gap problem" between law and practice (Ehrlich 1962:366-390; Moore 
1978; Nelken 1981), the ambivalent attitude towards law in development (Von 
Benda-Beckmann 1989), and in Elster's (1991) argument against the application 
of rational choice theories on politics and the state. An example of the limits of 
state power in relation to the maintenance of a local normative system is 
provided by a dispute over time. Time is not only a physical phenomenon, it 
legally constituted. The legal character of time is nicely epitomized by a certain 
clock near the Cais de Sodre" station in Lisbon with the words hora legal (legal 
time) written on the dial. Being a legal phenomenon, time has a power 
dimension to it. This dimension appears from events in Campea in January 
1969, when Portugal adopted Greenwich Mean Time. One village in the parish, 
Pepe, refused to adapt the clock in the tower of its chapel as the new time did 
not coincide with the "real" solar time (AJF 5 January 1969). In Pepe, this 
resistance was subdued, but in the neighbouring parish of Vila Cova, even 
today, irrigation water is distributed not by legal, but by solar time; by means 
of a clock the parson puts in his windowsill for this purpose (Stam 1993; 
Carvalho 1994). 
The events in Pepe and Vila Cova point to the limits of State power. These 
limits do not only exist in the cases of "normal" democratic states, but also 
occur under the "exceptional" conditions of communist or fascist dictatorships. 
People may simply refuse to comply with state regulations. The Portuguese 
Estado Novo dictatorship found it very difficult to organize the rural population 
in so-called 'people's houses' (casas do povo) in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Riegelhaupt 1979:169). The dictatorship was also incapable of checking 
emigration. Emigration was "suspended" in 1947 except for that which was 
regulated through bilateral agreements with host countries such as France and 
Germany (Decreto-Lei 36,199 dd. 29 March 1947; Cravo 1989:11). These and 
other restrictions on issuing passports made Portugal "one of the most restrictive 
countries in Europe in allowing emigration" (Rose 1969:54). Despite these 
regulations, the government was unable to curb illegal mass emigration in the 
1960s (Cepeda 1988). In the late 1960s when the government changed its 
policy, about one million Portuguese living in France legalized their status as 
Portuguese citizens residing abroad (Leeds 1983). Other examples of the 
2 3 De Tocqueville points to the contradiction that the French kings had become absolute monarchs 
but still found that their subjects knew how to protect themselves through customs and usages: "The 
king who should dispose unhindered over the State's wealth, often discovered that he was incapable 
of thwarting his subjects' deeds, even in the tiniest trifle, or to suppress the least important 
expression; and in case of conflict the subject would be better defended by customs than the citizen 
of a free country is said to be protected by law" (De Tocqueville 1988:38, my translation). 
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limitations of the power of the Portuguese State will surface throughout the 
upcoming discussion. 
The acknowledgement of the limitations of state power has its repercussions 
on the way in which one should perceive the role of law. Citizens are to a large 
extent autonomous of the legislature and develop their own rules and norms. 
Thus, I do not agree with Brandao & Rowland (1980) who maintain that law is 
an instrument through which social order is changed. Together with Von Benda-
Beckmann (1989) and Moore (1978), I refuse to see law as a "magic charm" 
and to accept a social engineering perception of law. Laws can exercise a 
forceful power over social life, but mat power is less direct than the social 
engineers believe. The autonomy of society vis-a-vis law is not absolute and if a 
certain law is accompanied by forceful implementation, the law's objects (the 
people) may have only limited options for resistance. Law does change the 
society, but not in a straightforward manner. 
Law is an instrument of power and as such it may constrain social action. The 
corollary of law as a constraint is that law is also a resource: people may turn 
to law and to the different interpretations of law, allow for, in order to realize 
certain goals in their interaction with other citizens or with the state. This means 
that in the relationship between the State and its subjects the law not only 
expresses the State's (will to) power, but also a constraint on that power. For 
the State cannot (at least formally) act beyond the borders set by its own 
legislation. 
Finally, the existence of other legalities alongside state law allows for political 
movements to develop their own legal frameworks and pose these as alternatives 
to the state system. The acknowledgement of legal pluralism thus opens the road 
to a specific political strategy that is based on the challenging of the state's 
sovereignty by the creation of an alternative normative system that rests on a 
counter authority. This element of legal pluralism is very relevant for the 
understanding of the baldios in Portugal. The restitution of the commons to the 
village communities in 1976 is, as I shall outline in chapter 8, an example of an 
attempt to create such a counter authority. 
This last aspect of legal pluralism leads to the second point concerning the 
relationship between state and law, namely, auctoritas non Veritas facit legem: 
Authority makes the law, not some objective notion of truth or justice. 
Notwithstanding its mythical claims to these objective (but actually socially and 
politically constructed) concepts, law is first and foremost the expression of 
power. Power of the state over the people is ambivalent, perhaps more aspired 
than effectuated, and probably always contested, but nevertheless also present 
and real. Given the nature of the state as an arena in which and for which 
different sections of society compete, law expresses, on the one hand, the 
ambitions of these sections and, on the other hand, the balance of power 
existing between them. Law is the language of politics and its texts represent a 
frozen image of the political struggle going on within the state for control over 
that state. In chapters 8 and 10 of this book I elaborate on the political nature of 
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the law in relation to drawing up of the 1976 decree and the political process 
resulting into its revocation in 1993. 

Chapter 3 
Implications: Research Approach, Questions and 
Location 
This Research and Other Approaches 
Approaching forestry, state and law in the way proposed here has several 
implications for the position one takes in other debates, particularly discussions 
on the development of alternatives to the traditional model of state-led forestry, 
the issue of common property regimes, and the way in which one should 
conceptualize rural communities. 
This book can be read in relation to Peluso's study of the Indonesian state 
Forestry Service. Peluso presents her book as "an argument against the 
custodial-paramilitary approach to forest management" and a plea for a "sincere 
development of the forest poor" (Peluso 1992:235, 250). In it, she contrasts the 
Indonesian government's objective of hoarding wealth in the form of teak with 
the abandonment of the destitute population living in and nearby the woods. 
Similarly, this book rejects the custodial-paramilitary model. But it is also an 
invitation for a closer look at what state apparatuses and local societies really 
are and do. It reveals the shortcomings of a simple interventionist or 
instrumentalist vision of the state and state intervention by portraying the state 
and the societies in which the state intervenes as complexes of actors engaged in 
political and economic power-plays over various social and natural resources. 
An alternative to state-led forestry is the promotion of community participation 
in forestry. After a long-standing tradition of state-led forest management, the 
1980s witnessed a shift away from state towards civil management: 
unfavourable experiences with government administration of forest land and 
afforestation efforts in Burkina Faso, Nepal, and India prompted forest policy-
makers to turn to the community as a capable and effective agent in 
afforestation and forest maintenance. The concepts of social and community 
forestry invaded the development-oriented discussion on forestry (Wiersum 
1987; Carter 1993; Kajembe 1994:26-30), and were even adopted by the World 
Bank (Sharma et al. 1994:4, 31, 33). This thinking guided the design and 
implementation of alternative forestry projects (for example Bohlin 1984; 
Freudenthal & Narrow 1991; and various contributions to Bradley & McNamara 
1993). The changes in the Portuguese policy towards the baldios and the 
commoners paralleled and even preceded this shift: until 1974 the state 
monopolized the commons. Afterwards, the state returned the lands to the 
communities and tried to develop a modus vivendi in the shape of a certain form 
of co-management that would satisfy both local demands and national needs. 
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Hence, the exposure of the Portuguese experience with state forest 
administration can be of great significance for the development of new forest 
policies in other parts of the world. 
This book will also address issues concerning common property regimes. 
Garrit Hardin's article "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968) has set the tone 
for the debate. The article's central point is that individual action leads 
inevitably towards the destruction of common-pool resources. His claim that 
communal resources are unavoidably destroyed by commoners acting as so-
called free-riders, forced others to try and get prove to the contrary; that 
communities are capable of managing their resources in an ecologically and 
economically sustainable way (see the various case studies in McCay and 
Acheson 1987 and Bromley 1992). The rudiments of a theory of common-pool 
resource management systems are focused upon the same objective: they try to 
prove that game models like the prisoners dilemma are inappropriate or can be 
adapted in such a way that coordinated restraint of exploitation becomes feasible 
(Wade 1988:160-164; Buis 1990, 11:911-918; Orstom 1992; Runge 1992). 
Since the beginning of the debate over the commons, participants in the 
discussion have tried to refine the definition of "the commons". "Common 
property" was judged too limited as it presupposed a certain juridical 
framework, which in many cases did not exist, and swept together under one 
heading different resources that might be managed according to distinct 
normative frameworks. Therefore, one has presently opted for the use of the 
term "common-pool" resources. By pointing to specific pools of resources being 
exploited communally, this term avoids the limitations of the earlier one 
(Bromley 1992:3-4, 11; Ostrom 1992:295-297). The distinction between 
common and other property regimes is based upon the concepts of access to and 
control over (access to) the use of a certain resource. Open access (no 
restrictions), is distinguished from limited access (access restricted to or 
dependent on a group of members) and private access (access restricted to or 
dependent on an individual (legal or natural) person). Common-pool resources 
are equated with limited access situations. By using this distinction, it becomes 
among other things possible to dismiss Hardin's critique of the commons as 
impropriate, since he is criticizing open access resources rather than at 
common-pool resources which are characterized by limited access (Berkes et al. 
1989). The restriction of access has an external and an internal dimension. 
Externally, outsiders are excluded, and internally the exploitation of the 
resource by the community members can be regulated, for instance by limiting 
the number of livestock or other arrangements maintained by the commoners 
(see Cox 1985:53-60; Oakerson 1992; and chapter 5 of mis book). 
Nevertheless, this analysis on the basis of access and control is still 
incomplete. Ultimately, control over (access to) a resource is always contingent 
upon relations between individuals. All rights of control, access, and 
exploitation, are necessarily maintained in coordination and cooperation (or 
conflict) with and according to the varying circumstances in society. As all 
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relations between an individual and a resource are socially negotiated, totally 
private and totally open access to resources do not exist in reality. They are the 
(imaginary) borderline cases in a broad continuum shaped by the variation in the 
scale of social conglomeration. These conglomerations are based upon different 
bonds and mechanisms, including kinship, residence, occupation, class, and 
nationality. The boundaries and the bonds that constitute these aggregates or 
communities are constantly negotiated. 
In this book, the continuum and the ongoing attempts to redefine the 
community are for example reflected in the development of different concepts 
for communal land such as baldios municipals, baldios paroquiais, and monte 
do povo. The bonds that define the conglomerate are residence in different 
scales of aggregation. In addition to communal property, another form of 
collective property exists in Portuguese communities, namely corporate 
property. This is property that is owned by a group of heirs holding fixed, 
alienable shares. Traditionally, this property regime governs the use of water 
for irrigation and milling (O'Neill 1987). As Velozo's (1953) discussion of the 
common (maninho) of Vilarinho da Furna and my description of the monte in 
Campea (chapter 7) indicate, the two categories overlap. In this perspective, it 
is fruitless to pursue an analytically exclusive and ahistorical definition of the 
commons. Instead, I propose a pragmatic approach and use "commons", 
"communal land", "common-pool resources", and baldios synonymously for the 
physical space (the area) actually or potentially holding the juridical status of a 
common according to Decreto-Lei 39/76. 
Along with the stress on sustainability, the tendency to idealize commoners 
and commoners' communities characterizes the debate over common property 
regimes. An early example of this idealization can be found in Morgan's study 
of the North-American Iroquois Indians (Lemaire 1986:222-230). In the 
nineteenth century, the discovery of ancient common-property arrangements in 
North America and Germany has been connected to attempts to give Utopian 
socialism a scientific base by pointing at the existence of a communist past 
(Engels 1973:39-58, 1980:64-5, 173, 214). In Portugal this idea of primitive 
communism was defended by Oliveira Martins (Dias 1953:18, footnote 2, 
Silbert 1978:232-240)'. 
Because of both the emphasis on sustainability and the burden of the earlier 
idealization of primitive communities contemporary discussions of common 
property arrangements tend to neglect the aspect of the distribution of power 
over and revenues from the commonwealth (i.e., Acharya 1989 in his study of 
the Nepal Jirel community forestry management system). The commoner is 
idealized. Cox (1985:61) goes as far as to suggest that the destruction of the 
1 Jorge Dias (1964) used Portuguese primitive communitarianism as an argument in defense of 
Portuguese colonialism in Africa. For a critique of the evolutionist presumptions and the quality of 
the ethnographic material on which the theory of primitive communism was founded, see Van den 
Bergh (1988:10-16). See also chapter 2, footnote 11 in this book. 
48 Planting Power 
commons was the result of a change in human nature: "Since it seems quite 
likely if 'economic man' had been managing the commons that tragedy really 
would have occurred, perhaps someone else was running the common." 
Apparently, together with industrialization, agrarian reform, and the reshaping 
of farming techniques, the type of person mentally capable of managing a 
common and of valuing the community's interests over his own private interests 
has disappeared and has been substituted by a new, self-interested specimen (see 
also Achterhuis 1988:216). 
This idealization of rural communities is also present in Portuguese 
anthropological work by Dias (1948, 1953), and Ribeiro (1991, or. 1940) and 
their students Costa (1959), Fontes (1977), Lema (1978), and Polanah (1981, 
1985). In the same vein as Wol f s (1966) closed corporate community, these 
authors presented images of rural societies that maintained strong 
'communitarian' traditions with respect to local rule, the administration of 
communal resources (land, water, mills and ovens), and the reciprocal exchange 
of labour. In their opinion, these communities were the last remnants of earlier, 
non-capitalist societies that had managed to survive into a hostile capitalist era 
because of the natural characteristics of their geophysical environment and then-
relative social and economic isolation connected to that environment. Moreover, 
authors like Dias and Polonah pay little or no attention to the differences in 
wealth and power that divided these communities. This idealization was 
corrected only in the beginning of the 1980s, partly by Jan Willem Bennema 
(1978), but particularly through the work of Brian O'Neill (1987). Today it is 
commonly accepted that, as Campbell and Godoy put it, 
[tjhe strong corporate sense manifested by these ... communities 
should not be mistaken for rural egalitarianism.... Corporation, a 
shared identity, and a sense of common purpose at a village level 
were perfectly compatible with the existence of sharp inequalities 
between peasants and marked intragroup rivalry (1992:115). 
This book fits in with this recent approach and is sensitive to the internal 
differentiation and conflicts within commoners' communities. 
Methodological Implications 
The theoretical discussion in chapter 2 of the concepts underlying this research, 
(S/s)tate, state formation, and law, defines the position of this book in relation 
to general debates on forestry, common property and the peasantry. In addition, 
it provides some clues for the way in which one should investigate the process 
of state formation and the role of state forestry in that process. 
The first methodological implication is mat one has to identify empirically the 
parts of social life that should be included in the state. One has to take 
sovereignty as a starting point and then determine whether that sovereignty 
materializes in the actors and institutions and whether their actions express that 
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sovereignty. Statutory law is a useful instrument because it draws the line 
between public and private spheres. But it does not substitute for the 
observation of sovereignty in action in real social life (for instance, in the shape 
of (informal) control by the state of a civil institution through the domination of 
the institution's finances) as a means to delineate the state from its exterior. 
The second consequence is that state and state formations are political 
concepts with economic implications; sovereignty implies (the will to) power 
over social and natural resources. Therefore, the investigation of state formation 
requires research on changes in control over these resources. 
Law, as the emanation of sovereignty, expresses the will to power. Therefore, 
the co-existence of legal/normative systems point to alternative "wills to 
power". The methodological implication is that to analyze the process of state 
formation in its second and third forms, expansion or contraction and 
intensification or reduction, and changes in statehood and state form, one has to 
look at the legal struggles and legal/normative systems within the different 
(political) arenas. In this manner, it becomes possible to identify whether or not 
and to what extent alternative sources of authority are submitted to, or 
integrated into the claimed sovereignty. It also becomes possible to see how and 
to what extent the state's internal coherence is politically constructed. 
The fourth methodological consequence is that the conflict between the wills 
to power of the central sovereignty and the local society appear clearest at the 
intersections where these overlap. Such overlap is evident in outreach 
structures. The way in which the central state tries to subdue the local society 
and the extent to which it successfully does so, constitute the actual process of 
state formation. Therefore, looking at these outreach structures' internal 
organisation (the way in which official and representative aspects are 
combined), and its concrete actions (both in terms of laws, by-laws, and 
regulations, and actual behaviour) is essential in any inquiry into states and state 
formation. 
Finally, my analysis of the role of forestry reveals that the forest bureaucracy 
is an outreach structure through which the central state can penetrate into, 
articulate with, and acquire control over local communities. In the specific case 
of Portugal, there is an additional element which supports this position. Since 
1976, the Forestry Service has been linked to those communities owning baldios 
through the commoners' commissions. In this manner, within the forest 
management organization bodies exist, that, similar to for example parish 
councils, have an administrative and a representative nature, and that can 
connect the forest administration to residual traditional authorities, the village 
council, and the zelador, with respect to the management of the baldios. 
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Research Questions and Method 
The problem addressed by this research is the changing relations between rural 
communities and the wider political and economic system in relation to and as a 
result of state forestry intervention in the rural population's boMios. In order to 
dissect, analyze, and understand these changes, one has to formulate concrete 
questions. These questions are related to all parties in the process: the state and 
the state apparatus, and the commoners and their society. The questions 
correspond to the different perspectives in my approach (political, economic, 
and legal) and they address two different levels: the empirical and the 
theoretical. 
At the empirical level, two social domains, the state and the society of 
commoners, and their mutual relationships are investigated. With respect to the 
first domain, the state, one has to identify how it and its apparatus came into 
being and were transformed during the afforestation of the commons, and when 
the baldios were later given back to the population. Hence, one has to 
investigate the development of state forestry administrative institutions and 
reveal the key factors that have shaped this development. Relevant questions 
are: How many people did the state Forestry Service employ over time? What 
were the officials' legal competencies? How did the Service mobilize support 
for its expansion and intervention into the commons? Which economic interests 
did it serve? 
The second domain is the rural society. Here, one has to identify the way in 
which the rural population - the commoners - organized their life and how this 
organization changed after the forestation of their commons. In both cases, one 
has to look at the formal rules and the actual practices. Relevant questions with 
respect to this domain are: In what way did the commoners use their natural 
resources and how did this change over time? What are the changes in the 
formal rules as defined within different legal contexts? 
The relations between both domains must also be studied. For example: What 
did the Forestry Service and its officials actually do when it intervened in the 
commons and how did they interact with the commoners? Did they change the 
formal rules that regulated the exploitation of the baldios? Did they enforce 
changes in the actual land use? Did these changes cause a transformation in the 
local society's political and economic organization? 
At a more abstract level one has to identify if these changes can be understood 
in terms of state formation in the sense that they express a significant 
modification in the relationship between the state and its subjects. In this 
respect, several issues and research questions arise. Hespanha (1980, 1986) 
suggests that there is a relation between the modification of the state's tax base, 
the strengthening of state control over the interior, the technical and social 
change in agrarian production, and the reformulation of the different concepts of 
property. If he is right, how should we understand the communities in which 
communal property has persisted through time? Is that persistence the result of 
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their isolation from the state and developing capitalism as Lema (1978:112) 
argues? Or are these communities, as Medeiros (1976:310-2, 1978:30, 37-81) 
claims, pockets of non-capitalist modes of production, which in articulation with 
surrounding capitalism, maintained their systems of local rule and their 
independence from the state? (See Fitzpatrick 1980:168-169, 1983 for the role 
of law in this articulation.) Should the state policy between 1926 and 1974 to 
divide and nationalize the commons be understood as an attempt to enforce the 
bourgeois revolution in these pockets and break their political autonomy? Can 
the restitution of the commons in 1976 be seen as a counter-tendency directed at 
the revitalization of local self-government and the decentralization of the state? 
And finally, how should one interpret the role of the state Forestry Service in 
these processes? 
The methodology I followed to answer these questions was based on the 
assumption that general social processes and changes can only be abstracted 
from concrete actions of individuals on the basis of theoretical assumptions. The 
data we gather are (pre-)conceptualized (Sayer 1984;51, 80-90). In this case, 
these assumptions are largely derived from critical political economy. Among 
other things, this means that individuals are not taken as isolated, they are part 
of a wider social settings; the community, the economy, the polity. Therefore, I 
combined elements from the traditional monograph method (the study of one 
parish) with the collection of general data on the country's economy and 
(political) history. I consulted archives and libraries in Lisbon, Braga, and Vila 
Real to become acquainted with the Portuguese discussion of the matter, and to 
master the general historical background of the phenomena I wanted to study. I 
also used the extended case method (Epstein 1967; Van Velzen 1967) of 
studying selected examples of communities where difficulties had emerged in 
the functioning of the local communal land management commissions. I visited 
these selected areas regularly throughout the research period (1990-1994) and 
interviewed the key actors involved. The monograph part is not intended to 
provide a portrait of an isolated community but to show the various 
developments resulting from a small community's integration into the wider 
national political and economic systems, by investigating its social, political, and 
economic history (Almeida 1977; Pinto 1977). Hereto, I lived in a village from 
December 1990 until October 1991 and returned to the same for several weeks 
in 1992, 1993, and 1994. I spent this time in the village on formal 
anthropological research (a small survey, structured and unstructured 
interviews, observation), on consulting the Parish Council's records, and on 
participating in its social and cultural life. The latter was certainly the most 
pleasant part of my stay in the village, and crucial for the success of the more 
formal elements of the research. 
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Research Location: Vila Real District and the Parish of 
Campeâ 
My inquiry into the relationship between the afforestation of the commons and 
state formation, took place at several different sites. My most important 
research location was a parish in the district of Vila Real. This district was 
chosen because it contains the largest concentration of common land and there 
are also a considerable number of communities that acquired their baldios 
according to the prerequisites of the 1976 law. Another reason for selecting this 
district was that I would be able to benefit from contacts that had earlier been 
established with the university and forest administrators in the region. In order 
to identify the best research location in this area I decided to search for 
communities where the patriarchal-communitarian institutions were still vital and 
where community members had been able to protect their common property 
regime despite state intervention. In addition, I sought a situation that would 
allow me to study the different reactions to the 1976 legislation. 
There were three possible reactions to the 1976 legislation. The first was that 
the population did not claim back its commons according to the conditions 
established by this law. If a community would claim back its commons, the 
1976 law defined two options: without state representation and with state 
representation to the commission (modalities a and b, supra, p. 14). Upon my 
arrival in Vila Real, I asked the Forestry Service's delegation to the area for a 
list of communities with management commissions (appendix 1). From this list, 
I selected the parishes where all three possible responses could be found: 
villages without a management commission, and villages with a management 
commission without or with state representation to it. It appeared that this 
situation existed only in four parishes: Alfarela de Jales, Santo André da 
Campeâ, Fontes, and Vila Verde. After having visited these areas, I opted for 
Campeâ on the basis of some other criteria, such as the size of the baldios, the 
existence of animal husbandry, the importance of certain non-agricultural 
sources of income, the character of the commission and, of course, the presence 
of the Forestry Service in the area2. This parish not only seemed to satisfy the 
criteria I had set, but also made me feel welcome during my visits. 
Santo André da Campeâ, abbreviated to Campeâ, is located in the extreme 
west of the district and municipality of Vila Real in the eastern folds of the 
Serra de Marâo (see map in figure 3.1). This mountain range, with a maximum 
altitude of 1415 meters above sea-level, runs from the north to the south and 
divides coastal province of Minho in the west from the interior province of 
Trâs-os-Montes ("Behind-the-Mountains") in the east. Minho consists of the 
districts Viana do Castelo, Braga, and Porto, and Trâs-os-Montes includes the 
2 It appeared that the commissions of Moreira de Jales, Vila Verde, and Balsa and Vale de Agodim 
had been either only recently created or were likely to fall apart soon. 
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Figure 3.1: The location of the research district Vila Real (shaded) and parish 
Campea (black). 
districts of Vila Real and Braganca. The Minho area is humid and with relative-
ly moderate temperatures, whereas Tras-os-Montes is dryer. In TraVos-Montes, 
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the variation in temperature is much greater, with hot summers and cold 
winters. As the local saying goes: Très meses de inferno e nove de inverno 
("Three months of hell and nine of winter"). Rainfall is concentrated during 
autumn and winter ( ± 75% in October-March) (World Bank 1978; Gaspar 
1981). 
The climatic difference between Minho and Trâs-os-Montes reflects a general 
phenomenon. Geographers characterize Portugal by two competing influences: 
the Mediterranean from the south and east, and the Atlantic from the north and 
west. The Mediterranean influence is continental, dry and with a large seasonal 
variation in temperature, whereas the Atlantic influence is maritime, moist and 
more moderate (see Pérez-Dîaz 1991:21 for Spain). The northwest of the 
country, Minho, is typically Atlantic, whereas the northeast, Trâs-os-Montes, is 
more Mediterranean. The mountain range of which the Serra do Marâo is a 
part, forms the geo-morphological barrier between bom regions, shielding the 
interior from the maritime Atlantic influence. According to Ribeiro (1987), this 
barrier has not only a climatological impact but also a cultural aspect, as 
appears for instance from the lay-out of the villages. Minho is characterized by 
dispersed dwellings, whereas in Trâs-os-Montes the houses are huddled closely 
together in small villages (Freund 1970; Ribeiro 1987, 1991:376-377). In 
addition, the Serra (mountain range) has also a political significance. The people 
living in Trâs-os-Montes - "Behind the mountains" - claim that it shields them 
not only from the humid Atlantic air, but also from government interference. 
Looking from Trâs-os-Montes, Lisbon and the government are light-years away 
and bear little influence on local political life. As the people say: Aquém do 
Marâo mandamos nos quern câ estào, "On this side of the Marâo, we who live 
here, govern ourselves. " 
Campeâ lies right on the eastern side of the watershed, in Trâs-os-Montes. 
The parish consists of a fertile plateau, 750 meters above sea-level, the sur-
rounding mountains, and a pan of the steep slopes running south to the Douro 
river. The plateau lies to the north of the road connecting Vila Real to Porto 
(see map in figure 3.2). This plateau is surrounded to the north, west and south 
by mountains of 1,000 to 1,400 meter above see level. To the east, at a place 
called Foz ("mouth"), it opens to the lower valleys of the interior of Trâs-os-
Montes. It is encircled by about 15 small villages most of which are located on 
the border between the fertile meadows and the barren wastelands. Three 
villages are located south of the road, on the slopes facing the south. As I will 
show later in this book, the three villages in the parish's southern half passed 
through a different economic and social development than the hamlets on the 
plateau. 
Because the Marâo shields Campeâ from Atlantic influences Vergilio Taborda 
(1932) includes the parish in Trâs-os-Montes. However, it is typically a border 
area. This is appears for instance from its climate. Compared to the rest of 
Trâs-os-Montes, the parish receives a lot of rain (approximately 1200 mm 
against 550 mm in Mirandela, in the heart of the province). It appears also from 
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Te Mondin. de Basto 
Figure 3.2: The villages constituting the parishes of CampeS, and Vila Cova 
(Mascosello and Vila Cova) and Quinta (QuintS) (scale 1:71,000). 
the lay-out of the villages and the local fanning system. Echoing JCI (1939, 
1941), Costa (1959:154) calls the way in which houses are huddled together in 
small hamlets, typical for Tras-os-Montes. 'Minho' is the alternation of crops 
and pastures, or the campos-prados farming system. This system consists of a 
rotation of fodder grains, grasses, potatoes, and maize on the same field. 
During winter, the meadows on the plateau (prados or lameiros) are intensively 
irrigated. The grass is cut and brought to the cattle which most of the day are 
kept locked away in stables. In April and May, the meadow is manured, 
ploughed and sown with maize or potatoes. The pasture is transformed into a 
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field (campo). Harvested by the end of September or October, the field returns 
to grassland, which after the autumn rains is abundantly irrigated, until it is 
covered by a constant layer of running water (dgua de lima) (Ribeiro 
1987:116). In mis manner, the grass's growth is not affected by the winter 
frosts. During the summer, maize and potatoes are irrigated. This irrigation is 
rather extensive, as there is often only water for two or three irrigation turns of 
several hours each during the entire season3. 
The present shape of the CampeS farming system is of a rather recent date. 
Maize arrived from the Americas sometime during the eighteenth century. 
Potatoes were introduced only in the twentieth century. Potatoes are not 
mentioned in an 1868 description by the Instituto Geogrdphico (1869:264), but 
in 1923 the municipality of Vila Real already produced a considerable quantity 
(Taborda 1932:121). Originally, the most important crop was rye. Sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries' documents show that the parishioners had to pay rents 
and church taxes in quantities of rye (ADB, Tombo da Igreja; ANTdT, Casa do 
Infantado, Livro 215). It is probable that the grain was cultivated in a two-folds 
system. The toponyms Veiga de Cima and Veiga de Baixo (Upper Valley and 
Lower Valley) still refer to that history (Taborda 1932:119, Dias 1949:106-
108). Today, maize and potatoes fill the fallow of the original two-folds system 
(Costa 1959; Ribeiro 1987). 
On the lower parts of the mountains encircling the plateau one can find sweet 
chestnut groves (soutos). Before the introduction of the potato, the chestnut was 
an important basic staple food. Grapes and olives are cultivated sparsely in the 
southern part of the parish. The inhabitants of the three villages in the south 
traditionally lived from animal husbandry: Until the mid 1950s they maintained 
large flocks of sheep and goats which were grazed on the village commons. On 
the plateau, horned cattle was more important. In the past, the farmers kept a 
local stock, the so-called maronesa. This breed was principally suitable for the 
production of meat and the provision of draught power. Nowadays, the marone-
sas have been replaced by the black and white Frisians, locally called turinas, 
which are kept for milk production. Milk is collected in several collective 
milking parlours which are owned by the dairy cooperative Agros. The shift 
towards Frisians has practically put an end to the practice of grazing cattle on 
the baldios. 
3 In the 1950s some potatoes were cultivated without irrigation on fields higher up in me moun-
tains. These potatoes were planted in March, in order to benefit from the rains. At that time, barley 
was still sown. As far as I know, this is no longer the case. 
The maize is generally weeded twice, and watered according to local water availability (three, 
four, or five rimes during the growth season), and very other week only in the most favoured 
situations. 
The sowing of fodder grains is combined with the harvest, so that during harvest the seeds are 
worked into the soil. 
Cabbages are planted on the potato fields, either amidst the crop, or along the borders. Beans are 
planted in combination with maize. 
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The baldios of the parish were (and still are) located on the mountains which 
encircle the valley. Their original juridical status is difficult to establish. The 
fact that an eighteenth century description included the parish among the prop-
erties of the Crown Prince could suggest that they were communally used 
Crown land (reguengos)4. However, the 1666 inventory of the Crown Prince's 
properties in the region mentions only a small area of circa 13,800 square varas 
or 1.7 ha in the southern half of the parish. The inhabitants of Lombo Meam, 
the original name of the hamlet of Montes, had to pay an annual rent of 16 
alqueires (272 litres) of rye and one sheep for the use of this reguengo 
(ANTdT, Casa do Infantado, Livro 215) 5 . Therefore, the baldios of Campea 
were certainly not reguengos. Furthermore, eighteenth century reports clarify 
that the land did not belong to the municipality (Goncalves 1983) so that they 
were not bens do concelho either. Whether this implies that the commons in 
Campea were "true" baldios, as Vila Nova de Portugal called it, or a maninho 
owned by the Church or another feudal landlord, cannot be ascertained beyond 
doubt. But, as I found only references to the payments of rent to the Church 
and feudal lords for privately exploited areas, I believe that it is safe to assume 
that the commons in Campea were indeed "true" baldios. 
In 1868, the Instituto Geogrdphico (1868:264) described the parish's commons 
as "denuded, or only covered by creepers." Pereiro and Rodrigues (1906, 
U:673) mention the existence of two lagoas (lakes) in the valley itself. In reality 
these "lakes" were a kind of wetland which during summer would dry and be 
used communally by the villagers of Pepe, Balsa, and Quinta as a pasture for 
their cattle. Nowadays, the mountains are covered by trees and heather, and the 
lagoas in the valley have disappeared. Both changes are the result of state 
interventions in the local common property arrangements during the 1950s 
which will be discussed extensively in chapter 7. Presently, about half of the 
parish area is common property. The lower parts of the commons are generally 
used for grazing cattle and collecting brush and fuel wood. The upper areas are 
controlled by the Forestry Service, which acquired control over these areas in 
1956. The expansion of the Forestry Service will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
4 This description was given by Father Cardoso in his Memorias Paroquiais (ANTdT, Volume 8, 
Mem. 65, p. 419) and has been copied by subsequent authors such as Leal (1874), Pereiro & 
Rodrigues (1906) and Costa (1934). 
5 One vara was about 1.1 meter, and in Trâs-os-Montes one alqueire equalled about 17 litres or 12 
kg (Castro 1978-1985,111:258, 260; O'Neill 1987). 

Chapter 4 
The Emergence and Transformation of the Modern 
Forest Bureaucracy 
Introduction: State Formation in Portugal 
The contemporary Portuguese state can be traced back to a kingdom that emerged 
in the twelfth century on the western shore of the Iberian peninsula. Two factors 
led to the appearance of this kingdom. One factor was the comparative strengths 
and weaknesses of Christian and Moorish warlords. The other factor was that the 
Christian count of the area around the mouth of the Douro River near the city of 
Porto, Portucale, aspired to free himself from his lord and master, the king of 
Leon. With help from municipal militia, and troops composed of their own vassals, 
and military religious orders (the Knights of the Temple, Hospital Knights the 
military orders of Aviz and Santiago) the count succeeded in driving the Moors 
back to Africa (the so-called reconquista) and carving out a territory with stable 
external frontiers, which was recognized by the Pope as an independent kingdom 
in 1179. Internally, the king had not only to deal with the bids for power by other 
noblemen, but also with constraints placed upon their powers by the liberties 
demanded by the municipalities, vassals and religious orders in reward for their 
contribution to the conquest. The many documents in which the king renewed or 
confirmed privileges granted by his predecessors show that the Portuguese ruler 
succeeded in countervailing centrifugal tendencies and maintaining their paramount 
position in the feudal order as well as their paramount ownership over the land and 
resources in their realm (Castro 1978-1985,11:82-83; Silbert 1981:84; see Neves 
1978-1993, for forest-related privileges). In the eighteenth century, the Portuguese 
kings were able to become absolute monarchs. King Dom Pedro II (1668-1706) 
ruled with almost unlimited power, unlike his predecessors who had to govern in 
cooperation with the Cortes, an assembly of the clergy, nobility, and 
representatives of the municipalities (Saraiva 1981:220). But even his dominion 
was incomplete: in the countryside the local communities governed themselves 
autonomously. These communities were what Elias calls village republics. To the 
central administration they remained black boxes. The king contented himself to 
indirect rule in their realm's interior and concentrated on those parts of his 
kingdom that were vital to his income and power (see supra, pp. 15-18). 
The transition to a bourgeois state lasted throughout the entire nineteenth 
century. In 1822, King Dom Joao VI had to accept a constitution that restricted his 
powers through the creation of a parliament which was elected by all literate male 
heads of households. In 1826 this constitution was revised in favour of the 
propertied classes: The suffrage was limited to those who paid at least 100,000 reis 
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in taxes. The creation of the Cdmara dos Pares (Chamber of Peers) which existed 
of noblemen and senior members of the clergy who were appointed by the king 
strengthened royal power and advanced the noblemen's position over the 
bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, it did not stop the latter's ascendency as wealthy 
civilians became ennobled. In that manner the traditional aristocracy gradually lost 
their terrain to the nouveau riche1. 1878 saw the last nobleman, the Duke of Avila 
presiding over of the Council of Ministers. And, between 1861 and 1900 the 
percentage of titled cabinet members declined from 35 to 3.4 (Oliveira Marques 
1986, 111:120). These changes in the composition of the parliament and the 
government indicate a transformation the State's class character: the State's societal 
basis shifted from the nobility to the bourgeoisie. 
The transition towards a constitutional monarchy and a bourgeois State met 
considerable resistance: civil war between 1828 and 1834 and rural and military 
uprisings in 1846 (called: Maria da Fonte), 1846-1847 (Patuleia), and 1851 
(Regeneracao). Notwithstanding these rebellions, the victorious liberals were able 
to reform the central State and its relationship to local administrations. The 
admmistrative codes of 1836,1842,1878,1886,1895, and 1896 reflect the central 
State's attempts to gain control over the municipalities and substitute direct for 
indirect rule over the country's interior. The trajectory was circuitous; some 
centralizing measures in one law were revoked by subsequent legislation (see also 
chapter 2). 
In the nineteenth century, the regime also reformed the organization of property 
by the sale of ecclesiastical goods of the dead hand (1834) and of crown and 
communal land (1869), by the abolition of feudal rights (1863), and by the 
institution of a new civil code (1867) (Saraiva 1981:287-295; Oliveira Marques 
1986,111:54-58, 118-122; Silbert 1978:79-101). These transformations stimulated 
the development of capitalist agriculture (Cabral 1981:212 ff., 1988:13; supra, 
chapter 2). At the same time, a process of proletarianization was taking place in 
the rural areas, first among artisans and later among farmers. As the domestic 
labour market was unable to absorb this emergent class of workers, many workers 
left the country, resulting in increased emigration during the last decades of the 
nineteenth century. 
The development of capitalism was connected to a new type of State 
intervention. Beginning in the 1850s, the State undertook the development of 
infrastructure. Under Minister Fontes Pereira de Melo, the government initiated 
the building of new terrestrial connections (roads, bridges, and railways) and 
promoted the development of a communication infrastructure (postal service in 
1850 and telegraph in 1857) (Oliveira Marques 1986,111:89-92). This policy was 
named fontismo, after the minister. It was through these activities that otherwise 
1 Between 1821 and 1890 the king ennobled 868 individuals, making them barons or viscounts. The 
devaluation of these tittles is well expressed in the popular saying: Foge coo, que tefazem baraol Para 
onde, se mefazem visconde?, "Run away, dog or they make you a baron! Where shall hide if they make 
me viscount?" (Oliveira Marques 1986, m:119). 
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isolated areas such as Tras-os-Montes became accessible (Lema 1980). This meant 
more intensive economic relations between these peripheral areas and the rest of 
the country directly through the hiring of labour for construction works (about 
13,000 to 14,000 rural labourers were employed yearly) and indirectly through the 
reduction of transport costs and time (Cabral 1988:15). The new roads, railways, 
and means of communication increased the presence of state power enabling the 
State to penetrate more easily penetrate into the thitherto remote corners of the 
kingdom. 
The last decades of the nineteenth century brought to light the weaknesses of the 
modernization model. Fontismo was financed by heavy State borrowing. By the end 
of the nineteenth century credit lines had dried up and the State suddenly faced a 
fiscal crisis. At the same time, domestic commercial wheat production (the source 
of income of the landed elite) was facing declining international market prices, and 
the increase in emigration put the market for agricultural labour under pressure 
(Cabral 1988:13). Finally, in 1890, the central government was deeply humiliated 
when a British cruiser invaded the Lisbon harbour and threatened to shell the city 
if Portugal did not immediately give up their territorial claims in southern Africa. 
The regime was not able to respond adequately to these economic and political 
difficulties and went bankrupt. Its social basis crumbled while republican political 
movements became more powerful. In 1891 the first revolt took place in Porto. In 
February 1908, King Dom Carlos and Crown Prince Luis Filipe were killed, and 
in October 1910 a military rebellion forced his successor, King Dom Manuel II, 
to abdicate and go into exile (Oliveira Marques 1986, 111:24-30, 43-50). 
The formal transformation of the State into a republic did not resolve the 
political and economic problems. As the State's fiscal crisis deepened, anarchy 
took hold. The political instability and the rapidly changing economic organization 
were also reflected in labour unrest and numerous strikes2. In 1919, monarchist 
troops formed a "counter-state", the "Monarchy of the North", which maintained 
control over the north of the country for about one month (Oliveira Marques 1986, 
111:246). After seven presidents and forty-five cabinets, of which the most enduring 
lasted 400 days and the shortest only 7 days (Schwartzman 1986:150), the republic 
fell victim to a conservative military coup in May 1926. Like elsewhere in Europe, 
the new regime rapidly acquired a fascist character3. In 1928, the military realized 
that they were unable to solve the country's economic problems and called on 
civilian experts. Ant6nio de Oliveira Salazar, an economics professor at the 
2 See Medeiros (1978) for an extensive description of the history of the labour movement during the 
First Republic. Labour protest against government policy was not without reason. Gallagher (1983) 
points to the anti-proletarian character of republican policies. 
3 The success of fascism in Europe of the 1920s is closely related to the way in which it successfully 
allied itself to nationalism: fascism claimed for itself the mission of creating a nation-state and repressed 
anyone who challenged that claim and mission (Pais 1986:134). Descriptions of the rise of fascism in 
other European states (France, Spain, Germany, Eastern Europe) can be found in Volume I of Pinto 
(1987). 
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Coimbra University and related to conservative catholic political movements, 
became minister of Finance. Salazar outwitted both his colleagues as well as the 
President of the republic and was able to accumulate all power in his hands. In 
1932 he became Prime-Minister. He remained the country's sole ruler until he fell 
ill in 1968. 
Salazar's rule meant a new phase in the process of state formation. Being an 
exponent of catholic corporatism, he reshaped the country using a corporatist 
outline and in 1933 he created the Estado Novo (the New State). Employers and 
labourers were organized in syndicates and guilds. Representatives of these 
organizations had privileged access to the government through the C&mara 
Corporativa, an advisory body consisting of the country's political and economic 
elite. The new political order entailed a leading role for the State on behalf of the 
country's most important capital groups. In 1931, two years before the new 
political model was officially established, the so-called Condicionamento Industrial 
(Conditioning of Industries) was created. This policy entailed that new technologies 
and new enterprises could start only when the government judged that existing 
industries did not already cover a certain field of activities in a sufficient manner. 
Any innovation also had to be desirable or acceptable from both the national and 
the social perspective (Brito 1985, 1989; Marques 1988). In theory, mis measure 
should have corrected capitalism's inefficient and wasteful character and alleviated 
the disturbances of economic life that resulted from speculation and egoism through 
coordination and planning4. In practice, however, it helped the elite to protect their 
interests and thwarted industrialization. Between 1920 and 1940 the industrial 
working population grew from only 1 to 2% (Gallagher 1983:76). 
The Estado Novo ruler was afraid that the emergence of an industrial proletariate 
would threaten political stability. Hence, agricultural policy was directed to the 
support of the family farm. Imitating Mussolini's agricultural policies in Italy, the 
government in 1937 created the Internal Resettlement Board or Junta da 
Colonizagao Interna (JCI) specially to encourage family farming by creating new 
settler communities on communal waste lands (Baptista 1978b, 1993:22; Cabral 
1982:29). The government also strengthened the Forestry Service in order to forest 
areas which in technical terms were unsuitable for farming. In this way, allegedly 
unproductive territories could serve the national interest by providing wood 
(EstSvao 1983). After 1945 the government started to support substantially 
industrialization. New legislation enabled the State to contribute capital for new 
enterprises after approving the viability of the investment. This law was aimed at 
import substitution and favoured the creation of iron, fertilizer, paper, and copper 
industries, and of electricity production enterprises. In 1952, the law on industrial 
conditioning was revised (Lei 2,052 of 11 March 1952, quoted by Brito 1985:57-
59, 1989:128 ff.). Nevertheless, the new legislation continued to favour the 
4 According to Marcelo Caetano it translated itself into "the cooperation of producers and discipline 
in the production, in the regulation of competition and the fixation of a just price" (Caetano 1935:19, 
quoted by Brito 1985:52). 
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financial elites in the country. 
Although Salazar organized the state according to the principle of corporatism, 
he officially maintained parliamentary rule as a form of representation. The 
government submitted itself to plebiscites and every seven years it organized 
elections for the presidency, and every four years for the chamber of deputies and 
the members of the municipal councils. Access to political (and public) offices was 
controlled by the Uniao National, which also tried to make the regime acceptable 
to the general public. The organization of political representation changed after the 
Second World War. During the regime's first decade, all candidates were drawn 
from the Uniao National. After the defeat of Germany and Italy in 1945, the 
political opposition in Portugal was allowed to participate in elections. But the 
district system and winner-takes-all principle guaranteed that the opposition would 
never gain substantial hold over the state's administrative and political institutions 
(Cruz 1988:179-227). 
When Salazar fell ill in 1968, he was succeeded by Marcelo Caetano. At that 
time, Caetano was a law professor at the Lisbon University, but he had already 
occupied important political offices such as leader of the official youth organization 
(Mocidade Portuguesa), Minister of Colonies, and of the executive committee of 
the Uniao National, and Minister of the Presidency (de facto Deputy Prime 
Minister and heir presumptive to Salazar). "As a publicist he was an ardent 
exponent not only of corporativism, but of a centralized, self-perpetuating, colonial 
empire" (Martins 1969). Caetano had been closely involved in designing the 
corporatist administrative state system. His career was halted by a political crisis 
in 1958, after which he retired to the law faculty. Caetano's downfall in 1974 
meant the end of the submission of the parliamentary system to governmental 
control. Since then the country has evolved into a multi-party democracy5. 
Until the overthrow of Caetano, the State had primarily supported the interests 
of the elite. One of the few interventions it undertook with respect to the lower and 
destitute classes in society, was the development of primary education. 
Education is the vehicle for the diffusion of a standard language, of the arts of 
reading and writing, and of a standardized national history, which contribute to 
cultural homogeneity and ideological conformation in favour of the country's 
metropole. This helps to break traditional loyalties to local and regional elites and 
the Church (De Swaan 1993, chapter 3). Education therefore, played a key role in 
the process of state formation, as has been shown by Eugene Weber's book 
Peasants into Frenchmen (1976). In Portugal, public primary education began in 
1772. In 1779 there were 720 state-financed schools in the country. During the 
nineteenth century, their number increased from less than one thousand to over five 
thousand by the end of the monarchy. But in 1910, in 17.5% of all parishes in the 
3 Portuguese history shows that a regime may combine different models of intervention and 
representation: the Estado Novo combined substantive support with direction, and incomplete 
corporatism with parliamentarism and clientelism (see Jessop 1983 for a description of the various 
models). 
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country, there was still no primary school (Oliveira Marques 1986 111:126-7). 
During the Estado Novo the number increased to 17,400 and by 1974 the entire 
country became covered with the education network (ibid, p.495). Under Salazar's 
regime the role of schooling went beyond the homogenisation of culture and 
ideology. The educational programme was strongly geared to the promotion of the 
regime and to the cultus of Salazar himself (ibid, p.496; Barros and Henriques 
1987; Stoer & Araujo 1987; Stoer & Dale 1987). 
The ideological rooting of the regime and the State was also realized by directing 
the flow of information towards the general population. Since 1926, the press was 
censored. From 1929 onward, publications had to be submitted to a special 
commission (O Povo do Norte, (Vila Real), 22 December 1929). In coordination 
with the censorship commission, the regime developed a propaganda policy through 
which it tried to spread certain beliefs about societal values, and the nation and its 
history. It created the Secretariado de Propaganda National (SPN, the National 
Propaganda Bureau) which in 1944 was renamed Servico National de Informagao 
(SNI, National Information Service) (Serrao & Oliveira Marques 1990, XII:440-
443). Forestry was one of the fields in which this service developed activities. In 
1944, the SNI distributed an eighty-page booklet in which the director-general of 
the Forestry Service, Themudo, explained the benefits of the afforestation of the 
baldios. 
The benefits of trees and forests were also propagated in "independent" 
publications, such as newspapers. During the years 1928-1930, 1958-1960, and 
1970-1973, regional newspapers in the Vila Real area, O Povo do Norte and O 
Vilarealense published (at least once a year) one article pointing to the value of 
"mankind's oldest friend", the tree6. Sometimes, these articles were almost 
literally identical. Damaging trees or tree plantations was depicted as an example 
of uncivilized and antisocial behaviour7. Thus, the press - tied by censorship laws 
- served as a herald for the State's afforestation programme. 
The Roots of the Modern Forest Bureaucracy 
The Estado Novo promoted afforestation of the commons. But the idea to plant 
these wastelands with trees was far from novel. It was the continuation and 
intensification of a policy that can be dated back to the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. State involvement in forestry is even older. 
As previously discussed in chapter 2, the Portuguese Forestry Service is rooted 
in three historical phenomena: the feudal organisation of royal hunting rights, the 
6 In O Vilarealense: 11-5-50,19-5-59,12-1-61,7-5-70, 3-6-71,20-4-73, 5-4-73. In O Povo do Norte: 
I-Yl-IK, 22-12-29, 2-3-30, 4-5-30. In the last article, the redaction pointed to the importance of 
education in the transmission of respect for trees and forests. 
7 See O Povo do Norte: 16-3-30, 13-4-30, and 20-t-30. 
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administration of royal timber during the construction of the Portuguese empire, 
and the scientific movement of the Enlightenment. These phenomena enabled a 
separate forest bureaucracy to emerge when the juridical and state systems were 
reformed during the nineteenth century. 
Although Portugal, unlike France and Germany, never belonged to the Frankish 
imperium, its early political and juridical structure resembled that of these two 
countries8. It was quite similar to the feudal regime that predominated over 
western Europe from the Carolingian era ( ± 800 AD) until the mid-fifteenth 
century when mercantilism and colonialism started to reshape the political 
economy. There were, however, some striking differences. One was the absence 
of the strong centrifugal tendencies that characterized medieval France and 
Germany. Due to the rather late date of the institution of the feudal system in 
Portugal and the centralizing effect of continuous warfare during the centuries of 
the reconquista, the Crown was able to maintain its paramount position vis-a-viz 
the rest of the nobility. 
The fact that the king was able to maintain certain rights in domains he did not 
own showed the strength of royal power. All land reconquered on the Moors was 
vested in the Crown. The king kept a part of these lands (the reguengos), but the 
rest was handed out as fiefs to vassals, religious corporations such as monasteries 
and bishoprics, or to farmer communities or municipalities (forms and cartas de 
povoagaof. Nevertheless, even in these granted areas the Crown often preserved 
certain prerogatives, including fishing and hunting rights (Castro 1978-1985, 
11:149-51, 155-160). 
These royal hunting rights constitute the beginnings of Portuguese public forest 
administration. During the Middle Ages, hunting was an important economic 
activity for royals and commoners alike. Hunting was one of the principal dis-
tractions of the nobility and represented an important source of subsistence for the 
villein (Oliveira Marques 1964:8). To a certain extent, a division of labour existed 
between the two: The king preserved the boars and other wild animals for himself 
and the higher aristocracy, as hunting these animals presented a "noble exercise 
and a great relaxation for the King and the Grand of the kingdom" and was not so 
much "a necessity for common subsistence" (King Dom Afonso in 1466, cited in 
Neves 1978-1993, 11:142-3; as in all citations of non-english sources, the 
translation is mine). Thus, the rulers could practice their warfare techniques and 
maintain their war charisma. The kings created hunting reserves, coutadas, which 
were joined into the Montana Real (Royal Hunting Administration). The 
supervision of these areas and protection of the game against trespassers and 
8 Costa (1989:162-167) names the Frank as one of the seven elements that constituted Portuguese law 
after the reconquista. The other six are: the primitive, the Roman, the Germanic, the Christian, the 
Muslim and Hebraic. 
9 Thus, the Crown hoped to secure the land it had gained from both Moor and Leon invasions (Castro 
1978-1993, 11:56; Costa 1989:193). 
66 Planting Power 
poachers, was entrusted to monteiros (game wardens). These game wardens were 
supervised by monteiro-mores (lords game-warden), who directed the guarding and 
policing of the preserves and forests (Carvalho 1960:661). These game-wardens 
can be seen as the first state forest administrators in the country. 
The presence and size of the royal hunting reserves depended upon the balance 
of power between the kings, their vassals, and the rural populations. Between the 
end of the thirteenth and the middle of the fifteenth century, the number of 
coutadas increased. During that time the kings were able to expand their power. 
The rural populations were not pleased with the expansion of the hunting pre-
serves. They saw their own rights curtailed and their fields and crops damaged by 
the wild animals that invaded their lands. Popular protest continued but to no avail. 
Only at the end of the sixteenth century, did the area covered by coutadas grad-
ually diminish. But this was caused by the decline of the economic importance of 
hunting, by population growth, and by the need to cultivate new parcels of land 
(Oliveira Marques 1964:199; Devy-Vareta 1986:25). 
The second root of public forest admimstration is related to changes in the 
economic order in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Castro 1978-1985,1:178-
179). After the expulsion of the Moors from Algarve in 1249, and their eviction 
from Andalusia in 1492, the war against them was continued overseas. Following 
the capture of Ceuta on the North African coast in 1415, the Portuguese started to 
build a "seaborne empire" (Boxer 1969:18). Ships were sent to the so-called Indies 
and to China to destroy the Arab trade monopoly in gold, silver, spices, and in 
textiles (silk). The economic, political, and religious ambitions of this enterprise 
are well reflected in a papal bull from 1456 in which 
the Pope authorize[d] the Kings of Portugal to attack, conquer and 
subdue Saracens, pagans, and other unbelievers who were inimical to 
Christ, to capture their goods and territories; to reduce their persons to 
perpetual slavery, and to transfer their lands and properties to the King 
of Portugal and his successors (Boxer 1969:21). 
Along the African, Asian and Latin American coasts factories were founded where 
merchandise was collected and shipped to the metropole. 
The empire literally floated on the vessels that connected the outposts with the 
capital. These ships were built out of timber. As a result, the overseas expansion 
was accompanied by a rapid degradation of the royal forests, which already 
suffered from grazing, fuel-wood collection, and other legal or illegal forms of 
exploitation. Declining domestic wood production forced the prohibition of wood 
exports. In 1471 the king prohibited the export of timber "for ships and charcoal 
from our kingdom of Algarve to Castile and to other parts" (Neves 1978-1993, 
U: 183). Notwithstanding these restrictions, the country's ship docks became almost 
completely dependent upon timber imports from Flanders and the Hanseatic league 
from the Baltic. This caused the monarch to believe that having a constant and safe 
source of timber at his disposal was essential to his best interest and that of his 
realm. Hence, he started to try to regulate timber exploitation in their properties. 
In 1450 he created a new office; the mateiro (woodman), who was charged with 
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the administration of the fellings in the royal forest of Leiria. Furthermore, the 
Crown published several laws to stimulate reafforestation outside its own estates. 
In 1565 King Dom Henrique ordered that 
the officials of all cities, towns and villages make plant and create pine 
forest on their waste lands within its boundaries... And that they in 
those areas which are not suitable for pines make plant sweet chestnuts, 
oaks and any other tree of quality which can be grown in these areas. 
And further that in the places where there are no waste lands or where 
these are not so large that one can grow the mentioned timbers and 
forests on them, or where it is impossible to guard them well, that here 
they force the masters of land, estates, farms and properties to have 
planted the mentioned trees on the sites where they least occupy the 
mentioned areas (Neiva 1991a, 1991b:8). 
In 1597 King Philip II ordered the reafforestation of his forest near Leiria. 
The forest near Leiria was placed under the responsibility of the Chief Warden 
of the Royal Forests (Carvalho 1960:662; Devy-Vareta 1986:10). After several 
reforms, this position was eliminated in 1790. In 1797, the former Chief Warden's 
tasks were delegated to the Junta da Fazenda da Marina (the Navy's Treasury 
Council). The assignment of forest administration to an organisation within the 
Ministry of Marines shows, that at that time the Crown was still principally 
interested in forest management as a way of guaranteeing the provision of raw 
material for the ship yards. 
The third root of public forest administration was the Enlightenment. The 
Enlightenment espoused a rational understanding of the world. One of its 
achievements was the development of economic science and, in particular, physio-
cracy. This type of economic reasoning maintained that real wealth should be 
acquired by exploitation of the soil, instead of by shrewd commerce. This was 
contrary to mercantilism which theretofore had predominated economic discourse. 
Under physiocracy, a scientific approach started to flourish in agriculture, and, 
subsequently in forest management (Buis 1985:519-528). This evolution led to the 
creation of the first university chair in forestry in Germany (see also supra, pp.22-
24). 
The first professional forester of Portugal, Jos6 Bonifacio de Andrade e Silva, 
was one of the foreigners who received their education in Germany. Upon his 
return to Portugal at the beginning of the nineteenth century, he published a book 
called Memoria Sdbre a Necessidade do Plantio de Novos Bosques (Memorandum 
over the Necessity to Plant New Bosks) in which he pleaded for reafforestation and 
for a better protection and management of existing forests: 
Notwithstanding the paternal zeal of our kings, the many ordinances and 
regiments which order the execution of new seedings and plantations 
and which give provisions for their keeping and conservation and their 
due exploitation, our bosks and woodlands have disappeared with a 
surprising speed since little more than a century, because since then the 
causes of this ruin have not ceased; some of these causes cannot be 
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evaded, but others can be corrected and minimized. (Andrade e Silva 
1815, quoted by Min de Agr 1940:6; Themudo 1944:38) 
One of the strategies proposed by Andrade e Silva to improve the situation was 
to reorganize the administration of the royal forests. He recommended the creation 
of a separate institution consisting of a director, two forestry engineers, and three 
forest administrators (guardas mores). Their tasks would include careful policing 
and keeping of the forests to prevent fires, burnings, roaming cattle, and 
trespassers (Andrade e Silva 1815:182). Each district had to be divided into 
cantons (feitorias) with a forest guard {guarda couteiro). A group of five guards 
would be under the command of a head guard, the only one in the field required 
to have forestry training. In the opinion of Andrade e Silva, the guards could best 
be recruited from the army (fropa de linha). Seemingly, he saw them more as 
custodians or policemen than as forest managers. For the execution of his 
management tasks, each guard would be assisted by a bookkeeper and the State 
would provide them with a house and a garden (ibid, p. 184). Andrade e Silva's 
proposal was never executed, but it directly influenced the subsequent evolution of 
public forest administration. 
Public forest administration emerged during the state reforms of the nineteenth 
century. In 1821 the royal hunting reserves and the related administrative offices 
like the monteiro-mores were abolished. Three years later, in June 1824, they were 
briefly reinstated, only to disappear definitively in 1833 (Neiva 1990:24). In July 
1824, a General Administration of the Woods of the Kingdom (Administragao 
Geral das Matas do Reino) was created, two parallel forest administrations existed. 
This new organism was the direct successor of the forestry department within the 
Junta de Fazenda da Marina (the Navy's Treasury Council). When in 1833 the 
Montaria Real finally disappeared, the General Administration of the Woods 
became the sole public forest admimstrative body in the country. In 1853 this 
organism was transferred from the Navy Ministry to the Ministry of Public Works. 
Seemingly, the forests were no longer seen primarily as a source of raw material 
for the docks, but began to be approached from a broader perspective. 
Furthermore, for the first time, professional forest experts were recruited (Mendia 
1945:6; Neiva 1990:24). In 1872 a new law was published that reorganized the 
forest adnnnistration again. The 1872 law contained, among other things, 
dispositions concerning technical aspects of forest management such as the 
obligatory formulation of management plan. In 1881 the General Administration 
of Forests was dissolved and its tasks were transferred to the Division of Agricul-
ture within the General Direction of Commerce and Industry. The Forestry Service 
reemerged in 1886 within the General Direction of Agriculture. In 1919 its 
evolution was completed. It was elevated to the level of directorate-general as the 
"Direccao Geral dos Servigos Florestais"i0. 
For a review of the relevant legislation: see appendix 3. 
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The Nineteenth Century Reorganization of the Forestry Service 
as an Example of the Rationalization of the Administrative State 
Apparatus. 
One of the central elements of the state reform of the nineteenth century, is the 
rationalization of the administrative apparatus. The significance of this process is 
the concomitant qualitative change in the nature of state power. This rationalization 
process implied the organizational reform of the state apparatus in such a way that 
office-holders became wheels in a larger, goal oriented, machinery. The individual 
official could no longer act arbitrarily, but was required to keep to formal rules 
and administer sine ira et studio. In addition, he was made totally dependent upon 
the abstract body of the State, from which he derived his powers and his 
livelihood. Submitted to a hierarchy of superiors, all his actions were supervised. 
Consequently, instead of being to a large extent autonomous, the official became 
an instrument in the hands of higher powers. This made rationalization of the state 
apparatus a step in the substitution of direct for indirect rule and the intensification 
of the power the State could exercise over its subjects through the civil service. 
In his discussion of bureaucracies, Weber (1959:21-22) enumerates eight features 
which characterize a rational bureaucratic organization. These features are: 
(1) the officials are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to 
their impersonal official obligations; 
(2) there is a clearly defined hierarchy of offices; 
(3) each office has a specified sphere of competence; there is a free selection of 
personnel which is appointed through a contractual relation; 
(4) the staff is selected according to technical qualifications which are tested by 
examination or guaranteed by certificates; 
(5) the salary is fixed and the office is at least the incumbent's primary occupation; 
(6) a bureaucracy has to allow for a career which implies the existence of a 
promotion system according to seniority and achievement; 
(7) the officials work entirely separated from ownership of the means of 
administration; 
(8) and are subject to strict and systematic discipline and control. 
In table 4 .1 , I compare the forest administration of the ancien regime and the 
administration that evolved during the nineteenth century to these eight points. It 
appears that both forms of administration differ fundamentally from each other and 
that the modern organization comes much closer to Weber' standards that its 
historical predecessor. 
Before the nineteenth century, the royal forest administrative apparatus according 
to Carlos Neves's (1978-1993) collection of medieval documents, satisfied only a 
few of Weber's requirements, such as those concerned personal freedom and 
hierarchy. Within the feudal administration of the royal forests, the officers were 
free individuals. (Personal servitude, or serfdom, disappeared from the country by 
the beginning of the thirteenth century, Castro 1978-1985,11:51). At that time, the 
apparatus also had a certain hierarchy: the guards were supervised by the chief 
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guards, and the game wardens by the lord game warden. But the documents show 
neither the exact authority and responsibilities of the guards and game wardens, nor 
clarify the precise tasks of the officials and their relationships to subordinates and 
superiors. Therefore, it is impossible to conclude whether or not this apparatus 
satisfies Weber's criterion on these two points. 
Table 4 . 1 : A comparison of the feudal forest administration and the forest bureaucracy that 
emerged from the state reforms in the nineteenth century to Weber 's model of rational 
administration. 
Characteristics of rational bureaucracy Ancien Nineteenth 
according to Weber regime century 
1. personally free yes yes 
2. hierarchy of offices yes yes 
3. sphere of competence unknown yes 
4. technical qualified staff no yes 
5. fixed salary and primary occupation no yes 
6. promotion system unknown yes 
7. separation of means of administration no no 
8. discipline and control no yes 
With regard to the other characteristics of rational bureaucracy, the ancien r6gime's 
form of forest administration differs considerably from Weber's model. Feudal 
officials were not selected because of their technical skills in game management or 
forest administration, but because of friendship or earlier services, or because their 
father had held the office. The offices of game warden in Alenquer and Santarem, 
were apparently passed on within the family Vaz (Neves 1978-1993, VI: 
10,40,97)". The offices were also positions of honour, given to royal servants 
who often executed other jobs as well. In many cases, being a game warden was 
probably only one out of many positions, and not the most important one. The 
guard appointed in the forest near Leiria in 1488 was, for example, also the king's 
shield bearer and sheriff of the town of Pederneira (Neves 1978-1993, HI: 123). He 
received his office in Leiria in reward for earlier services. Finally, the game 
warden did not earn a salary. Instead, the incumbents were rewarded by the 
attribution of certain liberties, as the right to bear arms whenever one liked (in 
1434, the monteiros and guardas of the royal forest of Ota near Alenquer, Neves 
1978-1993,1:261), or tax exemption. An example of the latter concerns the sixteen 
guards of the forest of Leiria. In 1502 the king renewed their liberties which dated 
1 1 Compare Hay (1975:197) on gamekeepers in Britain: "they ... passed their positions on to their 
sons." 
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back to at least as early as 14S0: 
By this charter we make known that the sixteen guards of our pine 
forest in our villa [town] of Leirya ... will be excused of paying the 
oitavo and the jugada of neither bread nor wine nor any other thing they 
have and that they can enjoy all the other privileges and liberties we 
have granted to the mentioned guards and woodmen. (Neves 1978-1993, 
V : l l ; see 11:68 for the reference to the same rights in 1450) 
Another, monetary, compensation the king could give, concerned the right to keep 
the fines paid by infractors of the forest laws. In a royal dispatch of 18 September 
1414, the king prohibited all hunting in the forest of Motrena near Setubal: 
Nobody, "not a daring knight, squire or any other person" was allowed to hunt 
deer, boar, or rabbit. Transgression was punished by paying "five libras of old 
coinage for each animal, deer, boar or rabbit, he had killed." These penalties were 
"for our monteyro-moor" (Neves 1978-1993,1:206). These examples show that the 
monteiros were rewarded with privileges, such as the right to bear arms, or 
exemption of certain taxes. In these cases, their income was not even related to the 
actual execution of the job. In the case where they could keep any fines, their 
income was not fixed, but depended upon the fines collected. Consequently, the 
ancien r6gime's organization does not meet the standards set by Weber concerning 
recruitment, technical qualification, and remuneration. Finally, given the coeval 
conditions regarding communication, it is also unlikely that the organization meets 
Weber's criteria of (constant) supervision. This does not mean that there did not 
exist any control at all over the actions of individual officials; people or 
municipalities could complain to the king about fines the game wardens applied or 
about the amount of timber royal officials felled (e.g. Neves 1978-1993, VI:34-35). 
But this kind of control through complaints cannot be compared with the constant 
supervision by superiors that Weber had in mind. 
Unlike the administrative organizations preceding the nineteenth century, the 
bureaucracy that emerged during the nineteenth century does meet most of Weber's 
standards. From 1847 technical experience in forestry became more important. In 
that year, forest administration was delegated to trained engineers. The growing 
importance of technical qualifications was reflected in the creation of a forestry 
course in Lisbon in 1865 within the Instituto Superior de Agricultura (ISA). For 
more than a century, this institute was the only place in the country where students 
received professional training for forest engineers (Neves 1964). 
The emergence of a Weberian form of organization is reflected by the Service's 
reorganization in 1886. In that year a new law stipulated the tasks of each officer, 
the qualities and skills required for each job, promotion regulations, salaries,, and 
other prerogatives. It established a clear-cut hierarchy of authority starting with the 
engineers at the top and continuing through the sub-ordinate engineers, the regentes 
(forest administrators), the mestres (foremen), to the guards who constituted the 
bottom of the pyramid. At each level a different task was delegated. The chief and 
subordinate foresters had to supervise the technical and administrative services and 
execute the instructions of the General Direction of Agriculture. The regentes of 
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the first and second class had to direct and control the seeding, plantation, felling, 
marking, and measuring, and supervise the mestres and forest guards. The mestres 
had to look after the execution of forest exploitation, such as marking trees for the 
thinnings of stands. Finally, the guards were responsible for policing the forests. 
They were given the status of a rural police force and had the right to bear arms. 
They had also to take an oath before the judge of the comarca (jurisdiction) in 
which they were employed (art. 60) 1 2 . 
This hierarchy was based upon personal merits in the form of acquired technical 
skills and training. At the lowest level, the officials' training was restricted to 
literacy. Guards had to know how to "read and write, they have to be younger than 
30 years old, while preference is given to soldiers of the army or die navy, with 
good behaviour" (art. 25). At the middle level in the bureaucracy, only certain 
practical skills in forest management were required. Technical education was 
demanded at the higher levels; the regentes had to present a certificate from the 
course for regentes agrtcolas at the technical school in Sintra, and the top officials 
needed an engineering course. 
Internal ranking within these professional categories made promotion possible: 
Mestres were chosen among the guards of the first class, "who have proven renown 
zeal and aptitude" (art. 24). Hence, if a guard of the third class did well and 
remained within the apparatus, he could eventually be promoted to foreman. 
Promotion was related to a raise in salary: a third class guard earned 120,000 reis, 
and a foreman 180,000 rMs. In 1918, the internal differentiation in the categories 
of regentes and mestres was refined by the creation of more classes. This increased 
the possibilities for a career within the bureaucratic organization. 
In only one respect does the modern forest bureaucracy not fully meet the 
standards Weber formulated for a rational administration. This criterion is the 
separation of the official from the ownership of the means of production and 
administration in order to guarantee complete mutual independence of the function 
and its incumbent and a full separation of the public from the private. 
In the rational type it is a matter of principle that the members of the 
administrative staff should be completely separated from ownership of 
the means of production or ad^ninistration... There exists furthermore, 
in principle complete separation of property belonging to the 
organization, which is controlled within the sphere of the office, and the 
personal property of the official, which is available for his own private 
uses. There is a corresponding separation of the place in which the 
official functions are carried out, the "office" in the sense of premises, 
from the living quarters. (Weber 1959:20) 
The Forestry Service does not fully fulfil this last condition. According to the 
regulation of 24 December 1903, forest guards had to be on a "vigil day and night 
over the forest area in their charge, being obliged to stay in it permanently [and] 
The 1901 and 1903 laws repeated these dispositions. 
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not to abandon [their] canton (...)" (art. 3). In many cases, the State provided them 
with a house built on a strategic site within the forest perimeter for this aim. The 
office of forest guard was not a "nine-to-five" job but a life-style. There was no 
separation between the private sphere and the place in which official functions were 
carried out. Although the legislation only mentioned this conflation of private and 
public in the case of forest guards, this confusion also existed in the jobs of forest 
administrators and chiefs of circumscriptions. Many resided in special areas, 
forestry parks (parques florestais), located near their offices in housing provided 
by the State. 
The conflation of private and public is connected to the special nature of forest 
administration. Forestry entails the management and exploration of a certain, often 
large, area. Particularly in the cases in which the land is occupied by the foresters 
against the will of the local population, forestry demands constant presence and 
surveillance. The ensuing intimate connection between the administrative apparatus 
and space is the subject of the next section. 
The Forestry Service and National Space: From the Royal 
Coutadas into the Commons 
The isolation the Service's administrators in separate parks and guards in their 
wards points to several important aspects of the Forestry Service. At the level of 
the individual, the job acquired the character of a lifetime occupation, a vocation. 
At the level of the collective, the separation from ordinary citizens reinforced the 
esprit de corps, and at the level of the organization, the isolation pointed to the 
intimacy of the forestry bureaucracy's connection to space and geography. The 
guards occupied a certain space, and their presence in it was the guarantee for 
control over that territory. This connection of forest admimstration to space was 
reflected in the way in which the vertical hierarchy of the organization 
corresponded to its horizontal distribution over the national territory: the apex was 
located in Lisbon, the circumscriptions in district capitals, and the lower level in 
municipal centres, whereas the organization lowest tier was dispersed over the 
countryside. 
The various reorganizations of the Service show the constant adjustment of its 
vertical and horizontal dimensions to internal and external developments, the latter 
being principally the organization's spatial expansion. During the ancien régime 
central state power was exercised through the physical presence of a person. Royal 
hunting was no exception. The geographical distribution of the royal hunting 
preserves reveals that the Crown did not penetrate very deeply into the country. 
Most of the coutadas were located near the capital, in the western part of the coun-
try and in the regions south of the Tejo River. The royal forest in Leiria was 
located within the same part of the country. Except for a few patches of land in the 
Serra de Gerêz, the Crown never controlled vast areas north of the Douro River 
or in the interior (Devy-Vareta 1985:60; see figure 4.1). 
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When the Service 
was created in 1824, 
it administered only 
the domains that had 
survived the dissol-
ution of the coutadas 
and royal forests such 
as the Pinhal of 
Leiria, an area of less 
than 15,000 ha. Thus, 
the Service was 
confined to the orig-
inal sphere of royal 
influence as it had 
been defined during 
the Middle Ages. 
T h i s area a l s o 
included some dunes 
along the coast, 
which from 1802 
onward were expro-
priated in order to 
consolidate the drift 
sands by covering 
them with trees 1 3. 
But during the 
nineteenth century, 
the Service's domain 
gradually expanded: 
in 1835, after the 
liberal victory in the 
Civil War and the 
independence of 
Brazil, the Service 
gained control over the forested lands of dissolved religious corporations as well 
as the nationalized properties of the Crown Prince (Casa do Infantado). 
Additionally, it acquired the forests adjoining mines, which had previously been 
under the administration of General Intendancy of Mines and Metals. 
This gradual spatial expansion was reflected by the Service's adjustment of the 
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Figure 4.1: map by Devy-Vareta (1985:61) of the old royal 
coutadas with the location of the circumsciption headquarters 
and regencies in 1918. 
1 3 The state started afforestation of the dunes in 1805 near Lavos. The idea was copied from France 
where Bremontion afforested the dunes in order to stop the silting up of the harbour of Arcachon in 
Aquitania. There, between 1800 and 1857 102,000 ha were covered with Pinus pinaster and hedges 
(Min de Agr 1940:8, Neiva 1991b:12) 
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vertical and horizontal dimensions of their organization. In 1847 the State forests 
in the country were grouped together into nineteen circumscriptions 
(circumscripgoes). In 1872, forest admimstration was centralized. The nineteen 
circumscriptions were replaced by three divisions: one in the north, one in the 
centre, and one in the south. The 1886 reorganization maintained this centralization 
but refined the organization's lower levels. The Service's territory was divided into 
three circumscriptions. Each circumscription was subdivided into sections (secedes) 
and cantons (cantoes). 
In 1918 the Forestry Service was reformed again. Decreto 4,249 of 8 May 1918 
divided the Service into a central bureau, eight circumscriptions, eighteen regencias 
and 121 cantons. The headquarters of the circumscriptions were located in district 
capitals like Braga, Porto, Coimbra, Lisbon, Evora, and Ponte Delgado (on the 
Acores), and in the towns of Manteigas and Marinha Grande. The staff was 
distributed as follows: 31 of the 186 staff members, including 6 engineers worked 
in the capital, 25 persons (8 engineers, 9 administrative aides, and 8 guards) in the 
circumscription headquarters; 18 regentes and one foreman in the various 
regencies; and 121 foremen and guards in the cantons (Decreto 4,249 of 8 May 
1918). The map in figure 4.1 shows that the regencias were still located within the 
confines of the former royal coutada. In continental Portugal, Manteigas, in the 
Serra de Estrella, and Tavira in Algarve, were the only exceptions. 
The reforms of 1886 and 1918 should be seen in relation to a new phase in the 
Service's development. Until 1886, the Service had been confined to state-owned 
land. But, through a law of 25 November 1886 the State declared that it would 
undertake the afforestation of the commons by submitting them to what it referred 
to as a "forestry regime": 
Successively and partially will be submitted to the forestry regime by 
means of the funds given for that end by the cdrtes,..., the uncultivated 
lands on the tops and slopes of the mountains, the shifting sands of the 
coastal dunes, and any other piece of which afforestation is necessary 
for the general interest of the country, in particular with respect to the 
water regime. The acquisition of the terrains ... that do not belong to 
the State will be done by expropriation for public utility.... (art. 4 and 
5 of the law of 25 November 1886) 
Under the provisions of this law, the first attempt to afforest the commons was 
made in 1888, with the decision to submit the waste lands of the Serras de GerSz 
and Estrela to the forestry regime. This step signified a fundamental change in the 
balance of power between the central State and the countryside. For the first time 
since the Middle Ages, the power of the central State forest admimstration crossed 
the limits of the old royal coutadas and reached into the north and into the interior 
of the country1 4. 
1 4 The quotation of this legal text points also to the role of forestry as a hegemonic project: state 
intervention is legitimated in terms of "the general interest of the country". 
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From 1888 onward, the central State intensified its attempts to intervene in the 
administration of communal and private property by abolishing the condition of 
expropriation which was still maintained in the 1886 legislation. This step was set 
in a decree from 24 December 1901 which elaborated the concept of forestry 
regime. The decree distinguished three types of regimes: the total regime and the 
partial regime, and the regime of simple policing. Categorization was made 
according to the type of proprietor: state land, acquired through nationalization or 
expropriation, was submitted to the total forestry regime; municipal, parish, and 
private properties were submitted to the partial regime; and, private landowners or 
groups of landowners could decide to submit their properties voluntarily to the 
regime of simple policing. In that case, the landowners were required only to 
provide one hectare of arable land for each 500 hectares placed under state 
vigilance for cultivation by the forest guard appointed by the State to watch over 
the area (art. 29 and 30 of Decreto of 24 December 1901) 1 5. 
The execution of the forestry regime with respect to the organization of forest 
management, policing, etc. was regulated two years later by the Regulamento of 
24 December 1903. This law stipulated that in the case of the partial forestry 
regime the proprietor (an administrative body or a private person) should be 
compensated for afforestation. The proprietor could choose between three 
modalities: (a) leave afforestation to the State and receive a share of the net 
revenues of the forest according to the value of the afforested land; (b) afforest the 
land and receive all of the profits; (c) expropriation of the land by the State which 
would submit it to the total forestry regime without any further entitlements for the 
original owner (art. 219 of Regulamento of 24 December 1903). The different 
modalities of the forestry regime in relation to property and management 
responsibilities are summarized in table 4.2. 
The relevance of the 1901 definition of the forestry regime is that the State no 
longer needed to expropriate the areas it wanted to afforest. The decree opened the 
road to state involvement in areas that were not state property. Only in the event 
that a landowner refused to accept submittance to the Forestry Service's interven-
tion, could the State decide to proceed with expropriation. Through the vehicle of 
the forestry regime, the State was able to proceed with afforestation of the sand 
dunes near the coast and the communal areas in the mountains, without having to 
obtain full property rights. 
As was the case in 1886, the State in 1901 legitimated its intervention by 
pointing to the public interest of the forests. As article 25 of the 1901 decree 
stated: 
The forestry regime comprehends the conjunction of dispositions 
1 5 This arrangement was also maintained in the case of guards in the perimeters under the partial 
forestry regime. It not only shows that the state tried to keep the guards' wages low by giving them land 
for their subsistence, but also confirms the strength of the ties between the guard and his canton: he 
literally lived off it! In some cases, the cultivation right would create conflicts between his assignment 
to protect the stand and his need for food. 
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destined at guaranteeing not only the creation, exploration and 
conservation of silvicultural wealth, from the perspective of the national 
economy, but also of the recoverage with forests of areas of which the 
afforestation will be of public utility, and convenient or good for the 
water regime and the defense of the river valleys, for the valorization 
of arid planes and the benefit of the climate, or for the fixation and 
conservation of the soil in the mountain or the sea-coast regions. 
(Decreto of 24 December 1901) 
Table 4.2: The different forestry regimes in relation to property and management 
responsibilities. 
Regime type Property type Manager of the forest 
Total forestry regime State State (Forestry Service) 
Partial forestry regime Communal (parish or 
municipal) or private 
State (Forestry Service) 
Owner 
Simple forestry regime Private Owner 
In the following two decades, the Forestry Service grew slowly in terms of 
territorial expansion and afforestation. Until 1934 it had only penetrated about 
80,000 ha and afforested about 17,000 ha of sand dunes along the coast and 21,000 
ha of waste land in the mountains (Min de Agr 1940:107, 115). The Service 
expanded much faster during the next four decades. This growth was facilitated by 
the approval of the national afforestation plan, the Piano de Povoamento Florestal 
dos Baldios ao Norte do Tejo 
The Piano de Povoamento Florestal 
The slow increase in the area afforested by the State motivated the Forestry Service 
to propose a special plan for the afforestation of the commons north of the Tejo 
River, the Piano de Povoamento Florestal dos Baldios ao Norte do Tejo. It was 
based on a study carried out in 1935 in which 532,000 ha of baldios larger than 
500 ha were identified. Of the total area, about 420,000 ha were considered to be 
available in the sense that they were not essential for the local populations' 
economies and suitable for forestry. The plan presupposed an important role for 
the State. Previously, afforestation of the baldios had been largely left to the local 
authorities. However, the slow increment in afforested areas demonstrated that this 
strategy had been a failure. Consequently, the State decided to intervene. 
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In principle the task of afforestation pertains to the local authorities, as 
they are the owners of the lands on which it will be executed. But in 
reality, this task transcends the more limited interests of local adminis-
tration, as it influences the cultivation and valorization of the grounds 
which are washed by the water courses and is of interest to the 
harbours, to the Nation's economic activities and to its defense. Further, 
it is a long term enterprise, of which the costs surpass the capabilities 
of local administrative bodies and of which revenues are realized only 
after many, many years. This is the reason why the project attributes its 
execution to the State, except for one case or another in which it is 
undertaken by these local entities. (Min de Agr 1940:27) 
The decision to let the central State undertake the afforestation effort nullified, 
in practice, the local authorities' ability to afforest their own baldios. The State 
"liberated" them of that "burden" which apparently went beyond their capacities. 
The intervention in the affairs of local administrative entities was legitimated by 
arguing that forestry transcended the more limited interests of these bodies, and 
that it was a long-term project. Similar to the 1901 justification of the forestry 
regime, it appealed to forestry as a public benefit. 
The afforestation plan itself was a detailed proposal for twenty-five years of 
intensive forestry intervention in the area north of the Tejo River. It distinguished 
twenty-two regions in the intervention zone. In each region it specified the areas 
to be afforested, the most suitable tree species for planting, and the staff needed 
for the execution of the programme. It contained a time schedule, a summary of 
the necessary financial means, and an estimation of its economic results in social 
and financial terms. The plan did not limit itself to afforestation alone, but also 
included plans for infra-structural works 1 6. The total cost of these projects was 
estimated at 747,460,078 escudos (written as: 747,460,078$00), to be spent in six 
periods of five years between 1939 and 1968. This meant an average annual 
spending of 16,922,626$00. Because the Forestry Service's budget was 
9,149,273$40 in 1937, the plan presupposed a budget increase of 85% (Min de 
Agr 1940:123-124). These expenditures were seen as an investment. After 1950 
revenues were expected to exceed disbursements (Min de Agr 1940:135). The plan 
was approved by the National Assembly in 1938 (Lei 1,971, Lei do Povoamento 
Florestal). The same year the Estado Novo's forestry policy towards the commons 
materialized. 
The essence of the Piano de Povoamento Florestal was that it brought about an 
enormous and rapid expansion of the area controlled by the state Forestry Service. 
The graph in figure 4.2 shows how the total area under the partial forestry regime 
1 6 The plan foresaw the construction of2,455 kilometres of forest roads, 26 buildings for the administra-
tion offices, 997 houses for forest guards, and 140 vigilance posts. The offices, houses, and vigilance 
posts were to be supplied with 1,159 telephones linked by a 5,800 kilometre-long cable network. 
Transport was to be carried out by 28 horses, donkeys or mules, 56 oxen, 28 fourgonnettes (small 
lorries), and 28 cars. 
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of the total area under the partial forestry regime between 1886 
and 1960 (in thousands of hectares; source: Mendonca 1961a:37-38). 
increased rapidly after 1940. In the fifty years between 1888 and 1939, 76,000 ha 
were submitted to this regime. In the next twenty years 383,000 ha (Mendonca 
1961a:37-38). 
The gradual growth of the area controlled by the Service resulted from the 
addition of dunes and communal waste lands to the forestry regime. It was clearly 
correlated to an expansion of the Service's administrative personnel. Between 1886 
to 1939 the number of officers employed within the Service grew from 120 to 393 
(table 4.3). In the Piano de Povoamento Florestal a staff totalling 1138 persons: 
935 forest guards, 125 mestres florestais and 30 forest administrators was foreseen 
by 1968, the year the project was to be finished (Min de Agr 1940:123). Thus, 
compared comparison with 1886, the execution of the afforestation plan in 1968 
demanded an increase of the Service's staff by a factor of ten. Furthermore, the 
Forestry Service's spatial distribution was to be changed radically. The plan's 
execution required the positioning of more than eleven hundred extra officers in 
the northern districts dispersed over twenty-seven new administrative areas and 977 
new cantons. Hence, it meant increased penetration and more concentrated 
presence of state officials in the countryside (table 4.3). 
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The penetration of the State into the north is visualized in figure 4.3. This figure 
represents a map of the commons under the forestry regime. It also shows the 
intensification of the State's presence in the countryside. In the map, I indicate the 
location of the headquarters of the administraçôes florestais (forestry admimstrative 
areas) as they existed 
i n 1 9 9 0 . 
(Administ raçâo 
(administration) was 
since 1931 the name 
of the former regen-
cias, Decreto 20,526, 
of 18 November 
1931.) Comparison of 
the maps in figure 
4.1 and 4.3 shows 
how the Forestry 
Service's attention 
moved from the 
coastal region near 
Lisbon towards the 
north and the interior. 
The geographical 
distribution of the 
staff reflected the 
organization' sinternal 
hierarchy: the top of 
the pyramid was 
housed in Lisbon, the 
intermediate level 
occupied the district 
capitals, and the 
executive was located 
in the countryside. 
Hence, the command 
structure emerged 
from the capital and 
f o l l o w e d t h e 
hierarchy through the 
c i r c u m s c r i p t i o n s 
headquarters in the 
district capitals and the administrations in the towns and down to the guards in the 
countryside. 
Whereas the area of communal land submitted to the partial forestry regime 
expanded rapidly, the growth of the actual afforestation proceeded at a much 
LS 
FOREST PERIMETERS 
ADMINISTRATION 
LISBON HEADQUARTERS 
Figure 4.3: Map of the commons under the forestry regime 
according to Mendonca (1961a) and the location of the central, 
circumscriptions and forestry administrators' offices. 
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slower rate. In fact, the Forestry Service never completed the plan. 1968 was 
officially the plan's last year. By then, of the 420,000 ha that the plan had 
envisaged, only 271,000 ha were covered by trees (Baptista 1993:288). Reasons 
for this failure included the Second World War, increased salaries of rural 
workers, and later, as a result of emigration, the increasing scarcity of a working 
force in rural areas. In 1988, the original goal had still not been attained as only 
380,000 ha of communal land had been afforested (IPF 1988). 
Table 4.3 shows the development of the organization in terms of staff and 
administered areas. It indicates that between 1886 and 1986, the number of staff 
members rose tremendously, from 127 to almost 3,800. But it also reveals that 
until 1956, the growth of the staff did not match that of the areas put under the 
Service's admimstration: between 1886 and 1956 the number of staff members per 
1,000 ha decreased from 3.8 to 1.4. 
Table 4.3: The numerical development of the Forestry Service's personnel (N) and the 
evolution of the area under its control and the number of staff members per 1000 ha (N|A) 
(Sources: legislation from 1886, 1918, 1936 (DL 27,207 of 6 November 1936), 1956 (DL 
40,721), and 1986 (DR 51/86), Mendia (1945:13), EA 1956, 1968, DGSFA 1972, IPF 
1988:11). 
Rank 1886 1918 1936 1956 1986 
N N/A N N/A N N/A N N/A N N/A 
Eng". 8 0.2 15 0.3 34 0.3 88 0.2 241 0.5 
Regents 11 0.3 20 0.4 30 0.2 56 0.1 
Guards 86 2.6 110 2.1 280 2.1 514 0.9 1477 3.0 
Others 15 0.5 51 1.0 49 0.4 141 0.3 2055 4.1 
Total 127 3.8 196 3.7 393 2.9 799 1.4 3773 7.6 
Area 33 53 136 554 498 
- the area is given in 1000 ha. 
- the areas are those areas submitted to the total and the partial forestry regime. The guards appointed 
to look after the areas submitted to the simple policing regime were guardas auxiUares and not included 
in the Forestry Service's cadre (Decreto-Lei 12,625 of 13 November 1926, and Decreto-Lei 39,931 of 
24 November 1954). 
- the mestres are included under guards as both ranks together constitute the service's bottom line. 
- in 1986 regents are not distinguished. Their equivalents are included either among engineers or among 
other personnel. The numbers of the cadre surpass the real staff numbers. For example, in January 
1994, the Service employed only 920 guards and mestres instead of the 1477 listed in the table. Due 
to measures which in the event of vacancies inhibit the appointment of individuals who do not already 
work within the civil service, by March 1995, this number had declined further to 895 (1.8 per 1000 
ha). The circumscription of Vila Real (128,000 ha) employed 168 guards, and the Vila Real forestry 
administration (12,000 ha) 8 (0.7 per 1000 ha) (pers. comm. Dr. Maria da Purificacao Pais, director 
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A look at the distribution of forestry officials in the different levels of the 
organization shows that the Service has passed through two phases. During the first 
phase, the number of guards, who constituted the organization's bottom line, 
followed the expansion of the area under the forestry regime, whereas the number 
of technicians at the top of the organization did not. The afforestation plan of the 
commons did not foresee an expansion of the Service's technical staff. However, 
the expansion of the area under the Service's administration demanded an increase 
in the Service's technical expertise. In the plan's initial phase, the demand was 
satisfied by engineers hired on a temporary basis as additional staff members. In 
the mid-fifties, this situation led to frictions among the staff and the Service started 
to malfunction. As a result, the Service was reorganized and the additional staff 
members were included in the fixed cadre (Azevedo Gomes and Quaresma 1988:3-
4;ANTdT, Arquivo Salazar, AOS/CO/EC-12, Pasta 23, DeOliveirato Salazar, 11 
February 1955; Decreto-Lei 40.721) 1 7 . 
In 1986, the Service's cadre expanded to an unprecedented size, particularly in 
the growth of the number of guards and other personnel. The enormous increase 
in this second category points to the qualitative transformation of bureaucratic 
administration and its internal intensification. 
Public Forestry and Private Property 
Thus far, I have focused almost exclusively on state-managed forests. But the State 
was certainly not the only party that entered into forestry. In fact, in relation to the 
private landowners, state-managed forests (that is, state owned stands plus the 
stands that are communal property but under the partial forestry regime) have 
always played a subordinate role in terms of forest area. In 1928 the State 
administered less than 5% of the total forest area. Even though the State's share 
more than trebled through the Piano de Povoamento Florestal, in 1988 most of the 
forest area in the country (85%) continued to be administered by private 
landowners (table 4.4). 
1 7 By 1956, the service employed thirty-two foresters in a regular position at the top. In addition, about 
thirty-five foresters were employed in the lowest rank (silvicultor 3° classe). In a report to Salazar, it 
was argued that this imbalance between the number of positions at the lowest and at the highest level 
implied the absence of career perspectives, which caused a general demotivation. Therefore, it was 
recommended that these temporary staff members be included in the fixed cadre (ANTdT, Arquivo 
Salazar, AOS/CO/BX-12, Pasta 23). 
Table 4.3 suggests mat the number of guards with a fixed position lagged behind the growth of the 
administrated area as well. This was not resolved until the reforms after 1974. 
of the Human Resources department of the Forestry Service). 
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Table 4.4: Development of forest property between 1928, 1959, and 1988. Sources: Min 
de Agr 1940:131; Mendonca 1961a:31; IPF 1988:9. 
Year Total area 
covered by 
forests (ha) 
State land Communal land Private property 
ha % ha L % ha % 
1928 2,331,400 53,662 2.3 55,954 2.4 2,221,824 95.3 
1959 2,900,000 58,000 2 145,000 5 2,697,000 93 
1988 3,056,000 78,000 2.6 380,000 12.4 2,598,000 85.0 
In chapter 2, I explained that there exists a form-determined variation in and 
between states concerning their internal structures and relations with their 
environment. In this respect, Jessop (1983:228-234) distinguishes several forms of 
intervention: formal facilitation, substantive facilitation, formal support, substantive 
support, and direction. The Portuguese State combined several forms of 
intervention in its forestry policy. This combination varied with the State's attitude 
over time towards private afforestation. 
Before the Second World War private forest owners were left alone by the State. 
Landowners planted trees without any help from or intervention by the Forestry 
Service. If the landholders wanted, they could invite the State to police their area 
under the conditions of the simple forestry regime. In exchange, they had to 
provide the guard with one hectare of land, a house, and pay his wage (Decreto-Lei 
12,625 of 13 November 1926). In principle, this would imply that the landowners 
had to manage the forest according to the Service's guidelines. However, the State 
did not have the means to enforce compliance. When a landowner refused to 
execute the afforestation plan or disobeyed other rules for forest exploitation, he 
was subjected to a fine of 500$00 to 5,000$00 (Decreto 39,391 of 24 November 
1954) 1 8 . If he continued to do so for three years, the forestry regime was annulled 
(art. 44). The simple forestry regime was particularly favourable for the 
landowner, not so much in terms of forest management, but because the 
arrangement offered protection for other aspects of his property. He could enclose 
(coutaf) grazings (pastos), game, and fish, and rather than looking after them 
himself, he could delegate the policing of his territory to the State. In other words, 
the simple forestry regime allowed the estate holders state assistance in protecting 
their property (Baptista 1993:282). This policy is primarily an example of what 
Jessop (1983) would call formal facilitation by the State of private (capitalist) 
entrepreneurs. 
1 8 This fine was not very high, only ten to one hundred times the penalty for grazing one single goat 
in a forest area (Decreto-Lei 39,930, art. 15). Moreover, it is not likely that a guard would really dare 
to penalize a wealthy estate holder. 
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In addition to formal facilitation, the State also turned to substantial facilitation. 
During the Second World War when problems with fuel imports arose, the State 
issued a law enabling the confiscation of timber and fuel wood from private land-
owners (Decreto-Lei 32,271 of 19 September 1942). In 1945, when the war drew 
to its end, the government decided that the landowners who had suffered from 
these confiscations should be compensated. It created the Fundo de Fomento 
Florestal (Forestry Development Fund, FFF), which had as its objective "the facili-
tation of reforestation of properties which had been affected by requisitions" and 
"the upgrading of forests belonging to the private dominion ... through the 
furnishing, to proprietors, of seeds and seedlings" (Decreto-Lei 34,394 of 27 
January 1945, quoted by Azevedo Gomes and Quaresma 1988:2). The fund was 
financed by a tax on the consumers' price of fuel wood and timber. 
The Forestry Development Fund's organizational structure reflected the Estado 
Novo's state form. It was a corporative organization under government direction. 
The admimstrative board consisted of the Director General of the Forestry Service, 
the government's delegate to the wood exporters' organisations (Gremios dos 
Exportadores de Madeira), and a forest owner chosen by the Ministry of Fxonomic 
Affairs (Decreto-Lei 34,394 of 27 January 1945). 
Before 1965, the fund had little effect in terms of the amount of money it 
distributed. But when the FFF was organisationally and spatially separated from 
the Forestry Service and received its own offices and bureaucratic apparatus 
(Decreto-Lei 40,721) it became much more active in providing support to private 
afforestation efforts (Azevedo Gomes and Quaresma 1988:2-3). During the next 
two decades it contributed to the afforestation of about 240,000 ha of private and 
communal land (table 4.5) 1 9 . 
Until the state reforms of 1974-1976, the FFF acted through five channels (table 
4.5): the execution of its own afforestation projects, assisting other state bodies 
active in forestry interventions in private dominions, the Junta da Colonizagao 
Interna (JCI), and the Commissao Coordenadora e Orientadora da Reconversao 
Agrdria (Coordinating and Orienting Committee for Agrarian Restructuration, 
CCORA), the supplying of planting material, and finally through the provision of 
technical assistance to landowners. The distribution of the fund's activities confirms 
that the State had a benevolent attitude towards the elite. The FFF's principal 
beneficiaries were the members of the landholding class in the south of the 
country. Between 1965 and 1974, 81% of the loans allocated during this period 
went to the districts of Beja, EVora, Portalegre, and Faro; 54% of the afforestation 
between 1969 and 1974 took place in the districts of Beja, Evora, Faro, and 
Portalegre; and 24% of afforestation in Lisbon, Setubal, and Santar&n. Of the total 
afforestation financed by the Fund between 1965-1974, 98% took place on land 
parcels larger than 50 ha, 84% on land parcels larger than 200 ha, and 59% on 
" One should note that the Forestry Development Fund was housed in the same building as the paper 
company, Companhia do Papel do Prado, at the Rua de Telhal in Lisbon. 
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land parcels over 500 ha (Baptista 1993:296) 2 0. 
After the 1974 revolution, the State became less willing to support the large 
estate holders. The JCI and the CCORA were replaced by the Institute de 
Reestruturagao Agrdria which was charged with the implementation of agrarian 
reform in the southern districts. In 1981 the Portuguese government obtained a 
fifty million US dollar loan from the World Bank for the Portuguese Forestry 
Project (PFP). This project was to afforest 60,000 ha by the state-owned paper 
pulp industry Portucel and 90,000 ha by the Forestry Development Fund. It also 
included the improvement of the infrastructure, the creation of a forestry extension 
service (Services de Extensao Florestal) and a credit programme. The project did 
not satisfy all its aims, mainly because of the public services failed to accomplish 
their tasks. Of the planned 150,000 ha, only 120,000 ha of forest were established, 
as the State only planted 60,000 ha thus falling 30,000 ha below its target. The 
extension service and the credit programme did not start up. Nevertheless, during 
the last two decades of existence, the Forestry Development Fund contributed 
through its own means and through the funds received from the World Bank, to 
the afforestation of 242,954 ha (table 4.5; see also chapter 11). 
After 1977, the Forestry Development Fund also participated in the afforestation 
of the baldios (Decreto-Lei 128/77 of 2 April 1977). As a result, between 1977 and 
1981,27,200 ha afforested through the Forestry Development Fund and 39,700 ha 
afforested through the World Bank loan took place on communal land. Thus, the 
fund was responsible for the afforestation of approximately 67,000 ha of baldios. 
Of the total acreage of forest planted under the responsibility of the Forestry 
2 0 The same can be said about the money spent by the JCI and the CCORA. The CCORA was created 
in 1970 by Decreto-Lei 491/70 within the State's Secretary of Agriculture in order to stimulate agrarian 
development. For an afforestation project, landowners received a maximum of 30 % of investment costs 
as a gift, and could acquire the remainder through a loan with 2% interest and a maximum term of 30 
years. The JCI's conditions were less favourable. It provided loans on a ten-year term. The forestry 
activities of the JCI and the CCORA, both extinct by 1975, were almost entirely limited to the southern 
districts. The twenty-three forestry projects of the JCI were all located in the centre and south of the 
country. Of the areas in which afforestation was subsidized by the CCORA, almost 86% were located 
in the five districts of the south (see table). Areas that were afforested by the Forestry Development 
Fund through CCORA financing (Azevedo Gomes & Quaresma 1988:10) are as follows: 
District Number of projects Area (ha) %. 
Beja 22 1,794 19.8 
Santarem 20 1,465 16.2 
Portalege 14 1,483 16.4 
Faro 20 1,186 13.1 
Castelo Bianco 10 1,806 20.0 
Others (7 did benefit from CCORA) 86 1,311 14.5 
Total (Ties and continent) 143 9,045 100,0 
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Development Fund 28% was on communal land 2 1. 
Table 4.5: The afforestation activities of the Forestry Development Fund (FFF) between 
1965 and 1986 and the bodies through which it received or channelled its credits. 
I 
Type of facilitation Period 
Area (ha) 
1. JCI credits 1966-1969, 1975 1,083 
2. CCORA credits 1971-1975 9,045 
3. FFF/PIDDAC credits 1966-1986 116,806 
4. Provision of plants 1965-1986 53,136 
5. Technical assistance 1966-1984 10,035 
6. World Bank loan 1981-1986 58,977 
Total afforested through FFF 1965-1986 242,954 
The fund's revival after 1965 was related to the strengthening of its organizational 
structure: it was made independent from the Forestry Service. Since then, public 
forestry activities have been organized in two divisions within the state apparatus, 
the Direccao-Geral dos Servigos Florestais e Aquicolas (DGSFA) for the public 
(comprising state lands and the commons), and the Fundo de Fomento Florestal 
(FFF) for the private sector. After 1977, the shift in the FFF's activities away 
from private property towards the baldios, the traditional domain of the Forestry 
Service, removed the justification for the existence of two parallel organizations. 
In 1983, both bodies merged into one organism, the Direccao-Geral das Florestas 
(Directorate-General of Forests, DGF) (Decreto-Lei 293/83 of 27 July 1983) 2 2. 
The DGF's activities were primarily directed towards public forest areas, although 
it also had to "promote and support the extension and technical assistance to private 
2 1 The regional distribution of (he World Bank afforestation on private property is shown in the table. 
It suggests that less emphasis was put on the southern districts (47% in Santarem, Castelo Branco and 
Portalegre) (compare note 20). The World Bank was active in Porto and Braganca. In Vila Real it 
developed only a few activities (Azevedo Gomes and Quaresma 1988:16). 
The figures given by Azevedo Gomes and Quaresma (1988) should be read with a caution. For 
instance in the case of the afforestation of common properly, on page 7 they declare that 45% of the 
area of afforested by the FFF after 1977 and 74% of the area afforested by the World Bank project are 
on communal land. This means that 27,184 plus 43,643 or a total of 70,826 ha would have been 
afforested in this period. On the same page, they argue that between 1977 and the end of the World 
Bank project 64,000 ha of communal land have been afforested. This slipshod manner in the 
presentation of statistics is a general feature of Portuguese forestry statistics. 
2 2 As the Forestry Development Fund only ceased to function after the conclusion of the World Bank 
project, the new directorate's internal structure was regulated three years later by Decreto Regulamentar 
51/86. 
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forest property and to assure the professional formation in the field of forestry'' 
(Decreto Regulamentar 51/86, art. 1, section n). In this manner, the Forestry 
Service continued to maintain a link with private forestry development after its 
reorganization. 
From State to Public Service 
The 1974 revolution ended in the creation of the Third Republic. This ushered in 
a new era in which the relations between the State and civil society were 
democratized. The revolution also brought Decreto-Lei 39/76 restoring the 
commons that had been submitted to the forestry regime to the original owners, the 
communities. This law seriously affected the Forestry Service. The Service's role 
was restated in terms of providing assistance to the commoners in the management 
of their properties. The Forestry Service turned, at least formally, from a service 
for the State into a service for the public. 
The new relationship between the Service and the commoners is the subject of 
chapter 9. In this chapter, I discuss another element of the post-1974 
transformation. After the merging of the separate units for private and public 
forests into one single structure, the reorganized Forestry Service formally became 
more involved in the supervision of private forest areas that were not submitted to 
the forestry regime. An example of this increased intervention in private forest 
management is that since 1988, private landowners are required to report lopping 
and felling of individual trees and trees in stands, rows, and hays to the public 
service (Decretos-Leis 172/88 and 174/88) and to apply for a licence for the final 
felling. The licensing system remained restricted to only two species (Pinus 
pinaster and Eucalyptus spp.) and did not affect the smaller and older stands 
(Decreto-Lei 173/88) 2 3. 
Portugal's entry into the European Community (EC) in 1986 also had an 
important impact on the state Forestry Service. The EC considered forestry as one 
of Portugal's trump cards (EC 1986:21, 96) and agreed to channel a flow of funds 
to the country to support forestry. These funds were available through the specific 
programme for the development of Portuguese agriculture, the Programma 
Especifico de Desenvolvimento da Agricultura Portuguesa (PEDAP) (Reg (CEE) 
3828/85), and the agrarian structural policies through EEC-regulation 797/85, the 
cornerstone of the 1985 revision to the European Agricultural Structures Policies. 
The funds were channelled through the European Fund for Regional Development 
In the case of pines: over 2 ha and diameters below 17 cm. In the case of eucalyptus: stands larger 
than 1 ha and diameters below 12 cm. Final fellings are defined as fellings in which more than 50% 
of the total volume is removed. 
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(Fundo de Desenvolvimento Regional, FEDER 2 4), the European Social Fund, and 
the European Orientation and Guarantee Fund for Agriculture (FEOGA). On the 
basis of the 797/85 regulation within PEDAP, a forestry branch was created, the 
Forestry Action Programme. This programme was 
three dimensional, including solidarity, national autonomy and 
environment. It had three functions (economic, social and ecological) 
and was connected to the set-aside regulations, regional development 
programmes (FEOGA), forest protection and the small-scale forest 
industry (saw mills). (Int 9-7-91) 
In Portugal, this EC-forestry programme was translated into the Programa de 
Acçâo Florestal (Forestry Action Programme, PAF), financed through the 
FEOGA. The programme intended to afforest 400,000 hectares in ten years time 
(Neiva 1991a, 1991b). Unlike earlier programmes, the landowner himself had to 
produce a proposal. Landowners who wanted to forest 5 or more ha of land, were 
eligible for subsidies between 30 to 100% of the investment. According to PAF, 
baldios commissions also qualified for PAF-subsidies for afforestation25. The PAF 
represented a considerable amount of money. For the PAF's second three-year 
phase (based upon the 1989 modification of regulation 797/85) which started in 
1990, the EC agreed to channel 74.13 million ECU through the FEOGA to 
Portuguese forest owners. From the State and the beneficiaries contributions of 
24.71 million and 12.68 million ECU respectively were expected. That the PAF 
was the second largest expenditure within the FEOGA's budget for Portugal, 
indicates the importance of forestry for the EC 2 6 . 
Since Portugal entered into the EC, the instrument of substantial facilitation was 
further developed through the creation of new subsidies and credit lines on behalf 
I use the Portuguese abbreviations. As an indication some figures of the sums involved: In 1987, 
FEDER attributed 359,8 million ECU to Portugal. One third (36.5%) was spent on projects in the 
North, 13.2% in the Centre, 11% in the Lisbon area and 19.6% in the Alentejo and Algarve. The 
remainder was spent on the Acores and on Madeira. About 65% of the regional support to the North 
went to infrastructural projects, like the construction of motorways and the improvement and expansion 
of the airport of Porto (EC 1989). But FEDER also supported other projects. 
2 5 Public contribution depended upon the species and the area, and whether the applicant was an 
individual or part of an association of forest owners (Associacao de Proprietdrios Florestais - APF). In 
this way, the EC and the Portuguese government intended to resolve the problem of scale in Portuguese 
forestry by stimulating the association of individual owners into one forest unit (Portarias 258/87, 832-
A/87 and 570/88 of 1 April 1987, 21 October 1987 and 20 August 1988). 
2 6 The Portuguese government played the game with the EC quite cleverly. Instead of paying 50% of 
the costs, as agreed in 1985 by Reg(EEC) 3828/85, it was able to shift most of the burden to the EC. 
During the programme's first phase (1986-1989), Portugal paid 2,307,266 cantos (one conto is 1,000 
escudos)(26%), whereas the EC contributed 6;480,090 contos (74%) on a total subsidy of 8,787,356 
contos. Total investment amounted to 10,918,249 contos (EC 1991). In 1989, by Reg(EEC) 1609/89, 
it was determined that the EC would pay 70% of the public contribution. The Portuguese contribution 
was at least partially financed through new World Bank loans. 
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of private forest owners. In addition, the State more frequently carried out the task 
of directing the management practices of private forest owners. These measures 
(closer supervision of management practices and an enormous flow of credit to the 
private forest owners), all show that, whereas during the last two decades, formal 
state control over the commons diminished, the State's involvement in private 
forest management had intensified. 
Conclusion: State Form and State Forestry 
The present Portuguese state is the result of a complicated process of state 
formation. In the Middle Ages, the ambition of a nobleman near Porto resulted in 
the realm of Portugal. During the nineteenth century, this realm was gradually 
turned into a bourgeois state: representation through a parliamentary system 
allowed the replacement of the aristocracy by the bourgeoisie in positions in the 
state's political and administrative organs. The State developed new modes of 
intervention to facilitate or support capitalist entrepreneurs. Finally, its internal 
structure was reformed in such a way that direct rule became viable. The modern 
Portuguese forestry bureaucracy emerged within this context of nineteenth-century 
transformations. 
According to Weber (1964:209), "[t]he proper soil for bureaucratization of an 
administration has always been the specific development of administrative tasks". 
In the case of the Forestry Service, that soil had a twin character: game protection 
in the royal hunting preserves, and the administration of wood felling in the 
Crown's forest. When Portugal became a seaborne empire, timber became a more 
important resource and, thus, the Crown took various measures to encourage 
afforestation and to protect its woods. The modern forest bureaucracy emerged 
during the nineteenth century. This step was facilitated by the restructuring of the 
state, the re-conceptualization of property, and the development of scientific forest 
management. The Forestry Service's creation and evolution illustrates the 
rationalization of public administration, the strengthening of state power, and the 
transition to direct rule. 
The nineteenth century also provided the conditions for the Service's penetration 
into the interior. The king's power had previously been limited to the littoral and 
the area around Lisbon. Under the legal provision of the forestry regime, the State 
was able to intervene in the management of the commons in the interior and the 
north of the country, which until then had been administered by the local 
communities. The result was a horizontal expansion of the Service's apparatus 
through the appointment of extra guards and the creation of new administrations. 
The internal hierarchy was not affected: strategic decisions were taken at the top 
in the capital, whereas at the bottom and in the organization's periphery the 
responsibilities had predominantly an executive character. 
The installation of corporatist rule under Salazar and later Caetano implied a 
clear strengthening of the afforestation effort and the Forestry Service in terms of 
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funds and personnel. The Service was able to obtain the financial means necessary 
to fully employ the legal tools it had acquired during the last decades of the 
monarchy. With these means, the Service could rapidly expand the area under its 
administration. Hence, it is during the autocratic Estado Novo that public forestry 
reached its zenith. 
The intensity with which the State intervened in the baldios can be contrasted 
with its attitude towards the private forestry sector. Most of the time, the 
Portuguese State refrained from action in the domain of private property. Since 
1901, it supported forest owners who wanted to have their land policed. This was 
accomplished by submitting their land to the simple policing regime. The forest 
owners were assigned a guard provided they would keep to certain management 
arrangements. These arrangements, however, were not superimposed but 
established by mutual agreement, and in the event that an owner did not want to 
execute them, he could rather easily liberate himself from state interference. After 
the Second World War, the State turned to substantial support through the 
provision of credit to forest owners. Initially this credit was destined to those who 
had suffered from forced timber requisition during the Second World War, but 
after 1965, other forest owners were also able to benefit from the arrangement. 
The provision of that support had a clear class bias; those who benefitted from it 
were the large estate holders in the south of the country, who also formed part of 
the regime's social basis. 
The changes in the state form that followed the 1974 revolution were clearly 
reflected in the Forestry Service. On the one hand, civil society in the form of 
commoners communities gained strength. Officially, at least, the Forestry Service 
turned from a service for the State, into a service for the public. On the other 
hand, its intervention in private forest management intensified. Credit facilities 
were expanded as a result of the availability of EC-funds. But, in addition to this 
substantial support, State interference in management intensified27. In this respect, 
one might argue that civil society became subject to stricter supervision by the 
State. 
It seems that public forestry parallelled changes in the state form: the build-up 
of public forestry during the nineteenth-century constitutional monarchy, its climax 
in terms of political support and expansion during the Estado Novo, its submission 
to civil society after the revolution, and its growing interference in private forest 
management during the Third Republic. In the following chapter I will examine the 
attitude of the Forestry Service towards the public, in particular to commoners' 
communities, during the first two stages in the Service's development. 
2 7 This new orientation of me Forestry Service towards private forest owners was also expressed by a 
new organizational geography: after 1992, the service increased its presence in the south, the region 
where, in terms of acreage, private forest owners predominate (IF 1994:ix-x). 
Chapter 5 
The Forestry Service and Civil Society 
Introduction 
In chapter 4, I focused on the institutional expansion of the Forestry Service in 
terms of number of officials employed and area of land controlled. This growth 
was related to specific changes in the internal structure of the Portuguese State and 
its relations with society. The state apparatus, in particular the forest 
administration, was reorganized according to the principles of a Weberian 
bureaucracy enabling it penetrate deep into rural areas, which had up to that point 
remained relatively free of state interference. In this chapter, I examine the 
relationship of the Forestry Service to the public, and discuss how the Service's 
expansion took shape in the countryside. I cite examples from different phases in 
the Service's development: (a) the period of hesitant growth until 1938, (b) the 
Forestry Service's rapid expansion during the execution of the Piano de 
Povoamento Florestal, (c) the Service's submission to civil society in the form of 
the commoners' communities after 1974, and finally (d) growing interference in 
private forest management after 1988. The examples illuminate the weaknesses and 
strengths of the state forestry bureaucracy during each of these stages. Two 
examples are derived from literature and general information, whereas the other 
two are the result of fieldwork in Campea, my principal research area. 
The examples of the bureaucracy's intervention in the countryside are presented 
in two different contexts: that of the submission of communal land to the Forestry 
Service's administration, and that of forest management. The two contexts differ 
in the sense that in the first, the Service's authority was still contested by the local 
communities which could still engage in an open struggle against its imposition, 
whereas in the second, the Service's authority was, at least formally, acknowledged 
by the communities. It will appear that in both cases the Service's power was 
severely constrained by popular resistance and, in fact, could only be effective as 
long as it was in some way or another supported by other mechanisms in the State 
or society. 
The Forestry Service and The Imposition of the Partial Forestry 
Regime: the Serra da Lousa 
The first example of the way in which the Forestry Service was able to acquire 
control over communal land is not derived from my own research data. In his book 
Terra Que Jd Foi Terra (Land Which Once Was a Home) (1985), Paulo Monteiro 
92 Planting Power 
describes the death of shepherd communities in the mountainous area of the Serra 
da Lousa. At the time he was writing his book, most of these hamlets had been 
totally abandoned by their inhabitants, who had either emigrated to Brazil or the 
USA, or moved into the nearby town. One of the villages in his study served as 
the background to O Fim do Mundo, the film I cited in the first chapter. Using 
correspondence between emigrated villagers from the region, Monteiro reconstructs 
the motives for their departure and their ambitions for the future (particularly with 
their desire to (re-)establish or enlarge their farms). Among the causes for the 
decline of these shepherd communities, Monteiro highlights the occupation of the 
mountain ranges (serras) by the Forestry Service. The afforestation of the 
commons by the Service in these areas put an end to traditional forms of land 
exploitation and employment, hence, forcing the people to leave. 
Terra Que Jd Foi Terra contains an elaborate description of the way in which the 
Forestry Service began its actions in the area. Basing his research on contemporary 
sources, Monteiro describes how a town about twenty-five kilometres to the 
southeast of Coimbra, in an area in the mountains near Lousa, was submitted to 
the partial forestry regime in 1909 1. Monteiro's description is particularly 
illuminating, because he connects the events in the early twentieth century which 
accompanied the arrival of the Forestry Service and, the subsequent forestation of 
the serra, to two more general developments. These were a 'civilisation project', 
and the dissolution of the pastoral mountain communities as a result of massive 
emigration. 
The first area within the municipality of Lousa that was submitted to the forestry 
regime belonged to the parish of Serpins. This parish lies to the northeast of the 
town of Lousa and had been an independent municipality until 1835. Its annexation 
by the municipality of Lousa laid the foundation for a conflict between the 
parishioners of Serpins and the municipal authorities in Lousa concerning 
jurisdiction over the commons. The municipality argued that these lands were 
submitted to the municipal authorities like in the other parishes within the 
municipality, whereas the Parish Council claimed them as its traditional dominion. 
The conflict was brought before the Coimbra district council, which in 1859 
ordered the Parish Council of Serpins to render all its goods to the municipality 
except for the baldios. It was ruled that these baldios did not belong to the parish's 
private property but to the communities within the parish, which were allowed to 
continue to administer their grounds as they had done before. Thus, the Municipal 
Council did not receive control over the baldios in Serpins, but it did start to 
interfere in their management through the nomination of zeladores and the creation 
of certain by-laws (posturas). 
1 His sources are: Adriano Jos6 de Carvalho's (1911a) O Regime Florestal em Serpins: ExposicSo e 
Critica. Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade; Joao Augusto dos Santos et al. (1911) A Cdmara de 
Lousd. e o regimen florestal. Porto: Empresa Guedes; and Adriano JosS de Carvalho's (1911b) O 
Regime Florestal e a Cdmara de Lousd. Porto: Empresa Litteraria e Typographica. 
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Among the properties that were transferred to municipal administration was a 
thicket of cork oaks called the Mata do Sobral. In 1909 the Municipal Council 
found no one who wanted to exploit the cork from mis woodlot. The Council 
concluded that this was because of the advanced degradation of the forest resulting 
from its abuse by the local population. Because the locals preferred to exploit the 
municipality's land instead of their private properties, the Mata do Sobral became 
severely degraded, while the surrounding areas remained in a reasonable state. Or 
as a contemporary source observed: 
In the Comoro's thicket, not one frondose and robust tree; around, on 
the private grounds, which are of the same quality, the cork oaks and 
the arbutes reach the most beautiful proportions! The contrast was and 
is striking. (Santos 1911:8; quoted onp.191) 
The Municipal Council believed that the municipal forest could only be preserved 
through state intervention and began to consider submitting the area to the forestry 
regime "in order to defend the general well-being of the community against the 
egoism, vandalism and rapacious mentality of the illiterate population of the 
mountain hamlets" (ibid; quoted on p. 189). 
The C&mara Municipal moved rapidly in order to obtain the desired intervention 
by the State. In March 1909, the Municipal Council decided to request submission 
of the area to the forestry regime at the first meeting the proposal was raised and 
without any other alternative being discussed. The Council convinced the central 
State authorities of the urgent need for afforestation by referring to the deplorable 
and degraded conditions of another mountain range in the area, the Serra da Lousa, 
which lies to the southeast of the town. However, the Council asked for 
intervention in the Serra de Serpins, which was less steep and not ruined by 
erosion. In this way, the first areas to be submitted to the forestry regime were 
precisely those that had the most abundant vegetation, the most bountiful fuelwood, 
and produced the best fodder. In other words, those areas that were the most 
valuable and the most important to the local population. 
The population of Serpins tried to resist the Forestry Service's arrival. In May 
it presented a petition to the Municipal Council demanding that the commons be 
divided among the commoners. Each commoner would pay a rent to the C&mara 
and plant or sow trees on his plot. The municipal authorities declined the demands. 
However, they responded that they would only request submission to the forestry 
regime of municipal properties (such as the thicket of Sobral), and they promised 
to defend the population's traditional prerogatives concerning brush and fire wood 
collection and cattle grazing. 
But when the Forestry Service arrived, it did not limit itself to the areas the 
municipal authorities had indicated in their response to the population's petition. 
Instead the Service included the surrounding commons in its afforestation plans as 
well. With the municipality's consent, the Service refused to abide by the legal 
prerequisite to inquire into traditional usufruct rights and to delimit areas for the 
continuation of communal exploitation. 
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The inhabitants of Serpins rebelled against the municipal authorities and the 
central State for imposing their power. They appealed to the king in 1910, and 
continued to collect fire wood and brush, and to graze their cattle on the disputed 
areas. As a result, the municipal authorities called in the military from Coimbra: 
The population, with the vanguard occupied by the female element, 
resisted tenaciously exclaiming 'This is ours! This is ours!'. The troops 
tried to destroy the bundles of brush, but the women doubled their 
clamours. (Carvalho 1911a:20 quoted on p. 198) 
The inhabitants also refused to help the Forestry Service to afforest their commons, 
even though the Service offered to pay them more than the average daily 
agricultural wage (400 reis instead of 240 riis), to demand less than the normal 
working time, and to give them free firewood. In the end, the job was executed by 
the inhabitants of a neighbouring parish, whose priest was the vice-president of the 
Camara (Monteiro 1985:185-199). 
Monteiro extends his description of the conflict with a thorough analysis of its 
cultural and political background. He believes (pp. 176-183), that the afforestation 
in the Serra da Lousa should be seen as an expression of how the urban population 
of Lousa perceived the people and landscape of the serra. These town dwellers felt 
only contempt for the people living in the surrounding mountains. 
They confused the mountain population with wolves; believed that these 
people, dirty from charcoal, low, with their round faces and their little 
eyes, seemed a type of mongols; and that in all that blackness, their 
mouths seemed to bleed, their teeth to radiate with ferocity, and their 
eyes to flash infernal thunderbolts. The children fled from them; and 
even many grown-ups lacked the courage to face mem. (Quotations on 
p. 178) 
At the end of the nineteenth century, this urban image of the serra and its 
population changed. The city dwellers were no longer dependent upon firewood 
and charcoal and, thus, began to look at the mountains in a new way. In the past, 
these inaccessible mountains, the domain of shepherds and charcoal-makers, had 
worked as a barrier between them and Lisbon. Now, they should be turned into a 
tourist resort: 
The Serra, for centuries that immense barrier to the natural and full 
expansion of Lousa, is nowadays with the modern means of 
communication and its forest and development of tourism a large and 
legitimate hope of the Lousanians. She, who, correctly speaking, closed 
us [the Lousanians, RB] off from the south, has today the task to 
compensate us for the harm she has done to us. (Lemos, Lousa e o seu 
concelho, 1950; quoted on p. 179) 
This redefinition of the mountains from a constraint into a resource, was connected 
to a revaluation of the people living on them. In 1932, the "mongoloid" of the 
nineteenth century had turned into a 
.. .little boy-shepherd, rustic, curly hair, his breast naked, a crook in his 
hand, - in the afternoon, in order to gather his cattle, masterly he 
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blows the horn, of which Pan, when he retreated definitively to the 
mythological mists, must have lost the original somewhere here in the 
mountains. (Luso, Viajar, 1932:87; quoted by Monteiro 1985:179-180). 
The urban people created a romantic image of the inhabitants of the serra. Instead 
of being considered dangerous wild creatures, they became inoffensive, primitive 
illiterates who needed to be civilized and educated. Forest management became an 
instrument of civilization. 
At the same time it was thought to be necessary to preserve the typical character 
and traditional costumes of the mountain dwellers because the advance of modern. 
society would most likely homogenize them and destroy their culture. These two 
perceptions of the mountain people as uncivilized on the one hand and noble, 
"typical" and charming on the other, were mirrored by two developments: 
educational expansion through the creation of schools in the mountain villages 
surrounding Lousa, and "folklorization" in the town itself. One started to refer to 
the Lous2 area as a homogeneous region, with its typical costumes, and created 
folkloric bands (ranchos) clothed in the "regional" "traditional" attire and singing 
old or new "traditional" songs "from the region". In this manner, the countryside 
became the object of modernization, while in town tradition was reinvented2. 
This modernization project - the domestication and civilization of the mountains 
and its population and the conceptualization of the serra as a resource instead of 
a barrier - characterized the cultural context in which the Forestry Service arrived. 
The project provided the cultural and political legitimation of Service's 
intervention3. 
Officially, the Forestry Service's intervention was due to the neglected state of 
the thicket of Sobral. It was represented as a necessary condition for the economic 
development of the area. Ideologically, the Service's intervention was justified by 
the idea of civilizing the mountain population. However, beneath this ideological 
layer there existed political intentions that had nothing to do with the deplorable 
conditions of the mountain vegetation, or with regional development or civilization. 
According to Monteiro, the Municipal Council of Lousa requested the Service's 
intervention not because of the degraded state of the cork thicket (in 1908 it had 
done nothing when the Algarvian enterprise which had exploited the Mata do 
Sobral left without paying the 492,000 reis of the two ultimate instalments), but 
because of the municipality's own eagerness to control the resources of Serpins 
which had remained in the hands of the parish. This political motive also explains 
2 This reinvention of tradition was a typical feature of the Estado Novo and officially supported. 
Salazar defended rural life and considered the village as the "soul of Portugal" (see for examples: O 
Vilarealense 23-8-51, 28-8-58, 8-12-60, 14-5-70, and 30-8-73). In 1938, a contest was held in order 
to identify a aldeia mats portuguesa (the most Portuguese village) (Pais de Brito 1982). 
3 The way in which the Forestry Service's official chronicler Mendonca (1961a, 1961b) depicts the 
role of afforestation of the commons shows that the Service itself perceived its intervention as a mission 
of civilization and modernization of the countryside as well. 
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why the Forestry Service could go against the preconditions of the law that 
regulated the introduction of the forestry regime, and refuse to execute an inquiry 
into the population's usufruct rights as well as refusing to reserve an area for the 
continuation of communal exploitation. It clarifies why the Service afforested the 
baldios instead of limiting itself to the reafforestation of the municipal thickets, and 
why it began activities close to the hamlets instead of in isolated areas farther 
away. It could only do so because, in its eagerness to establish its power over the 
parish of Serpins, the municipal authorities consented to and supported these 
actions. Two other events support this argument: the Camara and not the Forestry 
Service summoned the troops to quell popular resistance; and the Camara's vice-
president recruited the labour power that breached the locals' boycott of the 
plantation activities from his own parish. This means that the arrival of the 
Forestry Service should not only be seen as part of the national forestry policy, but 
also in the light of local struggles for power, control, and self-detennination. 
The Forestry Regime in the Serra do Marao 
The imposition of the forestry regime in the Serra da Lousa was shaped by the 
struggle between municipal authorities and parishes over control of the baldios. A 
similar political undercurrent can also be found in other areas. One such area is the 
Serra do Marao. Submission of this serra to the forestry regime took place in two 
steps. On the western side of this mountain range, in the part belonging to the 
concelho of Amarante, the commons were submitted to the partial forestry regime 
in 1916. As in the Lousa case, this decision was made at the request of the local 
municipal authorities, the Camara Municipal of Amarante (Decreto 2,786 of 
18 November 1916; Mendes 1928; Mendia 1939). Contrary to what happened in 
Lousa, the Forestry Service in Amarante organized an inquiry in June 1917 into 
the rights and privileges of the local population, and promised to safeguard them4. 
However, a conflict similar to that with Serpins arose. The parish of Ansiaes had 
belonged to an independent municipality that was incorporated into the concelho 
of Amarante in the nineteenth century (Freire 1909). When the Forestry Service 
started to work in the parish's commons, the parish authorities tried to stop them, 
saying that the decree referred only to the commons that belonged to the 
municipality, and as the commons of Ansiaes belonged to the parish, the decree did 
not affect them. However, as was the case in Lousa, their protests remained 
unheard and afforestation continued. 
The eastern side of the Serra do Marao belonged to the concelho of Vila Real. 
In 1917 the local Camara Municipal took the initiative to request the imposition of 
the partial forestry regime: 
4 A copy of this inquiry is still kept in the forestry administration's office in Amarante. 
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Under the proposal of vogal [councillor, RB] Senhor Rocha it was 
unanimously decided to submit to the forestry regime the baldios of the 
C&mara in the parish of Torgueda, the remainder in the parish of 
Lordelo, as well as the areas considered baldio on the slopes of the 
Sasbeira, bordering the national road N 10 until the hamlet of Pousada, 
parish of Campea, in order to improve the waters of the Corgo and 
Sordo rivers. (ACM 2 January 1917) 
However, none of the commons in the area belonged to the municipality. They all 
belonged to the different parishes (JCI 1939; Sousa 1983). This suggests that, 
similar to what happened a few years earlier in Lousa, the preoccupation with the 
watersheds served as a pretext. In reality, the municipality wanted to use the 
Forestry Service as a means of increasing its own power over the commons in the 
concelho. Again, the forestry regime (and the Forestry Service) was as a weapon 
in the hand of the municipality which could be deployed against the parishes. 
The municipality's request to submit the eastern side of the Marao to the forestry 
regime did not have any immediate effect. The area was not yet submitted to 
administration by the Forestry Service. However, afforestation continued to 
preoccupy the population of that part of the Serra. Perhaps this was because of the 
steady advance of afforestation in neighbouring Amarante, where in 1928 3,816 ha 
were already covered with trees (Mendes 1928). Furthermore, there were signs 
that the national government wanted to afforest the baldios on the eastern slopes 
of the Marao, including those of Campea. 
In December 1929, the Parish Council of Campea discussed the government's 
intention to afforest the parish commons. Afraid that this afforestation might be 
disadvantageous to the area's agriculture, the Parish Council decided to preclude 
state intervention and undertake afforestation by itself. Because the issue was of 
great importance, the Parish Council resolved to inform the population of its 
decision and to hear their response (AJF 15 December 1929). Three weeks later, 
on 5 January 1930, the Council met with a group of representatives from the parish 
population (the zeladores and some other inhabitants of the parish who were invited 
for the occasion). The representatives declared that the people supported the 
afforestation "under the condition that the commons remain in its property like 
before, and that it can wield and enjoy fully the same prerogatives" (AJF 5 January 
1930). Having thus assured itself of the population's support, the Council explained 
that its cash reserves were empty, and that it was unable to cover the costs of 
afforestation from its own means. In response, the people's representatives 
declared that the ten villages in the parish that owned large communal areas were 
willing to contribute the amount of money needed (2,165$00), provided that local 
labour would benefit from the employment. The villages then collected the money 
and handed it over to the Council5. Two months later, in March, the Parish 
5 The minutes do not contain separate entries which prove that the money was actually paid. But the 
fact that between July 1929 and July 1930 the council's budget increased by 2657$50 from 480$55 to 
3138$05 suggests that this really happened. See also appendix 7. 
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Council ordered four hundred litres of pine seed from the Forestry Service in 
Lisbon. However, instead of the seed, it received a message from the Service 
explaining that it was not the right season for seeding pines, and that it would send 
someone to clarify any questions. 
In April the council discussed the results of that visit. It appeared that the 
Forestry Service had set strict conditions for forestation. Therefore, the council 
thought it necessary to inform the people about the affair and give them an 
opportunity to express their opinion on the issue (AJF 6 April 1930). At the 
meeting, the new conditions created a lot of confusion: 
The people, seeing that the agriculture of this parish will be prejudiced 
if the area for communal exploitation is lost, disagreed about the future 
course. As it was impossible to come to a compromise, it was decided 
to notify the Governador Civil [District Governor, RB] of the existence 
of disparate attitudes which during the [Parish Council's] next visit 
would be explained verbally. (AJF 20 April 1930) 
What had happened during the conversations between the Forestry Service's 
representative and the District Governor is not known. The Parish Council's 
minutes neither explain the contents of the Forestry Service's conditions, nor 
describe the attitudes taken by the councillors and representatives of the villages 
who were present. Further, there is no mention made of the outcome of the visit 
to the District's Governor. As the records do not contain any further reference to 
the project, one must conclude that the population decided to abandon afforesting 
the baldios because of certain preconditions set by the Forestry Service. In the light 
of the conditions formulated earlier by the parishioners themselves, the Service's 
preconditions probably entailed limitation of the population's control over and 
access to the commons. 
The events between 1929 and 1930 in Campea show that the Forestry Service's 
aspirations went well beyond afforestation. Had the Forestry Service's intentions 
been purely to afforest the area, it should have welcomed the fact that the parish 
population wished to participate and had even raised the necessary funds. The 
Service stifled the local readiness and refused to take into account the population's 
needs regarding control over and access to the commons. The result of the 
Service's attitude was that the population abandoned the project and the mountains 
remained denuded and eroded. 
The case of Campea is no exception. In his study of Rio de Onor, Dias 
(1953:124) describes a similar case. Here, 
"partly inspired by the example [of the Forestry Service's afforestation 
works, RB], partly out of fear that the Forestry Service would master 
some of its baldios.... The village council must already have planted 
several thousands of sweet chestnut trees and also many walnuts, 
and is minking about new experiments. 
The commons of Rio de Onor were submitted to the forestry regime in 1940 as 
part of the perimeter of the Deilao (Decreto of 21 September 1940; see Gil 
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1975:59). However, afforestation in this area did not begin until the mid-1950s 
(DGSFA 1956b). 
The irony of this history is that the alleged incapability of local administrative 
bodies to afforest their commons had been used to legitimize the strengthening of 
the role of the Forestry Service through the Piano de Povoamento Florestal. As I 
explained in chapter 4 (pp.77-78), the government justified this plan by saying that, 
although the afforestation of the commons was in principle one of the local 
administrations' responsibilities, the task transcended their means and scope. But 
the cases of Serpins, Rio de Onor, and Campea demonstrate that the local 
population was prepared to afforest their commons. In Campea, this willingness 
even materialized in the form of gathering the necessary finances, whereas in Rio 
de Onor the local authorities actually carried out plantation works. These local 
initiatives did not proceed because of the Service's attitude. This attitude can be 
explained in two ways. First, it was in the interest of the Service to acquire full 
control over the commons as that would guarantee the institution's growth. Second, 
by halting local initiatives, it could argue at a national level that local councils were 
incapable of administering the commons thus requiring that those areas be handed 
over to the Forestry Service. The motives of the State's forest administrators went 
beyond the mere need to stop erosion and improve the watersheds. The examples 
discussed reveal that the Forestry Service's motivation was geared to acquiring 
control over the commons themselves. 
The Piano de Povoamento Florestal in Campea: 'For the Good of 
the Nation' 
The slow advance of the afforestation of the commons led to the formulation of the 
Piano de Povoamento Florestal. This plan included all baldios north of the Tejo 
River and thus envisaged the afforestation of the commons on the eastern side of 
the Marao. In April 1938, shortly before the afforestation plan was approved by 
the National Assembly, the president of Campea's Parish Council was called to 
Vila Real to discuss with the Camara Municipal the submission to the forestry 
regime of the baldios of the concelho, including those of Campea itself. The Parish 
Council decided to send two envoys: the president himself, and a council member 
(yogal), Eduardo Antunes Cerejeira6. As the council was convinced of the baldios' 
importance to the parish, it instructed the delegation to "discuss with the president 
of the municipality the best possible way to defend the commons" (AJF 
4 December 1938). Two weeks later, the envoys presented their report. They 
stated, that the president of the Camara Municipal had declared that "time had not 
yet been appointed for the inquiry and that later he would inform them, and that 
6 Eduardo Antunes Cerejeira later played an important part as Parish Council president and member 
of the Comissäo Politico during the intervention by the JCI. See also chapter 6. 
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he would do his best to achieve that the miriimum of the parish's grounds would 
be submitted" (AJF 18 December 1938). 
The last part of the president's statement suggests that over this twenty-year 
period the municipality's attitude had drastically changed. In 1917, the Cdmara 
Municipal itself had requested the submission of the entire Serra to the forestry 
regime. In 1938, it said that it would do anything to stop the Service from 
acquiring control over the area. Apparently, the municipality no longer saw the 
Forestry Service as a suitable means to acquire control over the parishes and their 
commons. 
In March 1939, the Parish Council of Campea was notified that the inquiry was 
set for May. The council was shocked by the news and discussed what the possible 
consequences would be for farming if all the commons were submitted to forestry. 
In order to stall such a development, it decided, 
unanimously to make a list of all the names of the montes baldios of 
each hamlet, its approximate sizes, the usufructuaries' names and its 
confines, as determined in art. 334 of the Administrative Code.... 
Ant6nio Joaquim Rebelo, the regedor of the parish, and Eduardo 
Antunes Cerejeira [were] charged with this task and [would] be paid 
50$00 each after its completion. (AJF 4 March 1939). 
The regedor and vogal completed a list, that indicated which baldios the parish 
would agree to yield to the Forestry Service in May. On May 21, the Forestry 
Service arrived for its inquiry. The Parish Council handed over the list and 
demanded that 
in the part dispensable of the logradouro comum all water wells are to 
be respected, and the irrigation channels as well, because these belong 
to private proprietors. And it demands that trees will not be planted 
within a distance of 5 meters of these channels in order to avoid 
hindrance of the water flow. It also demands that all rights7 are 
respected, and that only those baldios which are mentioned in the list 
will be subjected to the forestry regime. (AJF 21 May 1939) 
The officers took the list with them to Lisbon, while a copy was kept in Vila 
Real 8. 
It is unclear what happened thereafter. In August 1939, the Parish Council 
complained about irregularities committed by the Forestry Service. It accused the 
Service of not upholding the agreements made earlier that year. In September, the 
7 The word used in the text is servicos, or services. Therefore probably rights-of-way and other 
servitudes (serviddes) are meant. 
8 It was impossible to find the list, its copy, or even a reference in the archives of the Forestry Service 
in Lisbon and the municipality in Vila Real. Apparently, it is lost. Since the 1930s, the central 
department of the Forestry Service was moved and a fire destroyed part of the city hall in the 1970s. 
It is possible that the documents were lost during the removal and the fire. 
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president of the Campea Parish Council declared that he had complained to the 
president of the municipality about the imposition of the forestry regime claiming 
[fjirst, that only those commons shall be submitted to the forestry 
regime which are mentioned in the list prepared by the Parish Council 
and which the Parish Council considers nonessential for communal 
exploitation, and second, that the commons which are considered indis-
pensable continue to be owned by the Parish Council and shall be 
administered by the council and regulated by the by-laws in force. 
(AJF 3 September 1939). 
However, the minutes of the Camara Municipal's meetings during that period 
contain no references to the Forestry Service's activities. And within the Service 
itself, no living or written memory exists of this first attempt to afforest the 
commons of Campea. Apart from the Parish Council's minutes, the only proof that 
something had been going on is a short notice in a local newspaper, O Vilarealense 
of 23 March 1939. According to this article, the Forestry Service intended to plant 
272 hectares in the Serra do Marao, of which "32 ha were located between 
Espinho and the Alto de Velao," i.e., in Campea. But areal photographs from 1947 
do not show any sign of planted tree stands in that area. After the incidents of 
1939, the Parish Council's minutes do not mention any Forestry Service activity, 
either. Hence, one must conclude that for some reason, the Service must have 
refrained from intervention in the parish. It did not return to Campei until 1955. 
Before the Forestry Service's return to the parish, another state agency 
intervened: the Junta da Colonizagao Interna (JCI). This agency promoted the 
privatization of parts of the parish's commons by attributing glebas (plots) to a 
selected portion of its inhabitants. The way in which it proceeded with this 
privatization of the commons in Campea, is discussed in chapter 7. However, it 
is important to point out here that based on an assessment of land quality and 
possible land use alternatives, the JCI also determined which areas were to be 
administered by the Forestry Service in the future as part of the forestry perimeter 
of the Serras do Marao (Vila Real) e Ordem. 
In 1955, the Forestry Service summoned the representatives of the parishes 
included in the forestry perimeter of the Serras do Marao (Vila Real) e Ordem, to 
come to the City Hall in Vila Real. The Service invited them to state their demands 
with respect to their commons. At the meeting, the representatives of Campea tried 
to use the JCI's intervention in order to stop afforestation: 
By the representatives of the Parish Council of Campea it was said that 
they have nothing to expect from the activity of the Forestry Service, 
as the area which was left to them by the Junta da Colonizagao Interna 
was very small. However, they expressed their hope that the baldios 
problem will be reviewed in a way that benefits the parish, because the 
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present situation does not satisfy the local needs. (CFP to DGSFA, 
5 May 1955) 9. 
During this time, the Council developed a two-pronged strategy aimed, on the one 
hand, at reversing the previous intervention by the JCI and, on the other hand, at 
getting as much land as possible out of the planned afforestation. In March, it 
requested that the JCI return the commons to the parish. If that would be 
impossible, it asked the JCI to intervene with the Forestry Service so that 
the communities of Campea would be allowed to use their old fraldios, 
cutting brush and firewood (carqueija) and grazing their animals only 
in the territories each community originally had held, making coutadas 
and partilhas [reserves and partions, RB], like they still do in the area 
reserved for communal exploitation, until the start of the planned 
afforestation. (JDF to JCI, 3 March 1955). 
The JCI forwarded this request to the Forestry Service, which wrote to the Parish 
Council that 
it d[id] not see any inconveniences in the usufruct by the communities 
of the parish, like was their tradition and costume.... This usufruct right 
should be understood as temporary, tenninating when the expected 
works demand so. (DGSFA to JDF, 19 March 1955). 
The Parish Council answered immediately by asking for temporary licences for the 
cultivation of some baldios on behalf of "poor inhabitants of this parish to whom 
by bad fortune was not adjudicated a gleba" (JDF to DGSFA, 29 March 1955). 
The Forestry Service's reaction shows that it was not insensitive to the Parish 
Council's claims and had its own doubts concerning the JCI's actions in the area. 
The chefe da 1" circunscricao (director of the first circumscription) in Porto (the 
circunscricao in Vila Real was created only in August 1956) recommended that 
headquarters in Lisbon grant these licences because of the negative repercussions 
of the JCI's intervention in the parish: 
The villages of the Parish Council of Campea are separated from the 
baldios of the Forestry Service by land that the JCI divided into glebas 
which were given only to the most wealthy, under the allegation that 
only the wealthy households were in the condition to take care of the 
land in a convenient way. The remainder of the baldios it left to 
communal use, by both the rich and the poor. As a result, the original 
situation was clearly worsened, as the rich became richer and the poor 
poorer (CFP to DGSFA, 31 March 1955). 
A few weeks later, this recommendation was followed by a positive decision 
(DGSFA to JDF, 24 May 1955). 
9 The information about me intervention of the Forestry Service in Campea is taken from the 
correspondence between the Service and the parish, which was lent to me by the Service's headquarters 
in Lisbon. The abbreviations refer to: the circumscription of Porto (CFP), the directorate general 
(DGSFA, DG). 
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The Parish Council must have seen mat the Forestry Service might become an 
ally in its battle against the JCI. In June it sent another supplication to the Director-
General of the Forestry Service, in which it requested permission to graze sheep 
and goats, which "is also part of local usages and customs". It warned that in the 
absence of such a permit, the taxation of animal grazing on baldios would lose its 
legal base, which would undermine the parish's financial basis. Finally, the council 
stated that "only the revision of the division of the baldios of the parish would 
bring the people hope for another economic arrangement" (JDF to DGSFA, 
22 June 1955). The Forestry Service responded positively to this request as well, 
and promised to take the local population's usufruct rights into account during the 
execution of the planting activities. But, regarding the ultimate point raised by the 
Parish Council, it declared that "the requested revision of the division of the 
baldios only has to do with the Junta da Colonizacao Interna" (CFP to JDF, 
1 July 1955). 
From then on, the Parish Council did not make any further demands. Subsequent 
correspondence between the parish and the Forestry Service, refers only to the 
status of some baldios belonging to the villages Pepe and Avecaozinho, as it was 
not entirely clear under whose jurisdiction these areas belonged: the JCI's, the 
Forestry Service's, or the Parish Council's. The conclusion was that these baldios 
were neither included in the forestry perimeter nor reserved by the JCI, but had 
been restored to the Parish Council as its private property (CFVR to SF, 28 March 
1957; see also chapter 7, footnote 28). 
In September 1955, the Forestry Service requested that the municipal authorities 
invite the presidents of those parishes affected by the creation of the new forest 
perimeter to come to the town hall in order to participate in the valuation of the 
baldios (DG to CMVR, 7 September 1955): 
As it has become necessary to proceed to the valuation of the 
commons which will constitute the forestry perimeter of the Serras do 
Marao (Vila Real) e Ordem, representatives of the Ministry of Finances 
and the Ministry of Economy [under which the Forestry Service fell, 
RB] will visit this city on the next 17th.... 
In these terms I request your Excellency to see that the 
representatives of the involved parishes will appear in the City Hall on 
the indicated day and hour (...). 
Thanking you in anticipation, 
For the good of the Nation, 
The Director General 
Six months later, about half of the commons of Campea (625 ha or 25% of the 
parish's surface) was placed under the partial forestry regime as part of the forest 
perimeter of the Serras do Marao (Vila Real) e Ordem. In the decree, each hectare 
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in the parish was valued at 250$00, and it was established that the Forestry Service 
should respect the population's usufruct rights so far as these did not impede 
afforestation activities (Decreto 40,524 of 4 February 1956). In 1956, the forestry 
administration in Vila Real produced a proposal for executing the afforestation 
project (DGSFA 1956a). According to this proposal, 620 ha were intended for 
afforestation, while the remaining 5 ha were reserved for communal use. These 
5 ha were to be added to the 285 ha of baldio land located outside the forest 
perimeter and would remain under communal exploitation (see chapter 7). 
It would seem that the foresters responsible for the area tried to take the local 
demands for grazing and other forms of exploitation into consideration. Their 
proposal for the afforestation of the perimeter contains a lot of information about 
how the parishes would be affected by the project with respect to animal 
husbandry, demography, and the customary regulation of communal land use. In 
addition, the afforestation was scheduled so that traditional rights of grazing and 
brush collecting were protected. 
The Forest Guards as a Police Force 
In the previous sections I have explained how the Forestry Service expanded into 
certain areas. I continue here with a short description of the way in which the 
Forestry Service acted after the creation of forestry perimeters. Again, the 
examples are derived from different periods: the first one stems from the Estado 
Novo era, whereas the second dates from after 1974. It appears that there was a 
huge difference between the formal competencies of forestry officials and their 
actual powers. 
Keeping watch over tree stands was an integral part of forest guard duties. Only 
by policing the area could illegal forms of exploitation be prevented. In the case 
of the Portuguese Forestry Service, the guards were officially equal to rural 
policemen. The guards were given police tasks, they were armed and had to take 
an oath before the judge of the comarca. The formal power of the guards and the 
definition of what constituted offenses, confirm that Service was a custodial-
paramilitary organization. This feature was mentioned in chapter 2 as one of the 
characteristics mat made the Forestry Service a suitable outreach structure. 
Under the Estado Novo regime, forest policing was regulated by a number of 
decrees. In principle, all decrees went back to the legislation that regulated the 
forestry regime. This legislation was elaborated in 1926 (Decreto 12,625 of 
3 November 1926) 1 0. The decree contained various clauses relative to the 
execution of the forestry regime. It defined forest crimes set fines and penalties for 
committing these laws. In art. 18 it was declared that 
1 0 All these decrees in 1937 were put together in a leaflet published by the DGSFA and the Ministry 
of Agriculture. The quotations in the text are taken from this leaflet. 
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[t]he forestry agent that catches cattle in flagrant trespassing of the 
dispositions of the forestry police, will only return it to its owners after 
the payment of a fine, the damage, and the costs caused by the catching 
of the animals. 
The fines for trespassing, that is leaving public roads and firebreaks, varied 
between four and twenty Escudos 1 1. The decree also contained regulations 
partaining to wood theft, fires, hunting, and landowners failing to fulfil the 
requirements of the forestry regime (DGSFA 1937:23). The decree of 1926 
confirmed previous legislation by defining the status of each guard as a policeman: 
Each forestry functionary, after having taken oath before the judge of 
the comarca of his residence, has the character of an agent of the public 
force and of the rural police in the entire country; his charges have the 
force of a proof of evidence [corpo de delito] and merit faith until plain 
proof of the contrary. (Art. 9) 
Compared to the regular police, the forest guard's position as defender of the 
law was even stronger. In the case of crimes committed on forest land, the guard 
had the same powers as the administrator of the concelho with the authority to 
prepare prosecution. This made the forest guard equal to a public prosecutor. 
In the case of tumults, fires or other events occurring in properties 
placed under the forestry regime that demand criminal evidence, the 
forestry functionaries have the same attributions as law confers to the 
Admimstrators of the Municipality in the preparation of processes on 
behalf of the respective Delegate of the Prosecutor of the Republic. 
(Art. 11) 
Being policemen, all forestry functionaries had the right to bear arms (art. 13), 
provided by the State (art. 14). And if they hurt or killed someone while on duty, 
they would not be prosecuted because their position entitled them to the legitimate 
use of these arms (art. 16). The forest guards' activities were not only restricted 
to preventing forest crimes: 
The foremen and guards have the obligation to arrest any delinquent, (1) 
when during the exercise of their functions they are perturbed, 
disobeyed or injured, (2) when a crime is committed that can be 
punished under the Penal Code with a major penalty, and (3) in the case 
that one who committed a flagrant forestry delict is unknown by the 
1 1 The fines were: for a person, 4$00; for a vehicle, 20$00; for horned cattle, horses, donkeys or mules 
(per head), 6$00; for sheep and swines (per head), 1$00; and for goats (per head): 4$00. 
The fines for animals that went astray were doubled if they did not have a bell per five heads, or if 
they carried a bell that did not make a sound. After being caught, the animals were brought to special 
stables. The owner was charged with the costs of their maintenance: 4$00 for each head of horned 
cattle, horses, and mules, and 1$00 for goats, sheep, and swines per day (pp.16-18). 
The fines were made five times as high in 1954, except for that for trespassing with goats. This fine 
was raised to 50$00 (Decreto-Lei 39,931 of 24 November 1954, art. 15). This law did not change the 
status of the guards. It merely specified some crimes in more detail and contained measures against fire 
danger. 
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guard and the person has to be identified by a superior or a local 
authority. (Art. 25, DGSFA 1937:7-10) 
Their authority went beyond the mere imposition of the rules related to forest 
management. Indeed, they could prosecute anyone who committed a crime. 
The decree also guaranteed that the forest guard was always right in relationship 
to the persons accused of trespassing. Statements from a guard were considered to 
be true unless the contrary was proven. Since many crimes are not committed by 
individuals, but by groups, accused trespassers could often mobilize witnesses who 
would testify that they were innocent. But in the forest it is habitually very difficult 
to find witnesses who would corroborate the forest guard's accusations, thus the 
forest guard's statements were given more weight by Decreto 17,714 of 
13 November 1929. This decree made witnesses who would testify in favour of the 
guard superfluous if "the conditions under which the crime had been committed 
make it impossible" to verify the occurrences through the hearing of testimonies. 
It also allowed for capturing people that were seen committing a crime afterwards 
(DGSFA 1937:51). 
These regulations defined the relationship between the Forestry Service and the 
population. Giving the forest guards large responsibilities and authority equal to 
that of police officers, facilitated an oppressive imposition of the forestry regime. 
Silva's book Occupagao Sent Limites, contains documents from the early 1970s 
from parishes in the municipality of Sever do Vouga, in the district of Aveiro. 
Here, one can read several complaints about abusive or excessive behaviour by the 
forest guards. For instance, a guard was accused of having usurped a vineyard and 
a water-source by scaring the owner so much that he no longer dared to use his 
properties. Furthermore, people from the area were recorded saying that "[i]n 
order to get a job they sometimes had to kneel in front of the guards and raise their 
hands." They accepted these continuous humiliations "[o]ut of fear of the armed 
guards and ... because of the need to get employment in the Forestry Service's 
planting...." (Silva 1973:81-82) 1 2 
These and other acts of the excessive use of power by the Forestry Service's 
officials caused the authorities to become concerned with the situation. In June 
1958, a friend of Salazar wrote the Prime Minister a letter about the political 
situation in the north of the country1 3. The author argued that the support General 
1 2 I would have liked to present case material from the Campea' area, but this was impossible since I 
was never granted access to the local Forestry Administration's archives. 
Until the 1980s guards were not recruited among the people living in or nearby his canton and he 
and his family had to live in a house in the forest, far from the village. The ensuing lack of contact and 
interaction made the relationship between the forest guard and the population very official. In such 
cases, lack of knowledge about the local situation and contempt for the population, could easily lead 
to disputes over properties and boundaries. The difficulties which the service met in the field may well 
have been the result of the absence of social relationships 
1 3 They were apparently so close, that he could address his letter to his dear "Antdnio" and treat Salazar 
by the familiar "tu" instead of "Your Excellency". 
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Humberto Delgado was able to raise in the last presidential elections in 
municipalities such as Miranda do Douro, Vila Pouca de Aguiar, Chaves, and 
Montalegre should be attributed to the way in which the Forestry Service had acted 
in these areas1 4. The president of the Afonsim Parish Council in the concelho of 
Vila Pouca de Aguiar, for instance, told Salazar's informer that his parish would 
vote against the government because of the Forestry Service's and the Junta da 
Colonizacdo Interna's wrongdoings. These actions made 
that there [were] no longer open spaces of baldios which are 
indispensable for their animal husbandry and the collection of brush for 
their cultivated fields. The lack of accessible baldios has damaged their 
economic life, that also suffers from the caustic of constant series of 
fines (ANTdT, Arquivo Salazar, AOS/CO/EC-22, Pasta 1). 
In Vila MeS, Nuzedo, and Sampaio the Service planted its trees up to the village 
border. After stressing the great value of the afforestation of the country in 
general, the author concluded that "it is really a pity that the appreciation of such 
a large enterprise is affected by a disoriented modus faciendi that overshadows the 
laudation with which it would merit to be prized" (ibid). 
The JCI divided the baldios into glebas (plots). Some of these glebas were 
located within the hamlets' confines. People who owned adjacent plots were given 
glebas far away, lost in the uninhabited baldio, while the glebas directly next to 
them, were given to strangers, who would take from the original villagers the 
rights of passage or dispute the access to water. It even gave plots to people who 
immediately resold them and made a lot of money through this speculation, 
"instead of attributing them to others who really needed a field for work and food." 
Apparently, here, as in Campea, the JCI's actions favoured the wealthy over the 
poor in the parish. 
The author of the letter explains this behaviour by pointing to the competition 
between the Forestry Service and the JCI: 
The[se] services act is if Portugal was an unpopulated wilderness and 
if the respective sectors were watertight compartments. They do not 
adjust prudently their specific activities to general convenience nor care 
to respect the superior policy of the Nation. From the Directors-
General, adorned like tyrants, and the peripheral agents, adorned as 
petty tyrants, they work ~ arbitrarily and whimsically - with their eyes 
on statistics, without consideration for anything and anybody. (Ibid) 
The letter establishes that the Forestry Service (and the JCI) acted as an arbitrary 
tyrant without heeding the local socio-economic and administrative contexts in 
1 4 Humberto Delgado was an air force general who had been an enthusiastic supporter of the 1928 
military takeover and of Salazar's rule. But in 1958, discontented about the way Salazar had treated 
other (insubordinate) soldiers, he stood against the UniSo National's candidate in presidential elections. 
His candidature posed the first serious political threat to Salazar's rule. After being involved in military 
conspiracies against the regime, he was killed in exile in Spain by agents of the Portuguese Secret 
Service and Political Police (PIDE) in 1965 (Robinson 1979:73-74, 78). 
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which they functioned. In this manner the letter discloses the custodial-paramilitary 
posture of the Forestry Service. It also points to the ruler of the Estado Novo's 
particular interest in the Service's actions: the planting of trees without taking into 
account the needs of the population undermined popular support of the regime and 
favoured the political opposition. 
In 1974, Salazar's successor, Caetano, fell victim to a military coup. Fear of the 
political elite and its instruments of power subsided among the population. Not 
unlike what happened in Eastern Europe during 1989-1990 with the rapid 
dissolution of the communist dictatorships, the Portuguese bureaucracies and police 
apparatuses met increased disrespect and disobedience from the public. The 
interview below gives an illustration of the effect of this change in attitudes upon 
forest and game management. 
In 1993,1 asked a guard, what he was doing all day in the forest. He told me: 
Well, I read the Bola [a newspaper on sports, RB] and sometimes I 
make a little stroll to see what is going on. But I am alone in the forest. 
There is nobody to help and protect me. Therefore, I cannot afford to 
do anything serious. If, for instance, there is a hunter in my canton, he 
might have a permit, or he might have none, but surely he has a gun. 
When I go to him to ask for his licence, and he is a poacher, he may 
try to get away by shooting me first. Of course, I have a gun myself, 
but I prefer not to take any risk and return home at night safe and sound 
and see my wife and little daughter. If I would be able to identify the 
man and prosecute him in court, I have no chance of winning the case. 
Of course, according to the law my testimony has more weight than his, 
but he will ask some friends to testify for him, and make me look like 
a fool. So, as long as I have to work alone, and have no companion 
who can help me to catch a poacher and testify for me in court, I will 
just sit and read my Bola and do nothing, (hit 9 June 1993) 
This declaration gives one the impression that, although legally the guards wield 
virtually absolute power, in reality, (particularly after the revolution), that power 
has become rather limited. The fact that democratization has taken place and that 
people feel freer and less inclined to respect higher authorities, has seriously 
undermined the forest guard's ability to impose his authority (int 5 September 
1991). 
The Forestry Service and Private Forest Owners 
The guard's story reveals that even in the case of a baldio submitted to the partial 
forestry regime, the Forestry Service's effective power is much less than the law 
suggests. In the case of private property, its power is still weaker. As I explained 
in chapter 4 (pp.87 ff.), since 1988, forest owners are required to report thinnings, 
loppings, and fellings. Over the six years following the publication of the decree 
(1988-1993), the Service registered 1,705 of these reports. The number of reports 
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per year ranged from a maximum of 514 in 1989 to a minimum of 151 in 1990. 
These reports corresponded to a total volume of about 956,000 m 3 of timber 
(Instituto Florestal 1994:xlv). This means that during this six year period, the 
Service was able to register, on the average, a volume of about 160,000 m 3 each 
year. Compared to the country's total annual timber yield, this is an insignificant 
quantity. In 1988 the estimated harvest of pine and eucalyptus timber alone 
amounted to approximately 11.2 million m 3 (IPF 1991). Therefore, the reported 
fellings involved less than 1.4% of the total amount of timber felled in the country. 
Whether the licensing system was implemented is difficult to say. But, as it is not. 
even mentioned in the Service's 1994 report, this law probably remained without 
any significant effect1 5. 
As in the past, the State seemed to refrain from actions that would seriously 
affect the position of the private forest owner. Legislation concerning fellings and 
minnings had little tangible effect. There was a widespread concern for the poor 
state of the private forests in terms of fire prevention, health, and productivity (see 
for instance: Martins 1991:3-6; Morais 1990; int 10 April 91; Neiva 1991b; 
Publico 21 May 1991, 15 April 1992, 27 April 92, 8 May 1992). Nevertheless, 
the private forest owners were allowed to continue to manage their stands as they 
wished. The public service did not stimulate or enforce the removal of dead wood 
or other sanitary measures in private stands. The guard (quoted above) told me that 
it was hopeless to try to interfere with private forest owners, because he would not 
receive any backing from his superiors in the forestry administration. The 
transformation in the Forestry Service from a service for the State into a service 
for the public apparently did not go beyond the provision of subsidies. 
Conclusion 
The Forestry Service has often been accused of exercising brutal and absolute 
power over the areas under its control. The works of Silva (1973), Baptista 
(1978a:176-177,1993:290),Rodrigues(1987:58-59),andCastro-Caldas(1990:532-
534) document these transgressions. Baptista (1978a) notes, "the frontal repression 
of the battle in defense of the commons" and "the imposition of the forestry regime 
while repressing the people." I myself have heard people saying that in certain 
regions, the forest administrators "ruled like kings". 
These accusations rest upon the perception of the Forestry Service as an external 
agency that imposed itself upon the rural population. Indeed, there is sufficient 
evidence to show that during the Estado Novo the Service acted domineeringly even 
to the extent that it caused the regime's highest level to become concerned. 
1 5 The idea to license felling was not new: in 1927 a law was published which made such a license 
obligatory (Decreto 13,658 of 20 May 1927). The fact that the idea was reintroduced sixty years later 
shows that the state was quite powerless in relation to the direction of management of private forest 
properties. 
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However, the three examples concerning the forestry regime demonstrate that the 
Service's power was far from external and absolute. In Lousa, the Forestry Service 
intervened upon the request of the municipal authorities who wanted to acquire 
control over the commons of the parish of Serpins. These authorities themselves 
broke the popular resistance of the local parishioners. In Amarante, on the western 
slopes of the Serra do Marao, the municipality helped to enforce the Forestry 
Service upon the parish of Ansiaes, and thus wrestled the local baldios from the 
parish. In 1917, the Municipal Council of Vila Real developed a similar strategy 
for dealing with the commons of the parishes on the eastern slopes of the Serra do 
Marao. These examples indicate that the Forestry Service's intervention was 
conditioned by the local political agenda: the municipalities' attempts to gain 
control over the domains of the Parish Councils. 
The examples also show that the parish population was never a passive recipient 
of state intervention: in Serpins, the parishioners tried to avoid the Service's 
interference by proposing a division of the baldios. In this manner, they would 
dissolve the commons and hence destroy the legal basis for the partial forestry 
regime. They promised also to afforest the area by themselves. In Campea, the 
immunities and the Parish Council tried to defend their areas against forestation 
in a similar way. In 1929, under the military dictatorship that formed the prelude 
to the Estado Novo, they anticipated the forceful imposition of the forestry regime 
and tried to preempt such a development by undertaking tree planting themselves. 
The Service's refusal to accept these locally formulated solutions of the 
deforestation problem indicates mat tree planting was only one of their concerns 
and that acquiring control over the commons was also important. 
The imposition of the forestry regime in Campea seems to have been executed 
by the book. Apparently at that time and place, the Forestry Service did not act 
domineeringly but tried at least partly to respect local demands and rights. The 
events of 1955-1957 also demonstrate that this time, the initiative was with the 
central State. The municipal authorities played a subordinate role and seem to have 
executed only what was demanded from them by the central State in Lisbon. 
Finally, this case confirms that the mutual adjustment to different state 
bureaucracies was problematic. The Forestry Service's Director-General criticized 
heavily the JCI's actions in the area, while the Parish Council tried (in vain) to 
mobilize the Service to revert the JCI's actions. These events show that the State 
does not act as one coherent machine or monolith. It is internally divided. 
Elements of the state apparatus may compete instead of cooperate. 
The arguments used by the Parish Council and the Forestry Service against the 
JCI indicate that like the State, local communities were internally divided as well. 
Apparently, there existed wealthy people who had been able to benefit more from 
the privatization of the commons than their less affluent fellow parishioners. The 
nature of these social and economic differences are the topic of the next chapter. 
There, I discuss extensively the apparent contradiction of the existence of commons 
and a communalist tradition together with the economic and social fissures within 
the parish community. 
Chapter 6 
Commons and Capitalism in Campea 
Introduction 
Whoever arrives at Campea for the first time in spring, will find groups of 
villagers, men, women, and children, working side by side planting potatoes. 
These groups are composed of neighbours, who work without payment on each 
others' land. In exchange, they receive only a picnic of wine, bread, meat, 
chicken and codfish (bolos de bacalhau) and the certainty that their 'employer' 
(patrao) will provide labour power when their own fields have to be planted 
(Van der Linden 1988). In this way, part of the labour power in the parish is a 
common resource. In addition, part of the land is communal, as well. About 
half of the area is not individually owned, but is baldio and belongs to the 
village communities that compose the parish and is administered by an assembly 
of commoners and a collegium of elected officials. 
In the light of these elements, it is quite understandable why this type of 
society has been described in terms of communalism or communitarianism 
(Peixoto 1974; Dias 1948, 1953), closed corporate community (Wolf 1966) or 
peasant mode of production (Medeiros 1976, 1978) 1. The virtual nonexistence 
of wage relations in agriculture, and the relevance and intensity of mutual help 
and the exchange of labour make it easy to overlook the differences in power 
and wealth and the exploitative relations between parishioners. Nevertheless, 
these differences and exploitative relations do exist. In the past, however, they 
were greater and more explicit than they are today. All farming households 
nowadays seem more or less equal, whereas it would have been no exaggeration 
to call the Campean society of thirty or forty years ago class divided. Beneath 
the parish's present peasant appearance rests a capitalist past. 
The parish's capitalist past and the social divisions which extend to the 
present are the subject of this chapter. I explore the development of capitalism 
in Campea and reconstruct the process that led to its apparent disappearance. I 
conceive capitalism as a mode of production characterized, on the one hand, by 
commoditization of the inputs and outputs of the production process, and on the 
other hand, by the subsumption of labour to capital and its eventual 
1 The first authors assume that these forms of social organization could persist due to their relative 
isolation from their exterior (Sampaio 1923; Peixoto 1974; Ribeiro 1940, 1987, 1991:38, 373-385; 
Lema 1978:152; see also supra, pp.46-49). Medeiros (1976:310-312, 1978:57-72) is a Portuguese 
exponent of the articulation of modes of production school of Laclau (1971), Meillassoux (1973), 
and Wolpe (1980). 
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proletarianization (De Freitas, De Almeida, and Cabral 1974:8; Friedmann 
1980:160-162, 1986; Goodman and Redclift 1985). 
I start with a reconstruction of the development of commerce. I point out that 
because is Campea located halfway between the coast and the town of Vila 
Real, and because of its vast communal grazings, it became a relatively 
important centre of trade and commercial animal husbandry. I continue by 
demonstrating that capital in the form of land, cattle, and money, was 
concentrated in the hands of an elite, and by illuminating the role of these forms 
of capital in the reproduction of this elite at the expense of the rest of the parish 
population. I also point to the role of the commons in this process. 
"Repeasantization" is discussed in the second half of the chapter. There I start 
with a short discussion of the development of mass emigration in the 1960s and 
continue by showing how this enabled the substitution of capitalist farms with 
family farms. In the last section of the chapter I explore the implications of this 
reconstruction of the parish's history for the way in which one should look upon 
the commons and their afforestation. 
Commerce and Commodities 
The history of eighteenth and nineteenth century communities in Portugal 
remains a great extent unwritten (Brandao 1991:651). This makes my attempt to 
reconstruct the development of capitalist farming quite exploratory. In the 
particular case of Campea many historical data are simply non-existent, and this 
means that a sketch of the development of commercial farming will always be 
incomplete. 
Farming can be integrated in the market in three ways: through buying inputs, 
through selling products, and through hiring labour. In this section, I focus 
upon commerce and commodities. In the absence of historical data on the 
organization of the farm and its relations with the market, one has to turn to 
other characteristics which may point to the degree of commercialization in a 
local economy. The most suitable substitute indicator I found, was the 
percentage of traders in a certain community. If there were merchants in a 
particular population it can be said that in that community goods were traded. If 
the number of merchants was relatively higher than in other areas, this would 
indicate that commercial activities were more important there than elsewhere. 
The number has to be corrected for the size of the community. If there were ten 
traders in a village with fifty households, and there were eight traders in a small 
hamlet of only ten households, it can be assumed that commerce was relatively 
less important in the first case than in the second. The numbers of traders per 
hundred households in the various municipalities within the comarca of Vila 
Real, and in the town of Vila Real itself, and in the parish of Campea in the 
late-eighteenth century are listed in table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 Social differentiation within the comarca of Vila Real in the late eighteenth 
century (Amado Mendes 1981:433-434). 
Municipality HH ' N A %HH L J J/L I/O 
Vila Real 17,808 187 151 1.90 3,441 2,707 0.79 part 
town 945 114 0 12.06 5 72 14.40 out 
rural area 16,863 73 151 1.33 3,436 2,635 0.77 part 
Campefi 282 2 5 2.48 166 53 0.32 out 
Abreiro 217 1 0 0.46 108 73 0.68 out 
Alfarella 688 0 3 0.44 364 114 0.31 out 
Ahj6 813 0 16 1.97 229 248 1.08 in 
Athei 320 6 4 3.13 87 111 1.28 out 
Barqueiros 395 1 0 0.25 25 7 0.28 in 
Canellas 173 3 0 1.73 70 41 0.58 in 
Favaios 293 1 0 0.34 15 43 2.87 in 
Pontes 408 0 16 3.92 88 123 1.40 in 
Freixiel 319 2 0 0.63 129 92 0.71 out 
Gallegos 41 0 0 0.00 86 3 0.03 out 
Godim 317 12 2 4.42 108 90 0.83 in 
Goivaens 207 10 0 4.83 25 87 3.48 in 
HermeUo 483 0 2 0.41 268 19 0.07 out 
Lamas 913 0 0 0.00 242 238 0.98 out 
Lordello 155 0 14 9.03 13 22 1.69 out 
Mezao Frio 865 5 3 0.92 144 340 2.36 in 
Mondim 724 0 2 0.28 196 104 0.53 out 
Murca 1,029 24 0 2.33 573 206 0.36 out 
Parada 124 0 2 1.61 16 47 2.94 out 
Provezende 211 3 3 2.84 9 78 8.67 in 
Ribeira da Pena 540 0 9 1.67 288 170 0.59 out 
S B Martha 2,670 68 17 3.18 1356 643 0.47 in 
Serva 570 4 2 1.05 225 162 0.72 out 
S. Mamede 292 0 11 3.77 12 5 0.42 in 
Teixeira 147 0 0 0.00 67 19 0.28 out 
Vila Pouca 1,711 19 7 1.52 864 140 0.16 out 
Vimiozo 446 5 0 1.12 173 22 0.13 out 
Total comarca 32,879 351 264 1.87 9,221 5,954 0.65 part 
Remarks: 
HH: Households. N: Négociantes (merchants). A: Almocreves (porters). %HH: Number of 
merchants and porters (N+A) per 100 households. L: Lavradores (farmers). J: Jomaleiros (day 
labourers). J/L: number of day labourers per farmer. I/O: Inside or Outside the Douro Region. 
The figures in table 6.1 show that the traders were not equally distributed over 
the comarca. In municipalities such as Lamas and Teixeira they were com-
pletely absent, whereas in, for example, Vila Real and Santa Martha de 
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Penaguiao they formed an important category2. This regional variation in the 
distribution of the traders can be at least partly explained by the development of 
market oriented viticulture in the Douro valley 3. After 1754, port wine 
production was monopolized by the Companhia Geral de Agricultura das Vinhas 
do Alto Douro. This Company did not engage in the exploitation of vineyards, 
but regulated and monopolized the processing of the wine with brandy. The 
grapes were produced by individual landowners (Schneider 1980:43). The most 
innovative aspect of the company, was that for the first time in European 
history, a geographical place and the production of quality wine were connected 
through the creation of a special region, the Regiao Demarcada, in the valley of 
the Douro River. Most of the municipalities containing a high percentage of 
merchants were located within this region (see map in figure 6.1). 
Campea is located outside the Demarcated Region's northwestern corner. 
Campea's climatic conditions impeded commercial wine production. According 
to a 1721 report by the parish priest, the parish's population lived from grains, 
sweet chestnuts and animal husbandry: "people collect a lot of bread [grain, 
RB], a lot of sweet chestnut, and many beans; there are large montes where all 
breeds of cattle belonging to the inhabitants graze...." (Goncalves 1987, 11:532-
3) 4 . Yet, the percentage of traders in the parish exceeded the average in the 
municipality of Vila Real and, was comparable to that of wine-growing towns 
2 The figures are taken from a 1792 survey which has been republished by José Maria Amado 
Mendes in 1981. The inquiry distinguishes between several (professional) groups such as peasants, 
merchants, pharmacists, surgeons, blacksmiths and so forth. The list of professions gives an indica-
tion of the relative weight of agriculture and the role of other trades and crafts. In this manner, it 
sheds some light on the contemporary division of labour and, consequently, on the organization of 
production and commerce. For the purpose of this thesis, I limit myself to an enumeration of four 
professions: the négociantes (merchants), the almocreves (porters), the tavradores (ploughmen or 
peasants), and the jornaleiros (day labourers). 
The négociantes and almocreves together were responsible for trade. In modem Portuguese, a 
négociante is a merchant and an almocreve is a mule-driver or porter. However, in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century the almocreves' economic and social position was much higher than that of a 
simple carrier and equalled that of merchants. Figures from the 1831 tax assessment show that their 
financial position could be equal to that of landowners. Apparently, both were professional 
salesmen, involved in the transfer of commodities from one location to another (compare Ribeiro 
1990:425). Table 6.1 suggests that the difference between both categories was related to then-
residence: négociantes tended to dwell in town, whereas the almocreves lived primarily in rural 
areas. 
3 Commercial port wine production boomed after 1703 when through the Methuen treaty Portugal 
acquired free access to the British market. The Wilcoxon ranking-order test confirms that the 
indicators for commoditization and proletarianization in table 6.1 are significantly correlated to the 
variation in region. 
4 The priest answered a questionnaire related to a national inquiry by the Royal Academy of 
Sciences. The Academy asked the priests of the region to describe their parishes in terms of 
religious organization, population, products, and profession (Goncalves 1987,1:10). 
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Figure 6.1: The Regiâo Demarcada with the municipal capitals in 1761 (scale 
circa 1:575,000). 
like Provezende and Santa Martha. According to table 6.1, Campeâ was charac-
terized by a relatively high number of tradesmen. There were five almocreves 
and two négociantes living in the parish. This meant that 2.5 people in every 
hundred households were engaged in trade. Compared to the rest of the region, 
this was quite a considerable figure. Campeâ had a higher percentage of 
merchants than the other rural parishes within the municipality of Vila Real (on 
the average only 1.3 traders per hundred households) and higher than the 
average for the entire comarca (1.9 per hundred households). 
The relative importance of tradesmen in Campeâ can be explained by the 
traffic crossing the parish, and the commercialization of local produce. 
In the eighteenth century, Trâs-os-Montes to Minho was connected over land 
by five roads (see the map in figure 6.2): 
- the Chaves road, which passed through Montalegre to Braga (I); 
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Figure 6.2: The roads connecting Tras-os-Montes and Minho in the eighteenth 
century (scale 1:1,200,000). For an explanation: see text. 
- the Alturas road, connecting Chaves and Braga through Boticas and Alturas 
along the old Roman tract (H); 
- the Ribeira da Pena road, which connected Vila Pouca and Braga (D3); 
- the Mondim road, which linked Vila Real to Braga through Mondim de Basto 
(IV); and 
- the road of the MarSo, which connected Vila Real to Amarante (V). 
Most traffic passed through the roads of Chaves, Mondim, and the Marao 
(Goncalves 1983:41-42) s. The last two met in Campea. 
5 Despite its economic importance, the connection was badly maintained. According to an 1792 
inquiry the road through the Marao was "...perhaps the roughest of the province and maybe of the 
Kingdom, for [although] being the indispensable passage to the province of Minho, it can hardly be 
passed because of the disorder in which it finds itself..." (Amado Mendes 1981:455). 
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Today, the road through the Marao runs south of the population centres in the 
parish along the watershed that divides the plateau from the steep valleys which 
open downward to the Douro River. However, before 1860, the road ran more 
to the north, through the plateau itself. There it crossed several villages, where 
the passage of traffic encouraged the development of commercial activities. The 
name of the village Vendas hints at the commercial history of the area. 
Originally, it was called Gudim, "where one can find the shops [vendas] of 
Campeâ". In fact, bom négociantes and one of the five almocreves lived in this 
hamlet (compare Ribeiro 1991:349) 6. 
The second explanation for the presence of traders in the parish, is the 
marketing of commodities produced in Campeâ itself. In the 1721 report quoted 
above, the priest mentioned commercialization of cloth: "women use to take up 
the trade of weavers ... and to take cloth to the town where they offer it" 
(Gonçalves 1987, 11:532-533). The importance of the commercialization of local 
produce is further confirmed by the fact that in the parish there was a fair 
renowned for its cattle. In the eighteenth century markets and fairs were 
relatively rare and were concentrated in the urban centres. The town of Vila 
Real, for instance, had an annual fair in June (Santo Antonio), and two weekly 
markets: a meat market and the "hucksters" market (o mercado de regateiras). 
Only five rural parishes in the area had fairs: Sâo Lourenço de Ribapinhâo 
organized an annual fair while Adoufe, Lamares, Abaças, and Campeâ had a 
monthly market. 
The existence of this monthly market in Campeâ is another indication of the 
commoditization of the parish's agricultural production. Campeâ was 
particularly famous for its cattle (Gonçalves 1987, 1:112-113). This was a local 
breed of cattle, maronesa, which was in particularly high demand for its labour 
power. The importance of a local breed shows that at least part of the 
population was engaged in market-oriented cattle breeding7. 
Landlords, Ploughmen, and Day-labourers 
In the Douro region, export-oriented viticulture became a capitalist enterprise 
based upon wage instead of family labour. In 1721 the priest of Santo Ant6nio 
de AlvacSes do Corgo wrote die following portrait of the effect of this 
development upon his parishioners: 
6 The other almocreves lived in Balsa and in Pepe (for the location of these hamlets see the map in 
figure 1.2). The quotation is taken from a 1530 description cited by Freire (1909). Nowadays, this 
name, "Gudim", is barely remembered. 
7 This fair still exists, but it convenes twice as often. Today, it is organized on the 10th and the 
21st of each month. According to the parishioners, the present number of cattle for sale is much 
smaller than in the past. 
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[The parish] lies in a very steep setting, two léguas8 south of Villa 
Real; the Corgo river divides it from the parish of Lobrogos, where 
one can go by a boat crossing a large captation in the river...; [the 
parish] is a land abundant with fish and delicious fruits of summer 
and also much fine wine for the factories of the North, and olive oil; 
there is no grain, because the land is used for vines and olive trees; 
many nobles from outside the parish have their estates in it; this 
causes poverty among many of its inhabitants who work in the 
vineyards. (Gonçalves 1987,11:401) 
According to this account, the expansion of export-oriented wine production 
coincided with the replacement of peasants by agrarian employers and the 
emergence of low-paid day labourers. The number of so-called employer farms 
increased particularly during the second half of the eighteenth century. Many of 
these employer farms were founded to the detriment of the traditional 
homesteads (Bennema 1992:45-49). 
In Campeâ day labourers appeared in the eighteenth century. In 1721, 
according to the parson, Campeâ's population consisted of well-to-do peasants, 
traders and carpenters, but no day labourers: 
The naturals [of the parish] are all satiated lawadores [ploughmen, 
RB], rustic and crude, very shrewd and stubborn.... Many of them 
take up the trade of almocreve, and others of carpenter, to which all 
incline; they are all of a good stature, broad-shouldered, with lean 
bodies, very valiant...; they live long years for [being] healthy; in the 
luck of our time they live up to old age, coming to our town on foot, 
until the age of one hundred. (Gonçalves 1987, II:533)9 
This image differs considerably from the description of Alvaçôes do Corgo 
from the same year. It can also be compared with the data summarized in table 
6.1. According to the table, in 1792 the parish had fifty-three jornaleiros. 
Therefore, the emergence of jornaleiros has to be dated somewhere between 
1721 and 1792. 
In 1792, the percentage of jornaleiros had advanced considerably in Campeâ 
compared with other communities in the region. In the parish there were 0.32 
day labourers per lavrador. This was much less than in municipalities within the 
Demarcated Region such as Favaios or Mesâo Frio where there were about 
three wage labourers per farmer. The percentage was even smaller than in 
Fontes, a wine-growing municipality southeast of Campeâ, where there were 
1.4 day labourers per farmer. However, compared with the region to the north 
of the parish, the number of day labourers was already considerable: in 
Hermello (now called: Ermelo), just to the north of Campeâ, there were only 
8 A légua equalled about 5 to 6.2 kilometres (Castro 1978-1985,111:260-263). 
9 Indeed, it seems that the first half of the eighteenth century brought much wealth to the parish: 
its main church and all of its chapels date from this period. 
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0.07 labourers per farmer. Apparently, in Campea wage labour was not as 
important as in the wine-growing areas near the Douro, but in comparison with 
other rural communities in its surroundings, it could be possible to say that 
wage labour played a more important role 1 0. 
The presence of jornaleiros in itself does not necessarily imply the emergence 
of a class of landless labourers (proletarianization). Some wage labourers were 
probably ploughmen's sons who went to work temporarily for other farmers in 
Campea itself or in the neighbourhood to acquire some additional cash income. 
Even in the twentieth century this was a general practice. It is also possible that 
many jornaleiros were seasonally employed in the Douro vineyards. De Castro 
Caldas (1991:258-259) and Bennema (1992:97) mention that the Douro valley 
attracted people from as far as Galicia. Hence, the relatively high incidence of 
wage labourers in the parish indicates only that Campea was integrated into the 
regional labour market. In order to prove that mis integration should be 
understood as a proletarianization process, it is necessary to show that these 
jornaleiros were separated from their land. 
In the coming section, on the basis of a tax assessment from 1831, a list of 
the electorate from 1866, and a detailed study of the parish by the Junta da 
Colonizagao Interna from 1941, I discuss the emergence of a group of landless 
parishioners. 
The 1831 Tax Assessment 
The 1831 tax assessment can be used to make an indirect estimation of the 
differences in wealth and access to land between the parishioners. All taxes 
concerned capital and capital owners. The assessment included five types of 
duties: tithes on buildings (imposto urbano) and landed property (imposto 
rûstico), a tax on the sale of animals (maneio)11, and a levy on beasts of 
burden, mules or horses, the imposto novo. This levy was probably paid by 
1 0 Proletarianization was significantly higher in the Demarcated Region. Even in Campea itself, it 
was most advanced in Cotorinho, the southern-most village in the parish close to Fontes where there 
were seven jornaleiros on four lavradores. 
" The text of the law which in 1762 raised the taxes from 4.5 to 10% of all "commodities, rends, 
salaries, manevos and offices" uses the word maneio only in relation to traders, where it seems to 
refer to the amount of money these traders administer, their capital. According to Pereira e Souza 
(1827) day labourers were exempted from this duty. In the tax role, it is explicitly connected to 
cows or oxen. 
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porters (almocreves)12. Finally, some parishioners had to pay taxes on the 
interest (juros) they received from capital or outstanding duties. 
According to the data summarized in table 6.2, 160 persons paid a tithe 
(dicimo) on their buildings, 214 on their land, 52 on their cattle, and 80 on 
interest. Only 4 inhabitants were registered as having paid the imposto novo. Of 
those charged for landed estate, 200 were inhabitants of Campea, 6 were 
outsiders, and 8 were in the form of undivided inheritances. The largest duty in 
terms of volume of tax payments and taxpayers, was the land tax. This duty 
alone produced about two-thirds of the total amount paid by the parishioners. I 
do not know whether all pieces of land were taxed, or whether extremely small 
or infertile plots were exempted. However, even if this were the case, it is a 
fact that only a relatively small part of the population owned sufficient land to 
be levied. In 1831, the parish was inhabited by about 360 to 370 households 1 3. 
About 40 to 46% possessed no land at all or such small and worthless plots that 
they were exempted from these taxes (for a similar approach, see BrandSo 
1991). As far as these households did not have access to land through rent, they 
constituted the parish's (semi-)proletariate. 
Table 6.2: Tax payments in Campea in 1831; the categories are mentioned in the 
original order. 
Tax Urbano Rûstico Maneio Juros Imposto novo 
Nr. of tax payers 160 214 52 80 4 
Tax amount (riis) 13,250 101,840 12,020 22,327 5,000 
Average (riis) 83 476 231 279 1,250 
The possession of land did not necessarily make one a wealthy proprietdrio. 
First, land distribution was skewed within the category of landowners. In the 
village of Avecaozinho, for example, the amount of land tax paid varied 
between forty-two and fifteen hundred reis, so that some land possessions were 
more than twenty-five times as valuable than others. Second, there was no clear 
connection between the possession of land and that of other wealth. Only eleven 
out of the twenty-eight landowners paid tax on their dwellings (table 6.3). 
Apparently, the other seventeen either did not own the houses in which they 
1 2 Compared to the other taxes, the charge was quite high: For "hua mulla" (one mule) one paid 
1,000 riis, and for "duas bestas de Albarde" (two pack animals) 2,000 riis. The tax was paid by 
only four persons, one from Vendas and three from AveciSo do Cabo. 
1 3 Between 1792 and 1862 the number of households increased from 282 to 440 households. With 
Floud's formula (fn. 33) the number of households is estimated in 363. 
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lived, or they possessed such worthless residences mat they were exempted. 
Surprisingly, there is no clear connection between the size of one's landed estate 
and the worth of one's urban property. Even of the four largest landowners, 
who each paid at least one thousand r&s in land tax, only two paid the taxa 
urbana as well. Ownership of land did not necessarily imply wealth (see 
appendix 7) 1 4 . 
Table 6.3: The correspondence between the payment of the different taxes in 
Avecaozinho in 1831. The bold figures in the table refer to the total numbers of tax-
payers (derived from annexo 7). 
A paying B Rûstico | Urbano Maneio Juros No other 
tax 
Min - Max 
(re~is) 
Rustico 
Vrbano 
Maneio 
Juros 
28 11 4 4 13 4 2 - 1500 
11 16 5 3 4 4 0 - 100 
4 5 6 0 1 120 - 400 
4 3 0 5 1 117 -586 
Being totally or virtually landless, did not necessarily imply poverty. First, one 
could acquire land through renting and sharecropping15. Second, one could 
develop other activities not tied to the land. These other activities, for instance, 
lending money against interest (usury) or the sale of cattle, could provide one 
with a relatively high income. All but one of the seven persons in the village 
who did not pay the land tithe paid more man the poorest "landowners", in 
other kinds of taxes. 
Nevertheless, there remained a group which did not have any of these 
alternative sources of income. In the case of Avecaozinho, which had 
approximately forty-five households, the tax assessment included thirty-five 
names. Thus, around ten households, or one-fifth of the population, was not 
taxed. They were either exempted from taxes or neither possessed land, nor 
buildings, nor practised usury, nor traded cattle. This group probably had 
probably no other alternative source of income other than selling its labour 
power to fellow parishioners or to employers outside the area. 
1 4 With <x=0.05 the averages of the land taxes paid by those groups that pay the maximum or 
rninimum of urban taxes do not differ significantly from the average of the total payments 
(Wilcoxon two sample test, Corsten & Van der Laan 1987:108). 
1 5 In 1866, the Camped electorate roll distinguished taxes paid for properties that were leased and 
properties that were not leased, but only under the second entry were tax payments mentioned. This 
suggests that at least in 1866 only the proprietor paid taxes, not the tenant or sharecropper. 
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Summarizing these findings, one could conclude that in 1831, the differences 
in wealth among the parishioners were considerable and that at least one-fifth of 
the population had such a small amount of capital that they did not have to pay 
taxes 1 6. This group, the "non-capitalists", probably depended upon selling its 
labour power for a living. 
The 1866 Ballot Roll 
The next available source on wealth distribution dates from 1866. It concerns a 
list of the people entitled to vote and running as a candidate during the choosing 
of the juiz eleito (elected judge) for the parish of Campea, and the juiz de paz 
(justice of peace) for the julgado that consisted of Campea, Vila Cova, and 
Quinta together. Suffrage was granted to male heads of households who had 
enough wealth to pay a certain minimum level of taxes, and to literate officials 
such as priests and teachers1 7. This implied that political power was accorded 
to only a very small political and economic elite, which included the local 
landowners and bourgeoisie. 
The relative size of this elite can be estimated by comparing it to the number 
of households registered four years before the election. In 1862, the parish was 
inhabited by 440 households. According to the roll, 122 heads of households 
had the right of suffrage, but only 17 were eligible. Of these 122 men, there 
were 101 landowners (proprietdrios), 9 almocreves, 7 presbyters, and 5 with 
other professions (table 6.4) 1 8 . Assuming that in 1866 the parish population 
was approximately the same as four years earlier, less than one-third (28%) of 
the household heads had the right to vote and less than 4% could be elected. It 
1 6 My interpretation of the tax roll is qualified by the following four conditions: (1) it is not clear 
whether the names in the fist correspond with households or with individuals; (2) one household 
may be listed under different names; (3) one person may registered under different names (I assume 
that Luis Dinis and Luis Dinis da Fonte were the same person, just like Lourenço Martins and 
Lourenço Martins Rebello). and finally, (4) I may have misread some of the names: the roll is 
handwritten and uses abbreviations next to full names. 
1 7 According to the electoral law of 1852, one had to have a net annual income of at least 100,000 
réis for voting and 400,000 réis for being elected (Oliveira Marques 1986, HI:59). This 
corresponded to tax limits of 1,000 and 4,000 réis respectively. In the electoral law of 28 May 
1946, the minimum tax base was still maintained: According to this law the suffrage was granted to 
all literate men paying not less than 100$00 (1$00 - one escudo — equals 1,000 réis), and to 
females heading a household and paying not less than 100$00, too (art. 1). Poor people were 
excluded (art. 2) (Vareda & Costa 1973). After 1974, tax payments were no longer used as criteria 
for suffrage. 
1 8 Compared to 1792, the number of almocreves had grown, but this increase may also have been 
the result of a redefinition of this professional group. The négociantes were no longer mentioned. 
These either disappeared or were included among the almocreves. 
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is unclear whether the dividing line between the household heads with and those 
without the right to vote coincided with the division between the proprietdrios 
and jornaleiros. Smaller landowners (lavradores) probably did not have suffrage 
rights as well. Put together, the poorer smallholders and proletarianized rural 
workers constituted no less than 72% of the total number of households in the 
parish. 
Table 6.4: Composition of the franchised population of the parish of Campea in 1866. 
Category | number 
Proprietdrio 101 
Almocreve 9 
Blacksmith 1 
Priest 7 
Surgeon 1 
Farrier 1 
Miller 1 
Teacher 1 
Total 122 
The ballot roll shows that large differences in wealth existed among the 
population of Campea. This has implications for how one should understand the 
organization of political power in the parish as well. The restriction of suffrage 
rights to a small section of the population shows that, at least in relation to local 
justice, the system of patriarchal-communitarian rule favoured the small 
economic elite. Only 17 of the most wealthy males out of a population of about 
440 households (circa 2,000 individuals), were entitled to be elected to the 
office of a judge. Obviously the system was more "patriarchal" than 
"communitarian" in nature. Of course, this does not necessarily imply that 
administration within the various villages was equally "patriarchal" (see also 
chapter 7). 
The JCI's 1941 Inquiry 
Information concerning the composition of the population of Campea in the first 
half of the twentieth century was collected by the Junta de Colonizacao Interna 
(JCI). The JCI summarized the sizes of each farm in the parish according to the 
number of alqueires maize produced. (One alqueire is approximately equal to 17 
litres.) The harvests of other crops, such as potatoes and rye, were converted 
into the equivalents of alqueires of maize (JCI 1941, 11:151). In principle, it is 
possible to calculate the cultivated areas from these figures if one knows the 
average production per hectare. The JCI (1941 11:159) itself estimated the 
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productivity on reclaimed baldios at 2,500 litre/ha in the case of the wetlands on 
the valley floor after drainage and under irrigation (147 alqueires), and 1,500 
litre/ha in the case of extensive cultures on the slopes (88.2 alqueires). Taking 
this variation into account, it is reasonable to follow Lima Basto and De Barros 
(1935:197) in estimating the production of one hectare to be approximately 100 
alqueires19. The calculation results are listed in table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 shows that in 1940 the majority of the households in Campea 
worked on small plots: only 22% of the households farmed areas over two 
hectares. The households farming more than two hectares possessed on average 
more than two cows or oxen per household and they presumable had enough 
land to maintain a ploughing team. According to O'Neill (1987:79) "no villager 
who has no plough team is termed a lavraaor". This means that these farmers 
together with some others working between 1.0 and 2.0 hectares, formed the 
classes of lavradores (ploughmen) and proprietdrios (landowners). The 
households with areas smaller than 1.0 ha together with the remaining farmers 
with areas between 1.0 and 2.0 ha, constituted the (semi-)proletariate. In 1940, 
by far the majority of the parish population (between 60 and 80%) belonged to 
this stratum. 
Table 6.5: farm sizes in Campea in 1940 (calculated from JCI 1941:151-2 and Lima 
Basto and De Barros 1935:197). 
Cultivated area (ha) <o .i 1 0.1-O.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-2.0 >2.0 Total 
Number of households (HH) 74 116 102 102 113 507 
% HH 15 23 20 20 22 100 
Cows total number 10 39 96 164 296 605 
average per HH 0.1 0.3 0.9 1.6 2.6 1.2 
Goats total number 8 64 163 158 140 553 
average per HH 0.1 0.6 1.6 1.5 1.2 1.2 
Sheep total number 41 211 507 511 415 1685 
average per HH 0.6 1.8 5.0 5.0 3.7 3.3 
The areas in table 6.5 are based upon the estimation of farm output calculated in 
alqueires of maize. This means that the figures only give a rough indication of 
the actual land distribution. First, variation in soil quality is not expressed in the 
table. Second, it refers only to cultivated areas and does not include thickets, 
brush lands, or pastures. Finally, the table does not clarify property relations. 
1 9 Lima Basto and De Barros (1935) refer here to the bordering district of Porto. In regions more to 
the north, productivity was much lower. The figures in table 6.5 do not represent factual land 
distribution and should be read as an estimation. 
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Not all of the land upon which one worked was owned by that person. Many 
cultivated properties were leased by the small number of landowners controlling 
large areas. According to Costa (1959:96) "[s]ome farmers by inheritance or 
marriage possess[ed] large extensions of land and [saw] themselves obliged to 
rent it out to caseiros [tenants]". Obviously, landownership was even more 
skewed than the figures in the table suggest. 
Cattle were also unequally distributed. According to table 6.5, farmed areas 
and the possession of animals were correlated. The larger landowners tended to 
own more animals2 0. Large farmers tended to specialize in cattle, whereas 
goats and sheep were owned by the farmers who had 0.5-1.0 and 1.0-2.0 
hectares of land 2 1. The farmers with the smallest plots had only a few animals 
(0.1 goat and 0.6 sheep per household). This image of great social inequality is 
confirmed by the following example. When in 1952 the Parish Council decided 
to require that licences be obtained for the grazing of cows on the Lagoa de 
Pepe, (a communal wetland in the middle of the plateau), it received 121$50 
from only two farmers (AJF 3 August 1952). As the fee was 1$00 per animal, 
two farmers together possessed more than 20% of the total number of cows in 
the parish. Obviously the real extent to which the distribution of cattle was 
skewed, is not expressed by the table. This is probably because many of the 
cows listed as belonging to the poorer households were, in reality, possessed by 
some wealthy farmers who had "hired" them out to their poorer fellows. As the 
table only indicates the differences between income, not between capital, the 
real depth of social inequality in the parish is missed. This inequity was much 
larger man the table suggests. 
The figures listed in table 6.5 indicate that, in comparison to the 1721 report, 
a lot had changed. In 1721, the local priest wrote that his parishioners were all 
healthy and satiated ploughmen. More than two centuries later, the JCI (1941 
11:156) reported: "in the villages live many penurious families". The peasant 
community described by the parson in 1721 had turned into a class-divided 
society, at its extremes were a small group of farmer/landowners at one end and 
a large group of day labourers on the other. Landowning farmers produced 
cattle, maize, and potatoes on the basis of a hired labour force of jornaleiros 
who, having partly or completely lost their land, became dependent upon selling 
their labour to subsist. The landowners' enterprises employed a hired labour 
2 0 The skewed distribution of catfle would exacerbate the inequity in the distribution of land. This 
can be demonstrated in the following manner. According to O'Neill (1987:80), one needs 1.5 
hectares of meadow land to support a plough team. Therefore, the farmers with over 2 ha of farm 
land disposed over on average 3.9 ha of meadow land in addition to the areas they farmed. Those 
with less than 0.1 ha had only 0.15 ha of pasture. 
2 1 This impression is only partially correct. Sheep and goat herding were concentrated in the three 
villages in the southern part of the parish. Here, land holdings were smaller man elsewhere in the 
parish. Therefore, in reality animal husbandry was predominandy the business of the largest farmers 
in a community. 
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force. Some farmers even tried to attract capital for the commercial production 
of seed potatoes by the creation of a partnership company (O Vilarealense, 25 
August 1951).These farms had acquired a capitalist form of production. 
Commons and Capitalism 
The early development of commercial cattle holding and the presence of 
landless day labourers in Campea point to an important conclusion about the 
nature of the commons. In the Douro region commercialization of agriculture 
and the development of capitalism led to the privatization of the baldios. 
Commercial wine production contributed to the expansion of the vineyards, 
partly through the conversion of grain fields, and partly through the reclamation 
of waste lands (Bennema 1992: 45-49). As a result, one century after the 
foundation of the Compahhia Geral, most of the commons in this area had 
disappeared, becoming private property. In 1853 the Governador Civil of the 
province, reported the queen that in the Douro region: 
... the C&maras Municipals of Pezo da Regoa, Sabrosa and Villar de 
Macada do not posses any land, and there exist even only a few 
commons. This has,. . . , a powerful reason known by all, which is the 
nature of the land of the Douro, which has even turned the stony 
outcrops into cultivated fields (we can observe excellent vines in rock 
cracks). This [reclamation of waste lands] has been the effect of the 
expansion of the vineyards, consequence of the prosperity to which 
trade has called this country. (Ant6nio Pinto Lemos quoted by 
Goncalves 1983:66-67)* 
In Campea, the existence of the commons persisted. Following MacPherson 
(1975) and Hespanha (1980) who see a direct connection between the prevailing 
property regime and the mode of production, one would have to conclude that 
(contrary to the Douro area), Campea still lingered in a pre-capitalist, peasant 
economy. Further, the present existence of communal land should be seen as an 
indicator of the endurance of that pre-capitalist organization up to today. The 
data cited above, however, indicate that even in the eighteenth century this 
peasant economy gave way to market-oriented production. The magnitude of 
cattle trade in the parish points to the peculiar relation that existed between 
commerce and the communal monte. Apparently, these baldios played an 
important role in the development of commercial animal husbandry in the 
parish. The maronesa were grazed on the commons. Whereas in the Douro 
region the baldios were privatized and reclaimed for vineyards, in Campea, they 
The governor's report was related to an inventory of the forestry conditions in the area. It dealt 
with municipal woodlots and availability of land for afforestation. According to the governor, the 
area controlled by the municipalities in the district had been reduced by population growth, 
usurpation by locals in combination with careless local authorities, or even favouritism. 
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served as the basis for local commodity production. This not only shows that 
common property is not necessarily incompatible with commoditization, but 
even suggests that it can be beneficial to such a development2 3. 
Commons are compatible and sometimes even beneficial to the development 
of a capitalist mode of production. The same can be said about social inequality. 
In the previous section I have shown that Campea was characterized by large 
social and economic differences between a small wealthy elite and a large group 
of day labourers. The baldios could (can) exist within such a context of 
profound inequality. Moreover, their existence even reinforced that inequality. 
It is obvious that those who can graze more cattle on a common, profit more 
from it than those with fewer animals. According to the figures in table 6.5, the 
distribution of land and cattle were correlated. In this manner, the commons 
sustained the wealth of the large proprietdrios rather than providing the poor 
with the means to make a living (see for a similar conclusion: Velozo 1953:13). 
Land, Labour, and Cattle 
In its 1941 report, the JCI mentioned the poverty of a large part of the 
population of Campea. Its figures indicate that about two-thirds of the 
parishioners could be considered poor and virtually landless day labourers24. 
The structure of the parish society was reproduced by (among other things) the 
specific relations between these two groups. These relations were structured 
around four resources or forms of capital: land, labour, cattle, and money. With 
respect to money, usury continued to be an important means by which the 
wealthier parishioners could accumulate wealth. However, my material does not 
allow for elaboration on this point. Therefore, I will concentrate on the role of 
the first three resources as instruments of exploitation. 
The first form of exploitation of the poorer by the propertied strata is based 
on land. The elite's control of the land enabled them to rent out parcels to 
others. Land rent, either fixed or defined as a share of the crop, was thus the 
first instrument of exploitation2 5. The second instrument was related to the 
2 3 Cabrai (1974:34) makes a similar argument with respect to the existence on the commons of large 
herds of capitalist cattle owners without land in the Beiras. According to Taborda (1932:148,153) 
and Jacob (1989:147), the practice of commercial animal herding should be seen as the central cause 
for the persistence of the communal waste lands. 
2 4 This situation was typical for Tras-os-Montes as a whole. In the province the number of workers 
was around twice as high as the number of farmers. According to Lima Basto and De Barros 
(1935:288), of the agrarian working population of 191,388 persons, 24.7% were working for then-
own account, 44.5% were working for somebody else and 30.8% were unpaid helpers. 
2 5 In Cotorinho sharecroppers paid up to two-thirds of their harvest to their landlords (int 8 June 
1993). 
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first. He who controlled a lot of land, had both the need and the means to hire 
labour, while the landless had to look for employment. Hence, the wage relation 
was the second form of exploitation. But the exploitation of labour was not 
restricted to wage relations alone. The exchange of labour entails a hidden 
exploitation of the poor. People would work for a day for someone without 
demanding any payment but only some wine and food, knowing that in return 
they would receive a day of work back from that person, the retada. This 
system favoured the wealthy: 
One of the 'strongest' peasants in the region arrives to join more than 
70 persons at the planting of potatoes who will return him the labour, 
as his servants and tenants have helped his neighbours during the 
preparation of their terrains. (Costa 1959:97, my emphasis) 
The servants and tenants worked for their landlord's neighbours, but the patron 
would receive his neighbour's labour in return. In this manner, the landlord and 
patron received free labour. The landowner himself never returned the labour to 
bis neighbours. 
Even in the case where the landowner himself would participate, reciprocal 
exchange of labour did not lose its exploitative nature. O'Neill (1987:171-174) 
argues that the exchange of unpaid labour between unequal partners, under 
supposedly equal conditions, can be a form of exploitation. The poor man who 
helps his wealthy neighbour to thresh his bountiful harvest gives a larger service 
than he receives when his neighbour helps him with the few sheafs of rye he 
has collected. Bourdieu (1977:60, 192) calls these inequalities a form of 
"disguised corvee" or "gentle, hidden exploitation," while Scott (1985:306-307) 
speaks of the "euphemization" of exploitation. 
Exploitation of wage labour was not restricted to the domain of agriculture. 
Costa (1959:128-39) notes it in the employment of jomaleiros in non-agrarian 
jobs such as in the iron mines of Vila Cova, which employed about 1,000 men 
from the region, and in the lime ovens in Campanho, which employed between 
30 and 80 people, including porters. But even these labour opportunities outside 
agriculture were partially controlled by the local elite. Some of the proprietdrios 
worked within the mine's offices and could influence labour contracts, while a 
few of the important landowner families (Jorge Alexandre, Antunes Cerejeira, 
and Barria Maio) owned the lime stone furnaces (AJF 1 May 1950) 2 6. 
The third instrument for exploiting the less endowed in the parish was the 
leasing of cattle. In Campea, some wealthy landowners such as the Jorge 
Alexandre's, would give a pair of cows to a "partner". The partner was 
responsible for feeding the cows, but could milk the cows and use them for 
labour for free. Normally, each cow would give a calf. The cattle owner would 
keep one calf and the partner would be given the other in compensation for 
taking care of the animals. In practice, however, this rule was not always 
The names of persons in this book are pseudonyms. 
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followed: an owner would claim both calves if he found the animals in a poor 
condition due to inadequate care or overwork. (For example, during the 
transport of lime and plaster from the furnaces in Campanh6). He would then 
claim that the partner's treatment had reduced the cattle's worth, and in 
compensation for that loss, he would demand the second calf as well (int 20 
May 1993). 
In addition to land, labour, and cattle, some landowners could deploy a fourth 
means of exploitation. This was control over someone's consumption. Barria 
Maio and other large farmers (such as my landlady's husband) were also the 
major shopowners. The money a labourer would have earned working on a 
proprietdrio's farm, would in fact be returned to the landowner since the 
labourer would spend his earnings in the same landowner's shop to buy his 
daily ration of food. It is easy to see how a day labourer, similar to the main 
character in Edgar Elian Poe's The Pit and The Pendulum, could become 
trapped within an ever narrowing space between his landlord, employer, cattle-
breeding partner, and grocer. 
The local elite's powerful members controlled all the means of exploitation. A 
tenant relied upon the landowner for land, on the farmer-employer for 
employment, on the cattle owner for breeding and traction animals, and last but 
not least, upon the shop owner for his food and other needs. Under these 
condition, the reproduction of social differences, the class division between 
farmer-employers and proletarianized crofters and tenants, seems virtually 
inevitable. However, the histories of some important proprietdrio families show 
that there were many factors that frustrated this reproduction. Division of the 
patrimony, bad luck, and witless sons are only three out of the many events or 
conditions that could lead to the downfall of an elite family. 
The problems which the elite met in reproducing its economic and political 
power can be illustrated by the histories of the descendants of the three men 
who played an important political role in the parish during the Estado Novo. 
These three men formed the Commissao Politico, Salazar's Uniao National 
party representation at the local level. Its wealthiest member was Alberto (Al-
bertiriho) Barria Maio from Pepe 2 7. Barria Maio, the son of a school master, 
was a merchant and landowner. He became one of the largest cattle owners in 
the district, with properties in Campea as well as in other parts of the region 
such as in the Douro valley. He was also the largest shopowner in the parish. In 
1955, he had to pay the municipality of Vila Real 2,625$00 of avengas. He was 
the largest taxpayer in the parish and the twenty third largest in the 
municipality. This becomes even more significant since his shop was in a rural 
2 7 Barria Maio descended from Manuel Joäo Dias Barria, a proprietdrio from Vila Cova. In 1866 
this Barria was the richest man of the parishes of Campeä, Vila Cova, and Quinta, paying a tax of 
24,543 riis. Antonio Jorge Grilo, the richest man in Avecäozinho, paid only 6,336 riis. Barria 
Maio is discussed in chapter 7 (footnotes 27 and 28) because of his role in the privatization of the 
baldios of Campeä. 
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area, while the other twenty-two taxpayers were almost all located in the city of 
Vila Real (ACM 19 January 1955 ff.) 2 8 . Although Alberto Barria Maio was 
one of the largest landowners in the parish, after his death, his son did not 
continue to farm the land he inherited. Instead, he sold or rented out most of his 
properties in Campea and started a farm in Campo Maior, near Lisbon. There, 
he dedicated himself to intensive pig breeding. 
The history of the descendants of Fernando Cerejeira Seixo from Chao 
Grande is not unlike that of Barria Maio. Fernando Seixo owned one of the 
finest houses in the area, which remains famous for its beautiful garden and rich 
furniture. He also owned a considerable amount of land, including one of the 
valley's best fields, Chao Grande. In 1966, Seixo was elected member of the 
farmers' corporation (Gremio de Lavoura) of Vila Real (AJF 2 October 1966). 
Similar to Barria Maio's son, Seixo's descendants no longer live in the parish. 
His grandson consumed his grandfather's fortunes and was forced to sell his 
property. Nowadays, he works as an engineer in the north of the district. 
The Commissao Politico's third member was Eduardo Antunes Cerejeira. 
Antunes Cerejeira held public offices within the parish between 1926 and 1972. 
His political career was closely connected to the Estado Novo. When the 
military took over power in May 1926 and heralded Salazar's dictatorship, they 
gradually changed all political and administrative bodies and personnel. They 
appointed a new district government, and, in his turn, the new Governador Civil 
replaced the Parish Councils with Administrative Commissions. Cerejeira 
became for the first time involved in the administration of the parish of Campea 
in September 1926, when he was appointed a scribe to the Administrative 
Commission which had been installed a few weeks earlier (AJF 22 August 
1926, 5 September 1926). In 1946 he became the Commission's president. 
Contrary to Barria Maio's and Seixo's children, Eduardo's sons were still living 
in the parish when I did my research. They had become major local 
entrepreneurs. One son, Arturo, owned the most important caf6, restaurant, and 
guesthouse in the parish. The other son, Alfredo, had a dress shop, and held 
several public offices such as head of the local volunteer fire brigade. Both 
brothers continued their father's political career. In 1976, they were elected into 
the Parish Council, Arturo for the Socialist Party (PS) as the treasurer, Alfredo 
for the Social Democratic Party (PSD) as president. In 1990, Alfredo was the 
Parish Council's secretary, while Arturo belonged to the Parish Assembly. 
Although the history of Alfredo and Arturo Antunes Cerejeira shows that the 
elite have sometimes been capable of conserving economical and political power 
over generations, anyone who visits the area will notice that many of the better 
houses which belonged to the old landowning class, have become uninhabited. 
The proprietdrios' descendants still own them, but live outside the area, in Vila 
2 8 The exceptions were the Empresa Cerâmica de Vila Real (65,000$00) and Augusto dos Reis 
(27,000$00), both from Folhadela. 
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Campea after 1960: The Demise of the Landowning Class 
The downfall of the landed elite families was partly related to contingencies. 
After 1960 the reproduction of the landowning class met new difficulties which 
were related to overall changes in the local economy. These changes appear 
clearly from the figures presented in table 6.6. This table lists the farm-sizes in 
the parish according to the 1940 inquiry by the JCI and the 1989 inquiry by the 
National Institute for Statistics (INE 1989, 1993). The latter inquiry is the first 
one that provides information at the parish level. A comparison of both years' 
figures shows that Campea's society has been thoroughly transformed. First, in 
the four decades following the Second World War, agriculture lost its 
predominance in the local economy. While in 1941 97% of 524 households 
were engaged in farming, in 1989 this figure had decreased to 46%. Second, 
the structure of the farms had changed. There had been an increase in scale in 
terms of the area worked and livestock. The small farms with less than 0.5 
hectare had virtually disappeared while the share of farms over 2 ha had 
increased. In 1941 only 22% of the farming households belonged to that 
category. In 1989, this had increased to 37%. Third, livestock production had 
changed. The number of sheep and goats diminished dramatically, and the 
maronesas were replaced by turinas. The average number of cows per farm 
household had increased from 1.6 to 3.8 head. The category of farms over 2 ha 
exhibited the largest growth: from 2.6 to 5.8 heads per household. 
These developments at the parish level were confirmed by the results of my 
own survey in the village of Avecaozinho in 1991 (table 4.7). Compared to 
1940, there were no longer any tiny land holdings, and land had become 
concentrated in fewer larger farms. For many in the village, agriculture was no 
longer the basis of their existence. Instead, they had found employment in other 
economic activities, such as construction works or industries in town. 
Although in 1991 agriculture was no longer the sole way of making a living, 
farming continued to be an important livelihood for a large portion of the 
population. One-third of the households were registered as being engaged in 
farming. This meant that access to land, and differences in access, either in 
terms of area or the rules regulating it, still were important for the 
understanding of social relations within the parish. It appears that renting 
constituted an important way of obtaining land: According to INE (1989) 
figures, of the 242 farms in Campea, 97 farms rented a total of 126 ha. In 
Avecaozinho, out of 28 farms 14 rented a total of 36 ha (appendix 5). 
Real, in Porto, or even farther away. The landowning class has disappeared 
from the area. 
Table 6.6: Farm-sizes in Campeâ in 1940 and 1989 (sources: JCI 1941:151-153 and INE 1989). 
Farm size (ha 
arable land) 
Number of households (hh) Heads of cattle (n) 
1940 1989 1940 1989 
N % N % cows c/hh goats sheep cows c/hh goats sheep 
a £ 0 . 5 190 38 9 4 49 0.3 72 252 20 2.2 3 15 
0.5<a«£l.O 102 20 39 16 96 0.9 163 507 81 2.1 20 7 
1 .0<a£2.0 102 20 105 43 164 1.6 158 511 300 2.9 48 88 
a>2 .0 113 22 89 37 296 2.6 140 415 517 5.8 67 27 
2 < a £ 3 34 14 129 3.8 4 1 
3 < a £ 4 23 10 111 4.8 62 20 
4 < a ^ 5 14 6 123 8.8 1 6 
a > 5 18 7 154 8.6 0 0 
Total farming 507 97 242 34 605 1.6 533 1685 918 3.8 138 137 
Total households 524 100 705» 100 
s number in INE (1991). 
Table 6.7: Farm-sizes and distribution of cattle in Avecaozinho in 1940 and 1991 (JCI1941 and field data). 
Farm size (ha 
arable land)' 
Number of households (hh) Heads of cattle (n) 
1940 1991 animals/hh in 1940* animals/hh in 1991 
N % N % cows c/hh goats sheep cows c/hh goats sheep 
a=0 2 4 15 35 - 0.0 0.1 0.6 0 0 0.3 0 
0 < a £ 0 . 1 3 6 0 0 - 0.0 0.6 1.8 0 0 0 0 
0.1<a*;0.5 8 16 5 18 - 0.1 1.6 5.0 0 0 0 0 
0.5<a«Sl.O 9 18 2 7 - 0.3 1.5 5.0 3 1.0 0 0 
1.0<a£2.0 13 26 12 43 - 1.6 1.2 3.7 44 3.7 0 0 
a>2 .0 17 34 9 32 - 2.6 1.1 3.3 71 7.9 0 0 
2 < a £ 3 - - 4 14 - - - - 20 5.0 0 0 
3 < a £ 4 - - 2 7 - - - - 12 6.0 0 0 
4 < a £ 5 - - 1 4 - - - - 9 9.0 0 0 
a > 5 - - 2 7 - - - - 30 15.0 0 0 
Total farming 50 96 28 65 82 1.6 4 7 118 4.2 0 0 
Total households 52 100 43 100 - - - - - - 3 0 
* farm land only; 'mato' is excluded; leased land is discounted; 
b figures for the whole parish; only the totals refer to the village. 
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Oddly enough, according to my survey in Avecaozinho, the rented area was not 
equal to the leased area (12 ha). The difference between the leased and rented 
areas can be explained in two ways. The first is that people gave false responses 
to my questionnaire. This may have caused a bias in favour of renting rather 
than leasing 2 9. 
The second explanation for the difference between the let and rented areas is 
that landlords were systematically excluded from the interviews3 0. During most 
of the time I stayed in Avecaozinho, several houses remained uninhabited by 
their owners. Two houses belonged to two sisters, members of one of the 
proprietdrio families in the village, the Jorge Alexandre family. According to 
the neighbours, in the past they were important landowners, although they 
gradually sold much of their property (see below). At least one of the tenants 
(household 34 in appendix 5) rented of one of these sisters. Though it is 
unlikely that the total difference between the leased and the rented area can be 
attributed to these two households, their absence from the survey certainly 
accounts for a large part of that difference. The absence of the landowners goes 
beyond the fact that they were not included in the survey. In reality, they are 
vanishing as well. This can be illustrated by several examples. As mentioned 
above, one of the members of the Jorge Alexandre family, was my landlady. 
She was a clear representative of the landowning class. This was even expressed 
in the way her neighbours addressed her. They added -inha to her first name, a 
typical way of verbally distinguishing the proprietdrios. She had been able to 
maintain her class's life-style almost all her life. During our talks, my landlady 
assured me that she herself had never worked on her land and that, in the past, 
the housework had been left to a maid (criadd). In the meantime, however, the 
family had sold most of its property. According to their neighbours this was 
done partly to finance the classy life-style. My landlady still has some land 
though. One of the plots she owns is a field of approximately 0,5 ha with a barn 
and a well in the valley. This plot was leased on the basis of a five-year 
contract to Fatima, her former crlada (household 34). During my stay, Fatima 
announced that she did not want to continue the contract after its term had 
2 9 It is for instance conceivable that households systematically underestimated the leased area (of 
course, denial is a form of underestimation) and overestimated the rented area, for instance because 
they preferred to stress their costs (paying rent) and hide their income and assets (owning land and 
receiving rent). One household that denied letting land during the survey, admitted later having at 
least one tenant. On the other hand tenants, may either overestimate the rented area (stressing their 
costs) or underestimate it (saving their social status as farmers). This means that, in the case of 
landlords, the let area is likely to be understated, and in the case of tenants, the distortion caused by 
falsified answers can have go both ways. 
3 0 In the survey I asked for the names of tenants (in the case one admitted leasing land) and the 
names of landlords (in the case one admitted renting). Unfortunately, none of the other respondents 
answered this question. This makes it impossible to identify all of the landlords in the village and to 
see how many did not participate in me survey. 
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ended. Although the field had good soil and renting it included unlimited access 
to irrigation water through a bore hole, my landlady was unable to find another 
tenant. 
The lack of tenants and Fatima's reluctancy to continue the rental relation 
underscore the difficulties agriculture in northern Portugal is passing through. 
Despite the fact that the rent was very affordable no one wanted to take 
advantage of the land. While rents decline (Black 1992:99), wages rise, partly 
due to the emergence of off-farm labour. In addition, since 1986, EC-policies 
have been making it more difficult for small farmers to continue their enter-
prise. As a result, between 1979 and 1989, almost 200,000 farms have 
disappeared31. In this light, it is hardly surprising that my landlady did not find 
a tenant. It also becomes understandable that she and her children no longer 
invested their capital in farm land. Instead, they turned to real estate in Vila 
Real, where they bought apartments and a shop in a recently constructed apart-
ment building and shopping mall. 
In Avecaozinho, the family of Dinis da Fonte were considered a wealthy 
family, as well. This family had been among the village's elite for ages. In the 
1831 tax roll, a Luis Dinis da Fonte is mentioned, paying 500 reis for his 
landed estate and 100 reis for his dwelling (appendix 7). m 1866 Joaquim Dinis 
da Fonte was the second richest man in the village, paying 4,302 riis. The 
present generations of the family lost much of the former glamour. 
Nevertheless, one member, an elderly woman named Fortunata (household 26), 
still was the largest landlord in the survey: she owned about 5 ha of land all of 
which she rented out. 
The economic ascent of some members of the lowest social categories, 
confirms that the old social divisions between day labourers and landowners 
have become less important. Ant6nio and his wife (household number 09) from 
AvecSozinho are both descendants of small peasants or jornaleiros without land 
of their own. Without having yet acquired any property, Ant6nio was able to 
build up the largest farm in the village at the time, with over 10 ha of rented 
land and 25 head of cattle. Until 1992, Ant6nio was the only person in the 
village who had succeeded in obtaining enough funds for the financing the con-
struction of a modern stable. Moreover, he owned one of the few tractors in the 
village and was also the only person who had a liquid manure tank, no longer 
having to collect rnato for fertilizing his fields. If in the future, he and his wife 
will be able to manage their farm in such a way that they can repay their debts, 
they will be living proof that one no longer needs to be a proprietdrio or a 
lavrador in order to become a farmer. 
31 Semanärio Economico, (Lisbon), 3 April 1992, p.5; INE (1993:24). Since Portugal became an 
EC-member, the net earnings of farmers have decreased every year except for 1989. Between 1985 
and 1993 this income decreased by 39.1% (Eurostat 1994, Rapid Reports, Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries, no. 4). 
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These examples indicate that the parish's economic and social stractures have 
dramatically changed. First, the social stratification that emerged during the 
eighteenth century on the basis of ownership of land, has become outdated as 
economic wealth and social prestige are increasingly derived from sources and 
practices other than farming. Second, as a result of technological changes, the 
traditional distinction between lavradores who owned a pair of oxen or cows to 
pull a plough and those who did not, has become unimportant. Animals have 
been replaced by tractors. Third, the practice of hiring agrarian wage labourers 
has essentially been abolished. In 1989, there were only three farmers who 
employed labourers on a regular basis in the parish. Consequently, the class of 
jornaleiros (agrarian wage labourers), has disappeared, along with the 
landowners and the ploughmen. 
The "Escape" From Exploitation 
The main cause of the dissolution of the old social order and agrarian structure, 
has been emigration. Since 1960, in particular, many members of the lowest 
social classes have escaped from their imprisonment in the exploitative relations 
that tied them to the elite of Campea, and emigrated, at least temporarily, to 
make a living. The 1960 emigration movement was not the first in the parish. In 
fact, here, as in the rest of Portugal, labour migration has a long history. 
Between 1890 and 1980 more than 3.5 million people left the country legally 
or illegally for destinations such as Brazil, France, and Germany. Portuguese 
emigration has passed through three phases. The first one coincided with a 
massive flow of Europeans crossing the Atlantic to the Americas. This wave 
reached its zenith just before the first World War. During this phase, the 
Portuguese moved primarily to Brazil. After the Second World War, the second 
emigration period saw many Portuguese leave for the African colonies. During 
the late 1940s and 1950s, Africa was attracting 50% of all emigrants from 
Portugal, nearly twice as many as Brazil (Newitt 1981:164). Contrary to other 
emigrations, this emigration movement was encouraged by the Portuguese 
government as a part of its colonial policies 3 2. The third phase started in the 
1960s and coincided with labour migration from the Mediterranean to the 
North-West of Europe. This time, France was the preferred destination (see for 
example Cepeda 1988:219). 
The history of Campea does not substantially deviate from this general image. 
Among the 2,550 passports issued by the district's governor between 1930 and 
For mis reason and for me fact that according to the official guidelines moving to the African 
territories did not differ from moving within Portugal itself, emigration to Africa has generally been 
excluded from inquiries in Portuguese population movements (Serrao 1970:598 and for a critique: 
Brouwer 1994:158; in this article I also criticize the myopic approach of migration by authors like 
Serrao 1970, Cabral 1981, and Brandao 1991). 
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1947, only six were given to inhabitants from CampeS; three women and three 
men who all declared that they were going to Brazil (ADVR, Livros de 
Passaportes, Livros 175 and 176). The composition of this group confirms more 
general observations concerning the role of class and gender in migration 
(Monteiro 1985; Brettell 1986, 1988). The women, twenty, thirty, and fifty-one 
years old, all declared that they would be visiting their husbands. The youngest 
was taking a child with her. All of the women were registered as housewives, 
not one was classified as day labourer. This suggests that they all belonged to 
the higher social strata in the parish. Of the three men, only the youngest one 
(age twenty-eight) was recorded as an agricultural wage labourer, the other two 
(thirty and thirty-three years old) were registered as agriculturalists. Like the 
women, all men were married. Although the limited number of passports makes 
it impossible to arrive at clear conclusions as to the composition of the 
emigrating population in terms of class and gender, it seems that the situation in 
CampeS was similar to mat elsewhere in the north of Portugal. Men migrated 
alone, leaving their wives at home. The women stayed behind, or followed their 
husbands later. Further, it seems that the lowest class (about two-thirds of the 
parishioners) was underrepresented in the departing population. Only one in six 
was registered as a day labourer. Indeed, according to statistics for 1909 and 
1913, only one-fifth of the registered emigrants were agricultural workers 
(Serrao 1970:609-610). 
In demographic terms, the 1960 phase of emigration in Campea was much 
more important than previous phases. Between 1890 and 1920, when many 
persons departed for Brazil, the parish population showed a small decrease from 
1,979 to 1,914 (-0.11% per year). But between 1960 and 1970, the parish's 
population dropped more than 2% per year (table 6.8). During the same period, 
the estimated natural growth of the population amounted to 1.32% so that, 
roughly, about 3.4% of the population departed each year. After 1970 the 
number of inhabitants continued to decline. This tendency was caused partly by 
international migration and partly by an internal population movement towards 
urban centres such as Porto and Lisbon. There was also migration to the city of 
Vila Real from the parish. 
The effect of emigration on the local society can hardly be underestimated. In 
Avecaozinho only twelve households heads (28% of those included in the 
survey) did not have close relatives abroad (brother, sister, child). Thirteen 
declared to have come back to the parish after a stay abroad (30%). Most of the 
returned emigrants (two-thirds) had a farm, which some of them had been able 
to buy only after their return. 
During the 1960s, the impact of massive emigration upon the local labour 
market seems to have been tremendous. In 1963, a staff member of the State's 
regional agrarian services complained in a newsletter on farming published in 
the northern districts (O Lavradof), that labour shortages resulting from 
emigration and alternative employment opportunities in state-sponsored road 
construction and tree-planting works, not only complicated the execution of 
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labour intensive agrarian jobs, but also provoked demands for higher wages and 
an eight hour working day. These circumstances made it only more difficult for 
farmers to continue their traditional form of production based upon wage labour 
(SUveirinha 1963). 
Table 6.8: Demography of Campea and Vila Real district. Sources: Costa 1934:405-406; 
INE 1960, 1970, 1981, 1991; Floud's formula33 for the mean population growth is 
taken from Pina-Cabral (1986:15). The figures for the estimated natural growth in the 
district are from Nazareth (1985:976). 
Year House-
holds 
Persons Net average 
annual in-
crement (%) 
Year House-
holds 
Persons Net and natural 
average annual 
increments (%) 
Campea Net 
(Cam.) 
Natural 
(Distr.) 
1862 440 1,900 1900 502 1,947 
1864 2,030 3.25 1930 485 2,103 0.50 0.89 
1890 504 1,979 -0.10 1940 523 2,173 0.33 1.29 
1900 502 1,947 -0.16 1950 2,416 1.07 1.35 
1911 538 1,912 -0.16 1960 729 2,742 1.27 1.57 
1920 492 1,914 0.01 1970 546 2,224 -2.07 1.32 
1930 502 1,947 0.17 1981 571 2,193 -0.13 0.77 
1991 705 1,838 -1.72 n.a. 
The employer-farmers were extremely worried about the impact of emigration. 
In the documents of Salazar currently kept in the National Archive in the Torre 
do Tombo, one can find a letter written in 1963 by a proprietdrio from a rural 
parish in Minho, in which he complains that all of his parishioners have turned 
into communists. However, the letter's phrasing makes it clear that the 
ideological issue plays only a subordinate role. It is used as a vehicle for the 
expression of the real message: the landowner's frustration over lack of 
jornaleiros still willing to work on his fields: 
Your Excellency, I write you this letter in order to tell you that in 
[the parish] nobody talks about anything else but the three hundred 
men going to France. This should be prohibited by the State, as all 
that go there do nothing but talk of communism and how it is in 
France and in Russia. They even bring books back that deal with 
communism. Hence, I believe that it is convenient that you prohibit 
r = 100*( (XJXX - 1): r is the growth rate in percents, X„ is the number of inhabitants at the 
end of the period, X, is the number at the beginning of the period, and a= 1/m, with m as the 
number of intervening years. 
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them to depart, because when three to four hundred people go away, 
only the elderly stay behind and one will not find anybody willing to 
work in agriculture. Even if they return, they no longer want to 
work, for they tell the persons who go to call on them that they have 
brought money from abroad to live on.. . . According to what is being 
told in the shops those who go for two months bring twelve to 
thirteen thousand escudos.... Therefore, if one needs people to do the 
jobs on the fields, one cannot find any. (ANTdT, Arquivo Salazar, 
AOS/CO/ES-29, pasta 2) 3 4 . 
The farmers resolved the problems related to labour scarcity in part by the 
replacing manual labour with machines, the oxen were replaced by tractors, 
bands of threshers were replaced by threshing machines, hay was mowed by 
hay mowers and joined by balers, etc., and in part through the application of 
chemical herbicides. The 1970s and 1980s, in particular saw a rapid 
mechanization of agriculture. According to the 1952-54 agricultural survey, 
about 0.2% of Portuguese farms had a tractor. By 1989, this number had 
increased to 18.2% (De Freitas, De Almeida, and Cabral 1976:74; INE 
1993:24) 3 5. The result has been that tasks which in the past demanded the 
hiring of labourers, could now be executed by household members alone. 
Weeding, for instance, formerly demanded a standing force of some four or five 
workers. Nowadays, a farmer can himself spray the field with a herbicide and 
weed it only once or twice during the season, requiring only the help of his 
family members. The adoption of new technologies made the hiring of 
jornaleiros superfluous and allowed the transformation of employer-farms into 
family farms. 
Emigration not only made this development necessary, it also made it 
possible. Returning emigrants used their savings to buy land, machines, and 
other innovations. Returning emigrants have always invested in farms (Cepeda 
3 4 According to Costa (1959) rural wages at that time were approximately 20$00 per day, so that an 
agrarian worker in a month would earn less than 600$00. In this light, it is hardly surprising that 
people left for France. 
3 3 Mechanization measured by the number of tractors (De Freitas, De Almeida, and Cabral 1976: 
74,93,97; INE 1979, Total Geral:168; INE 1993:24). 
Year Farms with tractors Total farms Percent with tractors 
1952-54 1,906 853,568 0.22 
1968 17,163 811,656 2.11 
1979 52,322 783,944 6.67 
1989 109,126 598,742 18.23 
In 1952, the district of Vila Real had only 10 tractors, in 1972, this had increased to 722 (De 
Freitas, De Almeida, and Cabral 1976:97). In Campea, in 1989, 51 farms (21 %) owned 55 tractors 
(INE 1989). 
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1988; Wall 1986; Nobre 1987; Pina-Cabral 1986:13; Black 1992:101). 
Monteiro's 1985 study of early-twentieth-century correspondence between 
emigrants in Brazil and the USA and their families at home in Portugal clearly 
shows the emigrants' interest in acquiring or enlarging their farms. In Campea 
they did the same. The assets of Joana's household (household 27), for 
example, were bought with the savings earned by Joana's father in Brazil. As 
Joana and her mother told me, Joana's father had emigrated in about 1912, 
when he was sixteen years old, because he was afraid of being enlisted in the 
army. Joana's grandfather, a relatively wealthy peasant, had paid a passador, a 
"travel agent" for people trying to depart illegally, to help him cross the border 
into Spain. It had been rather difficult. Joana's father had been forced to hide 
for a week in a barn. Finally he sailed from Gibraltar to Rio de Janeiro, where 
he arrived seventy days after his departure from home. He stayed in Brazil for 
twenty-three years. During this time he saved money which he used for 
purchasing land in his home village. Today these assets still form the nucleus of 
his daughter's farm (int 1 February 1991) 3 6. 
After the Second World War, emigrants returning from France or Germany 
did as Joana's father had (see Amaro 1985a, 1985b; Cepeda 1988). Paulo da 
Silva (household 01) is a case in point. Da Silva's parents were very poor. He 
began with nothing; no land, no house, or any other property. When he realized 
that the chances to improve his life at home were slim, he decided to leave for 
Germany. There he lived as frugally as possible in order to save as much 
money as he could for his family at home. After a few years, he went back to 
Campea and married. After his marriage, he kept on working in Germany for 
several years, only seeing his wife and children during summer holidays and at 
Christmas. He invested his savings in his homestead; buying land and building a 
house and stables. During his absence, the farm remained in the care of his 
wife. After ten or fifteen years, he decided to stop working in Germany and 
return to the village. Nowadays, he divides his time between his farm and a job 
with a construction enterprise in Vila Real. 
The case of Da Silva illustrates that the effect of emigration was the influx of 
capital which was used to acquire land. Pina-Cabral's (1986:13) quotation of a 
wealthy peasant underlines the rise of the lower social stratum at the detriment 
of the landowning elite:"'Now things are as in the times of Afonso Henriques, 
of the Reconquista from the Moors, the sharecroppers are buying back the 
land'". Apparently, along with the agrarian structure, the social structure has 
changed as a result of remittances and returning emigrants. 
3 6 Joana's father was not the only member of this family to leave. In fact, all his brothers and sisters 
departed. Most of them never returned, but died and were buried in Brazil. Only one brother, 
Silverio, came back. Presently, his assets are incorporated into the properties of household 24, 
which belongs to Jos6, one of his sons. Jos6 himself left for Brazil in the mid-fifties, and came back 
definitively in the late-eighties. Contrary to his cousin Joana, he does not engage in farming, but 
lives off the revenues of his shop in Rio de Janeiro. 
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3 7 A Wilcoxon test shows that the age difference is statistically significant for p<0.025. (The test is 
described in Van der Laan 1983:21-26; Corsten and Van der Laan 1987:108-111.) 
3 8 According to the Wilcoxon test, the ages of the group renting all of a farm and of that renting 
only a part differ significandy with p < 0.025. 
INE (1989) gives the following figures for the most important commodities: 
Commodity Producers Sellers S h : i r e o f o u t p u t t r a d e d 
<25% 25-50% 50-75% >75% 
Maize 223 24 6 5 5 8 
Bovines 227 225 - - - -
Beans 209 43 9 16 7 11 
Potatoes 197 185 8 17 29 131 
Milk 153 133 2 - - 126 
Kümmert (1988:9) believes that the expulsion of labour from farming has not 
been accompanied by a redistribution of landed property and that this 
Umverteilung will not even occur in the next "generation. My impression is that 
in Campeä, the opposite is occurring. The influx of remittances on the one 
hand, and the sale of land by farmers and landowners who look for more 
rewarding investment opportunities outside agriculture on the other, have 
opened up the land market. The result of this redistribution has been that the 
actual agrarian structure has acquired a peasant outlook: the distribution of land 
seems less economic or class derived (Patnaik 1979:380, 415-6; Littlejohn 
1987:31), but rather determined by the family cycle. According to Chayanov 
(1987), this is a typical feature of a peasant economy. In the village of 
Avecäozinho, the six households who rent out land, consist of elderly people 
(with an average age of seventy) who have abandoned farming. None of them 
has any cattle. The tenants are much younger (with an average of fifty-three) 
and are actively engaged in agriculture37. Within the category of tenants, the 
percentage of the farm rented from someone else varies between 25 and 100%. 
Younger people tend to rent a larger part of their farm than the elderly (see 
annexo 6) 3 8 . However, in the case of Campeä, this peasant-like land 
distribution is not the relic of a pre-capitalist, communalist form of social and 
economic organization, but the effect of the particular way in which the parish 
has been integrated into the wider economy. The farms are founded or 
supported with money acquired by persons working as wage labourers outside 
of agriculture and often, even outside the country. The farmers are capitalist, 
simple commodity producers: subsumed to the logic of capital by its ties to the 
markets of labour, inputs, and outputs (Friedmann 1980, 1986) 3 9. 
Peasant-like features, such as the distribution of land, are the result of the 
particular way in which the parish has been integrated into capitalism. These 
features are not a relic of a pre-capitalist mode of production. In the same 
manner, the wide-spread practice of the exchange of labour, is not a mere 
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continuation of an ancient or traditional practice, but a reaction to modern 
changes in the labour structure. 
As a result of emigration and the growing opportunities for finding non-
agricultural employment, the number of people willing to work on a farm for a 
day's wage declined. Therefore, if a farmer chose to continue his enterprise he 
had no other option but to call upon his family for labour or to mechanize his 
farm. However, at certain moments in the production cycle, the family alone 
could not provide all the labour required. Particular activities, such as seeding, 
must be executed within a relatively short time span. Mechanization is difficult 
because of the plot sizes and the inclination of the fields. Mechanization would 
require a large investment which is unbearable and uneconomical for such small 
scale farms that predominate in the parish. Rather than mechanizing these 
particular jobs, another solution has been found: labour is pooled. 
Instead of hiring a group of workers, the job is done with the help of 
neighbours and relatives on the basis of reciprocity. Direct compensation is 
given only in the form of drinks during the job and a picnic (merenda) as soon 
as it is finished. Obtaining a working force for one's seeding and harvesting 
parties is no longer determined by the simple ability to pay wages, but depends 
upon non-monetary factors, such as one's popularity in the village, respect, and 
the number of days one's household members work for others. As with the 
emergence of the family farm, the exchange of labour is the direct result of the 
transformation of the parish's agrarian structure caused by integration into the 
wider economy through labour migration. Although the present form of the 
agrarian structure seems non-capitalist or traditional, its existence is purely 
modern 4 0. 
Conclusion 
The discussion of the history of social differentiation in Campea leads to two 
conclusions. The first one concerns the conceptualization of communities such 
as Campea. Although at first sight these communities may look like a peasant 
society in the best corporate community tradition, in reality they should be 
understood as a capitalist society. The second point concerns the implications of 
this conclusion for the relationship between the existence of common property 
In 1994, the exchange of labour was also used for the organization of a novel innovation in the 
Campean fanning system, the ensiling of maize. 
The exchange of labour is only important on the plateau. In Montes, a village on the southern 
flank of CampeS, the demography is much more unbalanced than in Avecaozinho. Here, two-thirds 
of the population are older than 50, and one-third older than 70; two-thirds are female. In this 
village, the system of labour exchange does not exist (any more) as its elderly inhabitants are 
incapable of working. As far as they still cultivate their fields for their own subsistence, they have 
to rely on hired workers. Apparently, here integration in the wider economy did not result into a 
'revival' of apparently 'communalist' practices. 
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and the prevailing mode of production. Contrary to what MacPherson (1975) 
and Hespanha (1980) have argued, there is no direct relationship between the 
legal form of property and the mode of production. The case of CampeS has 
shown that the existence of common property, baldios, was (is) perfectly 
compatible with and even instrumental to the development of commercial animal 
husbandry and farming based upon the hiring of wage labour. 
These conclusions have important implications for the way in which one 
should see the impact of the commons' forestation upon the local society. Some 
authors (Baptista 1978a, 1993; Estevao 1983) have claimed that twentieth-
century's afforestation of the baldios by the Estado Novo was a form of 
primitive accumulation since it meant the separation of the peasantry from their 
(communal) means of production. This brought about the dissolution of a pre-
capitalist mode of production. My analysis of the history of the agrarian 
structure in Campea has shown that, at least with respect to the particular case 
of this parish, this claim should be rejected. Campea was already fully 
capitalistic before the arrival of the foresters in the 1950s. 
The fact mat the afforestation of the commons did not bring capitalism, does 
not mean that it did not have any important bearing upon the parish and its 
population. These effects are discussed in the next chapter where I present an 
overview of the history of the organization of the parish and the administration 
of its commons. 

Chapter 7 
The Struggle over the Commons in Campea: 
Local Autonomy and the State 
Introduction 
The previous chapter sketched the development of capitalism in the parish of 
Campeâ. I showed that commercial and wage labour-based agricultural 
production prevailed until the 1960s, when it deteriorated as a result of massive 
out-migration of agricultural labourers and was supplanted by simple commodity 
production. I pointed also to the specific role of the baldios in the parish's 
economic organization. In the past and present, these were not so much a 
characteristic of a non-capitalist mode of production and an egalitarian corporate 
community but of sustained commercial farming that reinforced the differences 
between the wealthier and poorer strata in the parish. In this chapter I will 
continue with a discussion of the commons, but instead of focusing on their 
economic role, I will concentrate on their political-admMstrative aspects. I 
present the intervention of state agencies such as the Forestry Service in the 
exploitation of the baldios and show that this intervention contributed to the 
reduction of local autonomy an the development of central State power. 
The chapter covers a broad but still limited time range: it tries to shed some 
light on the very origins of the parish of Campeâ in the early-thirteenth century, 
the period of the ancien régime, and most of the twentieth century. But it stops 
just before 1974, because from this book's perspective, that year signifies an 
important rupture in the history of the parish and the management of its 
commons. Until 1974 there was a clear tendency towards the dismantling of 
village control over the baldios, but in 1974, when the Estado Novo was 
abolished, this tendency was reversed. The April revolution initiated the process 
leading towards the revision of the baldios' legal status through the publication 
of Decreto-Lei 39/76 in 1976. The national political context of this revision and 
the way in which it was taken up by the rural population are the subjects 
chapters 8 and 9. 
This chapter consists of three parts. In the first part, I reconstruct exploitation 
practices and the related form of local administration as they existed until the 
nineteenth century state reforms. Elaborating on earlier statements in chapter 2, 
I describe the role of waste lands (common and private) in the local farming 
system. I continue with a portrait of the organization of local administration at 
that time and point to the importance of village communities (povos) in 
comparison with institutions such as the parish, the municipality, the Church, 
and the Crown. This point is further elaborated for communal land management 
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in Campea at the turn of the century. The second part of the chapter describes 
how during the twentieth century, the parish, the municipality, and two central 
state agencies, the Junta da Colonizacao Interna and the Forestry Service, 
encroached upon village autonomy. The chapter closes with a discussion of the 
impact of these state interventions on the local society, in particular, equity and 
the capacity to revive the village community's system of local rule after 1976. 
The Commons in the Economy until the Nineteenth Century 
As I pointed out in chapter 2, in official language, the commons and the so-
called waste lands are conflated in the single term baldios. In reality, however, 
property status and land use are different categories which should not be 
confused. Areas which are officially denominated baldios are communally 
owned stretches exploited in different ways. Generally, they are not reclaimed 
for (agricultural) cultivation. Locally, these areas are called monte or monte do 
povo. In addition to these baldios other uncultivated lands exist, which can be 
owned by private individuals or by public bodies. 
In the past (and also in many places today) the existence of waste land pointed 
to a specific farming system in which the farming of infields was combined with 
the exploitation of uncultivated outfields. In such systems, the exact property 
status of the waste land was of secondary importance: they could be privately or 
communally owned. The private or communal waste lands and the (private) 
cultivated parcels were articulated in one system in which the uncultivated 
outfields had the following functions: 
1. the provision of green manure for the fertilization of the cultivated infields; 
2. the provision of grazing land for the animal herds; 
3. the provision of other resources like fuel wood, building material, etc.; 
4 . the provision of a reserve which could be reclaimed in the future. 
In principle, these four functions applied to all waste lands, regardless of their 
property status. However, in this book I focus upon those areas which were 
communally owned. 
The first function of the waste lands, (communal and private), was to provide 
fertilizer for the cultivated fields. Heather and other brashes growing there were 
collected, and in combination with animal dung, used for the fertilization of the 
cultivated infields. This system was not unique to the north of Portugal but has 
been known as a technique elsewhere in Europe (Slicher van Bath 1980:67, 
283). It imposed a certain minimal ratio between the farmed and the unfarmed 
areas. In 1805 it was estimated that in Minho, to cultivate one hectare required 
at least three hectares of waste lands for the provision of manure. The increas-
ing availability of artificial fertilizer reduced the amount of uncultivated area 
needed. As a result, in Minho, in 1903, the farmed land:waste land ratio 
increased from 1:3 to 1:2 (Nunes and Feij6 1990:61-64). In Campea in 1941 
this ratio was 1:4 (JCI 1941, 111:149; see the map in figure 7.1). The farmers 
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Figure 7.1: Land use in Campea in 1947 after an areal photograph. 
relied on access to brush to the extent that about one-third of the waste land 
area was their private property. 
The second function of the waste lands was to provide pasture for sheep, 
goats, and bovines. The animals were grazed in individual or in combined 
herds. At least part if not all of the households in a certain community contrib-
uted of animals and shepherds to the combined herds (vezeiras) (Peixoto 
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1974:396-398; Sampaio 1923:32-33; Velozo 1953:10; Dias 1953:13). In 
Campea, the village of Cotorinho maintained its last vezeira until 1957 or 1958 
(int 1 September 1991, 4 September 1991, 8 June 1993). 
Third, the waste lands provided the inhabitants with other kinds of resources; 
fuel, construction material (stones and timber), and the raw material for the 
production of commodities (pottery and charcoal) (Nunes and Feij6 1990:61). In 
CampeS, in addition to timber and slates for construction, lime was excavated to 
be sold to the vineyards in the Douro area and to urban construction works as 
plaster. Heather (torga) was exploited for charcoal. It was also sold to urban 
areas (Costa 1959:68, 82, 138; AJF 17 June 1923, 15 July 1923, 17 January 
1933). 
Finally, the waste lands served as reserve. For example, in the case of 
communal land, patches could be temporarily cultivated by indigent individuals 
or used for the construction of a house and a small garden by newcomers who 
had insufficient private land of their own. During the nineteenth century, the 
Cdmara Municipal of Barcelos (Minho, district of Braga), reserved certain 
communal areas for this purpose in order to allow the settlement of the 
municipality's poorest inhabitants. This policy was related to the rapid demo-
graphic growth and massive out-migration occurring at that time (Nunes and 
Feij6 1990:61). The recent history of Campea provides several examples of this 
kind of use of the baldios (e.g., correspondence between the Forestry Service 
and the Parish Council quoted in chapter 5; appendix 9). Obviously, this 
function eventually resulted in a reduction of the communal area. 
The relative importance of these functions varied according to location and 
time. An example of such variation in Campea' concerns the use of the 
communal baldios for grazing. Parish Council minutes indicate that in the 
second decade of the twentieth century, the interest in sheep and goat herding 
diminished in comparison to other forms of exploitation, such as bovines 
herding and the collection of brush for fertilizer. Such shifts could be translated 
into decisions to favour one form of exploitation over another. In 1923, people 
from two villages in the parish, Vila Nova and Avecao do Meio, requested that 
parts of their respective commons be closed to goats and sheep during the 
summer season; 22 March to 22 November (AJF 18 March 1923). Two months 
later, the majority of the inhabitants of Montes made a similar request for the 
period 25 March to 25 November (AJF 5 August 1923). In 1926, the seasonal 
ban on goats and sheep on the Vila Nova baldios was extended to the whole 
year (AJF 19 September 1926). 
As in neighbouring Minho, Campea's baldios served primarily for the 
provision of fertilizer and the grazing of cattle (compare JCI 1939:461; JCI 
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1941, 1:8; Costa 1959:78-83; AJF 3 April 1927) 1. The role of the commons in 
the local farming system also explains why people in the nineteenth century 
resented afforestation. They feared that it would hinder brush growth. In 
response to a 1803 state inquiry concerning the baldios in practically all 
comarcas of the Minho province, the corregedores (judges appointed by the 
King) did not complain about a shortage of trees but about their abundance 
because "the exuberance of certain species prejudiced the cultivated lands as 
well as the growth of the precious brushes" (Nunes and Feij6 1990:51-2) 2. 
There is no direct causal relation between the use and the property status of 
the land. The fact that land was used for the collection of manure and for 
grazing, did not necessarily imply that it was kept in common. The land's 
property status at a certain point in time was the result of an ongoing struggle 
between those who tried to privatize and monopolize the resources on it, and 
those who defended open access for all members of the community. In the case 
of the baldios, some households would strive for privatization in order to 
guarantee their individual access to brush. In addition to the exclusion of other 
brush users, the protection of brush against additional forms of exploitation (in 
particular, grazing) would help to increase the productivity of waste lands in 
terms of fertilizer. In those cases in which the proponents of privatization were 
successful, private plots of brush land were created. In Minho these plots were 
called boucas (bushes) (Nunes and Feijo 1990:61-63, 75, 79-80). In Campea, 
they were named tapadas (from tapar or "close") (see also Devy-Vareta 
1993a:245). Today, these names are still used to indicate private parcels with a 
communal past3. 
1 These functions were partly complementary: brash and animal dung are mixed for fertilizer, and 
if one did not have horned cattle, the sheep grazed on the commons would provide the dung. The 
complementariness of the two functions appears clear in the argument raised by the Parish Council 
in 1949 to dissuade the municipality from raising the fees for sheep licences: "some fields do not 
produce enough to sustain cattle; in those cases, sheep fertilize the land" (AJF 6 February 1949). 
2 They were particularly worried about pines (Devy-Vareta 1993a:102). 
It was also feared that tree planting would reduce the availability of irrigation water. In 1939, the 
Campea Parish Council urged the Forestry Service to plant trees sufficienuy far away from water 
sources and currents "so that the roots of the trees planted along their margins will not prejudice the 
water flow" (AJF 21 May 1939). 
3 Sometimes, privatization was proposed to countervail state intervention. In Campea, an inhabitant 
of Vila Nova proposed privatization of a specific baldio arguing that otherwise the land would be 
occupied by the Forestry Service. Instead it was decided that the concerned area - which was used 
by three villages - would be divided among the communities (AJF 22 October 1927). Five years 
later, in response to the publication of Decreto 10,552 of 14 February 1925 (which was aimed at the 
total division of the baldios among the commoners), the population spoke clearly against 
privatization, arguing that only the present generation would benefit and that new households would 
remain excluded (AJF 16 October 1927). 
In the Serra da Carramulo in the Vouga area the parishioners divided the commons in the 
beginning of the twentieth century, The right to brush was individualized, but the collective right of 
grazing was conserved. In this way the appropriation of the totality of the resources by one or a few 
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The systematic exploitation of a resource requires a certain management 
structure. In the case of a common which is exploited for different aims and by 
different people, an organization is needed that balances the different kinds of 
exploitation with the given (or produced) carrying capacity of the land. It must 
also reconcile conflicting demands for fodder and for fertilizer. The 
organization must also regulate individual appropriation of the common 
resource. In Portuguese communities such as Campeâ, this need for 
organization materialized in a specific form of local public administration. 
"Public Administration" in Campeâ until the Nineteenth 
Century: The Juizes de Vintena 
Under the ancien régime, public administration of village communities similar 
to those in Campeâ, was subject to three external agencies: the municipality 
(Câmara Municipal), the Crown, and the Church. These bodies influenced the 
local population primarily through levies, laws, by-laws, and sermons. But in 
communities such as the villages in Campeâ, their influence was rather limited. 
In the thirteenth century, the central State (the Crown) had little power over 
Campeâ. In 1220 King Afonso II ordered an inventory of his possessions and 
privileges in his realm. According to this survey (the Inquisitiones), there were 
703 parishes. In approximately half (412), the King owned royal estates 
(reguengos) (Castro 1978-1985 11:150). Campeâ, mentioned as Albergaria de 
Campiaa4, was one of the parishes without such reguengos. The King neither 
received rent (foro), nor controlled the nomination of the local parson, nor 
collected a tribute from the local church (padroado) (PMH 1928:41, 122, 190). 
The inhabitants of Albergaria de Campiaa were totally free of royal levies, 
but according to a 1660 inventory of the properties of the Crown Prince's 
Estates (the Casa do Infantado), those of Santo André da Campeâ were not. 
This inventory mentions a small reguengo near Montes for which the village as 
a whole had to pay one sheep and 16 alqueires of rye every year (ANTdT, Casa 
do Infantado, Livro 215). This can signify only two things: either the Crown 
wealthy farmers was evaded and the collective access to pasture maintained (int 1 October 1991). 
Both cases show how the common threat of total exclusion through monopolization by the state 
could incite a flight towards privatization. 
4 This old name of Campea suggests that in the past the parish housed a religious community 
which offered shelter (albergaria) to pilgrims crossing the Serra do Marao to Santiago de 
Compostela. The community probably consisted of Benedictines who were related to the Monastery 
of Pombeiro west of the Marao, near Felgueiras. According to the Inquisitiones, the archbishopric's 
tenants in Campea had to pay their rent at this monastery. This interpretation of the parish's early 
origins is consistent with the fact that Saint Andrew was its original patron saint - he was the 
Benedictines' favourite — and it also explains why today the parson bears the title of abode (abbot). 
(See Andrade 1900 on the tide of abode and agrarian monastries during the reconquista.) 
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had meanwhile acquired new rights in the area, which would imply an 
expansion, although diminutive, of royal domination; or the reguengo already 
existed in 1220, but was not listed under the heading of Campea because at that 
time it was located in another parish. The parish's borders as they exist today, 
were not the same as in the past. For instance Quinta, now a separate unit, once 
belonged to Campea. In both cases one has to conclude that although the Crown 
did exercise some power over the parish, that power was very limited5. 
More important than the Crown's possessions were those of the archbishopric 
of Braga. According to the lnquisitiones the archbishop possessed seventeen 
homesteads in the area. He also controlled the local church and chose its 
parson. Another homestead belonged to this church, but this probably served as 
the priest's sustenance (PMH 1928:238). In the sixteenth century, the 
archbishopric still controlled the church, but its properties in the area had 
diminished considerably. According to the 1593 inventory kept in the Braga 
District's Archive, it possessed only an orchard, a garden, three flat fields 
(chaos), a chestnut groove and two houses and a barn in the villages of Vendas 
(then called Gudim) and Vila Nova. The area of this property was rather small; 
less than 1 ha (7,772 square varas). 
The Crown's and Church's control over Campea's population was fairly 
limited. The same can be said for the municipal authorities. Formally, the 
parishioners came under the municipal administration of Vila Real. They had to 
respect the Municipal Council's administrative rulings and by-laws and local 
justice was subsidiary to the municipal judge and the royal delegate to the 
municipality. However, all these bodies and officials resided in town and, given 
the coeval means of transport and communication, could only influence life in 
distant communities such as Campea to a limited extent. 
The constraint that distance placed upon the exercise of centralized 
administration was even ratified by royal legislation. In the Ordenagdes 
Filipinos — a collection and examination of the legislation prior to King Fillip I 
which was in effect between 1603 and 1867 (Costa 1989:284-289) - it was 
determined that judges should be appointed who were responsible for the 
communities' administration in villages that had more than twenty households 
and were more than one legua from the main town. According to the law, each 
5 The first explanation can be that this reguengo was created after the inquiries, perhaps after the 
Duke of Braganca's accession to the throne in 1640, when his possessions were added to the royal 
domains. The second explanation is endorsed by reference in the lnquisitiones (p.40). According to 
this reference, "...in villa Campiaens habet Rex aliud casale heremum, et debet populari, et dant 
inde quartam ffuctus." (Villa Campiaens belonged to the parish Sao Miguel da Pena, east of 
Campea). It is possible that it alluded to a populated site within the present confines of Campea, for 
instance near the actual village of Montes. In 1530, the villages Cotorinho, Montes, and Parada 
were not mentioned under the heading of Campea (Freire 1909). This would also match with the 
popular belief that the original head village of Campea was not Vila Nova ('New town'), but the site 
called Crasto. According to this theory the term "crasto" was derived from castro, the denomination 
of pre-historic, Celtic fortresses. 
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year the Câmara Municipal and the procurador of the concelho were to chose a 
"homem bom" (best man) among the inhabitants, who "will act as judge [in it] 
and who will be sworn in at the town hall" (Ordenaçôes Filipinos I, Titulo LX, 
n° 73). These judges were called either juiz de vintena (judge of twenty) or juiz 
pedâneo (standing judge). They exercised the law over the inhabitants of the 
hamlets and villages (Pereira e Souza 1827; Caetano 1991:341). Formally, the 
standing judge was a municipal or even royal office. But, in practice, the 
villagers would themselves elect their juiz de vintena. 
Campeâ was located two léguas from Vila Real and several communities were 
larger than 20 households. These communities probably had their own standing 
judges. Therefore, in practice, the communities would rule themselves and 
administer justice along their own principles except for the most gravest crimes. 
The presence of these standing judges in the parish of Santo André da 
Campeâ is confirmed by records of the religious situation in the parish over the 
period 1655-1695 kept by the archbishopric (ADB, Visitas e Devassas, Livro 
220). Each year priests visited the parish in order to check whether the parson 
executed his task correctly, whether the church and chapels were properly 
maintained, and whether the morality of the spiritual communities within the 
area met the official standards (at that time many clergymen living in a parish 
were not parsons). According to these reports, the juizes de vintena were 
charged with looking after the necessary repairs of the chapels. They were also 
responsible for other community affairs. In 1679, the visiting priest reported 
that the bridge between Veçam de Cabo (today; Aveçâo do Cabo) and Pereira 
had fallen into ruin. As the bridge was needed for the administration of the 
Holy Sacraments, he had "ordered the vintena to repair it ... before the Day of 
[All] Saints under the penalty of 500 réis" (ibid, p.26). 
The chapters of the visitation report show that the juizes de vintena acted as 
intermediaries between the village communities and higher authorities such as 
the Church. They also show that the influence of the visiting priest was rather 
limited. The bridge mentioned in 1679 was still not repaired in 1681. Because 
the authority of the higher levels of the (Church's) admimstration was only 
effective when it was present, the (Church's) central administration's actual 
control over its subjects was restricted. The visiting priest stayed only a few 
days, the rest of the time, the parson and his flock were left alone. 
The Crown, Church, and Câmara Municipal did influence the local judges' 
action, but because of their absence, their real power was limited. In practice, 
the village communities ruled themselves as autonomous village republics as 
discussed in chapter 2. This is confirmed by a statement in the 1751 Memôrias 
Paroquiais (ANTdT, Memôrias Paroquiais, Vol. 8, Mem. 65, pp. 419 ff.) 
saying that in Campeâ, "there is no other jurisdiction but that of the villages". 
In short, under the ancien régime, Campeâ was merely a loose aggregate of 
independent villages tied together through their parson and central church. 
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The Regulation of the Use of the Baldios 
In general terms, the regulation of the use of the baldios consisted of two sets 
of directives. The first regulated access, and the second exploitation. The first 
set had two aspects; the definition (in time and space) of the communal 
resource, and the definition of who those who held usufruct rights, the 
commoner or vizinho (literally: neighbour). 
In Campea today with respect to land, exploitation is no longer regulated by 
other time mechanisms than the biological (agricultural) cycle. But in the 
beginning of this century, specific parts of the baldios were closed for the 
grazing of sheep and goats during the summer. Further in the past, time even 
defined that private property could become subject to communal exploitation. In 
Campea, an open field two-folds farming system was maintained which entailed 
the use of (private) fields for collective grazing during the fallow year (Taborda 
1932:119). This system already disappeared by the eighteenth century. A 1780 
rental contract mentions explicitly that fields were encircled by walls. Today, in 
Campea collective grazing rights on the fallows have vanished completely6. The 
only resource for which limits in time still exist is irrigation water. During the 
winter season, all irrigation water that does not come from private wells is open 
to all users (open access). During summer, between Saint John's Day (24 June) 
and Saint Michael's Day (29 September), the water is distributed among a 
limited group of entitled commoners on the basis of rotation. Each of the 
individuals is entitled to use the water during a specific period. When that 
period is over, another member takes his or her turn, and so forth. In this 
manner, the water is rotated within the community of water users (see also: 
O'Neill 1987; Stam 1993). 
The limits that divide the common from the private and one baldio from 
another, are still known and practised. Part of them are described in the 1952 
parish by-laws (Posturas 1952), part are conserved in the memory of the 
population. The parish is divided into twelve communities. These were the 
original villages with their own juiz de vintena plus some new villages which 
expanded to such a point that they were separated from their original centres. 
Each of these communities has its own territory, called limite. The limite 
includes both the private and the communal area and coincides with the standing 
judges' jurisdictions. The limits of these territories in the communal areas are 
reproduced in figure 7.2, except for those of Pousada, where the baldio was too 
6 This development was encouraged by the municipal authorities, for instance, by the prohibition of 
grazing on private lands without being able to show a written approval by the owners (ACM 23 
September 1927; compare Decreto 13,658 of 23 May 1927). The Parish Council resisted these 
measures. When in 1964 the Camara repeated the ban, the Parish Council responded that individual 
contracts between landowners and sheep and goat herders were far too complicated. Instead it 
proposed that a list would be drawn up of landowners who did not object to the use of their land by 
herders (AJF 5 May 1964). The municipality accepted this proposal (AJF 7 June 1964). 
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I = Pepe 
II = Aveçâozinho 
HI = Av. do M. 
rV= Av. do C. 
V = Vendas 
VI = Vila Nova 
VH = Vi. da P. 
VTA = Vi. da S. 
DC = Parada 
X = Montes 
XI = Cotorinho 
11111 Glebaa (privatized commons) 
1=3 Logradouro caraum (communal area) 
Y'/i Controlled by the Forestry Service 
Figure 7.2: Map of the borders of the village territories or limites in the (former) 
communal areas. (Source: parish archives and parish council president.) 
small (see table 7.1). 
The concept of vizinho was circumscribed both at the State and the local 
level. In the Titulo LVI of the Ordenaçôes Filipinos, (the seventeenth-century 
book of royal ordenances), vizinhos are defined as "'residents, their adopted 
children, a man married to a woman of the area as long as he lives there, ... 
and people having moved into the area with their family and majority of their 
goods more than four years ago'" (Nunes and Feijô 1990:65). The definitions 
formulated at that time for Campeâ are unknown, but the Parish Council's 
minutes show that people who owned or rented a field within a certain 
administrative territory (limité) could also use the brush land in that territory to 
fertilize that field (AJF 21 March 1923, 19 December 1926). Hence, even 
without being a vizinho in the strict sense as defined in the Ordenaçôes Filipi-
nos, people could acquire certain rights within a community. Finally, village 
communities could define their own standards. In Aveçâozinho, for example, 
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people living more than a half a year in the village were considered vizinho and 
entitled to the use of the village commons. 
The second set of regulations concerned the intensity of use and the distribu-
tion of the common wealth among the individual vizinhos. The intensity of 
exploitation could be regulated by prohibiting certain forms of exploitation. The 
most general instrument was the coutada. It was to close (coutar) or to prohibit 
(yedar) grazing or brush collection in certain areas during a particular period. 
This was a joint decision of the users for the purpose of collective convenience 
(see Peixoto 1974:391-392 on the Barroso). These prohibitions could also have 
a more specific character. In Campea, certain areas were closed to goat and 
sheep grazing, but open for horned cattle (AJF 18 March 1923, 5 August 
1923). Finally, regulations could concern the distribution of profits made from 
the commons among the commoners. Such regulations could consist of restrict-
ing the number of cattle a household was allowed to graze on the common or of 
setting certain limits to the quantity of brush or the amount of fuel wood one 
may collect7. 
The way in which the individual appropriation of brush was regulated in the 
area of Campea, the partilha, was described for the first time by Rocha Peixoto 
in his 1908 study of communalist traditions in northern Portugal: 
On the Transmontanian side of the Serra do Marao certain village 
communities meet in so-called chamadas, which are the local assem-
blies, in which they discuss the plots [leiras] to be chosen in the 
common for that season's collection of the tojo needed for fertilizer8. 
First it is discussed whether the area has little tojo, or whether these 
are still very young. But when the majority arrives at an agreement 
about the preferred zone, a day is set for dividing it. For the 
division, in some hamlets the parts are proportional to the properties 
of the farmer, as he who owns more also needs more fertilizer for 
his fields; in other [villages] equal parts are demarcated. 
On a previously fixed day, all men of the hamlet go the monte 
where they measure by means of a cord the chosen polygon. When 
the area is delimited, for example a rectangle, on one of the sides the 
representatives of the different households line up with their hoes in 
their hands; on the opposite site, another man, esteemed and 
experienced, verifies if the inhabitants are well spaced, ordering them 
to move away or come nearer if that is necessary for an equal 
distribution. When he, judging that the positions are correct, calls 
loudly 'Well it is' ~ all, one by one, give a stroke with their hoes. 
The result is a figure consisting of a dotted line with each dot being 
7 I did not find an example of this kind of regulation in Campea. 
8 Tojo is Ulex spp.. Other important brushes found on the commons of Campeâ are genista 
(Sarothamnus spp.) and torga or torgeira {Erica spp.). 
156 Planting Power 
the landmark of a plot. The subsequent attribution of the lots is done 
by writing down all names on slips of papers, which afterwards are 
successively drawn by a child. The first name drawn receives the 
first leira, and so forth, with the collective respect for what fortune 
has given. (Peixoto 1974:394-395, footnote added) 
Although Peixoto did not explicitly mention Campea, observations in the 
1930s and 1950s have confirmed that mis lottery system was practised in most 
of the parish's hamlets (JCI 1939:37, 1941, 111:150; Costa 1959:77). Only in 
Pepe was a different system used. Here the leiras were attributed to a household 
(head) for more than one season (JCI 1941, 111:150) and upon his or her death 
they could even be passed on to the child that took over the household (int 25 
August 1991). Nowadays, the inhabitants of AvecSozinho still use the lottery 
system for apportioning fuel wood. 
The Villages and the Parish in the Nineteenth Century 
Earlier in this chapter I said that the parish of Campea already existed in 1220. 
This is true, but one should realize that a parish in 1220 cannot be compared 
with a parish in 1800 or in 1995. First, the present parish does not have the 
same geographic boundaries as its predecessor. Second, its boundaries in terms 
of social significance and political power, have also changed. As I mentioned 
already in chapter 2, until the nineteenth century, parishes did not have a civil, 
secular status. They acquired such a secular status for the first time in 1830 
when they became civil ad^nmistrative entities within and beneath the 
municipality. Until then, the concelho had been the lowest level in the 
organization of the State. 
The creation of the parish as a secular entity, also had consequences for the 
legal status of the commons. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the commons 
belonged either to the povos (the village communities), or to the concelho (JCI 
1939:1; Nunes and Feij6 1990:65; Gralheiro 1990:26; Rodrigues 1987:18-20). 
Since the law of 26 July 1850, the baldios were considered to appertain either 
to municipalities (baldios municipals) or to parishes (baldios parochiais) (JCI 
1939:8; Rodrigues 1987:18-42; Nunes and Feij6 1990:73; Gralheiro 1990:52). 
Generally speaking, this law did not alter the legal and admmistrative position 
of the municipal commons. But in concelhos like Vila Real, where the baldios 
had belonged to the povos, the administration and ownership of the commons 
were transferred to the Parish Councils (Sousa 1983:63-68; JCI 1939:460-
463) 9 . 
* The institution of the parish as a civil administrative entity, did not follow a unilinear trajectory: 
the parish received civil administrative responsibilities for the first time in 1830, but these were 
withdrawn in 1832. In 1835 they were restored, only to be removed in 1842. With the 
admmistrative code of 1878 the parish became definitively part of the state apparatus (Caetano 
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In 1850 the villages officially lost their commons to the parishes. But, in 
reality, the povos continued to manage them independently. As Rocha Peixoto 
noted in 1908: 
A large part of the ... commons are submitted to general adminis-
tration by the Parish Councils. But in reality, everything related to 
their usufruct and mode of exploitation is not deliberated by the 
Councils, nor by any other institution higher in the hierarchy, but 
through the ballots in [village] assemblies of all the interested. 
(Peixoto 1974:391-392; author's emph.) 
Even in the early-twentieth century the Parish Council was barely involved in 
the organization of the commoners' usufruct rights. This does not mean that the 
Parish Council did not play any role in the exploitation of the baldios. It only 
signifies that this role was rather small. 
The earliest existing minutes of the Campea Parish Council reveal how 
unimportant the role of the parish was in matters of communal land 
management. These minutes date between the last decade of the nineteenth 
century and the first few years of the twentieth. They contain only three 
references to Council involvement in communal land affairs. All show that the 
Council merely ratified decisions made by the villages. 
The first reference is dated from 1890. In the Parish Council's minutes of 7 
December 1890 one can read that a majority of the inhabitants of Vila Nova 
presented a petition to the Council which requested regulation of the use of the 
village's commons. The Council's answer is quite illuminating. It gives insight 
as to how it perceived its role at that time. The Council decided to honour the 
request by, "authorizing them to formulate a code which after being finished 
will be presented to the Parish Council so that the latter can sanction it" (AJP 7 
December 1890). This decision demonstrates clearly that not the Council but the 
parishioners took the initiative. They asked the Parish Council to make a 
1991:352-354; Gralheiro 1990:32-35). This means that, strictly speaking, between 1850 and 1872, 
there were baldios parochiais without pardchias. 
Until 1911, the parish administered both Church and civil affairs. The role of the parish priest in 
the state administration is still unclear. Serrao & Oliveira Marques (1991) argue on page 315 that 
the parson was an authentic civil servant, paid by the state treasury. But on page 486 they state that 
"the clerus at the level of the parish was not paid by the state but by the citizens" through gifts (p6-
de-altar) and the annual church taxation (cdngrua). In addition to the gifts and taxes, the priest 
received money for extra services and masses (baptisms, marriages, funerals, etc.). The charges for 
these services could be quite considerable (Johnson 1983:189). 
Campean parish records suggests that the parson was not necessarily part of the local 
government. The minutes show that here he was councillor or president only between 1893 and 
1904. 
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regulatory code 1 0. The Council returned the request to the inhabitants by 
asking them to elaborate on it. The Council's own role was limited to officially 
certifying what the villagers had already determined. 
The other times when the Parish Council got involved in communal land 
matters, concerned the appointment of zeladores (overseers or caretakers). 
Twelve villages or clusters of villages in the parish had their own caretaker 
who, among other things, also looked after the commons within the village 
territory (limite)n. The zelador was not a typical Campea office but has 
existed in many other places under the same name (Dias 1948:83, 86-94 on 
VUarinho da Furna; Monteiro 1985 on Serpins; the Posturas of Cerva, 
Torgueda and Lamas d'Olo) or under different names (vedor, couteiro in 
Cotorinho and Montes (int 8 June 1993), mordomo in Rio de Onor (Dias 
1953:83; see also chapter 2). Probably, like in Vilarinho da Furna, in Campea 
these zeladores succeeded the juizes de vintena12. 
The minutes mention a "Book of Customs", possibly the 1890 or even earlier regulations of the 
commons' use in the parish priest's custody (AJP 30-03-1899). However, it is also possible that, 
like the Santa Maria de Alverenga's 1719 Usos e Costumes (Johnson 1983 passim), it listed the 
mutual obligations of the priest and the parishioners and their lay corporations. Unfortunately, in 
Campe3, there are no customs or by-laws determined before the 1950s in the Parish Council's 
office. These must be presumed lost. 
" The earliest by-laws in the region mat I have been able to consult are those of Torgueda, which 
date back to 1886. In these by-laws, the overseer's tasks were circumscribed as follows: 
"It is incumbent upon the zeladores to: 
1. look carefully after the observance of the parish by-laws in the areas mat have been put under 
their charge; 
2. report to the parish council secretary the trespassing of these customs within five days after the 
offence being effected; 
3. accuse [transgressors] in front of the appropriate judge within ten days after reporting [the 
crime] if the transgressor has not voluntarily paid his penalty and take the action until the final 
.... [illegible]. 
4. Serve and fulfil the orders of the parish council" (Posturas 1886). 
In the 1926 by-laws of Cerva in the concelho of Ribeira da Pena it was only written that the parish 
caretakers and the GNR superintend the observance of these by-laws and regulations in harmony 
with the dispositions of Lei n° 300 of 1913. 
The Lamas d'Olo 1901 by-laws were approved by the districts government, the CommissSo 
Districtal and the Govemador Civil, and not by the municipality. This suggests a strong autonomy 
of the parish over their internal affairs in relation to the concelho. The Torgueda by-laws were 
proposed by the C&mara Municipal and approved by the District Governor. Torgueda apparently 
had a much weaker position towards the C&mara (see also fn. 16). 
1 2 A correct understanding of the evolution of local administration during the nineteenth century is 
hampered by the fact that many offices existed with sometimes only slightly different names and 
with unclear responsibilities. The Livro de Visitas e Devessas for Campea mentions: mordomos, 
juizes da igreja, and juizes da vintena. 
In the Livro das Obrigacdes juizes are mentioned who were responsible for the fabrication of 
olive oil for the Holy Sacrament (ADB, Livros de Obrigacao 1660, 1670). What type of judges 
these were is not clear. Johnson (1983:183-184) mentions that in Santa Maria de Alvarenga in 
Minho the judge played an important role at marriages, baptisms, processions, etc. Again it is not 
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The exact responsibilities of the zeladores are not clear. It seems that they no 
longer played a role in the judicial system. This role was probably taken from 
them by the judge of the parish and the peace judge. The zeladores, however, 
remained important to the commons' administration. From the parish minutes, 
e.g., those of 4 April 1926, it appears that it was very uncommon that brush 
would be divided without the overseer being present. Hence, it is likely that the 
"esteemed and experienced" man mentioned in Peixoto's description of the 
partitioning of leiras as the one responsible for the proper spacing of the 
commoners, was in reality the community's zelador. 
The nomination of village caretakers was principally arranged by the 
villagers. When in 1891 the Parish Council president saw it necessary to appoint 
new incumbents, the Council decided, 
to wait until the village communities have made their proposals so 
that the Council will nominate according to their desires. Then the 
Cdmara Municipal will be asked afterwards to confirm them in their 
offices and pass them the respective credentials (AJP 4 January 
1891). 
As in the previous case, the role of the Parish Council was limited to ratifying 
the population's decisions. The same procedure was repeated seven years later, 
in 1896 (AJP 9 February 1896) 1 3. 
The Parish and the Commons in the Twentieth Century 
The Parish Council's minutes between 1904 and 1922 have been lost. (This 
absence already has been documented in 1945: AJF 1 January 1945.) It is 
unfortunate that there are no existing chronicles because, during these years, 
one of the major changes in the Portuguese state organization took place: the 
republic was established. As a consequence of the republicans' strong anti-
clerical ideology, in April 1911 State and Church were separated and the 
Church's properties nationalized. In Campea, the Church received back only 
what it needed for the execution of its religious functions. These objects were: 
the main church, eleven chapels, the altars, statues of saints, vases for the holy 
communion, and other utensils (Arrolamento 1912). In 1913, Lei 621 extended 
the secularization to the Parish Council's denomination. The Juntas de Paroquia 
clear what type of judge he is referring to. 
In the nineteenth century, the parish was administered by a parish council, a juiz da freguesia, 
and a. juiz de paz. Although I am inclined to follow Dias and see the zeladores as the successors of 
the juizes de vintena, I want to stress that this succession should not be seen in isolation from the 
emergence of other offices and institutions. Unfortunately, information about this process is still 
lacking. 
1 3 The municipality's role suggests that like the juiz de vintena the zelador was a municipal office 
and hence confirms the hypothesis that the latter emanated from the former. 
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were renamed Juntas de Freguesia14. Church adininistration was left to a 
separate body, the commissdo fabriqueira; whereas the Parish Council was only 
responsible for secular affairs. Separated from the Church and without a private 
office, it no longer met in the sacristy, but at the home of its president or other 
private individuals or in schools". Possibly as another consequence of this 
reorganization and secularization, the Council's responsibilities with respect to 
the commons also changed. The minutes from 1922 onward show that now the 
Junta de Freguesia interfered more frequently in communal land affairs. 
The increased influence of the parish on communal land management, appears 
in different ways. First, the Council acquired a stronger role in the nomination 
of village caretakers compared to the population and the municipality. In 1923 
the inhabitants of Montes demanded the replacement of their caretaker. The new 
incumbent was ordered to present himself to the Council within tJoirty days to 
receive the respective credentials (AJF 15 April 1923). Apparently, the parish 
no longer depended upon the municipality for the installation of zeladores, but 
could do that itself16. Successive events show that the Council also obtained 
more power over the villages. In 1926, two weeks after his installation, the new 
parish president demanded the replacement of the village overseers with "people 
he could trust" (AJF 17 January 1926). One month later, five new caretakers 
were appointed (AJF 21 February 1926). This event suggests that although the 
villagers still elected their overseer, the Parish Council was able to replace him 
with one of its own supporters in order to enforce its own power base. In this 
manner, the Parish Council could also promote its power over the administra-
tion of the village's commons (the montes do povo). 
The increase in Council influence over the appointment of zeladores was not 
the only change in that direction. Another was that the Council became directly 
involved in the resolution of conflicts over the baldios, particularly those 
between overseers and people accused of breaking the parish by-laws. The 
overseer would accuse trespassers in front of the Parish Council which would 
then give the accused an opportunity to prove his or her innocence. The minutes 
between 1922 and 1928 contain seventeen references to this type of Council 
1 4 Unlike Portuguese (pardquia and freguesia) and Dutch (parochie and kerspel), English does not 
have two different terms to distinguish the religious from the secular parish. Therefore, I will 
continue to use the denominations parish and parish council for the civil bodies that emanated from 
the ecclesiastical entities. 
The secularization meant that properties unnecessary for the Church's religious functioning such 
as the estates mentioned in the 1593 inventory and the 1780 rental contract were transferred to the 
state. In the case of the domains mentioned in these contracts, I have found no information mat 
might tell us what happened with farms and farm land. 
1 5 See, for instance, AJF 7 January 1923. The Parish Council's office was constructed only in 1962. 
" A large variation existed in the powers of the municipality and the parish. In 1921, the Parish 
Council of Torgueda still requested the municipality to nominate a caretaker (ACM 18 June 1921). 
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interference (appendix 8), while those covering the 1890-1904 period contain no 
such reference at all 1 7. 
A third, and perhaps more important modification was that the village 
commons became a source of income for the Parish Council. The Council 
received the fines collected from trespassers. One half of the fine was returned 
to the zelador as compensation for his services1 8. The other half was put in the 
Council's treasury. Furthermore, the Council received money from the 
alienation of communal property, from sales or lease contracts (see appendices 9 
and 10). Finally the villages had to pay a certain fee for the use of their 
communal areas. In 1923 the Council needed more money and decided to raise 
the duties (AJF 27 January 1923). The money raised in this way, 124$00, was a 
substantial contribution to the Parish Council's finances. At that time, these 
payments constituted about one-third of the Council's income (370$00, AJF 31 
December 1923; appendix 10). In 1942, it resolved to double the duties for the 
same reason (AJF 6 December 1942) (table 7.1). 
Table 7.1 The money paid by the villages for the use of their communal areas as fixed 
by the Parish Council in 1923 and 1942, and the sizes of the respective commons 
according to the 1939 inquiry (AJF 27 December 1923, 16 December 1942; JCI 
1939:460-461). 
Village 1923 1942 Area Village 1923 1942 Area 
Avec3o do Meio 10$00 20$00 100 Pepe 14$00 28$00 100 
Avecao do Cabo 20$00 40$00 60 Pousada" 0$00 0$00 10 
Avecaozinho 12$00 24$00 50 Vendas" 14$00 38$00 100 
Cotorinho 10$00 20$00 140 Viariz da Poca 10$00 20$00 160 
Montes 10$00 20$00 150 Viariz da Santa 10$00 20$00 170 
Parada 8$00 16$00 80 Vila Nova 20$00 40$00 200 
" Pousada did not have to pay anything "as it has only the baldio Traz-do-Val, which because of its 
small size only gives a leira for each inhabitant in one out of four years" (AJF 6 December 1942). 
" Vendas is not mentioned in 1923. But in 1927 its caretaker paid 14$00 for the common (AJF 
19 June 1927). 
1 7 The level at which conflicts were solved at that time is unclear. It is possible that the affairs were 
entirely dealt with by the village community itself (see, for instance, Dias 1948:92-94). But it is also 
possible that the offence was presented to the appropriate judge - possibly the juiz de paz. or the 
jutz dafreguesia, as is the case in Torgueda - (see also fh. 11). 
1 8 Similar practices can be noticed in Cerva, Torgueda, and Lamas d'Olo (Posturas 1886, 1901, 
1926). See also chapter 4 on the payment of fines to forest guards and the Posturas of Adoufe for 
the payment of village policemen {guardas campestres) (Posturas 1951). 
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The origin of this duty is unclear. The duty is not mentioned in the parish 
records previous to 1904, but it is possible that, at that time, it was levied by 
another institution or by the villagers themselves. Today the commoners of 
Avecaozinho still use their monte do povo in such a way. Each year one lot of 
fuel wood is auctioned. The money raised is used for the maintenance of the 
local chapel. In any case, the Parish Council of Campea was relatively late in 
exploiting the baldios as a source of income. According to the administrative 
code, it could have done so since 1878 (JCI 1939:10). In the neighbouring 
parish of Torgueda, the Council received money for the use of one of the five 
parish commons, at the latest from 1886 onward {Posturas 1886). Torgueda and 
Campea maintained different ways of collecting the duty. In Torgueda, a duty 
of 50 rtis was applied over each cart-load of brush taken from the concerned 
baldio, in Campea, a lump sum was paid by the entire village. Within the 
village individual contributions could be set according to each household's use. 
In Vendas for example, each time a household participated in a partitioning of 
leiras, it had to pay some money (int 28 August 1991) 1 9. 
The Council's increased authority over the villages was openly contested only 
once. In 1926 a conflict arose between the population of Avecao do Cabo and 
the Parish Council. The village's leaders attempted to prove that the inhabitants 
had the right to administer their commons independently from the Council and 
its caretaker. The leaders challenged the Council's authority by executing the 
allotting of brushes without informing the zelador or having him present. The 
Council renounced these claims. It argued that these rebellious villagers were 
reluctant or unable to present the documents which could confirm their 
assertion. Even if these documents existed, the old decrees that validated them 
had been revoked by more recent laws. According to the Council, the only valid 
regulation of the administration of the parish and its commons was the Council's 
own Cddigo de Posturas (Book of By-laws) and the single governing body was 
itself. Hence, it demanded obedience to its rulings from all the village 
communities. In order to assure itself of police assistance in case certain 
communities persisted with their rebellion, the Council sent a copy of its Book 
of By-laws to the GNR (Guarda National da Repiiblica, the military police) 
commander in Vila Real (AJF 18 April 1926, 2 May 1926). 
Although the conflict concerned the Parish Council's authority, it can only be 
understood fully in connection with an affair of a quite different character. The 
man heading the rebellion had been a member of the previous Council. The new 
This hypothesis is sustained by three facts: (a) the chapels are located within the villages with 
communal land and caretakers; (b) as the commons are not mentioned in the 1593 property register, 
they, therefore, did not belong to the Church; and (c) the chapels constituted separate units with 
independent (financial) administrations and treasuries (confirm ADB, Visitas e Devessas, Livro 767, 
fl. 71; AJP 6 September 1896). 
Even today the chapels are independent units within the ecclesiastical parish (their official 
proprietor according to the 1912 Arrolamento). The villagers have to pay the priest separately for 
his masses in their chapels and they are also responsible for chapel maintenance. 
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Council accused its predecessor of embezzling several hundreds of escudos 
which were missing from the previous Council's account. It is possible that the 
man turned the people of Avecao do Cabo against the Parish Council not 
because of a conflict about the village's autonomy in relation to the parish, but 
in order to strengthen his own position in the embezzlement affair. This seems 
even more plausible since apparently the rebellion calmed down in June, when 
the former treasurer handed over last year's balance (132$50) (AJF 20 June 
1926). After this date, the minutes do not mention the revolt again 2 0. 
The Municipality 
While the Parish Council increased its authority in relation to the villages, it 
was itself threatened by forces of the municipality and the central State. 
All historical inquiries into the legal status of the commons in the municipality 
agree that they belonged to t ie communities and later to the parish. 
Nevertheless, the Camara Municipal did influence the management of the 
baldios through its own municipal by-laws. The first available information 
covers only a part of these by-laws. In 1912, the municipality revised the 
chapter on animal husbandry. This revision affected the use of the commons in 
the municipality as goat and sheep holders were obliged to buy a licence for 
their animals. With such a licence, one could graze the animals "in all public 
spaces as far as these are not closed by laws, by-laws or by ancient uses and 
customs established and observed by the inhabitants of one or more villages in 
the municipality" (ACM 4 January 1912). Trespassing was punished by a fine 
of 0$250 (one-quarter of an escudo). 
The first full version of the municipal by-laws that I was able to consult dates 
from 1927. This version contains a specific chapter (chapter 4) on the 
municipality's commons with various dispositions concerning their use and 
usufruct. These regulations seem to have had a double objective: to protect the 
soil and vegetation against abusive exploitation, and to prevent illegal 
appropriation of communal land by individuals21. In protected areas 
2 0 The date of repayment suggests that there also existed a connection with national politics. In May 
1926, a military coup brought down the government and a dictatorship was installed. In August, the 
ruling Parish Council was replaced with an Administrative Commission (AJF 22 August 1926; 
supra, chapter 6). 
2 1 The by-laws prohibited setting fire to the common, tearing brushes, cutting fuel wood or brushes 
if one did not live in the parish, village, or group of villages to which the baldio belonged, opening 
tubes, channels, or wells, or constructing porches (alpendres), balconies (balcSes) and arbours or 
bowers (ramadas) which would hinder transit without a licence of the Camara. Moreover, it was 
illegal to: tear stones out of the earth or open pits in order to take stones, enclose a portion of the 
common with a wall or by any other means with the aim to appropriate it, or do anything that 
would lead to the same end. Along brooks (riachos) and on moors (forgueirinhos) it was prohibited 
to tear out heather or cut brushes except by means of a sickle. The Camara could concede licences 
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(coutadas), cutting brushes was only permitted during the autumn (August to 
December). Violating any of the regulations was punishable by a penalty of 
30$00. At that time, the fine was a considerable amount of money. For 
example, it equalled 8% of the Campea Parish Council's total budget in 1923 
(AJF 23 December 1927). The municipal authorities seem to have realized this. 
Later, it was decided that the fines not regulated by law, would be halved. The 
reason for this change was not made explicit (ACM 4 January 1929). 
The baldios within the municipality belonged to the parishes. However, the 
1927 by-laws suggest that at that time the municipal authorities did, 
nevertheless, exercise some control over the commons. They also indicate that 
this control was not equal in all parishes in the municipality. Chapter 2 of the 
Cddigo de Posturas dealt with the licensing systems for goats and sheep grazing 
outside private areas previously mentioned in the 1912 by-laws. This system 
was only applied in part of the municipality. Sixteen parishes, including 
CampeS, were not mentioned; thus, they were apparently exempted from this 
rule 2 2. It is likely that in these parishes, local control was stronger than in the 
fourteen parish included in the by-laws. 
The application of certain measures in specific parishes and groups of villages 
as well as the tacit exclusion of other communities suggests two things. First, it 
implicitly confirms the historical authority of the povo over the commons. In 
that sense, it repeats the statement made in 1912, which defined "laws, by-laws 
and ancient uses and customs" as normative structures pertaining to the village 
level rather than to that of the parish. Second, it demonstrates that the Camara 
could exercise control over some of the (baldios in the) parishes while over 
other parishes, its powers were more limited. In Adoufe for example, the 
Camara was even able to sell communal land (ACM 21 December 1928). This 
to open tubes, channels, or wells upon the payment of 25$00 along with the other costs needed 
according to the law for the concession of a licence, in agreement with the instructions of 
25 September 1901 (ACM 23 December 1927). 
2 2 Article 11, n°3, section 1 of chapter 2 mentioned the following sites where a licence was required 
for the pasturing of goats and sheep: "the parishes of Andraes, Arroyos, Constantim, Folhadela, 
Lordelo, Matheus, Parada de Cunhos, S. Diniz and S. Pedro of Vila Real; in the villages of 
Craveloz and Vila Seca of Favelos in the parish of Adoufe; the villages Borbela, F16res, S. 
Mamede, Nispera of the parish of Borbela; in the villages Abobeleria, Bouco, Lage, Ponte Nojaes 
of the parish of Moucos; in the villages Pena and Povoa of the parish of S. Miguel da Pena; in the 
villages Aruadelo and Pouzadelhos in the parish of Sangueda; in the villages AzarSs, Ermidela and 
Vila Marim of the parish of Vila Marim; and in the villages of Bijalhaes and Mondroes of the parish 
of Mondroes". The parishes Abacas, Campea, Ennida, Guiles, Justes, Lamares, Lamas d'Olo, 
Nogueira, Quinta, S. Tome de Castelo, Vale de Nogueira, Vila Cova, and Vilarinho de Samarda 
were not mentioned. The 1912 modification cited above did not include any restrictions with respect 
to the part of the concelho affected by the regulations. 
This difference between parishes and parts of parishes within the municipality, leads to at least 
two questions: To what extent was the designation paroquiais applied by the JCI in 1939 correct, 
and what was its exact significance. The fact that villages were sometimes mentioned separately, 
underscores the argument that the role of the parishes in baldios management was only secondary. 
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is something that never happened in Campea. In Campea its involvement seems 
to have been restricted to granting licences for wells, etc. It is my belief that 
these differences are related to the evolution of the concelho of Vila Real as an 
administrative entity. Abacas, Guiaes, Sao Tom6 do Castelo, and Justus were 
raised to concelho in the first decades of the thirteenth century (Reis 1991:222-
241) and, during the administrative reforms of 1836 and 1853 were added to 
Vila Real. Campea, Vila Cova, Quinta, and Lamas d'Olo had previously 
belonged to the concelho of Ermelo (extinct by a decree of 31 December 1853) 
(Costa 1934, VL231-232; Barrata 1988; Sousa 1983:18). Apparently, the 
Municipal Council had fewer powers in the newly acquired areas than in the 
original municipality. This hypothesis is confirmed by the cases of Serpins in 
the concelho of Lousa (Monteiro 1985; chapter 5) and of Cerva in Ribeira da 
Pena. Cerva was an independent municipality until 1853. When this parish 
formulated its by-laws in 1926, it apparently did not need the municipality's 
consent. In fact, a considerable part of its posturas was dedicated to the 
demarcation of Cerva's parish commons from Ribeira da Pena's municipal ones 
(Posturas 1926). 
The autonomy of the parish in relation to the municipality was the temporary 
outcome of an ongoing struggle. In October 1941, the municipality tried to 
impose the licensing of sheep and goats on Campea as well. It also intended to 
prohibit grazing without the presence of a shepherd (AJF 19 October 1941). 
The Parish Council reacted by admitting that the law permitted the "highly 
esteemed Cdmara" to charge goats and sheep. But it pointed out that the 
commons of Campea were parochial and had always been owned by the 
Council. It also pleaded with the municipality to take into account the poverty of 
the parishioners. People could not afford to have a shepherd accompany their 
individual herds 2 3. It seems that the Council's plea was successful. The 
licences were not introduced in Campea until 1946. Even then, the Parish 
Council was able to use them to its own benefit, as it received the Camara's 
consent to add the licences' revenues to its own treasure (AJF 13 January 
1946) 2 4 . 
The Parish Council eventually lost the struggle over the imposition of a 
licensing system for herding, but it was able to convert it into something for its 
own benefaction. However, at the same time, other developments undermined 
its tax base and financial autonomy. From the mid-fifties onward, the Parish 
Council was forced to pay 25% of its income from fines to the municipality and 
the district (contribuigao industrial and albergaria districtal, created by Decreto 
30,389 of 20 April 1940) for funds destined for industrial development and 
2 3 I do not know whether these modifications were really introduced in the other parishes of the 
concelho. The minutes of the Camara from this period are lost. The only reference I do have, is 
derived from the minutes of the Campea Parish Council and therefore only accounts for the situation 
in this parish. 
2 4 In 1949 it resisted increases in the licence prices (AJF 6 February 1949, 6 March 1949). 
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housing for tramps and beggars. These payments were mentioned for the first 
time in the 1955 grazing regulations (Regulamento 1955). The payment of these 
duties meant that the municipality and the district were able to expand their tax 
base at the cost of the parish. In order to resolve the problem, the Council 
stopped compensating the zeladores, who had until that time received half of the 
income from the fines (int 15 April 1992). In this manner, the growing power 
of the municipality started to undermine the powers and autonomy of both the 
Parish Council, the povos and their overseers. 
Junta da Colonizacao Interna 
Two central state institutions, the Forestry Service and the Junta da 
Colonizacao Interna (JCI) started to interfere with Campea as part of the 
national policy directed towards the reclamation of communal waste lands. The 
JCI was created in 1936 as a division of the Ministry of Agriculture, with the 
special purpose of improving the exploitation of the commons (Decreto-Lei 
27,207 of 16 November 1936). It was to stimulate reclamation of waste lands 
for the settlement of new farmers (art. 173, § 2, n°4 of the decree). In 1939 the 
JCI published its first report in which it identified 407,544 ha of baldios all over 
the country that had not been submitted to the forestry regime by the Forestry 
Service. These baldios were concentrated in the north: more than half of their 
total area was located within the borders of the Vila Real, Viseu, and Viana de 
Castelo districts. Vila Real had the largest share with more than a quarter of the 
total area. The JCI proposed the development of the waste lands in two ways: 
reclamation for agriculture (18% of the total area), and reclamation for forestry 
(82%). In 1937 and 1938 it provisionally reserved 79,951 ha (16,507 ha in the 
Vila Real district) for these purposes. In Campea, the JCI found 1,322 ha of 
communal land of which 1,027 ha was to be reclaimed for agricultural aims. 
The remainder (295 ha) was to be for forestry. In September 1937, it reserved 
the commons of the villages Vendas, Vila Nova, Viariz da Poca, Viariz da 
Santa, Pousada, Parada, Montes, and Cotorinho, which totaled approximately 
1,010 ha (Declaracdo de Reserva, Didrio do Governo of 11 September 
1937) 2 5 . 
The 1939 proposals were vague and sprawling. In the next two years, the JCI 
made detailed studies of the local social and economic conditions in the areas 
for which it had intervention plans, and formulated more elaborate projects (JCI 
1941). According to this more profound inquiry, the total area of the parish of 
Campea amounted 2,615 ha, of which 1,273 ha (49%) were private property 
In the concelho of Vila Real, the JCI found 5,212 ha of communal waste land (14.5% of the 
municipality's total area). Of this area, 3,284 ha (63%) was considered suitable for forestry. In 1941 
the reserve was expanded over the total communal area (Didrio do Governo 107, n S6rie, 10 May 
1941). 
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and 1,342 ha (51%) were communal property. Only a small amount (20%) was 
actually cultivated (see figure 7.3). The report also dealt with the question of 
social differentiation, showing that land and cattle were unevenly distributed 
among the households. The larger landholders controlled much more cattle man 
the small holders, who owned only a sheep or goats (table 6.5). In order to 
rectify the unbalanced social conditions, the JCI proposed that more than one 
third of the communal area (40%) be turned into privately owned plots (glebas) 
and be divided among the 507 commoners in the parish. These plots were to be 
reclaimed for agricultural aims. In this way the JCI hoped to increase the 
average farm size by 1.1 ha (table 7.3). The idea was to improve the viability 
of the small enterprises. The remaining areas with poor soil quality or steep 
inclination, were to be afforested26. The settlement of colonists and the 
creation of new hamlets were excluded since, according to the JCI, the parish 
was already densely populated. 
The JCI realized mat the division of the commons would seriously affect the 
Parish Council's budget. Under the existing conditions the parish annually 
received the duties paid by the villages for the use of the commons. The 
division and the attribution of the commons to the individual commoners would 
inevitably put an end to this source of income. Therefore, the JCI proposed not 
to hand over the administration of the total area to be afforested to the Forestry 
Service, but to maintain a tract of 181 ha under the direct a<hninistration of the 
Parish Council as a compensation (see figure 7.3). 
The first time the Parish Council's minutes refer to the JCI's interference in 
Campea is in November 1947, when the parish received a letter in which the 
JCI declared that alienation of the parish commons was submitted to stringent 
limitations as a result of the provisional reservation by the decree of 11 
September 1937: "no concessions can be granted longer than one agricultural 
year and mat the concession cannot have a final character" (AJF 3 November 
1947). During the following three years nothing happened, but in July 1950, the 
Parish Council received a second letter which stated that Campea would be 
visited by a brigade "in order to execute the division of the baldios as defined in 
Lei 36,054 of 20 December 1946" (AJF 6 August 1950). This letter was dated 
on the 17th of July. Three days later, on the twentieth, the brigade arrived in 
the parish and "asked for the baldios". The Parish Council handed over the 
baldios and arranged for people to accompany the brigade and to help with the 
work (ibid). 
The Parish Council did not try to resist the JCI. It worried only about the 
financing of the work needed for the apportionment such as demarcating the 
plots and placing landmarks. The Council did not have the money to finance the 
work. This problem was solved by the municipality's offer to lend the money 
2 6 The JCI distinguished two types of agriculture: intensive and extensive. The first concerned the 
production of maize and potatoes, the second concerned rye and wood. 85% of the area for so-
called agricultural glebas was, in fact, destined for afforestation by the individual landowners! 
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Figure 7.3: Property status and proposed use of the commons according to JCI 
(JCI1941). 
needed for the execution of the division of the commons in the first village. The 
municipality explained that the division of the baldios not only cost money, but 
also created revenues. The commoners had to pay for the glebas they received. 
The revenues of the first village could be used to cover the expenditures in the 
second, and so on. The money of the last village would then be returned to the 
C&mara to pay back the loan. When the Parish Council saw that the financial 
obstacles were removed, it made no further objections to the division (AJF 6 
August 1950) and it let the project proceed. Throughout the rest of the year, 
eight villages underwent the division scheme. From these villages, the Parish 
Council received a total of 6,245$00. The division's total expenditures, 
4,830$00 (AJF 5 November 1950), were more than recovered in the sums paid 
by the villagers for their portions. The partitioning left a net revenue of 
1,415$00 to the Council. 
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Awarding to the JCI's original plans, the baldios would be divided into areas 
reserved for afforestation and cultivation (table 7.3). The area for afforestation 
would be submitted to the forestry regime and managed by the Forestry Service, 
while the area for cultivation would be divided. During the implementation of 
this project, some inhabitants of the parish started to speak out against it. They 
argued that there was no land left for communal use. This would be especially 
detrimental to the newly established households because they would not have 
access to brushes for manuring their fields nor access to pastures for their 
cattle. Another argument was that people would take their cattle to their gleba 
and, on the way, destroy what would be growing on the glebas of their 
neighbours (int 28 August 1991). Some influential people (mentioned were 
Alberto Barria Maio and Fernando Cerejeira Seixo) took their concerns to the 
engineer who was in charge and they made him review the project2 7. 
Consequently, besides to the areas destined for forestry and cultivation, a third 
area was demarcated. This area would remain communal. The parish's forest 
area was cancelled. Instead, it was decided that the Council would receive some 
parcels of communal land in full property. These parcels were taken from the 
parish's public domain and became part of the Council's private property. 
In order to free some land for communal use, the number of plots was 
reduced, so that only about 170 of the 507 farming households in the parish 
would receive a gleba instead of every household as was the original plan. The 
recipients of a gleba forfeited their right to the brush on the remaining 
communal area. This was reserved for those who did not receive a plot (art. 17 
of the Posturas of 1952). The new model was implemented in seven villages. 
Different systems were implemented in other villages: In Avecao do Meio all 
inhabitants of the limite received a gleba, while in Cotorinho, Montes, and 
Parada no glebas were designated (table 7.2). 
By August 1951, the apportionment was completed and the JCI lifted the 
reservation on the areas which had not been divided, or designated for 
communal use (logradouro comum), or attributed to the Forestry Service. These 
areas were handed over to the Parish Council in order to be sold to the highest 
2 7 The engineer, who on behalf of the JCI made an inventory of the baldios of Campea, confirmed 
that he had had close contacts with both men. These contacts were rather enduring. In the 1980s, 
after his return from Mozambique, he helped Barria Maio with a request for a subsidy for a new 
stable. Contact, however, was not so close that he knew that Barria Maio had died a few years later 
(int 21 April 1992). The engineer denied any involvement in the project's later stage. Instead, he 
indicated a colleague who was a responsible for the revision. But when I contacted that person, he 
also denied any involvement in the division of the baldios in CampeS. Furthermore, he refused to be 
interviewed. Because of this evasive behaviour, it has been impossible to refute allegations with 
respect to favouritism. (Costa 1959:93; Baptista 1978a:185; int 28 August 1991; correspondence 
between the Parish Council and the Forestry Service quoted in chapter 5). 
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bidders (AJF 5 August 1951). They were privatized in the 1960s and 1970s 2 8 . 
At the same time popular resentment against the division process reached such a 
peak that some prominent farmers formed a committee and sent a petition to the 
local and national authorities (the Cdmara Municipal, Governo Civil, JCI and 
the prime minister's cabinet) in which they requested the investigation of the 
division process 2 9. The leading forces behind mis movement were the parish 
priest, his brother, and the Parish Council's secretary (O Vilarealense, 8 
November 1951). The JCI reacted through a letter to the Parish Council, in 
which it declared that the division was legal only if there was a declaration of 
consent signed by the majority of the villagers. "If there was no consent 
between the people about the division, the JCI would hand over the baldio in its 
totality to the Forestry Service" (AJF 23 October 1951). This letter was 
discussed by the Parish Council on 23 October 1951. The Council argued that 
transferring the baldios to the Forestry Service would imply a serious prejudice 
2 8 These areas were Traz-do-Val in Pousada (± 4.4 ha), Lagoa de Pepe (± 7 ha), Carquejedo and 
Chao Velho in Avecaozinho (2.16 ha), and Carvalheira de Baixo in Avecao de Cabo. These areas 
were gradually privatized in accordance with art. 399 and 400 of the Administrative Code: 
The larger part of Traz do Val (2.3 ha) was destined for the mining company of Vila Cova for 
the construction of a neighbourhood for its workers, about 1.2 ha for the building of a school, while 
the remainder was to be sold in small lots for housing for the poor (AJF 1 May 1960). The mining 
company bought its share in 1961 (AJF 5 February 1961). The construction of the workers' quarters 
started some years later but was never completed. The remainder was sold for housing during the 
following decades. 
Carquejedo and Chao Velho in Avecaozinho were sold in 1963 to three propriet&rios for 
cultivation. Alberto Barria Maio (of the Commissao Politico) and Joaquim Jorge Alexandre (of the 
Parish Council) acquired 0.78 and 0.345 ha respectively (AJF 7 June 1963). The third proprietdrio's 
name was not mentioned, but interviews with villagers indicated that this area was purchased by 
Joaquim's brother. 
The Lagoa de Pepe (reservation lifted on 10 October 1951, Declaracdo de levantamento) was 
privatized in two steps. On 7 April 1957 part of the 9,675.65 m 2 was divided into 16 lots, varying 
in size between 2.539,60 and 92,20 m 2. The buyers of 14 lots are known. These lots were bought 
by 12 landowners, 11 from Pepe and one from Chao Grande. This sale produced a total of 
33,489$90 (about 3$46 per m 2). The rest of the area (circa 6.1 ha), was leased to the highest bidder 
for six years. Although I did not find any minutes from the meeting in which the rent was 
adjudicated, I suppose it went to Manuel Chaves of Mineiros E.T. V* in Vila Real, who offered 
30,500$O0 or 5,083$00 annually. Alberto Barria Maio was one of the bidders who did not get the 
lease. Six year later, on 17 February 1963, the land was rented again. This time, Alberto Barria 
Maio obtained the lease by paying a rent of 5,267$00 per year. Three years later, in 1966, he 
bought the area for 36O,15O$0O (5$90 per m 2). 
Carvalheira de Baixo in Avecao do Cabo was used from 1976 onwards for the housing of people 
returning from the colonies after independence (JDF 7 March 1976). 
The most important beneficent of the privatization process incited by the JCI was Alberto Barria 
Maio, who was able to get 6.9 ha out from the aftermath of the JCI's intervention in addition to a 
gleba of 2.2 ha. 
2 9 My attempts to find a copy of me petition failed. Neither the Parish Council, nor the Governo 
Civil, nor the Prime Minister's Cabinet seem to have kept their copy. In the Comoro's book of 
correspondence, the petition is mentioned, but the band in which it should have been conserved was 
empty. 
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to the parish. Thus, in its response to the JCI, the Council declared that the 
Parish Council the opponents of division were not the legitimate representatives 
of the parish and that handing over of the area to the Forestry Service would be 
a blow to the region's well-being and that the reclamations sent to the 
JCI came from persons who by no means can claim to have the right 
to be the legitimate representatives of the parish, and even less to be 
considered the defenders of its interests. (AJF 23 October 1951) 
Table 7.2: Division of the commons in 1951 supervised by of the JCI (Source: Posturas 
1952, parish records, DGSFA 1956a). 
Hamlet #hh. Divided 
(ha) 
Glebas Commons left (ha) 
Average 
(ha) 
Total area/hh 
2 3 2:3 4 4:(l-3) 
Aveçâo de Cabo 57 22.41 25 0.90 25.70 0.80 
Aveçâo de Meio" 34 20.71 34 0.61 0.00 0.00 
Avecâozinho 58 13.62 20 0.68 20.06 0.53 
Pepe 91 35.71 25 1.43 29.73 0.45 
Vendas 93 30.76 27 1.14 48.94 0.74 
Viariz" 84 12.34 13 0.95 88.88 0.83 
Vila Nova 66 62.98 25 2.52 32.78 0.80 
Subtotal0 483 198.53 169 1.17 246.9 0.78 
Cot., Montes, Parada 73 0.00 0 0.00 39.0 0.53 
Total parish 556 198.53 169 1.17 285.09 0.76 
* Seventeen households lived in Avecao do Meio itself. The number of households entitled to the 
commons was greater since inhabitants of Pereiro, Pereira and Seixo belonged to this limite, as 
well. 
" Viariz da Poca and Viariz da Santa are taken together. In the Posturas of 1958, their communal 
area is estimated in only 59 ha. Assuming that the remaining commons were indeed 59 ha instead of 
88.88 ha, the average household in the Viarizes held 0.56 ha and in the totality of the seven villages 
participating in the division 0.69 ha. of communal land (Posturas 1958) 
c Not including Cotorinho, Montes and Parada. These hamlets did not participate in the partitioning. 
Their communal area is estimated at 39 ha (DGSFA 1956a). 
An interesting component of the Parish Council's deliberations is the explicit 
fear of the Forestry Service. The Council was afraid that handing over the 
baldios for afforestation would imply the loss of pastures and fertilizer "without 
which the parish, given its climatological conditions, would be unable to 
survive" (AJF 23 October 1951). The Council decided to ask the Governador 
Civil and the president of the Camara Municipal to intervene in order to stop 
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the transfer of the commons from the authority of the JCI to the Forestry 
Service. The Council also mobilized support from the parish's regedor and the 
Comissao Politico, the local level of the Uniao Nacionaf0. 
The Parish Council's reaction was successful and the petition remained 
ineffective. There was no investigation was started and the division was never 
undone. The petition's only visible consequence was that the list of people 
entitled to a gleba was adapted. According to the parish priest, those who in 
1951 had signed the appeal, were excluded from the glebas. He himself had 
provisionally received a very nice plot with some trees in the area of Vila Nova. 
He told me that he had obtained the area because of the presence of some water 
sources which served the village of Vila Nova. People believed that these 
important resources were safer in his hands. They trusted that their parson 
would not be inclined to cut-off the water source. But after the priest became 
involved in the petitionary movement, he lost his provisional title, and the plot 
was given to someone else (int 10 October 1991). 
In 1955 a new Council was installed, which called upon the Forestry Service 
to reverse the process. As I have shown in chapter 5, this attempt was futile and 
the division of the commons was never unmade. 
The new division scheme was cheaper than the previous one. In Avecao de 
Cabo and Avecao do Meio, it cost 102$00 for labour and 120$00 for transport. 
A 1.1 ha gleba cost 700$00 making the price per hectare around 635$00 (int 28 
August 1991). Therefore, in both villages, the division of about 23 ha produced 
an approximate gross revenue of 14,600$00, and the net revenue in these two 
villages alone was already 14,475$00. The money the Parish Council could 
raise by the entire division would amount to 127,000$00. Apparently, this 
second partitioning was even more profitable to the Parish Council than the first 
one. However, the money did not enter the parish treasury all at once; people 
receiving a plot were allowed to pay in small instalments of 20$00 (AJF 
4 November 1951). 
Cotorinho, Montes, and Parada refused to participate. In these hamlets on the 
parish's steep and mountainous southern fringe, people predominantly practised 
sheep and goat herding. 43% of all of the goats in the parish and 59% of the 
sheep were kept in these three villages but only 8% of the cows (JCI 1941). 
The baldios in these communities continued to be exploited communally until 
the submission of the area to the forestry regime in 1956. However, the Parish 
Council initiated various measures to make sheep and goat ownership less 
attractive. In 1946 a licensing system was established which demanded the 
payment of 0$50 for each goat and 0$30 for each sheep. In 1951 the grazing of 
sheep and goats was prohibited in all communal areas except for those of 
Cotorinho, Montes, and Parada. In 1955 these villages were submitted to a 
This is the only reference to this institution made in the Parish Council's minutes. Its members 
can be found in chapter 6. See also chapter 9 on its role in the 1972 elections. 
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special, JCI-inspired, regulation (Regulamento 1955). This regulation limited the 
space where these animals could graze: 
Within the communal areas distributed to each of the hamlets 
designated in art 1. [Cotorinho, Montes and Parada], the Parish 
Council can close [coutar] particular lots in which it is prohibited to 
graze goats and sheep, if it judges necessary, because of 
reforestation, the growth of fuel wood for a better provision of the 
inhabitants to whom the communal areas belong, or the possible 
improvement of the parish economy. (Regulamento 1955, art. 5) 
Elsewhere in the parish it became prohibited to graze bovines, horses, donkeys 
and mules in the montes Traz-do-Val (of Pousada), Roco e Carvalheira de Baixo 
(of Avecao de Cabo) and Lagoa (of Pepe and Balsa) without special licences. 
These licences (for the Lagoa of Pepe created on 3 August 1952) were a new 
source of income for the Council. In August 1952 it received 121$50 from two 
licence holders of the Lagoa de Pepe alone (AJF 3 August 1952). In 1954, it 
received 142$00 from the same area. 
The JCI's interference was not limited to the execution of the land divisions. 
The board also tried to regulate the use of the remaining communal areas; both 
in 1951 and 1958 it formulated new by-laws for the parish (AJF 13 December 
1951, 2 December 1958) 3 1 
The Forestry Service 
The second central state institution intervening in Campeä was the Forestry 
Service. This service had unofficially published its plan for the afforestation of 
the waste lands in 1935 (Memoria söbre o Reconhecimento dos Baldios ao Norto 
do Rio Tejo, later officially published in Min de Agr 1940). In this plan, the 
Serra do Maräo was included in a larger area (block H), covering 29,025 ha of 
baldio land in the Porto and Vila Real districts. Before 1936 16,535 ha had 
been already placed under the partial forestry regime, 6,535 ha in the concelho 
of Amarante in the district of Porto, and 10,000 ha in Mondim de Basto in Vila 
Real. The Forestry Service defended the afforestation of the area by arguing for 
the production of quality and pine timbers, and for the hydrological adjustment 
of the basins of the Rivers Tämega and the Corgo and some smaller tributaries 
of the Douro. It proposed planting 18,000 ha with, among others, Pinus 
sylvestris, Quercus rubra, Pseudotsuga douglasii, and Chameacyparis lawsonia 
(Min de Agr 1940:64). 
3 1 Contrary to the 1951 by-laws (Posturas 1952), the 1958 proposals were never printed. They seem 
to have had little impact on the parish. The main differences with the previous version concern the 
duties on the commons (absent in 1952 and present in 1958) and the licensing system for grazing. 
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Between 1935 and 1955, there were no major developments in the Campea 
area (see also pp.99-104 supra). In April 1955 the Forestry Service informed 
the municipality of Vila Real of their intentions to afforest the commons in the 
area. Consequently, the Camara announced a meeting in the city hall at which 
the traditional usufruct practices and rights would be identified: 
The Camara Municipal of Vila Real announces that on the next first 
of May in the city hall the inquiry will be held referred to by art. 14° 
of the Decree of 24 December 1903 that approved the regulation of 
the execution of the Forestry Regime, with respect to the perimetro 
of the Serras do Marao (Vila Real) e Ordem.... This inquiry is 
intended to identify the uses of the povos related to transit, water, 
pastures and exploitation of forestry and mineral products in the areas 
included in the Forestry Regime, and of the inconveniences which 
may rise from the application of that regime. (CMVR 1 May 1955). 
At the meeting the representatives of the ten parishes affected by the project 
expressed their great concern about the afforestation projects. They made it 
clear that they would protest when the exact limits of the areas to be afforested 
became public. They further demanded sufficient land around the villages for 
pastures, and they expected the Forestry Service to respect the existing rights 
regarding water, passage, and the zones "closed" by the Parish Councils (the 
coutadas). They also asked the Forestry Service to execute the planting "by 
plots, leaving not yet reforested areas free for grazing and the collection of 
brush and firewood" (Inquiry 1 May 1955). 
In June, the Technical Forestry Council advised that the process to submit the 
area to the forestry regime be continued, although they conceded that 
the announced intervention of the Forestry Service has caused some 
alarm in some rural circles. Given the very peculiar characteristics of 
the agricultural exploitation in a geographic unity in which the 
baldios have a special meaning for the mountain economy, [the 
council recommended that] submission [should] not imply integral 
afforestation, exactly because one recognizes the imperative necessity 
of save-guarding the legitimate interests of local agriculture.... [T]he 
reforestation should not have the objective to create extensive and 
endless woods, but first and foremost the constitution of woodlands 
that not only have to resolve the notorious lack of woody material, 
but have the primary function of improving and defending the 
pastoral conditions. (CTFA 22 June 1955) 
In February 1956, the forestry perimeter of the Serras do Marao e Ordem was 
created with an area of 8,250 ha (Decreto 40,524 of 4 February 1956). As I 
already mentioned in section 5.4, in Campea an area of 625 ha was placed 
under the forestry regime. Later that year, an afforestation plan for the 
perimeter was drawn up, which assigned 620 ha in Campea to would be 
afforested, with the remaining 5 ha reserved for communal use (DGSFA 
1956a). The Forestry Service tried to take into account the herders' need for 
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grazing grounds. When it started the work, the Service prohibited grazing in the 
areas where trees had been planted. After a few years, when the trees had 
grown sufficiently, grazing was again permitted, but by then the animal stock in 
the parish had decreased so dramatically that there was almost no interest in the 
pastures. 
The exact pattern of the afforestation cannot be reconstructed because I did 
not have access to the Vila Real Forestry Administration's archives. It seems, 
however, that by the end of the 1970s or at the beginning of the 1980s, the 
areas that had been designated for afforestation had been covered by trees. 
Unfortunately, the forest burned a few years later, so presently, most of the 
area administered by the Service is void of trees again. 
The Impact of the Interventions 
The interventions by the JCI and the Forestry Service had a serious impact on 
the parish population. The first effect was to increase the social and economic 
inequality. In the parish, 169 households benefited from the division by 
receiving 198.53 ha 3 2 . The average size of the glebas varied among the 
villages from 0.61 ha in Avecao do Meio to 2.52 ha in Vila Nova (table 
7.2) 3 3 . Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show that the households that received a plot were 
better off than those who did not. The average communal area available to the 
latter was only 0.76 ha per household, while the owners of a gleba, on the 
average, had access to 1.17 ha. Assuming that productivity of brush in all the 
areas was more or less equal, the owners of a gleba could collect 1.5 times the 
amount of brush than those who did not obtain a plot (table 7.3). At the level of 
the village, this factor varied between 3.2 in Pepe and 1.1 in Avecao do Cabo 
(table 7.2). This was exacerbated by the fact that, although the gleba holders 
forfeited the right to brush in the remaining communal area, they were still 
allowed to graze their cattle there. Moreover, the burden of demographic 
growth was fully placed upon the remaining communal areas. Heirs to persons 
either with or without glebas were (and are) still entitled to full use of the 
commons, so that the number of households exploiting it tended to grow. 
Consequently the individual shares tended to decrease. Those who were able to 
obtain a gleba, already belonged to the wealthier strata in the parish. Therefore, 
the JCI's intervention increased the existing inequality. 
A second effect of the JCI's intervention was that the attribution of the 
commons to only a part of the parishioners created a new social distinction 
3 2 The households received the glebas as provisional property. Final property tide was only 
acknowledged some years later by an alvard de propriedade definitiva. 
3 3 Within the villages, the sizes of the plots varied as well. In Avecaozinho, for example, the 
smallest plots were 0.S ha, and the largest 0.% ha. 
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between those "who had a gleba", and "those who did not". The former lost 
access to brush growing on the commons and were also excluded from the 
village assembly. This new distinction accentuated the existing difference 
between the wealthy and the poor. 
Table 7.3: Comparison of the impact of the different projects (JCI 1939, 1941; DGSFA 
1956a; Posturas 1952). 
Communal area to JCI1939 JCI 1941 JCI 1951 
DGSFA 1956a 
be divided 1,027 574 199 
be afforested 295 768 625 
remain communal 0 0 285 
total baldio area* 1,322 1,342 1,109 
average area of glebas 2.03 1.13 1.17 
communal area per household 0.00 0.00 0.76 
I 
* Total area differences are caused by inaccuracies. In 1992, according to the land register, Campea 
had 1,226 ha of communal land. 
A third effect was the undermining of the autonomy of the parish and the social 
institutions at the village level that had been in charge of the management of the 
commons. Of the original 1,342 ha of communal land only 285 ha continued to 
be communally used. Almost 200 ha was divided and 625 ha allocated to the 
Forestry Service. As a result, the commons no longer constituted a source of 
income for the Parish Council. The last payment of annual taxes by the villages 
mentioned in the Parish Council's records was in 1953. The zelador of 
Cotorinho paid 103$00 outstanding taxes (AJF 1 June 1953). As the caretaker 
no longer acted as a tax collector, the office became less important, and it lost 
even more attractiveness when it was decided that the zeladores would no longer 
receive half of the fines charged for trespassing. (The office disappeared in 
1976, when the new law concerning the commons was implemented.) Finally, 
the by-laws which had played such an important role in the management of the 
commons until 1976 lost their relevance to the majority of the parish population. 
Today, most of the inhabitants hardly remember that they ever existed. In 
almost all villages grazing and the collection of brush is done without any 
regulation. The baldios have lost their meaning as a focus of local, autonomous 
administration since control over the area was transferred to the municipality 
and to central state agencies. 
The zeladores' policing tasks were gradually taken over by the Guarda 
National da Reptiblica (GNR). This military police force had, among other 
things, the specific task of patrolling the countryside. In Campea, until the 
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1950s, its intervention was only seldom called for. Originally, the GNR was 
summoned for problems that transcended the abilities of the zeladores or the 
Parish Council, or when people from outside the parish were involved. An 
example is its intervention in 1924 when conflicts arose between people from 
Campea and people from Ansiaes, a parish in the municipality of Amarante. 
The latter had invaded the baldios of three villages and tore out the heather for 
the manufacture of charcoal. One of the measures which the parish took to 
countervail this invasion was asking he GNR to patrol the area (AJF 4 May 
1924). 
The second case in which the help of the GNR was required was when the 
parishioners got out of control of the Parish Council. In 1947 the GNR collected 
the licence fees for sheep and goats (AJF 1 April 1947). Additionally, the GNR 
helped to collect fines in 1949, 1954, 1958, and 1959 (AJF 1 May 1949, 5 
December 1954, 3 August 1958, 1 February 1959). In 1954 the Council asked 
the GNR to patrol the commons of Vila Nova. The Parish Council had just 
issued a regulation prohibiting sheep and goat herding in all of the commons, 
except for those of Cotorinho, Montes, and Parada. Apparently, some people 
did not accept this restriction (AJF 6 June 1954). In 1965 the Council turned to 
the GNR to intervene because of a wood theft from the common of 
Avecaozinho (AJF 2 May 1965), and again in 1966 because of a conflict over 
pines in Pepe. Inhabitants of this village started to cut the pines that had 
spontaneously grown in their leiras. The Parish Council objected saying that 
usufruct rights in leiras only extended to the brush, but not to the trees. It asked 
the GNR to catch the thieves (AJF 7 August 1966, 4 September 1966). The 
increased intensity of police interventions in the parish resulted in the GNR 
establishing a station in the parish between 1955 and 1958. Today his station no 
longer exists. 
These examples indicate that the interventions by the municipality, the JCI, 
and the Forestry Service created new problems which exceeded the Parish 
Council's powers and which could not be handled by the traditional authorities. 
It is quite likely that mis was because these interventions had weakened the 
traditional structures of communal rule and communal land management. 
The increased inequality among parishioners, the reduction in the size of the 
baldios, the decrease in the number of commoners, and the dismantlement of 
traditional management institutions at the village level, have caused the 
weakening of the local society's capacity to sustain institutions that regulated the 
exploitation of the commons. The elite, according to Wade (1988:190), essential 
for the continuing communal management of resources, lost interest in the 
remaining communal area because its members had been able to monopolize the 
brush land they needed. The Parish Council lost interest in the commons too 
because they were no longer a source of income apart from that obtained by 
selling them. The only people who remained interested in the commons were 
the economically and politically disenfranchised. These households still 
depended upon the baldios for their fertilizer and pasture land. However, this 
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stratum's already feeble ability to sustain the social institutions that had 
managed the commons during the previous centuries, was rapidly reduced by 
mass emigration. In short, the JCI's division of a part of the baldios and the 
Forestry Service's afforestation of most of the remainder led to an undermining 
of the local society's capacity to sustain the local institutions related to the 
management of the commons. 
In comparison to the alternatives proposed earlier, the 1951 and 1956 
interventions by the JCI and the Forestry Service, was clearly the worst in 
terms of its effects upon social equity. However with respect to the commons 
(as a social institution) it ultimately proved the best. The original projects of 
1939 and 1941 would have left no communal area at all, while only relatively 
small areas would have been placed under the forestry regime (table 7.3). The 
1951 and 1956 interventions involved the submission of a large area to the 
Forestry Service's administration. As a result, in 1976, when the commons 
were restored and village rule was revived, a large area could be returned to the 
population. In addition, parts of the original commons were maintained as such. 
These remaining commons could sustain the social institutions which until the 
1950s had administered the baldios as happened for example in Avecaozinho. If 
the 1939 and 1941 plans would have been implemented, the commons and the 
related institutions would have disappeared entirely. 
Conclusion 
For centuries local affairs in Campea had been admimstered by the povos. The 
Crown, Church, and the Cdmara Municipal had minimal influence on day-to-
day life. The commons were one of the central points of community rule and, 
although the Parish Council acquired the formal authority to administer these 
areas, at the beginning of the twentieth century the villages still remained 
largely autonomous with respect to the management of their commons. At that 
time, the parish resembled an agglomerate of independent village states that 
defined their own rules and appointed their own overseers (Elias 1974:22; 
Bennema 1976, 1978). 
Between 1904 and 1922 this started to change. The Parish Council placed a 
duty on the use of the commons and acquired more control over the 
appointment of overseers. It also received half of the fines applied by these 
overseers. At that time, the Council more or less successfully resisted 
encroachment on its powers by higher levels in the state apparatus: the 
municipality and central state services. But in 1946, the municipality was able to 
impose licensing upon sheep and goat holding, a practice which had been 
established twenty years earlier in fourteen other parishes. From the mid 1950s 
on, the Parish Council had to give a share of its profits from the fines to the 
municipality and the district in order to cover the contribuigao industrial and the 
albergaria districtal. The final blow to local control over the commons came 
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from the interventions by the JCI and the Forestry Service. The division of a 
part of the commons by the Junta da Colonizagao Interna in 1951 and the 
afforestation of most of the remaining land from 1956 on, put an end to the 
commons as a source of income for the Parish Council. Thereafter, it relied on 
subsidies from the State. The only way in which the commons still contributed 
to the parish budget was through sales. 
The encroachment upon the villages' autonomy and communal resources by 
the JCI and the Forestry Service was facilitated by the social contradictions 
within the parish. People without sheep or goat herds were not interested in 
communal pastures, but preferred privatized access to brush. Therefore, in all 
of the villages except Cotorinho, Montes, and Parada, the commons were 
partitioned. Furthermore, the wealthy were keener to divide the land than the 
poor were, since it would enable the wealthy to obtain rights to a larger quantity 
of brush. Byt they did not opt for a total division as that would place them on 
an equal footing with the poorer families. After the partitioning, the elite lost 
interest in the commons as they had their own brush. Sustaining the institutions 
which had traditionally managed the baldios was left to those who did not 
participate in the division. The community as a whole lost interest. The 
abolishment of duties decreased the importance of the village zeladores, and the 
decision to stop paying them for their service made the office unattractive. 
It is in this context of diminished social capacity to sustain the institutions for 
communal land management that the 1976 legislator tried to restore "traditional" 
self-government. In the next chapters I will go into the reason for such a desire 
and discuss the extent to which it was successful. It is in the context of 
disintegrating traditional management structures that the 1974 revolution took 
place and community control over the baldios could be reestablished. The new 
rulers felt that the JCI's and the Forestry Service's interventions had 
disproportionately hurt the commoners and so they tried to develop a legal 
framework that would reinstall village rule at least over these commons that had 
previously been transferred to the Forestry Service's authority. 
In the following chapter, I describe the events that caused the demise of the 
Estado Novo regime and I discuss how this led to a new legal framework for the 
management of the commons. Furthermore, I delineate how this framework was 
shaped by a conflict in the capital between politicians and forestry officials. In 
chapter 9, I return to the countryside and to CampeS. In this chapter, I portray 
how the 1974 takeover was received by the rural population, and how in 
Campea the new law on the commons was implemented. 

Chapter 8 
The Commons and the Revolution 
Introduction 
The present administration of the commons in Campea has been profoundly 
influenced by the implementation of the 1976 law on the baldios. In 1990 three 
villages, Avecaozinho, Cotorinho, and Montes, had active communal land 
management commissions of the modality b (with state representation), whereas 
those of Pepe, (also modality b) and Avecao do Cabo, (modality a; without state 
representation) had ceased to function. These commission were the result of a two-
sided process. On the one side was the process of law-making. On the other side 
was the way the 1974 law was used by the officials in charge of its implementation 
as well as how the law was absorbed by the various communities in Campea. In 
this chapter, I will discuss the first side, law making. I will show that the 1976 law 
should be seen as an attempt to reconcile two contradictory aims: the protection 
and continuation of the afforestation project that started in 1938, and the 
strengthening of local communities in order to promote popular democracy and 
socialism. These were the aspirations of several different social groups: 
commoners, foresters from the Forestry Service, and politicians related in 
particular to the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). 
I approach the legislative process that took place between 1974 and 1976 from 
its context; the background of the military takeover and the ensuing struggle for 
power between radical and moderate military and civil forces. This struggle, which 
emerged shortly after the coup, was reflected in the debate over communal land. 
Three different groups were involved in this debate: parishioners, forest engineers, 
and politicians. Each of these groups published its own proposal for the future of 
the commons according to its perspective on and interest in the matter. The result 
was a compromise. Although it was formulated by the communists, in the end, it 
was more beneficial to the Forestry Service's bureaucrats than to revolutionary 
politicians. 
There are two reasons for writing this chapter. First, examining the context in 
which laws are made and analyzing the interests of the groups involved, shows the 
political nature of the 1976 law. Second, all of the previous studies on the 
Portuguese revolution have neglected the question of the commons. It has always 
remained subordinate to more general issues such as the euphoria and deception of 
the Left, decolonization, and land reform. Even publications on (radical) grass 
roots movements such as Hammond's (1988) Building Popular Power or Barradas' 
(1994) O Futuro Era Agora, do not refer to the struggle for the baldios. Thus, this 
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chapter is an attempt to reintegrate this struggle into the history of the 1974 
revolution. 
The Revolution: Its Political Background 
The coup of 25 April 1974 was a military coup. It was carried out by a group of 
discontented low-ranking officers ("The Captains of April 25") who were united 
in an informal military organization called the Movimento das Forças Armadas 
(Armed Forces Movement, MFA). This organization had been created six months 
earlier in reaction to decrees that had reorganized the army's career structure. 
These low-ranking officials saw the decrees as a threat to their own position in 
relation to conscripts (Insight Team 1975:33-34; Fernandes 1976:73-76). 
In the beginning, the movement did not have a clear political signature. As Vîtor 
Alves, one of its leaders, declared: 
We all had very varied political ideas ... some were Marxists, some 
were conservatives. At first we had simply come together because we 
were friends; then we brought others into the group ... The criterion 
was simple: who was ready to protest about the decrees — and stand up 
and be counted on if it came to direct confrontation with the 
government. (Quoted by Insight Team 1975:34) 
But during the next six months the MFA evolved into a politically left-wing 
organization. The servicemen began to approach their professional problems from 
a broader perspective and connected them to fundamental characteristics of the 
Estado Novo regime and its colonial policies (see Gonçalves 1985 and the interview 
with Melo Antunes in Avillez 1994). 
Since 1961 the regime had been engaged in several costly wars in its African 
territories which had claimed thousands of lives. Things were not going well for 
the Portuguese. By the beginning of 1974, some 150,000 Portuguese troops had 
lost a war in Guinea-Bissau and were losing in Mozambique. Only in the war in 
Angola was their position not entirely hopeless (Insight Team 1975:125; Maxwell 
1975:30). The colonial wars had enormous costs. Between 1961 and 1974, 7,674 
Portuguese soldiers were killed and 27,919 seriously wounded (Blackburn 1974:6; 
Robinson 1979:184). During the 1960s, approximately half a million Portuguese 
(almost 3% of the population) served in the armed forces. During the same era, 
only three countries surpassed this number: North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and 
Israel. In the end, the conflict absorbed almost half of the government's budget and 
10% of the Gross National Product (Barreto 1987:31-32, fn. 19). For Portugal, 
warfare was particularly burdensome because of the condition of the country's 
economy: in 1960, the Gross National Product (GNP) per capita was lower than 
in any other country in southern Europe (Robinson 1979:140, 144). 
Fear of being enlisted in the colonial army intensified emigration. The need for 
additional finances forced the government to abandon its traditional isolationist 
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policy and to open the economy to foreign investors (Blackburn 1974:7-8; 
Robinson 1979:141; Bruneau 1984:20) 1. 
The MFA did not formulate political demands until February 1974. This step 
was catalyzed by the publication of a book, Portugal and the Future, by General 
Ant6nio de Spinola (Goncalves 1985:56). Spinola had been commander of the 
colonial army in Guinea-Bissau, but resigned in 1973 after a difference of opinion 
with the government. In his book he defended the idea of a Portuguese federation 
including its overseas territories as a way to end the colonial war while protecting 
the interests of Portugal and white settlers in Africa. It caused (also commercially) 
a sensation. Within a fortnight it was republished three times 2. 
The coup took place in the early morning of 25 April 1974 and met no 
significant resistance. Only some battalions of the GNR and the headquarters of the 
PIDE (Policia International e de Defesa do Estado, secret service and political 
police) in the centre of Lisbon tried to withstand the rebellious units. The shooting 
that took place claimed five lives - the coup's only victims. When the PEDE troops 
saw that they had no chance to win, they surrendered3. 
Marcello Caetano, then leader of the Estado Novo regime, fled to the GNR 
barracks at the Largo de Carmo, also in the centre of the city. The barracks were 
rapidly surrounded by rebellious troops and civilians. He remained there until the 
early morning of 26 April, when he surrendered to General Antonio de Spinola. 
The general had been called in by the MFA especially for this occasion, because 
Caetano refused to capitulate to a low-ranking official4. After Caetano's arrest, the 
1 The isolationist policy ("autarchy") of the Estado Novo can be illustrated by the following examples. 
Until 1948 the country refused to accept the United States Marshall relief plan; Portugal only entered 
the United Nations only in 1955 and the IMF and World Bank in 1960 (Serrao and De Oliveira Martins 
1990:64, 82, 329). Until 1965 its frontiers were closed to foreign investors (Medeiros 1984:192). 
Between 1961 and 1968 the amount of capital entering the country increased from 1.1 million to 5.8 
million contos (Castro 1984:198). The inflow of foreign investments was criticized as a selling out to 
foreign multinationals, thus possibly contributing to the nationalist emotions that undoubtedly 
contributed to the coup's success, particularly in its initial phase. 
2 The book was published by a subsidiary of the country's largest industry, the CUF, that also had 
strong colonial interests. CUF's role as a publisher was not as surprising as it may seem at first. Like 
many senior officers, Spinola had combined his military career with a business career. He was director 
of a number of companies, including the large Champalimaud Corporation. For nine years he was also 
chief administrator of the Portuguese steel concern, Siderurgia National (Insight Team 1975:43). 
3 For a brief analysis of the PUDE's role under Salazar see Tom Gallagher (1979). 
For detailed descriptions and analyses of the 1974-1976 events and their background and aftermath 
see Figueiredo (1975), Insight Team (1975), Robinson (1979), Ferreira (1983), Gallagher (1983), and 
Bruneau (1984). Most material in this section is taken from Insight Team (1975) and Robinson (1979). 
4 See a summary of a confidential report by the commander of the troops on the Largo do Carmo, 
Salgueiro Maia, published in O Jornal of 24 April 1992. Spmola's exact role is surrounded by mystery. 
Caetano (1976:24-25) declared that, trapped in the GNR barracks, he had a private talk with Spinola, 
who assured him that he had not participated in the conspiracy. But when Caetano asked Maia who was 
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MF A handed power over to the Junta da Salvaçao National (Junta of National 
Salvation) composed of six generals. Two, General Spinola and General Francisco 
da Costa Gomes, would become the exponents of the political tenets that fought for 
power in the country during the next two years5. 
The rapid and almost bloodless takeover was named the "Carnations Revolution" 
(Revoluçdo dos Cravos). It derived its name from the flowers that the victorious 
troops had sticking out of the barrels of their guns. The carnations had been given 
to them by the city's celebrating population. Thus, the red carnation became the 
sign of democracy and socialism which the takeover brought out into the open. It 
was the symbol of revolution. Civilian participation was central to the coup's 
success (see Gonçalves 1985:58-59). Caetano (1976:19) himself believed that 
popular support for the coup demoralized loyal troops. It also impeded the defense 
of the government buildings on the Terreiro do Paço Square on the bank of the 
Tejo River. The commander of a battleship refused to open fire because he did not 
want to hurt the mass of civilians gathered in the square. 
Although the administration of the commons became an important issue after 
April 1974 and the law on the commons was the last piece of revolutionary 
legislation to resist subsequent political developments (it remained unchanged until 
September 1993), the communal land question can in no way be considered a cause 
of the revolution. The direct cause for the coup de état was the colonial war. Its 
underlying origin was the bankruptcy of the political and economic model which 
that war sought to defend; metropolitan stagnation sustained by colonial 
exploitation. 
In the métropole, the Estado Novo's economic policies had always favoured the 
landed, industrial, and financial elites, shielding them from external competition. 
As a result, the poor got poorer whilst a small group of about forty families 
in charge, Maia immediately pointed to the general and said, "Spmola". Contrary to Caetano, most 
authors attribute only a minor part to Spmola in the conspiracy. 
5 Francisco da Costa Gomes had been Commander in Chief until March 1974. He and Antonio de 
Spmola were sacked a few days before the coup because they refused to attend a ceremony organized 
by Caetano to assure himself of support within the military for his colonial policy. In 1961 Costa 
Gomes, then sub-secretary of the army, had been involved in a conspiracy led by Julio Botelho Moniz, 
Salazar's defense minister. Moniz's plot was a reaction to the first armed attacks (4 February and 15 
March) by the Angolan independence movement and a response to United States pressure on Salazar 
to abandon the colonies. The conspirators believed that Portugal was in no shape to maintain the states 
quo with respect to its overseas provinces. About Moniz's conspiracy, see Ferreira (1992:255-73), 
Praga (1991), and a short reference by Robinson (1979:77). The year of 1961 was a difficult time for 
the Estado Novo: On 31 December 1961 there was an abortive coup in Beja (Cakes 1991b; Ferreira 
1992:283-284). 
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hoarded exorbitant wealth6. This deep social and economic gap between a small 
prosperous elite and the destitute masses was also reflected in the agrarian 
structure. A host of smallholders' minifundia existed beside a small number of vast 
estates. In 1952-54 88% of the farms were smaller than five ha. These farms 
controlled only 22.6% of the agrarian area. On the other hand, 44.6% of the area 
was controlled by the 0.4% of the farms larger than one hundred ha (De Freitas, 
De Almeida and Cabral 1976:76-77). Four persons (Posser de Andrade, Santos 
Jorge, and the dukes of Cadaval and Palmela) owned over 95,000 ha (Robinson 
1979:147). 
The large estates were concentrated in the south of the country. For example, 
in the district of Evora the average farm size in 1952-54 was more than sixty-six 
ha. In the north, farms were smaller; for example, in the Vila Real district the 
average size was two ha (De Freitas, De Almeida and Cabral 1976:84). But as I 
have shown in the case of Campea, land holding was skewed as well: about two-
thirds of the rural population possessed such tiny holdings that they had to make 
their living through agrarian wage labour on the larger employer-farms in their 
neighbourhood. At the district level, these larger farms amounted to 16.4% of the 
total number of farms (De Freitas, De Almeida and Cabral 1976:103). In the 
1960s, this agrarian structure entered into a crisis: attracted (or driven) by the 
differences in wages and pushed by the fear of conscription a large number of 
people emigrated. Notwithstanding the government's attempts to curb this 
emigration, between 1960 and 1970 the country's total population diminished by 
almost 4% (from 8,999,000 to 8,668,000) (INE 1960, 1970). 
6 The seven financial conglomerates which "owned" the country (CUF, Espfrito Santo, Champalimaud, 
Banco PortuguSs e Atlantico, Borges & Irmao, National Ultramarino, and Fonseca & Burnay) were 
dominated by two forty-four families. These families were tied together in two groups (Santos 1977). 
The most important magnates were Jorge de Mello, Champalimaud, and Espirito Santo. 
Jorge de Mello was director of the CUF (Companhia Uniao Fabril), the country's biggest 
conglomerate, controlling one-tenth of Portugal's industry. The CUF had a virtual monopoly of the 
tobacco market and large shares in the market in soap, chemicals, textiles, and insurance (Insight Team 
1976:59). Its most important activity was the production of artificial fertilizer. It was created in 1898 
by de Mello's father-in-law, Alfredo da Silva. who is reputed to have owned the sixth largest personal 
fortune in the world when he died in 1942. Alfredo da Silva was a supporter of the regime and member 
of the Cdmara Corporativa (Robinson 1979:145; M6nica 1990). De Mello was married to a member 
of the Champalimaud family (Expresso 2 May 1993). 
The Espfrito Santo family owned the largest bank in the country at the time. Through the bank it 
controlled a web of companies with interests in insurance, oil, steel, paper, cement, beer, car tires and 
plantations in Mozambique and Angola (Insight Team 1975:216; Robinson 1979:146). After 1974, the 
bank financed the right-wing CDS and PPD parties (insight Team 1975:217). 
These conglomerates also controlled a large part of the wood processing paper pulp industry: Espirito 
Santo and Champalimaud owned part of the CPC (Companhia Portuguesa de Celulose) in Cacia, and 
De Mello's CUF was a partner in a joint venture with Swedish Billerud in Celbi. The seven 
conglomerates together controlled four-fifths of the capital in this branch. 
For an extensive review of the capital groups and their interrelations before 1974, see Martins 
(1973). 
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The protectionist policies shielded the country's agriculture and industry against 
foreign competition. In the short run, this was beneficial to the small number of 
enterprises that dominated the national economy such as the CUF and a few 
financial conglomerates. In the long run, however, it meant that these companies 
were unable to compete on the European and the world markets. The ongoing 
protectionism and the limitations put upon foreign investments locked up capital in 
the country's national and colonial territories and made it difficult to attract new 
investments and technologies. In this manner, it foiled further accumulation. 
Furthermore, within the country, enterprises that did not dominate their sectors 
were throttled by the constraints the regime placed upon them through the 
conditionamento industrial. This industrial policy primarily favoured the large 
conglomerates. The result was that, in addition to the tensions between the elite 
and the masses, there were also different and conflicting interests within the 
bourgeoisie itself. These oppositions were the basic reasons for the regime's 
downfall. The regime fell victim to the contradictory claims of the bourgeoisie with 
respect to the country's economic development. Its guidance on behalf of merchant 
capital and a few oligopolies was seen as a threat to other sections of the 
bourgeoisie (Poulantzas 1977:42,44,48; Santos 1990:21-22). 
The Commons in the Revolutionary Arena 
The dispute over the baldios was not one of the main causes of the revolution. 
Apparently, the baldios issue did not gain such a political weight that it made 
people rebel against the government. Yet, in certain localities the division of the 
baldios into glebas by the JCI and their afforestation by the Forestry Service 
created such resentment that the population revolted. In the district of Vila Real in 
1958, the population in some parishes went so far as to vote against the regime 
because of the JCI's and the Forestry Service's actions (see chapter 5). The 
population of Sao Tom6 do Castelo, also in Vila Real, even engaged in an overt 
rebellion that had to be suppressed with help from the police (int 4 September 
1991). Popular resistance to afforestation in Serras de Lousa near Coimbra, de 
Montesinho and da Nogueira near Braganca, and in Serra de Leomil near Viseu 
inspired Aquilino Ribeiro, one of the country's most famous litterateurs, to write 
his romance Onde os Lobos Uivam (Where the Wolves Howl). The title of this 
book encapsulates the author's attitude towards the Service's actions in the Serra 
de Leomil, Ribeiro's home area. The wolves in the title referred not only to the 
wild animals that roamed the baldios, but also to the foresters and the other state 
officials. The regime did not like his criticism. In March 1959 the book was 
forbidden and its author persecuted (Caldeira and Andringa 1994). Since then, this 
work has become emblematic of the movement for the recuperation of the 
commons (see Rodrigues 1987:18, 58; Secretariado dos Baldios do Distrito de 
Viseu 1992). 
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Likewise in Beira, in a region more to the west near the Vouga River, the 
oppressive behaviour of forest guards, the systematic intrusion of the public service 
in private land, and the planting of extensive fire-prone pine stands near inhabited 
areas incited popular resistance. In 1970, several parish councils in this area tried 
to sue the State for the damage caused to their population through afforestation. 
Their struggle was extensively documented in local and national journals. Many 
people participated. A petition in which the baldios were claimed by the population 
was signed by 760 persons (Antonio Bica in letter of 23 November 1987 to Manuel 
Rodrigues). The document contained a long list of complaints against the Forestry 
Service, and demanded also that responsibilities of the forest guards and other staff 
members be "refined", "not in order to punish them, criminally or disciplinary, as 
we [the signatories, RB] consider their attitudes to be the result of deformed 
professional training rather than an antisocial personality" (Silva 1973:75-88, 
quotation from page 88). In 1973, Silva joined his newspaper articles and the 
documents drawn up by the parishioners together into the book Occupacdo sem 
Limites (Occupation without Limits)7. 
These examples show that during the dictatorship there was resistance to the 
State's afforestation policy. After the revolution, claims regarding the commons 
could be made overtly, and a specific arena emerged around the communal land 
issue. In this arena, the movement in the Vouga area, the Forestry Service, and the 
Communist Party all played major roles. 
For the people in the Vouga area, the downfall of the Estado Novo regime 
helped their struggle for the commons. Immediately after the revolution, 
inhabitants created commissions charged with regulating forest management and 
claiming the baldios back from the Forestry Service. Moreover, they tried to find 
support for their movement within the new government. During a meeting in Sever 
da Vouga on 18 August 1974, they drew up a petition in which they summarized 
their complaints against the Forestry Service (Anonymous 1974). The petition was 
sent to three cabinet members: Vasco Goncalves, Vitor Alves, and Alvaro Cunhal. 
The first was prime minister and the second secretary of state of agriculture. 
Alvaro Cunhal was a minister without a portfolio and hence did not have specific 
official responsibilities in the fields of forestry or communal land management. He 
was most likely sent a copy of the petition copy because he was also the secretary-
general of the Communist Party. 
The Forestry Service developed its own strategy. After the coup, a new director-
general was appointed. He created a working group within the Service charged 
with preparing a proposal for a new legal base for managing the commons. The 
original group consisted of five forestry engineers: Mendonca, author of the 1961 
review of the implementation of the Piano de Povoamento Florestal (Mendonca 
1961a), Cabral, who would later become deputy director-general, Oliveira, a 
7 Pereira da Silva worked for the Lisbon newspaper O Didrio. The movement was also discussed in 
A Terra (an underground newspaper) and the Comircio do Porto (Bica in letter of 23 March 1987 to 
Manuel Rodrigues). 
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forestry administrator in the nature reserve of Ger&z, known for his knowledge of 
traditional communal land management practices in that region, Jos6 Joaquim 
Moreira da Silva, the deputy director of the forestry circumscription in Porto, and 
Lucflio Martins, a forestry engineer working in the Service's central office in 
Lisbon. In political terms, the group covered the entire spectrum of different 
ideologies present in the country. Mendonca was said to have been a supporter of 
the previous regime, whereas Moreira da Silva and Lucflio Martins were claimed 
to be sympathetic to the Left. The group presented its final report to the secretary 
of state of agriculture in November 1974. This report was submitted to a 
referendum in December of that year (int 2 April 1991, 22 March 1993; see 
chapter 9). 
The third actor in the communal land issue was the Communist Party. The PCP 
had been involved in the communal land struggle since 1969. One of its members, 
Ant6nio Bica, acted as a lawyer for the rebellious parishes in the Vouga area. In 
1969 he was visited by a group from the parish of Talhadas in the municipality of 
Sever do Vouga 8. The parishioners came to ask him whether it would be possible 
to claim their baldios back from the Forestry Service. When I interviewed Bica, 
he recalled: 
I saw that they were really determined to get their land back from the 
Forestry Service. I heard all the injuries they suffered during the 
occupation of the commons by the Service, and told them: 'Well, from 
the legal point of view, there is no chance that you can win. It is not 
sensible to start a case in court, because you certainly will lose. But, as 
it is a serious problem, and if you all, without any exception, remain 
united, and if you want to start a social movement in the parish in order 
to recuperate your baldios, I think we can be successful. But I want one 
hundred per cent of the people involved, and no one staying out'. I told 
them that this was a social-political movement and therefore it was 
necessary to be sure that all would be united. They turned to me and 
responded: 'Yes Sir, we want to do this'. Then I made a report based 
on the information they gave me, sent this to the government, and asked 
for the restitution of the commons. The press started to write about it, 
and the movement rapidly expanded to the other parishes in the region. 
From Talhadas it went on to Prestimo, Cedrim, Albergaria das Cabras, 
He had acquired a certain trust among local farmers because of his role in the management of the 
local agrarian cooperative. He had also helped them when the Junta National de Vinho (National Wine 
Board) came to collect additional duties by organizing mass tax evasion in the region by convincing 
postmen to warn farmers that they were going to receive an assessment, thus giving them the 
opportunity to refuse it (int 1 October 1991). His interest in agrarian questions and land reform are 
reflected in a brochure he wrote during his directorship of the Vouzela cooperative. In the twenty-six-
page booklet, he defended the modernization of agriculture and proposes the creation of production 
cooperatives through the merging of individual smallholders. Individual incomes were to consist of a 
fixed sum which equalled the rent of the farmers' properties by the cooperative and a variable sum to 
compensate the farmers' labour (Bica 1966). 
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Cabreiros, Campia, Marcoselo das Maias, thus it spread over all the 
villages in that neighbourhood. 
In the face of this development, the government tried to open 
negotiations through the Aveiro District's Governor. It gave in rapidly. 
That is, it issued a decree by which the population which up to then 
never had received anything, was granted a fixed share of 25% of the 
revenues of the baldios. But the population was not satisfied, and 
demanded the total restitution of their commons. Especially the people 
of Talhadas wanted to go on. We occupied three hundred ha. of land 
and arrived at an agreement for the devolution of a large part of the 
common to this parish. (Int 1 October 1991) 
Of course Bica's involvement was professional; he was the parishioners' lawyer. 
But it was also political. Bica explicitly told the parishioners that their struggle was 
a political movement. He tried to use the baldios issue as a vehicle for the 
parishioners' political organization. Therefore, the role of Bica in the Vouga 
movement has to be approached as part of the strategy of Bica's party9. 
The PCP also tried to influence the Forestry Service. It used at least two 
channels. First, it participated in the working group that the Forestry Service 
formed for the reformulation of the legal base for managing the commons through 
the person of Lucilio Martins1 0. Second, in May 1974, Bica and another party 
member, Tengarrinha, contacted the commission and expressed their stand on the 
issue. 
Notwithstanding Marlins's presence in the working group, the influence of the 
PCP delegation was rather limited. Its members were seen as outsiders without any 
real knowledge of the problem of the commons. According to one of the working 
group's members, the PCP delegation initially even proposed dividing the 
commons. In this way, the envoys proved their naivety in the matter: "Tengarrinha 
came from Algarve and Bica from Beira. These people could never understand the 
reality of the commons." The party envoys only revised their position and agreed 
to conserve the baldios' communal property status in June or July after internal 
discussions (int 2 April 1991) 1 1. The way in which this person, who was one of 
' His party's involvement is confirmed by the mentioning of the Vouga movement in the (clandestine) 
Avante! of March 1974, and also in the PCP's Direction of the Northern Regional Organization's 
Balance of the Demands and Political Struggles of the North in 1973 (DORN 1974). 
1 0 During our interview, Lucflio Martins was very vague about the reasons for becoming involved in 
the issue. He told me that only that he had been selected because people thought him trustworthy. He 
did not explain by whom and why (int 22 March 1991). 
1 1 Bica denied this allegation: "No, the Party never wanted division of the commons. That is the old 
idea of the liberals. The idea was always collective exploitation by the population" (int 1 November 
1991). Perhaps the allegation is connected to the Vouga petition: the people from the Vouga area 
proposed, that, in case the commoners would decide not to continue communal exploitation, they should 
be allowed to divide their commons. 
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the foresters of the working group, described the negotiations with Bica and 
Tengarrinha tells a lot about this person's own position. The disqualification of in 
particular Bica's competence seems inaccurate, as Bica had acquired considerable 
knowledge of the communal land issue as the Vouga movement's lawyer. 
Seemingly, the speaker tried to downgrade the PCP's experience in communal land 
matters in order to raise the impression that the Forestry Service was only one 
capable of formulating an appropriate legal formula. 
I will return to the substance of the dispute between foresters and communist 
party members later. The point I want to make here is that in the first year after 
the revolution, three groups fought in the battle over the commons: the parishes 
from the Vouga area, the Forestry Service, and the PCP. Until 1975 the Forestry 
Service was able to dominate the field. This changed only when, due to political 
changes at a more general level, the PCP gained power and was able to dominate 
the country's political scene. 
The Revolutionary Period: 1974-1976 
In April 1974, the MFA still was a moderate political movement. It was primarily 
bent on resolving the colonial question. Because General Spinola had published a 
book on the matter, the MFA thought that he would be the most appropriate person 
to lead the country. Consequently, General Spinola was inaugurated as president 
three weeks after the takeover (Insight Team 1975:114). Spinola installed a 
provisional government headed by Palma Carlos, like Caetano, a law professor 
from the University of Lisbon. 
It rapidly became clear, however, that Spinola and his supporters held different 
opinions from the MFA on how to stop the colonial wars. After a conflict over this 
question, Palma Carlos and his government had to step down in July. They were 
replaced by a second provisional government, which was more closely connected 
to the MFA. The new prime minister, Vasco Goncalves, was a member of the 
MFA. He was also the only colonel on the movement's coordinating committee and 
the MFA's highest ranking officer (Insight Team 1975:148-149). During the 
following months, the conflicts between the MFA and the general intensified. By 
the end of September 1974, it came to a final power test which was won by the 
MFA. General Spinola resigned and was replaced by General Da Costa Gomes. 
The second provisional government was replaced by a third, again under 
Goncalves's leadership (Insight Team 1975:166-178). 
The results of these shifts were immediately reflected in the country's politics. 
Decolonization was stepped up. Independence was quickly granted to Cape Verde 
and Sao Tom6 e Principe, and the incorporation of Portuguese territories into India 
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was formally recognized (Robinson 1979:221) 1 2. Furthermore, the population, 
dissatisfied with the slow reform of the country's socio-economic structure, became 
agitated. Revolutionary fever ran through the country. Popular movements seized 
the land belonging to large estate holders in the south, and occupied plants and 
created workers' management committees in the cities. 
The radicalization of the political process caused great concern to Spinola and 
his supporters. In order to stem the rising of the "red tide" they attempted a second 
coup on 11 March 1975. But they failed because the key brigades remained faithful 
to the government and the people of Lisbon erected barricades and encircled one 
of the mutinous barracks. Spfnola and his party fled to Spain (insight Team 
1975:219-227). 
The result of Spinola's strategy was exactly the opposite of what he had 
intended. The Junta da Salvagao National was dissolved and replaced with the 
MFA-dominated Concelho da Revolugao (Revolutionary Council). Revolutionary 
fever intensified. Banks and large industries were nationalized (Insight Team 
1975:229) 1 3. On 26 March 1975, the fourth provisional government was installed, 
once again headed by Vasco Goncalves. The secretary of state of agriculture was 
replaced by a minister, Fernando Oliveira Baptista, an agricultural economist. 
The changes at the Department of Agriculture point to two important 
developments. First, they signified the importance which the new government 
attributed to agrarian questions. The new incumbent was a full minister who could 
attend the cabinet meetings. Second, Baptista's appointment implied a political 
radicalization. The new minister wanted a drastic reform of the country's agrarian 
structure. He created a legal framework for the spontaneous land seizures in the 
south (Decreto-Lei 203-C/75). In the so-called ZIRA (Zona de Intervengao da 
Reforma Agraria, Agrarian Reform Intervention Zone), land was confiscated from 
large estate holders and united into production cooperatives. In addition, he took 
measures that concerned the entire country; for instance, Decreto-Lei 201/75, 
which introduced protection of tenants and regulated rents, and Decreto-Lei 195-
A/75, which abolished the last remaining feudal rent payments (foros). Finally, he 
drew up proposals for laws that would regulate the restoration of the commons. In 
January 1976 these were published in a slightly modified version as Decreto-Lei 
1 2 Goa, Damiao, and Diu had already been occupied by Indian troops in December 1961. Their defense 
resulted in twenty-five deaths and more than three thousand prisoners. Salazar and Caetano had always 
refused to recognize the absorption of these territories by the Indian Federation. Salazar had even 
declined to let the prisoners return believing that they should have fought until the last man (Ferreira 
1992:271; Caires 1991a). 
1 3 The shares of the large capital groups in the paper pulp sector were confiscated, too. CPC in Cacia, 
Celnorte, Socel, and Celtejo were nationalized on 9 May 1975 (Decreto-Lei 221-A/75). Since then these 
four plants have remained united in a state-owned, public enterprise, Portucel. Between 27 May 1975 
and 14 July 1976 this company was administered by the workers under Decreto-Lei 554-A/76 (Portucel 
1978). CUF's 22% interest in Celbi was also nationalized, but Billerud's 78% remained unchanged, 
as all other foreign capital. 
192 Planting Power 
39/76 and 40/76 (Estrela 1978:239, 250-252; Hoebink 1981; Barreto 1987:216; 
Hammond 1988:178-187) 1 4. 
For the implementation of his reform policy in the north of the country, Baptista 
created a new state organism, the Servigo de Apoio e Desenvolvimento Agrdrio 
(Agrarian Support and Development Service, SAD A). The main reason for this 
step was that the class nature of the state machinery made it unsuitable for the 
support and development of the peasantry. The central level of the old agrarian 
services had been occupied by citydwellers, and the regional level was populated 
by caciques and other members of the rural elite (Baptista 1978a: 135-139). 
The fourth provisional government was in control until 10 July 1975. When the 
Socialist Party (PS) and the Social Democrats (PPD/PSD) withdrew their ministers, 
Vasco Goncalves formed a new cabinet (the fifth provisional government) 
consisting of ministers from the MDP (an umbrella of progressive oppositional 
movements created for the 1973 elections), the PCP, and several independent 
ministers. In September Goncalves was replaced by Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo 
(the sixth provisional government). Although Baptista lost his position as minister 
to the socialist Antonio Lopes Cardoso, the PCP continued to be present in the 
ministry through Ant6nio Bica, who became secretary of state for agrarian reform. 
On 25 November 1975, the radical left attempted a coup, which like Spinola's 
eight months earlier, failed. The sixth provisional government remained in charge. 
However, the PCP (rightly or wrongly seen as responsible for the insurrection) lost 
most of its political influence (Insight Team 1975:245-265; Robinson 1979:194-
251). After parliamentary elections in April 1976, Pinheiro's cabinet was 
succeeded by the first constitutional government under Mario Soares, the leader of 
the Socialist Party. Cardoso continued as minister of agriculture until September 
1977, when he resigned after a conflict with Soares concerning the future of 
agrarian reform. He was replaced by Ant6nio Barreto, whose opinions were less 
radical (Robinson 1979:252-268; Hoebink 1981:41; int 28 May 1993). 
This brief review of the turbulent years following the Carnations Revolution, 
shows that after a relatively moderate beginning in April 1974, the political process 
radicalized. Due to drastic shifts in the power balance resulting from pressures 
within the army trying to stop the colonial war and from social unrest in the south 
and the industrial areas, the PCP was able to dominate the political scene for a 
period of six months. It was exactly during this period that the fundamental 
decisions were taken concerning the legal status of the commons. Baptista's 
proposals, after being accepted by the council of ministers, were never 
promulgated by the president of the republic due to the premature end of the fifth 
government. Yet, his ideas would define the legal status of the commons during 
the next twenty years. His successor copied Baptista's proposals without substantial 
1 4 For a review of the agrarian reform legislation see Mouro and Mouro (1976). 
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The Actors and Their Proposals 
The 1976 legislation was the outcome and materialization of a social struggle 
between three groups: the parishioners from the Vouga area, the Forestry Service, 
and the PCP. Each of these groups proposed certain measures aimed at the 
reorganization of communal land management. And through each of these 
proposals shines the particular perspective and interests of the group which 
promoted it. 
The Parishes from the Vouga Area 
In their petition sent to the second provisional government in August 1974, the 
people from the Vouga area did not limit themselves to complaining about the past, 
but also sought to influence the future of communal land management. They 
concluded their document by making eight demands which can be seen as the first 
attempt to formulate a framework for a new legal regulation of the status of the 
baldios. These demands essentially called for: 
a. The restoration of those commons occupied by the Forestry Service to the 
administration of the parish councils of the parishes in which they were 
located. 
b. The restoration to the administration of the Parish Councils of all baldios 
larger than 5 ha that had been acquired by individuals within the last fifty 
years, or since 28 May 1926 (the date of the military takeover that put and end 
to the First Republic) if the alienation had occurred in such a way that the 
majority of the population never had a chance of acquiring parts of the baldio. 
In case the present proprietors paid for the land, they were to receive their 
money back. 
c. The legalization of usurpations of baldio land by parishioners if these 
usurpations were in harmony with the principles of justice and equity. 
d. The creation of basic legislation for forest management (cuttings, replantings, 
etc.). 
e. The development of a national forestry plan for private and collective property. 
1 5 Klein and Stok (1986:134) claim that Cardoso removed measures included by Baptista to countervail 
social differentiation. Baptista (1978a:94) suggests the same when he mentions the decalcar (copying) 
of his proposals by his successor. I have not been able to verify these assertions as I have never had 
the opportunity to read Baptista's bill. 
modifications15. After promulgation by the president, the decrees were published 
in January 1976. 
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f. The reorganization of the Forestry Service including a purge antisocial civil 
servants from its ranks, and a rearrangements of the Service's into an 
investigative and planning-oriented body. 
g. The creation of a national forest fire-brigade and; 
h. The conversion of the corps of forest guards into a group of personnel keeping 
watch over the mountain regions and waste lands (Anonymous 1974; Avante! 
1974a, 1974b; Bica 1989). 
Among these points, three elements merit special attention: the ousting of the 
Forestry Service, the transfer of the administration of the commons to the parish 
council, and the acceptance of (limited) privatization of communal land. 
As to the first element, the ousting of the Forestry Service, the petition's 
phrasing suggests that the local population had lost all confidence in and respect 
for the Service. The authors of the petition demanded the limitation of the Forestry 
Service's role to the provision of technical advice and assistance. The corps of 
forest guards, the means through which the Service exercised direct control over 
the baldios, had to be separated from the Forestry Service and the Service had to 
be transformed into a body with wider "ecological watchdog" functions (demand 
h of the petition). This did not mean that the petitioners objected to afforestation. 
On the contrary, they were well aware of the value of the forests on the baldios. 
In document it was stated that "today wood production is the best form of 
economic exploitation of the mountain baldios...." (Anonymous 1974, section 10). 
Four out of the eight demands concerned forest management. The petitioners 
demanded legislation that would regulate the exploitation of the commons by the 
parish councils and prohibit certain practices such as early felling. They also 
demanded a national forestry plan, improvement of the fire combat organization, 
and general vigilance over the wild vegetation. 
The second element that merits special attention is the transfer of the commons' 
administration to the parish councils. The petitioners argued that in the past in 
which allegedly the parish councils played a major role in the management of the 
commons. However, in Campea the commons were clearly the communities' 
traditional domain. Of course it is possible that the situation was different in the 
Vouga area and that there the parish councils had played a more dominant role 
than in Tras-os-Montes. In any case, the petitioners claim fitted neatly within the 
interests of the parish councils, which constituted the movement's leadership. 
The third element concerns the privatization of the commons. The petitioners did 
not object to the alienation of communal land. They demanded only reversion of 
the privatization of a piece of baldio if that had been done against what they called 
"the principles of justice and equity". This point should also be approached from 
the perspective of the interests of the movement's leadership. In many parishes 
privatizations had taken place with the consent of the local Council on behalf of the 
local elite. 
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The Forestry Service 
The petitioners from the Vouga area proposed strengthening the position of parish 
councils in communal land matters and ousting the Forestry Service. The working 
group created by the Service itself, suggested the opposite. Its proposition was 
accepted by the state secretary of agriculture but did not become law because of 
the intervention by Spinola. When the general attempted his coup on 11 March, the 
cabinet meeting that was to discuss and approve the Service's proposal was 
adjourned. Although the coup itself failed, a new government was installed which 
developed its own ideas about the commons. The exact contents of the Forestry 
Service's proposal can be found in appendix 11. Here, I limit myself to discussing 
the political implications of their enactment. 
The foresters of the working group did not agree with the idea that the 
afforestation of the commons had been disastrous to the local communities: 
...in an impartial balance one will have to recognize that the material 
prejudices were not as high as has been claimed. But nobody will dare to 
deny that there have been sometimes really dramatic psychological 
traumas. (Preamble 1974 enactment) 
They accepted that things had gone wrong and that, in the past, the commoners had 
been insufficiently compensated for the loss of their baldios. They attributed these 
imperfections not so much to the afforestation project itself, but to poor 
administration and lack of sound legal regulations. 
As a way to correct the imbalances of the earlier forestry intervention the 
working group proposed that the population would participate in forest management 
and receive a larger share of the revenues from the tree stands: 
It has been tried to make the new text take into consideration the 
aspirations of the village communities participating in the administration 
of the baldios and defending in a concrete and dynamic way their 
legitimate interests. (Preamble 1974 enactment). 
Therefore, the group proposed a new framework for the management of the baldios 
which would allow more involvement by the local population. It would also 
guarantee them fair compensation for the exploitation of their land. 
This new framework involved three elements: a (re-)definition of the property 
status of the commons, the (re-)formulation of the distributive code which regulated 
the division of forest revenues among the commoners and the State, and the 
development of an organizational format which would reconcile popular 
participation in the administration of the commons with technically and 
economically sound management of the forests. 
The working group started defending the position that the ownership of the 
commons should not be determined by means of the administrative order of the 
State, but by the existing usufruct rights. It argued that traditionally the baldios 
belonged to neither the parishes nor the municipalities, but to users' communities 
(povos) which were smaller than the parish and consisted generally of one or more 
villages. Consequently, the border of a baldio would not necessarily coincide with 
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an adnunistrative division. A parish area would be divided into various commons 
and as a community could have usufruct rights in areas from other parishes or 
municipalities. A common could also encompass areas across these administrative 
boundaries. 
The group also developed a new distributive code to determine the compensation 
that the commoners would receive for the loss of their pastures to forestry. 
Formally, according to the 1901 and 1938 legislation, the parish councils or 
municipalities received part of the revenues from the forests that had been planted 
on their baldios according to their share in the investments, i.e., the land 
contributed to afforestation. The remainder went to the State. In the case of 
Campea, the project proposal's total investments amounted to 18.5 million escudos. 
As the land was valued at 250 escudos per ha, this implied that the parish would 
receive about 10% of the gross revenues. This regulation was changed in 1962, 
when it was determined that the parishes would obtain a fixed 10% share of the 
timber and fuel wood. In 1972 this portion was raised to 25% (Avante! 1974a). In 
reality, the parish councils seldom received anything. Payments, if any, entered 
into the treasury of the municipal authorities, and frequently their actual amount 
depended upon the relationship between the Cdmara and the forestry officials 
(Anonymous 1973; int 22 March 1991, 2 April 1991, 4 September 1991). The 
working group reversed this distributive code. It proposed that the share received 
by the Forestry Service be calculated according to its investment and that the 
proprietors would receive the remainder. It estimated that with this approach the 
users' communities would receive at least 60% of the gross timber revenues. 
In addition, the working group proposed three variations for the management 
structure of the commons: (a) management by the population, (b) management in 
cooperation with the State, and (c) management solely by the State. The first two 
modalities guaranteed participation of the commoners in the management of the 
baldios. The final modality was designed for those cases in which the population 
would not be interested in any of the other options for management, or when the 
commons concerned were classified as nature reserves. 
These three elements again point in one direction: the institutional self-interest 
of the Forestry Service. This can be supported by the following three arguments. 
First, attribution of the administration of the commons to small social units 
preserved the Service's strength in relation to local communities. Compared to the 
villagers, parish administrators were generally more experienced and thus capable 
of causing more "complications". Municipalities even had an administrative staff. 
Hence, the Service's move to delegate ownership rights to village communities 
rather than local administrative bodies was not only inspired by a certain concept 
of traditional ownership rights, but also by strategic considerations. As the former 
Secretary of State Ant6nio Bica put it: 
...the Forestry Service's technocrats in a progressive disguise "surpassed" 
the popular movement, as is the mark of all pseudo-revolutionaries, and 
tried to subdivide the baldios into small areas (smaller than the parishes), 
with independent administrations, and in many cases without organizational 
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power or capacities, in order to allow the Forestry Service to maintain the 
baldios under its tutelage. (Bica, letter to Manuel Rodrigues, 23 November 
1987, p.5) 
Second, the proposal included the option that the State could manage the 
commons by itself. 
And, if it is decided to maintain state intervention in a certain case, this is 
done because of imperatives of a geographical nature. The majority of the 
baldios is located in areas that are extremely sensitive to destructive 
activities by erosive agencies. (Preamble 1974 enactment) 
In this manner the third modality offered something like a safety valve. If many 
communities threatened to break with the Service, the latter could always resort to 
technocratic arguments such as the necessity of its presence in an area to look after 
erosion or to protect a specific ecosystem. 
Third, in the first version of its proposal, the working group had not included 
the first modality which permitted administration of the commons without state 
participation. This modality was only added after the secretary of state of 
agriculture had refused to endorse the enactment unless the commoners were given 
the freedom to choose their own relationship with the State. Thus, in the 
enactment's original version, the power of the Service was even stronger than in 
its final version. 
Table 8.1 Summary of the ownership and management situation of Portuguese forests in 
1972 (sources: DGSFA 1972; Mendonça 1961a; IPF 1988). 
Owner Regime Manager Area 1972 Manager Regime 
State total other entity 2,841 2,841 
51,523 
total Forestry Service 48,682 
549,021 
Community 
(baldios) 
partial Forestry Service 500,339 
partial owner 2,540 586,870 
Private partial owner 83,991 960,294 
simple owner 873,763 873,763 
Total under forestry regime (ha) 1,512,156 1,512,156 1,512,156 
Total forest area (ha) 1959, 1988) 2,900,000 3,065,000 
Not submitted to any forestry regime (1959,1988)" 1,400,000 1,600,000 
* Estimations on the basis of the total forest areas in 1959 and 1988; the actual forest area controlled 
by the State was smaller than the area submitted to the partial forestry regime. 
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For these three reasons, the working group's enactment was clearly directed at the 
continuation of the Service's presence in the commons. The importance of that 
continuation becomes directly obvious if one realizes that the commons formed the 
raison d'être for the Service. The Forestry Service was involved in the surveillance 
of about half (1.5 million ha) of the total forest area and managed only one-fifth 
(550,000 ha). Moreover, only a relatively small part of the area managed by the 
Service was the property of the State (52,000 ha.). The majority (90%), was baldio 
land owned by local communities (table 8.1). Hence, control over the baldios was 
vital to the Service. If that were to be taken away, the Service would lose most of 
its material basis, and risk being reduced to a loosely tied network of forest guards 
executing the simple forestry regime in the privately owned montados in the south. 
It would also lose its privileged position as one of the very few state organisms that 
generated its own income. Loss or division of the commons would lead to 
reduction of the area under control, as well as the body of officers, administrators 
and other civil servants staffing the organization. 
The Communist Party 
The replacement of the third provisional government by the fourth meant the end 
of the proposal drawn up by the Forestry Service. Instead, left-wing politicians 
such as Baptista who envisaged a radical reform of the country's agrarian structure 
took it upon themselves to reformulate the legal framework for the administration 
of the baldios. The PCP's interests in the matter were evident in their bill. 
Basically, these interests were the promotion of revolutionary social transformation 
and the creation of a popular support base among the peasantry of the north. The 
law's integral text is included in appendix 12. 
The law's main objective was to integrate local commoners into democratic 
forms of organization. It was not directed at the administration of forests. Contrary 
to the 1974 draft, it no longer protected the Forestry Service's exclusive interests. 
The Forestry Service was not even mentioned. The Service's position was further 
weakened by the fact that of the three modalities for managing the commons 
proposed in the 1974 draft the third modality was dropped. The working group had 
proposed to give the commoners the option to choose between management by 
commoners alone, by representatives of the population and the State together, or 
by the State alone. Because the law did not include this last option, it guaranteed 
the commoners' involvement in the management of the baldios. Management of the 
baldios could no longer become an exclusive task of the Forestry Service. 
Furthermore, all typical forestry-related stipulations such as the creation of 
intervention zones, were dropped. Instead, the 1976 law contained all kinds of 
regulations concerning the election of members to the management commissions, 
convocation of assemblies, etc. All these regulations were absent in the 1974 
Forestry Service's proposal. 
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The legislature's attitude towards the afforestation project appears clearly from 
first sentence of the preamble of the 1976 law: 
The handing over of the baldios to the communities which were robbed of 
them by the fascist state corresponds to an old and constant demand of the 
povos and will concretize intentions which have been repeatedly announced 
by the various Governments that have come after 25 April 1974. 
(Preamble Decreto-Lei 39/76) 
The intervention in the commons by the fascist state through the parcelling of land 
by the JCI and afforestation by the Forestry Service, were presented as acts of 
robbery. Whereas the Service's working group still defended the afforestation 
project itself and was only willing to accept that its implementation had been unfair 
or badly organized, the 1976 legislature assumed that the entire project had been 
unjust. 
The text of the preamble also shows that the law was meant to have a more 
general goal. In addition to regulating the ownership and use of the baldios, it was 
geared to a general transformation of society in order to stimulate, 
local and direct forms of expression and democratic organization which 
permit the rural workers to increase their control over the productive 
process and natural resources.... In this way one has tried to associate 
concretely the institutionalization of local democratic organisation to the 
restitution of the baldios. (Ibid) 
In short, the law supported a retreat of the State in favour of a particular form of 
popular democratic participation. Echoing Hammond (1988), one might say that 
it was building popular power. 
The 1976 law and the 1974 proposal differed in their perception of the 
afforestation project, the position of the Forestry Service in relation to the village 
communities and to other public bodies, and the general political aim they 
embodied. Despite these differences, they had three features in common: the 
exclusion of the parish councils from communal land management, the distributive 
code that regulated the division of forest revenues between the commoners and the 
State, and the prohibition to privatize the commons. In the 1976 law, this 
prohibition was even stricter than in the 1974 proposal. 
The phrasing of the law reflects the different strategic options which the PCP 
formulated during 1974-1976. These options are discussed in the next section. 
The PCP as a Revolutionary Movement 
From the April revolution until the end of 1975, the PCP was one of the central 
civil political organizations in the country. The main reason for this was that, at 
that time, it was "the only political organization worthy of the name" (Santos 
1982:264-265). The PCP was the sole opposition movement that had survived the 
Estado Novo's political repression. It was founded in 1921 and had its first 
congress in 1923. The party was then banned in 1927, soon after the overthrow of 
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the republican regime and before Salazar's rise to power. But contrary to the 
socialists, republicans, liberals, and other opposition parties, the PCP was able to 
maintain its organizational structure during the dictatorship. It went underground, 
where it continued to publish its party newspaper, Avante! (Forward!) and even 
organized clandestine party congresses. During this period, the party gained 
considerable popular support among the working class in the industrial centres of 
Setiibal and Lisbon (Barreiro), and among the rural proletariat in the Alentejo. This 
was due to the party's work in the labour movement (both in industry and 
agriculture)16. Outliving all other opposition groups, it was for years the main 
driving force that kept anti-Fascist resistance alive (De Figueiredo 1975:238-239). 
As Mario Soares, the socialist leader and current president of the Republic 
recalled: "The truth is that [at that time, RB] we all were communists" (Lopes 
1992). 
Shifts in the Parry's Strategy 
The party's long-term strategy was geared to the introduction of socialism. As the 
programme of the sixth congress of 1965 stated, the party's "supreme objective ... 
[was] the victory of the proletarian revolution and the construction of socialism and 
communism in Portugal" (quoted by Robinson 1979:202). But in the short-term, 
the party could endorse other policies first, such as the installation of bourgeois 
parliamentary rule. 
During the revolutionary period, the party's strategy passed through several 
phases. Initially, the fall of the Salazarist regime was seen as "the realisation of the 
national and democratic revolution", an essential step on the journey to socialism 
which could not be omitted (PCP's Congress October 1974, quoted by Robinson 
1979:202). Therefore, the party supported appeals for order, national unity, 
economic reconstruction, wage restraint, and the need for dedicated hard work. For 
example, in June 1974 the party's regional leadership in Lisbon attacked strikers 
of the postal service, stating: 
The objective [of those who instigated the strike, RB] is this: to oppose the 
workers to the Provisional Government and to bring an atmosphere of 
discontent and revolt that benefits fascism and reaction. (Quoted by Insight 
Team 1975:124). 
In August 1974, the party endorsed a government decree banning political 
stoppages and strikes in sympathy with other workers, as well as introducing a 
tiiirty-seven-day pre-strike period which, if violated by workers, made a lock-out 
legal (Robinson 1979:202). In October 1974, at the brief seventh party-congress, 
Pereira (1987) believes that the present concentration of its electorate in these regions still reflects 
the 1940s proletarianization process. This would indicate that the party still capitalizes on past social 
processes and has been unable to adapt itself to subsequent developments. 
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the PCP even dropped the demand for Portugal to immediately leave NATO as 
well as the concept of a dictatorship of the proletariate (Robinson 1979:229). 
The abortive coup of 11 March 1975 marked a new phase in the party's strategy. 
Political life and the PCP's attitude radicalized. Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves, 
allegedly a party member, believed that Portugal was a country on the road to 
socialism. His vision was endorsed by spontaneous popular movements in the 
country: occupation of land by the Alentejano rural proletariat demanding land 
reform, house squatting, workers' committees taking over enterprises, etc. When 
this social movement overtook the party's positions, the PCP reformulated its ideas 
about the process of social transformation taking place in the country. It no longer 
perceived democracy as a necessity for achieving socialism. In June 1975, two 
months after the elections for the Constitutional Assembly which showed that the 
party would not be able to rule on a parliamentary basis, the party's general 
secretary, Alvaro Cunhal, told Oriana Fallaci: 
We are effecting a revolution with the armed forces.... We communists do 
not accept the game of elections. Elections have nothing or very little to 
do with revolutionary dynamics.... There are two options here: either a 
monopoly with a strong reactionary government or the end of monopoly 
with a strong communist democracy.... We do not wait for the results of 
elections to change things and destroy the past.... (From: Interviews with 
History, quoted by Robinson 1979:236) 
Although Robinson (1979) takes a clear anti-PCP stand, accusing it of anti-
democratic and Stalinist attitudes, he also suggests that after Spinola's unsuccessful 
seizure of power, the party had strategic as well as ideological reasons to review 
its position and to make more radical demands. The PCP became engaged in a 
three-front war: against the far left, which accused the party of revisionism because 
of its participation in a bourgeois government, against the moderate left (the 
Socialist Party), and against the Right. The occupation of estates in the Alentejo 
and of industrial enterprises elsewhere in the country were not initiated by the 
party itself but by the ultra-left, by local party members, and also by socialists. 
Fearing alienation from its popular base, the party attempted to absorb these 
movements and make them its own. In 1974 the party started to lose popular 
support because it did not back the strikes (Blackburn 1974:30). This tendency to 
make itself an ally of (radical) social movements became even stronger when at the 
1975 elections for the Constitutional Assembly, the party ended up behind the 
socialists and the moderate social democrats. The party had no other choice for 
staying in power but to cling to its ideological kin within the MFA. 
The PCP's efforts to formulate a new law for the commons can be interpreted 
as the outcome of its awkward and contradictory relationship with social 
movements. The law then becomes an attempt "to make these movements its own" 
as Robinson (1979:237) would put it, and it is an attempt to avoid further 
alienation from the party's popular base. In other words, one might say that there 
was a populist strategy behind the PCP's stand towards the commons. By backing 
a law which satisfied protracted demands of rural communities, the party could 
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promote itself as a defender of the northern peasantry. In this manner, the law can 
also be seen as an attempt to acquire support among this specific social class 
which, until then, had provided only scant support to the party (compare Baptista 
1978a: 155). 
Next to this more or less opportunistic interpretation, other readings of the 
PCP's law on the commons are possible. These are connected more to the party's 
fundamental interpretation of the nature of the commons and the revolutionary 
potential of their administration by the local communities. These readings can be 
summarized by the labels "primitive communism" and "dual powers". 
The way in which the PCP approached communal land management was heavily 
influenced by the work of nineteenth and twentieth century social scientists on 
Portuguese rural communities. Authors like Oliveira Martins, a late nineteenth-
century politician and scientist (Silbert 1981:238-242; Silva 1978:46-47), and 
anthropologists such as Jorge Dias (1948,1953) and Rocha Peixoto (1975), applied 
the ideas of primitive communism developed by Friedrich Engels (1980) to 
Portuguese rural communities. Since then, this romantic perception of rural 
communities has profoundly influenced intellectual discussions both on the Right 
and the Left (see for instance chapter 10 for the arguments formulated by the left-
wing politicians in parliament in defense of the 1976 law). Baptista agreed that the 
commons should be seen as a remnant of a pre-capitalist social formation, but he 
also followed Lenin's argument that these communities' direct transition to 
communism was impossible (Baptista 1978a: 166-167). In addition, he criticized the 
image of rural societies as internally equal and pointed to the importance of social 
differentiation. 
In the course of this process [the penetration of capitalism, RB] the 
(formally) maintained [communitarian] tradition - for instance: those 
having animals have access to the commons — acquired a new content. It 
served above all strata the farmers with access to pastures that could 
support their herds during the part of the year the communal area could 
not be used (Baptista 1978a: 94). 
Consequently, he argued that it would be necessary to protect smaller farmers 
against the large cattle holders who would perceive the maintenance of communal 
pastures as an improvement in their own position. Therefore, Baptista included 
several measures to counter the monopolization of the commons by the local elite. 
Baptista acknowledged that communitarian traditions could exacerbate social 
differentiation within a community of commoners, but he apparently believed that 
this was a perversion of that tradition. Social differentiation was externally caused. 
It was the result of the penetration of capitalism, rather than something inherent to 
the community itself. Baptista did not really free himself of the romanticism that 
characterized Portuguese thinking about the commons. 
When Cardoso adopted Baptista's proposals, he skipped the measures which 
were aimed at counteracting the impact of social differentiation on communal land 
use (Klein and Stok 1986:134). Hence, the law as it was published in 1976, totally 
reiterated the romantic ideas about rural communities that had been developed in 
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the previous century and brought into Portuguese anthropology by such people as 
Oliveira Martins, Peixoto, and Dias. The law's attempt to administer the commons 
through a commoners' assembly and elected officials was clearly built upon the 
anthropological experience that pointed to the traditional role of village councils 
and elected zeladdres and mordomos. 
The 1976 law points also to Lenin's ideas about social revolutions. Lenin 
proposed power dualism as a revolutionary strategy aimed at undermining the 
regime and establishing an alternative State by creating an alternative source of 
legitimacy. In doing so, one not merely breaks the State's legislative monopoly 
and, consequently, dismantles the State's legitimizing capacity, but one also poses 
an alternative source of legitimacy and law (Poulantzas 1978:76). This situation of 
dual powers characterized at least two revolutionary situations; the Paris Commune 
and the Russian revolution (Santos 1979:153, 1982:252). In Portugal, the concept 
of dual powers applies to the initiatives taken by the masses in a (pre-)revolution-
ary crisis versus the official administration of justice (Santos 1979, 1982, 1990). 
People created their own tribunals in which individuals were judged according to 
criteria set by the revolutionary context. Santos (1979:156-160, 1982:256-262) 
gives the examples of a woman who illegally occupied a house, and a man who 
killed his patron. Both people were acquitted because of the revolutionary character 
of their acts. The woman was part of a squatters movement aimed at rectifying 
unjust rental conditions, and the man was judged to have acted out of self-defense 
and in reaction to what his patron had made him suffer before the revolution. The 
provisional governments tried to embody this kind of legitimation into the State's 
legal system by producing a legislation with a revolutionary contents, such as 
agrarian reform, and the new rental law (Santos 1990:32-33). 
Baptista's proposal and the 1976 law fitted into this revolutionary legislation. It 
created at least a potential situation for dual powers and legalities. On the one 
hand, the commoners' commissions derived their legitimacy from customary rights 
with respect to communal land use. This traditional legitimacy existed 
independently from the State. When the new law restored the commons, this 
ancient legitimacy was reinforced by a revolutionary legitimacy. On the other hand, 
the parish councils were legitimized by their traditional connection to the Church, 
and by their position within the state apparatus (secularization of the state was 
implemented only in 1912). So while the parish councils derived their authority 
from the top, the commoners' assemblies and management commissions derived 
their authority and legitimacy from the bottom, from the community's interior. In 
this manner, the commoners' commissions posed an alternative to the ruling State. 
Why the PCP Failed 
Careful examination of these three elements in the PCP's analysis (transition to 
communism, dual powers, and populism) shows that they are internally and 
mutually contradictory. 
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First, despite defending the commons and commoners' communities as examples 
of primitive communism, the party believed that a direct transition to communism 
was impossible. The commoners' communities had to pass through a phase of 
capitalism and social differentiation. Nevertheless, the PCP promoted a law which 
would at least slow that transition down. In addition, the idea of non-capitalist 
communities itself was erroneous. As I have shown for Campea, these communities 
were already characterized by a capitalist organization in their economy and a 
strong integration in the wider economic environment. 
Second, as Poulantzas (1977, 1978) argues, the PCP's strategy was geared 
towards the creation of popular power outside the State (power dualism) and, at the 
same time, occupation of key positions within the state apparatus itself. The first 
strategy failed because the PCP was unable to combine the different foci of popular 
power such as popular courts of justice, squatter movements, agrarian 
cooperatives, and neighbourhood committees into one cohesive movement. Even 
the attempts to unite the communal land management commissions into regional 
secretariats never had this effect. In practice, these secretariats hardly challenged 
the State's legitimacy, and merely acted as service organizations to commoners 
who wanted to create management commissions. (I return to this issue in chapter 
10.) The second strategy failed for two reasons: the underlying instrumentalist 
conception of the State and the tenacity of the bureaucrats who were able to bide 
their time. The party assumed that the State could be controlled and wielded freely 
by those who mastered it. In this manner, the PCP failed to see that the State is a 
theatre of war. This war concerns not only classes and interest groups trying to 
gain control over the State, but also the bureaucrats who compose its apparatuses. 
As Poulantzas (1977:128) and Santos (1990:33-35) argue, the latter simply waited 
until the revolutionary tide ebbed away. The most original characteristic of the 
Portuguese State was its capacity to remain intact amidst profound social struggles 
through a relatively long-lasting, widespread administrative paralysis. 
These general observations also apply to the case of the law for the commons. 
First, the PCP was unable to unite different management commissions under one 
system capable of posing as an alternative to the State. Second, attributing official 
legality to the local management commissions by definition rooted them in the 
State. Thus, the idea that these commissions represented an oppositional power and 
alternative legality dissipated. Finally, the party was unable to break through the 
vested interest of the Forestry Service in the commons and the technological 
rationale by which it legitimated its privileged position in discussions over the 
future status of the commons. 
The third strategic error concerns the support that the party expected to raise by 
endorsing the restitution of the commons. The PCP misinterpreted the power 
relations between the different classes and the extent to which the people would 
endorse a socialist experiment (Poulantzas 1977:134). The same holds true for the 
peasants targeted by the law for the commons. The party's policy towards the 
commons was never able to break existing political loyalties. Although control over 
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the commons played an important role in local politics, it never did so 
unequivocally in favour of the communists. 
Conclusion: The Forestry Service's Victory 
After the revolution, three groups struggled over the baldios: parishioners from the 
Vouga area, foresters, and the PCP. Although the parishioners were the first to 
enter the arena, they were the least influential. Their proposal, which entailed the 
strengthening of the parish councils to the detriment of the Forestry Service, hardly 
influenced the final outcome. Marginalized, they had to accept that the final legal 
text was a compromise between the foresters and the communists. At first, it 
seemed that the PCP and other radicals were the victorious party. The 1976 law 
on the commons fitted within the general framework of agrarian reform. It allowed 
for popular democratic control over the means of production, contributed to the 
socialization of the means of production, and hence to the transition to socialism. 
However, a closer inspection of the 1976 law shows that it also contained some 
elements that had been defended by the bureaucrats and technicians of the Forestry 
Service. These elements were the protection of common property against 
privatization, and the elimination of the municipal and parish councils from 
communal land management. 
The PCP was unable to use the law as an instrument for acquiring political 
support among the rural population. The commons never became a source of an 
alternative legality which could challenge the bourgeois state and open the road for 
popular democratic rule as the party had hoped. The result was that the Forestry 
Service , not the PCP, benefitted from the law. The law did not oust the Service 
from the commons. It created an opportunity for the continuation of the forestry 
project and the Service's presence in the area; Just as the Forestry Service itself 
had proposed in 1974, the management of the baldios was attributed to the villages 
and not to the parishes or the municipalities, and an administration modality was 
created which permitted for the Service's representation on the commoners' 
management commissions. In this manner, the law offered ample opportunities for 
the Service to retain its control over the commons. In next chapter, I will discuss 
the reception of the 1974 revolution and 1976 by the people of CampeS and discuss 
whether the Forestry Service really grabbed the opportunity. 

Chapter 9 
Carnations and the Commons in Campeâ 
Introduction 
In chapter 8 I explained that the 1976 law on the baldios was the outcome of a 
struggle between foresters and communists. In the capital, Lisbon, the communists 
were victorious, but the new law offered ample opportunity for the continuation 
and development of the Forestry Service's forestry project and control over the 
commons. It laid the foundations for the Service's victory in the countryside. The 
question is, whether the Service really exploited this chance. Did it maintain its 
dominion over the baldios? Did it take advantage of the law to develop a new and 
more stable relationship with the local population and involve them in afforestation 
and forest management? Or did it hide behind the borders of the areas subjected 
to the forestry regime and continue in the same manner as under the Estado Novo? 
These queries are the main topics of this chapter. 
The relation between the commoners' communities and the Forestry Service can 
only be understood by looking at the broader context. The 1976 law on the baldios 
was part and parcel of a revolutionary movement. Therefore, in the first sections 
of this chapter I will discuss how the revolution itself was received in Campea and 
how the law was implemented in the parish. I go on to uncover what this says 
about the nature of both the parish society and the State at that time. The chapter 
concludes with a portrait of how the Forestry Service and the commoners' 
communities of Campea related to each other after 1974. 
Vila Real and Campea: Change but no Rupture 
Military takeovers in Portugal were typically metropolitan, taking place in Lisbon, 
or in Porto, "the capital of the North". Coups d'etat did not really touch upon 
social and political life in the countryside. When the Municipal Council of Vila 
Real heard of a coup in Lisbon, it sent its congratulations to the victorious party 
and expressed its loyalty to the new authorities. Thus, on 29 April 1974, it cabled 
to the President of the Junta da Salvagdo Nacional, His Excellency Ant6nio de 
Spfnola, to express its "unanimous hearty and respectful salutations and entire 
fidelity" (ACM 29 April 1974). When the first provisional government was 
installed in May, the C&mara Municipal sent its best wishes to the new prime 
minister. 
The phrasing of these salutations differed slightly. The municipal authorities 
complemented their new superiors, but also tried to protect their own positions. To 
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the usual greeting, they added a phrase saying that they had always acted in 
"absolute respect of the principles of administrative legality and municipal rights" 
(ACM 20 May 1974). The message was more than a congratulation. It was a 
defense of their own past. 
The explicit claim to correct governance suggests that the members of the 
Camara worried about the repercussions of their past actions in participating in and 
supporting the previous regime and executing its policies in the concelho. By 
referring to their correct admimstrative behaviour, they hoped that the new regime 
would not be too harsh with them. Their concern was not without reason, for in 
October the Municipal Council was replaced by an Admimstrative Commission, 
which would govern the municipality until the elections in 1976 (ACM 28 October 
1974). 
The replacement of the Camara was a change but not a rupture in political life 
in the municipality. It did not mean that revolutionary fever started to run through 
the city streets. The most revolutionary remark I could find in the Commission's 
records over the entire revolutionary period (1974-1976) concerned the lifting of 
car parking prohibitions. The commissioners agreed that "the innumerable signs 
prohibiting car parking represent[ed] an abusive limitation of the public right in 
benefit of the commodity of a few" and were "the image of the former regime's 
prepotency" (ACM 2 November 1974). 
Together with the Camara, most parish councils were also replaced by 
admimstrative commissions. Only in Campea did the Parish Council, elected two 
years earlier, remain in charge. The reason for this anomaly was its president, 
Joao Lebre. Even prior to his election, Lebre was known as a "communist", 
although he never was a "comrade". After 1974 he joined the Socialist Party (PS). 
The denomination "communist" told perhaps more about the regime than about 
Lebre's actual political outlooks or affinities (compare Soares's remark on p. 199, 
supra). The oppression of political freedom during the Estado Novo meant that 
anybody who deviated from official standards was labelled in such a manner. Lebre 
differed from these standards in that he was literate and had the habit of reading 
a critical newspaper, A RepHblica, to small groups of fellow parishioners who 
themselves were unable to read. Because gatherings of more than three persons 
were considered suspicious during the Estado Novo, he was regarded as a 
subversive element and a troublemaker. The Comissdo Politico, in charge of 
dealing with that kind of rabble-rousers, took away his right to vote. Not that this 
mattered a lot: of the six hundred heads of households, only roughly two hundred 
still had voting rights (compare Cruz 1988:200). 
Lebre's political career began by accident. Once, when he visited Vila Real 
together with a friend, he met the president of the Camara Municipal. At the time, 
the lists of candidates for parish presidents and councillors had to be composed, 
and the president of the Parish Council of Campea, Eduardo Antunes Cerejeira, 
was too old to serve another term. His friend told the president of the Camara that 
this was the man he should choose for to replace Cerejeira. The president turned 
to Lebre and asked him whether he was interested. Lebre responded that his 
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rommunist reputation made him an unlikely candidate for any political office. 
Nonetheless, the president decided to nominate him and asked him to choose 
people to put on his list of candidates for the Council. 
The sitting Council, which was then dominated by Salazar's party Unido 
National, objected against Lebre's nomination and went to Vila Real to tell the 
president of the municipality that the intended candidate belonged to the opposition. 
But the president was not impressed. Lebre had predicted that this would happen. 
The Council then tried to present an alternative list of nominees. It failed because 
the nomination period expired before the list was completed. Then it tried to 
sabotage the election itself by refusing to hand over the key to the Council's seat. 
As a result, the voting had to take place in a school. The election itself was a 
mockery. There was only one list of candidates and not more than fifty people 
actually went to the ballot box. After the "election", the outgoing Council tried to 
obstruct their successor's functioning by withholding the Parish Council's official 
seal for some time (int 25 August 1991). 
By April 1974, the difficulties that had characterized the start of Lebre's 
presidency had become irrelevant and the new Council was fully in function. Lebre 
had been invited for a meeting at the Cdmara's seat in Vila Real on 25 April 1974. 
The Minister of Public Works was also to attend. But during the night before 
Lebre heard on the radio about the coup in Lisbon. He rightfully guessed that the 
minister would not come and so he stayed at home. A few days later, when he had 
to go to town for some other business of his own, he visited the president of the 
Municipal Council. The man told Lebre that he expected that he and his colleagues 
would have to resign. Lebre answered that he himself did not mind: "I entered 
office as a communist, now I will have to resign as a fascist, but I am not going 
to worry about it" (int 25 August 1991). 
During the following months, nothing happened. But then a man known for his 
monarchist sympathies came by. He told Lebre that "they" (the newly appoint 
Administrative Commission of Vila Real) intended to replace the Campea Parish 
Council, but that they wanted him to stay on. Lebre refused this offer. He did not 
want to abandon the people he himself had chosen. A few days later, he went to 
Vila Real to see the Commission that had taken over administration in the 
municipality and he told them that, to his knowledge, democracy demanded 
different procedures. The Commission discussed the issue and agreed that it would 
be undemocratic to change the Council without consulting the population. 
Therefore, they suggested that Lebre ask the parish priest to call a meeting of the 
parish population in order to decide about the Council's resignation or continuation. 
Lebre recalled: 
About two hundred people came to that meeting.... I was with my back 
to the people so I could not see them voting. But afterwards I was told 
that only two persons had raised their hand in objection. So we could 
stay on, knowing that the great majority of the population was with us. 
(Int 25 August 1991) 
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Thus, the Parish Council was able to continue as the parish's Administrative 
Commission. 
The Revolution: Rear and Front? 
The 1974 events in Vila Real and Campea show that the revolution did not cause 
dramatic changes in the way in which the municipal and parish authorities acted. 
The revolution happened far away in the capital and only interfered modestly with 
local (political) agendas. The little importance attributed to the Lisbon events is 
clear from the Parish Council's minutes: the coup, as that of May 1926, was not 
even mentioned. However, such a bucolic image of the north of Portugal does no 
justice to the fierceness with which the political conflict was fought in this region. 
In the summer of 1975, communist meetings were disturbed and communists were 
attacked. In Vila Nova de Famalicao, near Porto, the PCP party building was 
destroyed after violent clashes over the reinstatement of managers who had been 
purged from the administration of a textile factory. Two demonstrators were killed 
(Insight Team 1975:258-259). According to Gallagher (1977:64), by September 
1975 almost one hundred Communist Party buildings were damaged or demolished. 
Even near Vila Real, political killings took place. The case of the bombing of a 
priest, Father Max, and his companion on the road between Regua and Vila Real, 
was still pending in court in 1993'. 
The northerners' resistance to the dominance of left-wing political movements 
after the revolution has been understood in two manners. First, it has been seen as 
the expression of their ("the rear's") difficulty to keep up with the rapid political 
changes in and around the capital ("the vanguard"). Second, it has been interpreted 
as the logical consequence of the dominance of the peasantry in this area. 
The first interpretation was summarized by President Da Costa Gomes during 
a speech in July 1975: 
The march of the revolution has accelerated faster than the people have 
the capacity to absorb it... . We have in Lisbon an area capable of 
absorbing revolutionary advance but it stretches through an industrial 
belt of only twenty miles. The rest of the country runs the risk of 
loosing connection with the front of the column (The Guardian 26 July 
1975, quoted by Insight Team 1975:260 and Gallagher 1977:64). 
1 Father Max was murdered on 2 April 1976. The killers were probably members of the right-wing 
Movimento Democrâtico de Ubertaçâo de Portugal ^Democratic Movement for the Liberation of 
Portugacl, MDLP). The MDLP was led by exiled Spmola (Robinson 1979:241). The MDLP regional 
leadership's social position barely corroborates the peasant conservatism thesis. The persons involved 
were a canon of the Braga cathedral, a lieutenant-colonel (at the time member of the Conselho da 
Revoluçâo), and two important entrepreneurs from the region (O Jornal 25 April 1991, Expresso 12 
June 1993). 
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The fact that in 1972 Campea had already installed a Parish Council which was 
connected with the political opposition, shows that such an interpretation is at least 
debatable. One might claim that, at that time, Campea rather than the capital 
represented the front. 
The second interpretation has been developed by Gallagher (1977). He explains 
northern hostility to the revolutionary process by the concept of peasant 
conservatism. Gallagher argues that the 1974 coup received support from the 
intellectuals, the industrial and urban based proletariat, but not from the peasantry 
living in rural communities north of the Tejo River. There, minifundias were the 
dominant form of landownership and extremes in wealth and poverty were absent. 
Emigration acted as a safety valve and dissipated social tensions, while returning 
emigrants did not alter the pre-existing social order. Finally, peasant identification 
with the Catholic Church quelled any dispute over traditional authorities. These 
characteristics made the population conservative and suspicious of leftist ideologies 
and political projects (Gallagher 1977:60). 
I reject this type of argument for three reasons. The first reason concerns the 
nature of the northern society. Contrary to Gallagher's assertion, the northern rural 
"peasant" society was not at all free of extreme differences in wealth. In chapter 
6 ,1 showed that in Campea a small elite controlled most of the resources while the 
mass of the population lived in poverty. Lima Basto and Barros (1935) and O'Neill 
(1987) give similar accounts for other communities in the north. Furthermore, it 
is incorrect to identify the north with peasantry and smallholders. Proletarianization 
was quite advanced in rural areas such as Campea and the Douro region. The anti-
communist disturbances Gallagher was referring to, such as that in Vila Nova de 
Famalicao, took place in urban centres with considerable industrial development. 
Hence, it is incorrect to equate conservatism with peasantry, and to exclude other 
social categories. 
I also object to Gallagher's assumption that one's economic (class) position 
explains one's political opinions. Compared to its southern counterpart, the 
northern (rural) proletariate held relatively conservative political opinions, for 
instance in terms of party preferences at elections. However, its living conditions 
were at least as poor as those in the south where the workers voted predominantly 
communist. The lack of political radicalization of the agrarian workers in the 
Douro could be related to the strong presence of the Church in the area: contrary 
to its southern counterpart, the northern elite remained faithful to the Catholic 
Church and as such disarmed anti-clerical political movements like syndicates and 
the Communist Party. Workers and the elite were united by the Church. Hence, 
faith could quell dispute over traditional authorities (Bennema 1992:176-204). 
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Seemingly, in this part of Portugal, religion can be understood as a hegemonic 
ideology 2. 
The third argument against the "peasant conservatism" thesis is that the north did 
not always support conservative politicians. Throughout the twentieth century it 
took a progressive stand. For example, in February 1927, less than one year after 
the military takeover that heralded the installation of the Estado Novo, a republican 
uprising challenged the military dictatorship. The rebellion was based in Lisbon 
and Porto but received relatively strong support in the north. There, almost all 
major garrisons revolted. Only those of Braganca, Chaves, Braga, and Viana de 
Castelo stayed in their barracks. In the south, the troops continued to support the 
military dictatorship and actively suppressed a strike in support of the rebellion 
(Bandeira 1987:33-42). Later, during the Estado Novo, the district and town of 
Vila Real were still seen as oppositional. In 1934, the district's Govemador Civil 
claimed that Vila Real was "one of the most difficult districts to govern," and "one 
of the strongest bulwarks of an old [republican] party" (quoted by Ramos 
1986:115). In 1958 Salazar's correspondent in the Vila Real district pointed out 
that at presidential elections many parishes had voted against the regime and in 
favour of the oppositional candidate, General Delgado, because of their discontent 
with the regime's agrarian policies (supra, chapter 5). Finally, in Campea, two 
years before the revolution, a council was elected that was associated with the 
moderate opposition. This also indicates that the population was not simply 
conservative. 
This discussion shows that one can use neither the dichotomy of rear and front 
nor the concept of peasant conservatism to explain why between 1974 and 1976 the 
northern population opposed the revolutionary process and at subsequent elections 
voted predominantly in right-wing parties. Bennema (1992) concludes that one 
should look at the role of religion to explain the northern people's attitude towards 
the revolution. I suggest that one should look also at the structure of the State. 
The Portuguese State was highly centralized. While the central bureaucracy was 
created relatively early, there was only a weak representation of the central 
authorities present in the interior. Much of Portugal remained a hinterland with 
state structures such as the Forestry Service geared to its exploitation instead of to 
its development. The general economic policy aimed at colonial exploitation and 
the development of the coastal areas (Graham 1985:906). In light of this 
concentration of state power, it is quite understandable that in rural towns and 
villages, the dispute over state power was less intense than in the capital. Taking 
over the State required control over the army barracks around Lisbon, the GNR 
headquarters at the Largo do Carmo, and the government offices on the Terreiro 
do Paco, but not the dominance over some transmontanian village square. 
2 This does not mean that traditional authority was never challenged. According to Rosas (1990:406-
412), peasants attacked wealthy proprietdrios who hoarded large stocks of maize and other essential 
commodities. These landowners tried to avoid the forceful government food requisitions between 1941 
and 1945 in order to sell their produce on the black market. 
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The Carnations Revolution, like its 1926 predecessor, was primarily a military 
takeover. The ensuing revolutionary process (Processo Revoluciondrio Em 
Caminho, PREC) was a state campaign, the enterprise of politicians and military 
men. For the northern rural population, it was a metropolitan programme, top-
down in nature, and exogenous to their own society3. In light of what I said earlier 
about the structure of the Portuguese State it is hardly surprising that people did 
not support it. They had never had any reason to believe that Lisbon would be 
doing something for their benefit. 
The Commons of Campea and the Revolution 
The centralized nature of the Portuguese revolution also characterized the struggle 
over the future of the baldios. This struggle was primarily fought in Lisbon, in the 
capital, although the outcome affected the inhabitants of the countryside. In the 
previous chapter I said that the communal land question was debated by three actor 
groups: the parishioners from the Vouga area, the Forestry Service and the 
Communist Party. This is true, but my description of the law-making process in 
the same chapter shows that the agents based outside the capital played a very 
subordinate role. The people from the Vouga area were incapable of influencing 
their opponents, the Forestry Service. They were not even capable of influencing 
the position taken by their closest ally, the Communist Party. The play was staged 
in Lisbon and the parishioners from the Vouga area were only marginal actors. 
Based outside the theatre, the countrymen, even when organized like the 
parishioners from the Vouga area, could hardly influence the process: they were 
its objects, rather than its subjects. 
The revolutionary struggle's metropolitan character also appears from the records 
of the Campea Parish Council. The discussions within the Forestry Service and the 
Communist Party and between them about the future status of the baldios could be 
carried on without being noticed by the people and the administrators of Campea, 
a parish to which the outcome was highly relevant, as it had a vast baldio under 
the Forestry Service's control. The April coup was not mentioned and the dispute 
in Lisbon over the commons continued unnoticed by the Parish Council. It was not 
until December 1974 that the baldio issue affected the rural population. Then, the 
Parish Council received a letter from the Forestry Service's director-general, in 
which he asked the Council to organize a discussion of the proposal which was 
prepared by the working group within the Service. This proposal would entail a 
new legal status for the commons and a new relationship between local authorities 
and the Service: 
3 Baptista (1985:633-634) concluded that "given local social and ideological conditions", the fascist 
state had been able to effectively repress leftist movements in the north, so that the Left never gained 
a solid foothold prior to 1974. After April 25, the left-wing militants remained outsiders who "did not 
move easily in the area nor did they find it easy to relate to the local population. " 
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As the country at this moment is passing through a period of 
democratization, and in the spirit of the Movimento das Forças Armadas 
decisions should not be taken without popular participation, the 
secretary of state of agriculture would like to see that the present 
proposal is made known to the population and discussed in public by the 
communities which have the strongest interests in the problems of the 
commons. (DGSFA to JDF 15 December 1974) 
That same month, the Parish Council organized two meetings in which parishioners 
could discuss the proposition. These meetings were not recorded, but according to 
its president, few objections were raised at that time. This is the only time during 
the law-making process when the commoners, the objects of the struggle over the 
baldios, became subjects, participants. 
Back in the capital, the working group's proposal got stuck in the political battles 
following General Spinola's unsuccessful seizure of power. In March 1975 Baptism 
entered into office and started to draw up a new bill. In September he was replaced 
by Lopes Cardoso. In Campeâ the matter received no further attention until 
February 1976. One month after the law's publication, the Parish Council received 
a second letter from the Forestry Service, this time not from the director-general 
hhnself, but from the Administrador Flot-estai of Vila Real. The forestry 
administrator included copies of the two decrees 39/76 and 40/76 and informed the 
Parish Council that "according to number 2 of Article 18 the Parish Council has 
to organize a provisional census of all users of each baldio before the twenty-fourth 
of March.... [IJn the case Your Excellencies have any difficulties with the inter-
pretation of the referred decrees and need whatever clarification" he would place 
himself at their disposal (AFVR to JDF, 13 February 1976). 
The Parish Council immediately called a meeting (for 7 March 1976) and 
organized a census. After the completion of the census, a new reunion was 
summoned on 30 May. At this meeting the Council hoped to create users' 
commissions. 
In harmony with the determinations of section a) of n° 4 of the portaria 
n° 117/76 of the first of March, I convoke a commoners' assembly of 
the communal lands of this parish ... with the following objectives: 
- Election of the presidium of the assembly; 
- Resolving doubts and objections concerning the inscription or omission 
of any commoner in the provisional sensus; 
- Choosing an entity: baldio of the parish, or baldio of hamlets, or 
baldio per hamlet; 
- Choosing the form of administration of the commons in the parish; 
- Election of an administrative board.... [T]he choice of a form of 
administration and the election of an administrative commission will 
only be valid when at the meeting at least 50% of all registered 
commoners are present (Convocatôria 20 May 1976) 
The gathering did not have the desired results. Of the 533 inscribed commoners, 
only 133 (25%) came, and the assembly had to be dissolved because the 50% 
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quorum demanded by the law had not been met. The Parish Council issued a 
second summons only seven months later, in November, after having received a 
letter from the Administrador Florestal of Vila Real saying that the period for 
creating committees had once again been extended (AFVR to JDF 8 September 
1976). This meeting on 6 November 1976 also ended without result. It was 
attended by only 80 people (16.8% of all commoners). Three months later, in 
March 1977, after the election of a new Parish Council, a third meeting was 
called. This time 101 commoners were present. Again the quorum was not met. 
But because the law determined that the third meeting did not require a quorum, 
this one was able to proceed as a legal assembly of the commoners of Campea. 
The assembly decided to choose as its administration form "baldios per village" 
and not "baldios for the entire parish". The villages of Cotorinho, Montes, Pepe, 
Avecaozinho and Pereiro, and Vila Nova elected a commission according to 
modality (b), whereas Avecao de Cabo preferred modality (a). The other hamlets 
decided to have their commons administered by the Parish Council who would act 
as their representative (Minutes Baldios 1976) 4. 
The difficulties to create local management commissions might suggest that in 
Campea, the villagers had lost interest in the commons. An inquiry in 1991 showed 
that this was not the case: 59% of the households visited still used the commons 
while 83% objected to their dissolution (Brouwer and Kwakkenbos 1993). 
Therefore, I believe that these difficulties were related to the parishioners' inability 
to sustain the management organisations required by law. 
The 1976 law was based upon the legislature's confidence in the historical or 
traditional capacity of local communities for self-governance. The assemblies and 
management commission copied, institutionalized, or formalized traditional forms 
of community organization for communal resource management. In chapter 7 I 
showed that the communities in Campea did have a history of local governance. 
For centuries they elected juizes de vintena, juizes da igreja, and mordomos. For 
generations they appointed zeladores to administer of their commons and other 
community affairs, and judges for their parish and region (the juiz dafreguesia or 
juiz eleito, and the juiz de paz). However, by 1976 these institutions had weakened. 
In 1928, the position of the juiz de paz (peace judge) was turned from an elected 
office into an appointed one. This position was automatically given to the male 
teacher of the primary school in the parish's main village (Decreto-Lei 15,344 of 
12 April 1928; Silva 1987). The result was the disappearance of the office 
altogether although, officially, the juiz de paz still exists (Lei 539/79 of 31 
December 1979). In some villages such as Avecaozinho, the zeladores survived, 
though the office lost much of its former interest because of the division of part of 
the commons by the JCI and the subjection of most of the remainder to 
administration by the Forestry Service. These operations reduced the number of 
4 This delegation was not foreseen by Decreto-Lei 39/76 and therefore illegal. Nevertheless it was a 
widely spread practice. The minutes of these meetings are kept in the Parish Council's office in a 
separate book. 
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villagers interested in svostaining communal land management arrangements and 
stripped the zelador of most of his responsibilities and income. 
Finally, the law itself contained conditions that made its implementation more 
difficult. It demanded that a commoners' community elect four commissioners for 
the communal land management commissions of modality (b) or five for 
commissions of modality (a) (art. 9), and three members to the presidium of the 
general commoners' assembly (art 7). In the case of Campea, this meant that a 
village of forty or fifty households, many of its members barely literate, had to 
elect seven or eight persons for an institution that in the past had required only 
one. In short, whereas the community's capacity to sustain local government 
institutions had diminished, the new law demanded an even larger commitment 
from the commoners. Hence, it is almost a miracle that these commissions were 
even elected at all (see also chapter 10, fn. 16). 
The Implementation of the 1976 Law 
In 1977, six villages created their commission. In 1990, only three of these 
commissions were really functioning. The rest had fallen apart as a result of 
conflicts over spending as was the case in Pepe and Vila Nova. In other cases, the 
commission had simply not been reelected as in Avecao do Cabo. Only in 
Cotorinho, Montes, and Avecaozinho, did the commissions continue to function. 
In each of these villages, the commissions played a different role. These 
differences were related to the specific developments in the hamlets. Cotorinho and 
Montes suffered severely from mass emigration. In Montes the number of 
inhabitants decreased sharply. Between 1950 and 1981 it diminished from 101 to 
53 inhabitants (table 11.4), and in 1991 I counted only 26 inhabitants. Most of the 
remaining residents were elderly women, of whom 10 were older than sixty-five. 
As a result, farming had declined and so had traditional forms of land exploitation. 
The herds disappeared and even brush collecting was discontinued. Therefore, the 
local commissions requested the Forestry Service to afforest the areas which in 
1951 had been left to the villages for pastures, and which had not been not placed 
under the forestry regime in 1956. In these villages, the commissions acted as 
"landlord" to the State, i.e. the Forestry Service. If there was a timber sale from 
thinnings or final fellings, they expected to receive their 60% share as "rent" which 
could be used for public amenities. 
The situation in Avecaozinho was quite different. Emigration did not have such 
a disastrous impact there as in Cotorinho and Montes. Over the period 1950-1981 
the number of inhabitants declined from 242 to 146, and in 1991 I counted 149 
inhabitants. According to my survey, almost two-tiiirds of the households still were 
agriculturalists (table 6.7), and all but one of these fanning families still collected 
brush for fertilizer. Even a young farmer, who, with help from the EC, had 
constructed a new stable in 1993, continued to mix manure with brush. He saw 
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liquid manure as a second-rate fertilizer because it does not improve the structure 
of the soil. 
Unlike Montes and Cotorinho, Avecaozinho participated in the 1951 division of 
the commons. Twenty households in the village received a gleba. These gleba-
holders were officially excluded from the remaining common as far as the 
collection of brush was concerned. This meant that in 1951 only thirty-eight 
households were fully entitled to exploit the common (table 7.2). However, this 
number increased gradually because of a rule that the heirs of gleba holders could 
not be excluded. In 1991, fifty-one households were considered commoners: forty-
two in Avecaozinho and nine in Pereiro. In addition, a first generation gleba holder 
could acquire access to the baldio through his children5. 
Like in Montes and Cotorinho, the baldios of Avecaozinho existed in two parts: 
the area which was subjected to the forestry regime and the area which the JCI had 
indicated for communal exploitation (20 ha). The two parts were separated by the 
road connecting the parish to Mondim de Basto. The State occupied the upper half, 
whereas the village kept the area on the lower half, closer to the village (see the 
map in figure 7.2). The village's baldios management commission formally 
controlled both areas, but, in reality, it concentrated its efforts on the lower part. 
In this lower area, the commoners and their commission de-regulated the cutting 
of brush and the grazing of cattle. This was probably because, due to the existence 
of private bush land, the increased use of artificial fertilizer, and the shift from 
maronesa towards frisian cows, these forms exploitation no longer reached a level 
that called for restrictions. Brush growth was not in a serious danger. The only 
limitation was that one would have to take care not to damage the seedlings of 
trees when cutting brush. As a result, the common had become covered by a 
forest. The exploitation of this forest was regulated. Tree felling, mainly for the 
provision of firewood, was the exclusive responsibility of the village's communal 
land management commission. 
The exploitation and allocation system for trees copied the system used originally 
for the apportionment of leiras. On a pre-determined day, the president of the 
management commission and two other villagers went to the common to mark the 
trees they felt were appropriate for felling. Each tree was marked with an axe and 
tagged with a number on a small slip of paper. Each number signified a lot. A list 
was kept of the number of trees in each lot in order to see that all lots were more 
or less equal in size. This did not mean that all lots contained the same number of 
trees. If a lot consisted of small trees, the number was increased accordingly to 
arrive at an average volume. Later, the names of the people entitled to the common 
were also written down on paper slips. These slips were put into a plastic bag and 
drawn by a child. The first name drawn won the first lot, and so forth. 
5 Household 18 (appendix 5) was an example of this practice. This "household" consisted of a man 
and his unmarried daughter living in separate houses. The father received part of the lot of firewood 
that had been attributed to his daughter. 
218 Planting Power 
A second activity of the commission was fund raising and distributing money. 
It did so in two ways. The first was the sale of timber. In 1993 it sold around forty 
pines to a lumberjack. The second way was the alienation of land for construction. 
The commission sold plots of about 300 to 400 m 2 for 150$00/m 2 to vizinhos for 
the construction of houses. Officially this practice was illegal. The 1976 law 
prohibited any alienation (art. 2). The authorities in Vila Real, however, found a 
way to circumvent this prohibition by applying Decreto-Lei 40/76. This law was 
originally created to regulate the restoration of commons, which during the period 
prior to 1976 had been usurped. But in Vila Real, the authorities used it to legalize 
present sales under the condition that the management commission presented a list 
with signatures proving that the majority of the commoners had agreed (int 19 May 
1992). I discuss the application of the money raised in this way in chapter 11. 
The examples of the baldios management commissions of Avecaozinho, 
Cotorinho, and Montes demonstrate that the Service was rather passive. All of 
these commissions were of the modality (b) type. This meant that, formally, the 
Service was represented by the local forest guards. In practice, however, the 
guards never attended the commissions' meetings nor did they actively seek contact 
with the villagers. Officially the State should "...[ijnform the management 
commission about the management of the forest patrimony in all cases that this is 
requested; [and it should pjresent reports and financial accounts of its activities" 
(art. 13 of Decreto-Lei 39/76). But the State and its Forestry Service never did. In 
fact, the Forestry Service continued to manage the upper part as if there were no 
management commission. After a fire in the 1980s which destroyed most of the 
plantation on this stretch, the Service replanted some parts with Douglas firs 
(Pseudotsuga mensii). Then, in 1990, the Service opened up fire corridors. Both 
decisions were taken without consulting the management commission6. The 
Forestry Service also never tried to assist the commissions with managing those 
areas not placed under the forestry regime. This was not in harmony with the 
stipulation that "[t]he State, through the competent services ... guarantees the 
necessary technical support, ... and verifies the application of convenient 
techniques for the installation and management of tree stands" (art. 12). In short, 
the Service continued to concentrate itself in the areas it had acquired during the 
Piano do Povoamento Florestal and did not adapt itself to the conditions created 
in 1976. 
The foresters defended their behaviour by saying that the Forestry Service did 
not want to be accused of paternalism, and that a more active attitude would not 
be appreciated by the population (int 19 June 1992). This argument was not 
without grounds. The past events had given people sufficient reason to look upon 
the Forestry Service with distrust. However, the provision of technical support is 
not necessary paternalistic. That depends upon the attitude and behaviour of the 
6 This fire was also the reason why the commission in Avecaozinho did not exercise the "landlord" 
function which characterized its counterparts in Cotorinho and Montes: the stands had been destroyed 
before any timber was harvested. 
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forestry organization and the individual officials. Moreover, Further, it is quite 
clear that better management of the forests would be in the interest of both the 
Service and the commoners7. 
The relevance of the provision of techmcal support is shown by the following 
examples. In the case of Avecaozinho, the commission determined the quantity of 
firewood to be given to the commoners that year. When demarcating the firewood 
lots, there was a tendency to increase the quantity. First, the commission felt 
pressured by the inhabitants to give at least as much wood as the previous year. 
Second, the commission's attempt to make the lots more or less equal in size 
favoured an upward correction in the lots demarcated later on. The result of this 
upward pressure was the demarcation of about three hundred trees with an 
estimated volume of 120 to 160 m 3 . This meant that the commission allowed the 
cutting of approximately 8% of the number of trees on its total area and 8 to 10% 
of its total stock. The felled volume exceeded by far the estimated one-year 
regrowth (80 to 100 m 3). When I estimated the standing stock in 1993, I indeed 
found that the number of trees and the volume of the stand had decreased 
compared to 1991 8. 
Advising the management commission about the amount of trees felled for 
firewood would have been one occasion in which the Forestry Service could have 
helped the villagers with the exploitation of their common. Another occasion at 
which the Service could have helped concerned the feeling of timber. In 1993, the 
management commission sold forty pines, which according to the tree rings on the 
stumps were 40 to 45 years old. The optimal rotation of Pinus pinaster, is about 
50 to 75 years depending upon the quality of the site (int 4 April 1991, 9 April 
7 Different administrators had different attitudes towards baldios commissions. The Administrador 
Florestal of Montalegre assured me that he would try to advise the commoners on fellings. Guards 
normally would not attend commission meetings, because they were not invited. However, if called 
upon, they would go (int 26 May 1993). 
8 In July 1991 and June 1993 I estimated the number of trees per ha and the stock using the Bitterlich 
mirror relascope and calculating method (De Vries and Stoffel 1967, k=4). The results were: 
- in 1991:39 plots, 141 trees, d g =25.8 cm, d c=24.5 cm, 1^= 11.8 m; v c=0.272; estimated mean stand 
basal area 14.4 mVha, N/ha=276, total volume on 20 ha 1592 m 3. According to the system developed 
by Luis and Bento (1991) for pine stands in this region, this means that minnings were possible (Paiva 
1994:77). In the sampled 144 trees, 11 (7.6%) were marked for felling. Assuming that these trees 
represented the average, they constituted a volume of 120 m 3. In reality, the volume was greater 
(d g=28.2 cm, estimated volume 160 m 3). 
- in 1993:66 plots, 176 trees; d g=27.4 cm, cL=26.5 cm, h,= 14.1 m; v c=0.315; estimated mean stand 
basal area 10.7 m?/ha, N/ha= 181, total volume on 20 ha 1372 m 3. According to the method formulated 
by Luis and Bento (1991), intervention was not recommended. 
The estimated difference in volume between 1991 and 1993 (276 m3) is more or less realistic: in the 
two-year interval, fuel wood had been felled (at least one time 120-160 m 3, but perhaps twice), many 
trees had been destroyed by a heavy snow storm, and about forty of the best stems (over 40 year-old 
trees with diameters of circa 50 cm) had been sold for timber. 
Relevant references for Pinus pinaster in northern Portugal are: DGSFA (1969), and Duarte, Ribeiro 
and Cosme (1991). 
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1992; Duarte, Ribeiro and Cosme 1991). Technical support could have convinced 
the villagers to postpone the felling and make more money later. 
Finally, in 1991 and 1992, I observed that pines were infested with beetles. If 
that infestation would not be stopped, it could lead to the total destruction of the 
forest (private, communal and state). One of the plague's causes was the 
commoners' habit of leaving the timber felled for firewood in the forest too long 
with the bark still on it. In doing so, it served as a breeding place for the beetle 
larvae. In 1993 the management commission determined that the allocated lots of 
firewood should be removed within one month. This regulation was inspired by 
three motives. The first motive was reducing the felled volume. The previous 
commission also maintained a one-month limit but had ruled that trees not felled 
on time would be cut and auctioned afterwards. The second motive was that 
concentrating felling in a shorter time span would strengthen social control. The 
impression existed that on earlier occasions people felled more trees than the 
number allotted to them. The third reason was reducing the time span that the 
felled trees would stay in the stand. However, effective prevention of this species 
of beetle requires a time span of no more than two weeks or the removal of the 
bark. The measures show that the commoners themselves were aware of some of 
the problems. If the Service had taken the pains to enlighten them on this particular 
subject, this would not only have helped the commoners in protecting their own 
forest, but it would also have helped to protect neighbouring private stands and the 
stands under the admimstration of the Service. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed three issues: the impact of the Carnations 
Revolution in Vila Real and Campea, the way in which the 1976 law was 
implemented, and the relationship between the Service and the commoners' 
commissions. I have shown that the political tensions in Lisbon went unnoticed in 
Campea. Here, continuity prevailed over radical ruptures. Some would analyze this 
difference in terms of oppositions: front versus rear, or urban progressiveness 
versus peasant conservatism. However, my description of the political situation in 
the Vila Real area demonstrates that this type of analysis is incorrect. First, many 
of the northerners were not peasants but proletarians. In the case of the latter, 
Bennema (1992) has shown that there is no direct connection between a person's 
social or economic position and his or her political outlook. Second, the north was 
not always conservative. In the particular case of Campea, political continuity was 
not the result of conservatism, but of the parish being ruled by people associated 
with the opposition. Prior to the changes in Lisbon, progressive forces dominated 
the political scene in Campea. If one would want to apply the terms "front" and 
"rear" to this particular case, one would almost be forced to reverse them. Until 
1974, not Lisbon, but Campea held the vanguard. Third, the differences between 
the north and the capital should also be viewed in relation to the structure of the 
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State. The revolution was a metropolitan enterprise in which the inhabitants of the 
northern countryside were objects rather than active participants. 
The issue of the commons did not play a significant role in the parish until the 
end of 1974. Unlike in the Vouga area, there was no indigenous movement that 
wanted to reclaim the commons from the State. Even when the 1976 law was 
published and the Forestry Service urged its implementation, it took until March 
1977 before some of the villages created management commissions. The reasons 
for this difficult revival of community rule were three-fold: (a) general social 
changes (emigration in particular), (b) the state intervention in the commons during 
the 1950s that had undermined the local communities' ability to sustain communal 
land management institutions, and (c) the law itself. In comparison with the 
traditional system, the law placed a heavy burden upon the villages' already 
weakened organizational capacities. The effect was that only a few villages were 
able to maintain a stable management structure. In two of them, this meant little 
more than the creation of a channel for the funnelling of (forest) revenues to the 
community. Only in one hamlet, Avecaozinho, did the commission assume 
functions that went beyond those of a landlord and implied direct communal land 
and forest management. 
The last item of this chapter concerns the Forestry Service. I have made it clear 
that the Service played an important role in the initial phase of the 1976 law 
implementation in Campea. Its letters in February and September 1976 triggered 
the process that led to the formation of management commissions in the parish. But 
ever since, its role has been passive. Although formally present on the 
commissions of Avecaozinho, Cotorinho, and Montes, the Service did not develop 
any activity which was supportive to these commissions, nor did it help them in 
their tasks of investing in their village and managing their commons. Instead, the 
Forestry Service retreated behind the wall of the forestry regime. It continued to 
manage the territories subjected to that regime independently, without involving the 
commoners as it should have done according to the law. 
This last point, the abstinence of the Forestry Service from participating in the 
commissions, and its barricading itself inside the areas under the forestry regime, 
leads to the final conclusions of this chapter. The first is that the 1976 law did not 
pose any challenge to the Forestry Service. It remained firmly in command over 
the baldios under its control. The second is that the Service did not exploit the law 
as far as it could have. By not participating in the commissions it did nothing to 
make the commoners committed to its mission of afforestation. Even worse, it did 
nothing to improve management of the areas that bordered on its own territory, but 
were not subjected to the forestry regime. In short, it did not profit from the 
opportunity that the baldios law offered in terms of expanding and improving forest 
administration beyond the territories it had occupied prior to 1976. 

Chapter 10 
The Commons and Political Struggle in the National 
and Local Arenas 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I discussed how the 1974 revolution was received in 
Campel and how the 1976 law on the commons was implemented. In this chapter 
I will continue with the political debate that followed the law's publication and in 
1993 ultimately resulted in its revocation. 
This chapter covers two arenas: the national and the local. It begins with a 
description of the parliamentary debate and the political process that led to the 
revision of the 1976 law. It continues by presenting the main arguments used by 
the different political parties in the parliamentary debate. I will analyze these 
arguments and address the central point that they fail to explicitly admit: baldios 
are a source of political power. In the remainder of the chapter, I deal with local 
political arenas. In doing so, I present three different cases of conflicts around the 
formation of baldios management commissions and I show how political parties 
became instruments in and objects of the battle between the different actors, 
commoners, councillors, and officials. In the last sections I pull all of the elements 
together and draw conclusions about the position of the commons and the Forestry 
Service under the system of parliamentary democracy. 
The Commons in Parliament 
As I pointed out in chapter 8, the 1976 law was based upon specific ideas about 
the form of representation of the citizens to the State, about the legitimacy of 
traditional claims of the rural population over the baldios, and last but not least, 
about the future path of social development. These notions were only able to gain 
political relevance because of the specific circumstances between 1974 and 1976. 
As Robinson (1979:253) put it, the "Age of Aquarius" had just begun, and the, 
perhaps, naive hopes for a different future and a new mankind had taken 
possession of the politically dominant groups. However, the translation of these 
hopes and aspirations into law could only have happened because the Left briefly 
controlled the State: the reactionary forces of General Spfnola were beaten, the 
forestry technicians (temporarily) defeated, and radical Marxist inspired movements 
and parties determined the debate. This political conjuncture resulted in a law that 
situated the restitution of the commons within the frameworks of agrarian reform, 
popular democracy, the socialization of the means of production, and socialist 
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transition; and that appealed to an alternative type of legality, not the State's but 
the people's. 
The location of the baldios law within a politically radical project and the law's 
connection to a popular democratic model, made it vulnerable to right-wing 
reactions. As soon as the political power balance moved away from the radical left 
back towards more moderate or right-wing forces, the law on the commons became 
one of the targets at which these political movements aimed their restorative 
efforts1. 
Initially, the opponents of Decreto-Lei 39/76 proposed abolishing the commons 
as a separate category of property and transferring them to the property and 
management of the parish council. In practice, this would mean the restoration of 
the juridical situation that had been created by the civil code in 1966. However, 
during the political process, the purport of the enactments presented by the 
opponents gradually changed to temporary acceptance of the commons as a 
separate form of property with the village management commissions as a separate 
form of administration. In the 1993 revision, the concept of common property was 
left intact, although the baldios' legal protection against alienation and 
disentailment was weakened and the powers of the parish councils were 
strengthened. 
The dedication with which moderate or right-wing forces fought the baldios law 
after 1976, appears clear from the continuous flow of proposals put forth by these 
political parties. During the seventeen years following the revolution, on average 
one enactment per year was presented in parliament. The central democratic and 
social-democratic parties (CDS and PSD) submitted most of these proposals (table 
10.1). In 1977 these parties had their first success. In October Lei 79/77 
transferred management of the commons to the parish councils. Consequently, 
Decreto-Lei 39/76, although not repealed, was implicitly put out of action. Two 
months later the previous situation was restored on the initiative of the communist 
party (PCP) through the revocation of the relevant article (Lei 91/77 of 
1 In terms of electoral support, there were no major shifts between the left and the right of the political 
spectrum until 1983. However, minor variations had large impacts because of shifting strategies and 
alliances of the four main parties (Aguiar 1985:771). Only since 1987, has the right held a solid 
majority in parliament (Robinson 1979:235, 255; Aguiar 1985:772; Bruneau 1984:139; Martins 
1991:93-105; Publico 8 October 1991): 
Spectre Party 1975 1976 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987 1991 
left PCP 12.5 14.6 19.0 16.8 18.1 15.4 12.1 8.8 
PS 37.9 35.0 27.4 27.8 36.1 20.7 22.2 29.3 
PRD - - - - - 17.9 4.9 0.6 
PSD 26.4 24.0 
42.5 44.9 
27.2 29.8 50.2 50.4 
right CDS 7.6 15.9 12.6 9.9 4.4 4.4 
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3 December 1977) 2. Decreto-Lei 39/76 remained in action until 1993, when an 
alliance of the PSD and the PS resulted in its annulment. 
Table 10.1 Enactments or Projectos de Lei (PJL) moved against the 1976 law on the 
commons presented after 1977. 
Enactment Party Date Property status of 
the baldios 
Effect on management commis-
sions 
PJL 272/H CDS 14-11-1981 parish property dissolved 
PJL 289/H PPM 08-01-1982 idem idem 
PJL 291/H PSD 09-01-1982 idem idem 
PJL 361/11 AD 23-07-1982 idem idem 
PJL 199/m CDS 15-07-1983 idem idem 
PJL 281/in PSD 03-02-1984 idem delegation by the parish council 
PJL 013/IV PSD 13-11-1985 idem idem 
PJL021/IV CDS 13-11-1985 idem idem 
PJL 174/TV Ind. 09-04-1986 idem idem 
PJL 287/TV PS 12-11-1986 common property delegation to the parish council 
PJL041/V PS 17-10-1987 idem idem 
PJL 064/V a CDS 30-10-1987 parish property delegation by the parish council 
PJL 090/V 2 PSD 13-11-1987 idem idem 
PJL 225/V PRD 30-10-1987 common property -
PJL 532/V PSD 28-04-1990 parish property under Governors' supervision 
PJL 109/VI PS 18-03-1992 common property delegation to the parish council 
PJL mm PSD 08-06-1992 parish property idem 
Lei 068/93 - 04-09-1993 common property idem 
AD (Alianca Democratica): alliance of CDS, PPM, and PSD; CDS: central-democratic party; PPM: 
monarchic party; PRD: renovative democratic party, PS: socialist party; PSD: social-democratic party; 
Ind: independent deputy Goncalo Ribeiro Teles. 
a Both projects are taken together in parliamentary decree 132/V of 31 January 1989, published in the 
Didrio da Assembleia da Republica (DAR) of 11 March 1989, pp.694-695. 
Why did it take so long for Decreto-Lei 39/76 to be repealed? One reason was the 
balance of power between the different political parties and the consequent 
feebleness of majority coalitions. Until 1987 none of the governments possessed 
a sufficiently stable base in parliament to complete their term. The three and a half 
2 Article 109 on "Commons and other communal things" of this law stated: "The definition of the 
communal things, in particular the baldios and other goods of communal exploitation, is attributed to 
the Municipal Assembly or the Parish Assembly, according to whether it concerns communal things of 
the municipality or of the parish, and their management is responsible to the respective executive local 
administrative bodies [the Parish and Municipal Councils, RB]." Lei 19111 had been the PSD and 
CDS's initiative, but had been supported by all parties except for the PS (DAR 2 July 1986, p.3363). 
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years after July 1976 saw five governments come and go, three of which were not 
even based in a parliamentary majority but appointed by the president of the 
republic precisely because of the impossibility of majority coalitions (Bruneau 
1984:98). Between 1980 and 1987, there were four different cabinets (Martins 
1991:93-105). As a result of this generalized political instability prior to 1987, 
parliament was dissolved each time before any of the proposed amendments were 
even voted on. Therefore, at this stage, the 1976 baldios law was never seriously 
endangered. 
The period of instability ended in 1987. That year's elections were won by the 
PSD with 50.2% of the vote. With a comfortable absolute majority in parliament, 
this party was able to form a cabinet which for the first time in the post-1974 
history, succeeded in completing its full four year term. 
Under the new stability, the enactments aimed at the dissolution of the commons 
were approved by parliament without serious difficulty and they would surely have 
resulted in the disappearance of the local management commissions and the 
commons if their realisation had not depended upon approval by the president of 
the republic. Since 1986, this office was occupied by the former Secretary-General 
of the Socialist Party, Mario Soares. When in March 1989 the first enactment that 
passed parliament (Decreto Parlementar 137/V) was presented to him for 
promulgation, the president decided to use his prerogative to submit it to the 
Constitutional Court for consultation. The court ruled that by attributing the 
commons to the parishes, the bill clashed with article 89 of the constitution. This 
article defined the different categories of property and explicitly recognized the 
existence of communitarian property managed by local collectives as a separate 
category within the public sector (Constitutional Court, Acdrdao n° 325/89 of 17-4-
1989). Backed by the court, Soares was able, and formally even obliged, to veto 
the bill. Because the PSD and CDS could not muster the two-thirds majority in 
parliament that was necessary to overrule a presidential veto, the enactment was 
dropped. 
The Constitutional Court 
The 1989 enactment was stopped because the Constitutional Court had decided that 
it was unconstitutional. One should however realize that the court's ruling was not 
unanimous, but by majority vote. The judges disagreed about the correct 
interpretation of the constitution and about the enactment's implications with regard 
to the property status of the baldios. The fact that a majority of the court opposed 
the bill was related not only to the lack of consensus about the correct 
interpretation of the juridical issue, but also to the composition of the court along 
partylines. Ten of the thirteen court members were appointed by parliament. These 
members coopted the other three (Martins 1991:71-74). When choosing a 
candidate, parliament not only took into account his or her legal expertise, but 
looked also at the nominee's political affiliation. The court members when selecting 
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candidates for the other three seats, did the same. It was an informally agreed upon 
practice that the court's political composition would more or less reflect and 
balance the variety of the political outlooks in parliament. As court members were 
appointed for six years and deputies had a four-year mandate, the court's 
composition often lagged behind the developments in parliament. Consequently, at 
the moment the court received the new baldios bill for judgement, the shift from 
the left to the right which had occurred in 1987 elections, was only partially 
reflected in the court's composition. As a result, a compared to the distribution of 
seats in parliament, many of the judges were ideologically close to the PS and the 
PCP 3. 
Later in 1989, an occasional coalition of the PSD and the PS enabled the revision 
of the constitution. One of the modifications concerned the status of the baldios. 
In the new text, the commons were included in the cooperative sector (art. 82). 
Leftist legal experts such as Ant6nio Bica, expressed their fear that this 
modification of the constitution in combination with changes in the composition of 
the Constitutional Court would weaken the protection of the baldios as common 
property against new enactments from the parliamentary majority (Bica 1989). 
In 1990, with its majority in parliament, the PSD had another bill approved. The 
enactment left commoners' commission intact but placed their functioning under 
the district's governor's supervision. President Soares decided to challenge both the 
absolute majority and the new constitution by once again using his power to veto. 
To the surprise of many commentators, the Constitutional Court endorsed Soares's 
doubts and rejected the bill. It interpreted the revised Constitution as a 
strengthening of common property. The court argued that 
... the 1989 revision developed a logic of "destatization" of the 
communal goods in relation to the State and the public sector of 
property and brought to these goods an increase in their autonomy as 
part of the social and cooperative sector of property. This autonomy has 
to translate itself into a strengthening of the communitarian or civic 
dominium over the baldios. (Acdrddo 240/91, pp.27-28) 
The court ruled seven to six that the bill ran against the dispositions of article 82 
of the revised Constitution and the enactment was dropped just as in 1989. 
3 In May 1993, one of the court's coopted members who was associated with the PCP, announced his 
resignation. The court's president, Luis Nunes de Almeida, announced that he would maintain the 
agreement made by the parties in 1989 regarding the presence of the political currents in the court and 
invite another member from PCP circles. But another member from the PSD-wing within the court 
announced that he would try to shift the balance in favour of his party and the government (Publico 14 
May 1993, O Independente, (Lisbon), 18 June 1993). I do not know who won the dispute. 
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The 1993 Compromise 
In 1992, the PS presented a new proposal, Projecto de Lei (PJL) 109/VI, hoping 
to settle once and for all the issue of the commons. It intended, on the one hand, 
to legalize widespread and generally accepted illegal practices such as the 
construction of dwellings on baldio land, and on the other hand, to strengthen the 
position of the local management commissions. Therefore, the PS expected that the 
PCP and PSD would both endorse the proposal (int 8 April 1992). However, its 
initiative was immediately followed by another enactment from the PSD, which 
reiterated their previous proposals. It was clearly less favourable to the commons 
in general and community administration in particular, than the bill presented by 
the PS. This second enactment, PJL 163/VI, defined the baldios as property of the 
parish councils, which were to gradually replace the commoners' management 
commissions as the administrators of the baldios. Both proposals however 
concurred on some other major points, and the parties were able to arrive at a 
compromise. In June 1993, parliament approved a new law for the commons. This 
time President Soares had no other option than to pass it since the PS and the PSD 
together held enough seats to overrule a presidential veto. The new law on the 
commons, Lei 68/93, was published in the Didrio da Republica in September, 
1993. 
The numerous obstacles on the road to the new baldios law did not leave the 
final outcome unchanged (see table 10.1). The earliest enactments had all been in 
the same vein as Lei 79/77 and were geared towards the total abolition of 
community management and the attribution of the baldios to the municipalities and 
parishes. From 1984 on, the proposals accepted management by users' 
communities as a variant in addition to administration by the local authorities. 
Initially, the establishment of local rule was made dependent upon the parish 
council's willingness to delegate its responsibilities to the commoners. In 1986, the 
PS proposed the opposite approach: the owner community was allowed to delegate 
management to its parish council. This model would legalize existing practices 
while leaving intact the idea of common property. In 1989 and in 1991, the 
Constitutional Court's decisions dashed any hope of the CDS and PSD mustering 
enough juridical and political support to dissolve common property altogether. It 
forced them to accept the model proposed by the PS (PJL 163/VI). The option to 
delegate management to local councils was included in the 1993 law, which 
explicitly defined the baldios as "land possessed and administered by local 
communities" (art. 1; see annexo 13 for the full law text). 
Between 1977 and 1993, the defenders of common property were able to temper 
the attempts to transform the baldios into parish property. They failed however to 
conserve the strict protection of common property against disentailment and 
privatization. The earliest projects included various kinds of stipulations that would 
facilitate the dissolution of (parts of) the baldios. They either eliminated the idea 
of common property (PJL 272/11 up to and including PJL 174/IV), or, like the 
PSD's projects of the fifth and sixth legislature (PJL 90/V, PJL 532/V, PJL 
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163/VT), deposed of the commons if they were not claimed within five years by the 
commvjnities. The 1993 edict no longer included this last disposition, but still 
offered the opportunity to lift the common property status for industrial and social 
development and for construction of housing. It also included a disposition allowing 
the extinction of a baldio after ten years of "unjustified abandonment". In that case, 
the baldio would automatically become the property of the parish(es) in which it 
was located. These possibilities certainly implied a threat to the future existence of 
the baldios as a distinct form of property. Finally, the 1993 law eliminated the 
Forestry Service's exclusive position in the management of the commons. The 
stipulation that allowed state representation in management commissions, article 9 
section b of Decreto-Lei 39/76, was abolished. The Service could only maintain a 
hold on the commons through partial or complete delegation of the commoners' 
authority. In that case, however, the Service was only one of the possible partners, 
along with other central state institutions and the parish council (art. 22). 
The Baldios in Parliamentary Discourse 
The stream of enactments proves the fierceness with which the CDS and the PSD 
engaged in battle to modify the commons' legal status. The fact that they continued 
their efforts after most of the other measures related to the 1975 agrarian reform 
had been abolished or made powerless, suggests that these parties for some reason 
or another were profoundly interested in changing this particular aspect of the 
(post-)revolutionary legislation. What were the reasons for this obsession with 
dismantling the communities and strengthening the parish council's authority? The 
formal motivations contained in the enactment themselves or expressed during the 
parliamentary discussion, indicate three lines of reasoning. The first argument 
concerns the malfunctioning of the 1976 law. In this respect, the law's critiques 
pointed to the relatively small number of operative commissions and the relatively 
small size of the area claimed by local management commissions. The second 
argument consists of the law's failure to stimulate development in the regions 
where the baldios were located. The third and last argument concerns the awkward 
relationship that the law had created between local administrative bodies and the 
communities. 
The first argument put forward against the 1976 law concerned its effectiveness. 
Carlos Duarte, deputy of the PSD, justified his enactment by pointing to the fact 
that of the 637 commoners assemblies created since 1976, only 132 were still 
functioning and that only 141,000 ha (37%) of the commons had been restored to 
compartes (Duarte, intervention in parliament, 30 November 1990). The PSD also 
argued that the commoners' assemblies and management commissions which had 
been created, were not functioning as well as they should have been: "the general 
interest was not always rigidly taken into account, and ... even sometimes 
investments were made which were not the most urgent" (DAR 27 April 1988, 
p.3203). Finally, the party proposed that parish councils should be attributed with 
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the management of the baldios. Local councillors were not only experienced 
administrators, but also — also being commoners themselves — experts in local 
customs and needs (ibid, p.3207). 
The alleged mismanagement and misappropriation of revenues from baldios by 
the commoners' management commissions were connected to the second line of 
reasoning in the CDS's and PDS's argument: the law's impact upon development. 
Both parties argued that the rigid protection of the baldios as common property and 
the prohibition of their alienation under the 1976 law seriously constrained the 
ability of local executives to develop their local economies (for instance, by the 
installation of industries). The commons were not alienable under any form (sale, 
rent, lease) except for a rental relation with the State for forestry purposes. 
Valuable land was taken from farmers while baldios, which were suitable for 
construction, continued to remain unused. Hence, they argued that the legal status 
of the commons needed revision. The protection of the status of common property 
had to be softened, and alienation for industrial development or social aims had to 
be allowed. 
Similar to the PSD, the PS was concerned with the baldios' possible contribution 
to rural development. Hence, it formulated PJL 41 /V, which was part of a packet 
of proposals concerning the country's forestry development4. In the justificatory 
notes accompanying the enactment, the PS stated that the actual contribution of the 
commons to rural development in the "deprived zones of smallholder fanning and 
small and medium-sized property" (PJL 41 /V, preamble, p. 170) was insufficient. 
Reforestation of the commons by the previous political regime, the Estado Novo, 
had brought not only costs, but also considerable benefits to the local communities 
in terms of soil conservation, watershed improvement, communication infrastructu-
re (roads), timber plantations, and a large organizational infrastructure. But these 
benefits were by no means a reflection of what should have been achieved and 
what was possible. The 1976 law on the commons was meant to correct the earlier 
ereors but still lacked a clear development strategy, whereas the "baldios ... should 
be turned into true poles of development, creators or stimulators of specialized 
employment, and the producers of sustained flows of multiple goods and multiple 
indirect benefits" (PJL 41/V, justificatory notes). The PS's enactment contained 
several measures to ensure that the baldios could fulfil such a development role, 
for instance, through the opening of special credit lines. 
Finally, the PS argued that Decreto-Lei 39/76 assumed that traditionally all 
baldios had been administered by village communities without interference by the 
parish council and did not take into account the historic diversity in which local 
administrative authorities did play an important role in the management of the 
commons in some areas. Therefore, the party in its enactment, created the 
4 PJL 39/V (Lei de Bases do Sistema de Promoçâo e Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Florestal), PJL n° 
42/V (Lei do Arrendamento Florestal), and PJL 43/V (Incêndios Florestais). 
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possibility of parish and municipal councils acquiring more control over the baldios 
in the case that no commoners' committee was created. 
The defenders of the 1976 law raised several counterarguments. The Green 
Party, for example, referred to the value of traditions and objected to the law's 
modification "in a genuine acceptance of the communitarian culture, never 
accepting in whatever case an administrative system which introduces in the 
communitarian body the alien element of tutorship by the local authorities" (DAR 
27 April 1988 p.3304; see also DAR 1 February 1989, p. 1200). The PCP pointed 
to the crimes of the previous regime and argued that the dissolution of the 
management commissions would mean the re-creation of the Estado Novo's 
dictatorial legal order (ibid, p.3207, 3210; DAR 1 February 1989 p. 1199). Others 
alluded to the possibly damaging developments that would be triggered by lifting 
the restrictions regarding the alienation of baldios. They were afraid that this 
relaxation would favour the interests of real estate speculators rather than the local 
population, or that it might lead to a rapid expansion of the area covered with 
eucalyptus trees (DAR 27 April 1988, p.3210; DAR 1 February 1989, p. 1200). 
They also pointed to the amenities created by local commissions (such as those 
listed by Rodrigues 1987:101-102) to prove that many commissions used their 
money to the benefit of local development. 
Behind the parliamentary scenes, the Forestry Service acted in defense of 
common property as well. As I described in chapter 8, it played an important role 
in the discussions on the legal status of the baldios immediately after the 1974 
revolution. It even presented the population with a proposal for a new legal 
framework for the commons (see chapter 9). But in March 1975, the Forestry 
Service lost control of the law-making process to left-wing politicians and was 
forced to take a more backseat role. Yet, it did comment in at least two cases on 
enactments presented to parliament. In 1984, it formulated an opinion concerning 
the enactments PJL 199/m and PJL 281/III (Anonymous 1984) 5. The Service's 
recommendations regarding these enactments showed that it was still keen on 
preserving its institutional self-interest by trying to guarantee full control over the 
commons. The document's authors warned of the bills' power to hand over 
commons to the parish councils and empowering these to administer the baldios 
independently from the Forestry Service. They argued that prior to 1974, the 
parish councils had already administered the land destined for communal use (the 
so-called logradouros comuns). Although article 401 of the admmistrative code had 
formally obliged them to afforest these areas within twenty years, they had done 
so in very few cases. Hence, the Service concluded that parish councils were not 
equipped for handling the administration of forests or of land appropriate for 
afforestation. In addition, the Service objected to relaxing of the restrictions on the 
alienation of baldios as this would endanger the "continuity of the forests". 
5 During ray visit to the service's headquarters in 1993 I was informed that the PS's 1992 enactment 
(PJL 109/VT) had been sent to the circumscriptions for comments. Apparendy, the Forestry Service still 
played an advisory role in the parliamentary debate on the baldios' legal status. 
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The Service's recommendations were not inspired only by concerns for the 
nation's forests, but also for the Forestry Service itself. This is clear in the 
document's last section. There, the authors explained what they saw as the 
consequences of approving the 1984 enactments for the Forestry Service. In some 
categories, personnel would become superfluous, and in particular the Forestry 
Service's regional bodies would run the risk of being integrated into the regional 
directorates of agriculture. In short, the Forestry Service's objections were at least 
partially based upon their fear of being dismembered, which was understandable, 
seeing that 80% to 90% of the area managed by the Forestry Service was baldio 
(see chapter 8). 
The Baldios as a Source of Political Power 
The development issue played an important role in parliamentary discussions. 
Apart from the PS's 1987 enactment (PJL 41/V), none of the bills contained 
substantial measures geared to the development of the baldios. Apparently, 
development was not the main motive inspiring the PDS and CDS opposition to the 
1976 law. In fact, notwithstanding their lip-service to the development issue, the 
justifications for their proposals clearly demonstrated that they were mainly 
communities. Both objected to what they called "parallel powers", by which they 
meant the existence of two types of authority on the same level. As it was stated 
in the preamble of the CDS's 1987 proposal: 
In our conception of the state, we understand that the local 
admimstrative bodies are effective and legitimate representatives of the 
local communities, and it does not make sense that the administration 
of the commons is entrusted to other entities, in this way provoking, in 
innumerable cases, discordant situations, parallelism or even 
superposition, to which the project wants to put an end. (Preamble PJL 
64 AO 
The PSD argued that under the regime prior to 1974, the parish councils had 
perhaps been undemocratic and had not represented the population. Under these 
conditions the communities' demand for independent local rule had been justified. 
But since 1974, the parish councils have been democratically elected and 
accordingly should be considered the local population's legitimate representatives 
(DAR 2 July 1986, p.3366). In addition, councillors were no strangers to the 
population, "in the local admimstrative circles where there are baldios, the local 
admimstrators themselves are simultaneously users ... and not some alien body 
which is unfamiliar with the local realities!" (DAR 27 April 1988, p.3207). The 
parish council was part and parcel of the parish community. Its members were also 
commoners. In fact, as the PSD put it, the commoners' commissions were alien 
elements in a state form based on the principle of representation, and did not fit 
into the existing constitutional order. Mending this anomaly, "this enactment [PJL 
90/V, RB] will finally introduce the rule of democracy in the management of the 
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commons" (DAR 1 February 1989, p. 1200; see also preamble PJL 64/V, p.278; 
PJL 90/V, p.496) 
If one looks at the various enactments and the records of the resulting discussions 
in parliament, it becomes clear that the issue of parallel powers formed the core 
of the PSD's and the CDS's articulated argumentation against the 1976 baldios 
law. According to these parties, the baldios law and the management commissions 
were aberrations in the prevailing state system which was based on representative 
democracy. To a certain a extent, they were right. For, as I explained in chapter 
8, the 1976 law had been created as a replacement and a challenge to this order by 
posing an alternative system grounded on direct or popular democracy. It was an 
exponent of the revolutionary legality that during the turbulent 1974-1976 period 
had contested the State and the State's legality, and an attempt to develop a 
situation of dual powers or legal dualism. In this respect, the quintessence of the 
conflict over the baldios concerned the foundation of the State and its 
representative democratic form. I have also explained that the baldios law, like the 
rest of the revolutionary legislation, never seriously challenged the state system nor 
contributed to the transition to socialism. Even between 1974 and 1976, neither the 
popular democratic movement nor the communists were able to decisively move 
the balance of power in their favour. This is why Santos (1990:33-35) says this 
period was characterized by impotency dualism instead of power dualism. After 
1976, those who tried to create a revolutionary alternative to the State, lost more 
ground and were never again in a position to seriously challenge parliamentary 
rule. In light of this political reality, the PSD's and the CDS's accusations and 
concerns with parallel powers and legal dualism were exaggerated. These concepts 
cannot really describe the actual political conditions. Therefore, one has to try to 
look through these allegations for the real motives behind them. 
The real motives underlying the PSD's and the CDS's opposition to the 1976 law 
on the baldios, had nothing to do with their anxiety about power dualism. Yet, 
these motives concerned the very basis of the present state form. When I 
interviewed one of the signatories of the PSD's enactment about his party's motives 
for its constant battle against the baldios law, and confronted him with the fact that 
these enactments lacked tangible development-oriented measures, he admitted that 
this was true. His bill would do little for the development of commoners' 
communities; it was essentially geared towards the development of his party. 
Generally speaking, the PSD dominated the parish councils. Consequently, this 
party was able to direct a flow of money to projects, public works, etc. in a 
manner pleasing to the local voters. In doing so, it could build and maintain a loyal 
electorate and win the next elections. If someone from a competing party created 
a commoners' management commission in the parish, that party would control the 
revenues of the commons. Sometimes, these revenues were even larger than the 
sums controlled through the parish council by his party, the PSD. Therefore, other 
political powers could divert money from his party and in that manner raise 
electoral support and possibly even defeat the PSD in future elections (int 20 June 
1991). Notwithstanding the public references to inappropriate use, exploitation of 
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the commons, or lofty notions such as legalities and representative democracy, the 
real issue was much more down-to-earth. Fundamentally, the objections to the 
1976 law on the commons were party-political: the management commissions had 
to be abolished because they were or could become instruments in the hands of the 
political opposition, in particular the PCP. The commissions could then threaten 
the ruling party's electoral basis. 
Despite the rhetoric, the battle over the baldios' legal status was not particularly 
related to the question of misappropriation of revenues or to the fact that originally 
the 1976 law was part of a socialist project. It was not even animated by the 
competition between two competing models for state organization (representative 
versus popular democracy), or two types of legality (state versus revolutionary). 
But it did touch on the ruling political order's foundation: the party system. 
In a liberal democracy one is, as Ant6nio Vitorino (1991:26) put it, "condemned 
to having political parties." In general terms, the system's very essence is the 
existence of party organizations which represent the ideas, interests, norms, values, 
and beliefs of their supporters, and defend these in the political arena (see Aguiar 
1985:773). This party system is governed by two contradictory or dialectical 
relations. The first one concerns the connection between a party's ideology and its 
political power, and the second concerns the bond between a party and its 
politicians. 
The first contradiction is between the party's ideological ambition and the 
amount of electoral support it mobilizes. Political parties stand for an ideal. In 
abstract terms, they represent and defend a certain Weltanschauung, as Weber 
(1964:117) puts it. Yet, in reality, political principles are easily discarded when 
they prove to be obstacles to political power. In 1915, disappointed by the German 
Socialist Party's decision to abandon internationalism and to endorse Germany's 
participation in the First World War, Michels wrote: 
Unquestionable principles are often a stumbling-block to a party whose 
main desire is to increase its membership; and to disregard inconvenient 
principles may bring electoral advantage, if at the cost of honour. The 
leaders are the first to favour such a tendency, for the more widely 
extended the foundations of their party, the greater grows their own 
individual power. (Michels 1962:362) 
In Portugal, the ideological flexibility of the political parties is remarkable. 
Bruneau (1984:96-99) noted, for instance, that the PS changed within a fortnight 
from a rather radical Marxist political organization into party much more to the 
right. In the beginning of 1978, after a short-lived alliance with the PCP, it formed 
a coalition government with the right-wing central-democrats of the CDS. This 
flexibility was primarily resulting from of the personal political ambitions of the 
party's leadership. The only coherent and consistent party was the PCP, but they 
became frozen in a rigid, Moscow inspired, interpretation of Marxist-leninism. 
The other party histories are less structured around organizations, but are rather 
influenced by the personal achievements and failings of their leaders. 
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The flexibility in terms of the world views of Portuguese political parties, can 
be explained in part by the country's recent history. Until 1974, freedom of 
association and speech did not exist. After the Carnations Revolution people began 
to organize political movements, yet these (except for the PCP) were not rooted 
in long-standing traditions, or in specific social groups or classes. Therefore, in 
post-revolutionary Portugal, "the party system [was] not the product of social 
dynamics and expression, but appear[ed] as a series of options that present[ed] 
themselves tentatively to an unknown electorate" (Aguiar :768-769). This peculiarity 
explains why in only one year the PS could govern alone, then make a coalition 
with the CDS and later make another coalition with the PSD. 
The second contradiction involves the party and the politicians who compose it. 
The role of politicians is to defend their party's political project. In a parliamentary 
system, they have to do so by gathering votes at elections in order to occupy the 
largest possible number of seats in parliament or in other representative bodies. 
The number of seats in such bodies defines a party's political influence. Its 
spokespersons may speak eloquently and argue convincingly, but as long as they 
are not backed by a sufficient number of benchers, their efforts will be in vain. 
Politicians are not only a party's agents in the parliamentary and the electoral 
battlefields, but they are also individual persons with wills and desires of their 
own. One can say that, at one extreme, politicians may place themselves at the 
service of their party's ideals, and at the other extreme, they may use the party for 
their personal ambitions. It is difficult to find pure examples of either of these 
extreme cases. In Italy, Berlusconi and his Form Italia come close to the situation 
in which a party is used for the personal ends of an individual. In general, personal 
ambition and political commitment without personal interests are mixed (Weber 
1964:77-128; Michels 1962; Bourdieu 1989; Flores d'Arcais 1991). 
Politicians are dialectically related to their parties. On the one hand, each 
politician has his own personal support group, not necessarily his clientele in the 
strict sense of patronage, but his "personal political capital" as Bourdieu 
(1989:237) calls it. When a politician enters into a party, he adds his personal 
capital to the political capital of that party. Hence, a party's political capital can 
be expanded by adding persons who bring in their personal capital. On the other 
hand, each party has its own institutional capital, which is based upon, for 
example, "a long-standing struggle against fascism" (the PCP), or on "having 
saved the democracy in 1975" (the PS), or on "stable government" (the PSD). This 
capital can be expanded by the provision of certain real or claimed services to the 
electorate such as raising state pensions or building motorways, as the PSD did just 
before the 1991 parliamentary elections. The voter votes for a politician or for a 
party, not only because of ideological congeniality, but also with the expectation 
of receiving certain (general or personal) benefits (Aguiar 1985:779-780; Silva 
1993:489). In this sense political parties are "sophisticated service enterprises" 
(Aguiar 1985:773). Ambitious persons select the party with the largest institutional 
capital. In addition, until recently, political offices at all levels (except for the 
presidency and the parish) could only be attained through political parties. In the 
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past, independent candidates were not accepted (Vitorino 1991:29) 6. Thus, 
politically ambitious persons could not be elected into office without first acquiring 
party support. In this manner, politicians and their parties are mutually dependent: 
the parties rely upon individuals with personal political capital and those individuals 
need the parties to enter into office. 
The Baldios in the Local Political Field 
The realm of local politics offers perfect examples of how the dialectical relation 
between politician and political party works in practice. All parties try to enlist 
specific persons who, for some reason or another, can be expected to raise 
considerable electoral support. Often they even compete over the same individual. 
Control over the Parish Council of CampeH, for instance, was normally disputed 
between the PSD and the PS. In 1989, the CDS was able to win local elections 
because it enlisted a candidate who was able mobilize sufficient local support as an 
individual. This was because of his role as a farmers' leader in a conflict with the 
municipal authorities over the exploitation of groundwater. The municipality had 
wanted to tap the parish's water resources to guarantee a supply for the growing 
population of Vila Real city. People from Campelt were afraid that this water 
exploitation would adversely affect the water availability in the parish itself. So 
when the municipality started the construction of the catchment tanks, they 
occupied the building site, and thus forced the Municipal Council to modify its 
plans. The man running for the CDS led these actions. The fact that he did not fit 
in with the CDS profile in regard to religious zeal, for example, did apparently not 
impede his candidacy for this conservative christian-democratic party. Another 
example, which was even covered by the national press, concerned the Municipal 
Council of Sintra, near Lisbon. During preparations for the 1993 local elections, 
the PSD, the PS, and the PCP tried to tempt a local priest, Father Delmar, into 
running on behalf of their party. They did not even ask that the priest to become 
a member or subscribe to the party programme, but contented themselves with 
having him on their list as an independent (O Independente 15 June 1993). The fact 
that parties with different ideologies tried to enlist him, shows that his political 
outlooks were relatively unimportant; all parties were merely interested in his 
personal capital in the form of support from his parishioners. 
These two examples concern cases in which political parties tried to capitalize 
on an individual's personal political capital, but there are also cases in which 
political party struggles were subsumed to personal ambitions or feuds that had no 
6 Although in 1991 a law was approved that allowed persons who do not belong to a certain party to 
run for a municipal office, the parties have carefully protected their oligopoly. A party only needs 5,000 
signatures for running in national elections and individual candidates for the presidency of the republic 
7,500 to 15,000. However, an individual running for the municipal councils of Porto and Lisbon has 
to present circa 10,000 signatures in his support (Vitorino 1991:29). 
The Commons and Political Struggle 237 
direct political party or ideological background. In the Municipality of Chaves, the 
PS and PSD fought over the Parish of Torre de Ervededo. In reality, in this parish, 
party politics and personal rivalries were inseparable. The party dispute was a feud 
which dated back to the pre-1974 era, between the parties' local leaders; a lady in 
her seventies and a priest in his nineties. Both leaders had their own bands of 
supporters, and what one tried to accomplish, the other tried to annul (Dionisio 
1991). In Bragado, a parish halfway between Chaves and Vila Pouca de Aguiar, 
power was also contested by the PS and the PSD. This dispute was related to the 
rivalry between the villages of the parish. The parish's main village voted PS, 
whereas the population of the dependent hamlets voted PSD. As the council 
president (PSD) told me: "Even if I would run for the PCP, the population of my 
village would still back me, and the people of Bragado would vote PS or PSD. At 
the local level, political parties are unimportant. People vote for persons" (int 25 
May 1993) 7. Nevertheless, in reality, individuals with political aspirations are not 
entirely free in their choice of party affiliation, and the option to run as a PCP 
candidate could easily prove to be disastrous. In the case of a former parish council 
president of Dornelas, in the municipality of Boticas, I got the impression that his 
ties with the PCP hampered his political career: in a PSD-dominated parish he 
managed to get elected to the Parish Assembly notwithstanding his party affiliation. 
If he would have been affiliated with a party that was more acceptable to the local 
electorate, he probably would have won a place in the Council8. 
These examples demonstrate the subsumption at the local level of party politics 
to other social struggles. As I will demonstrate in the rest of this section, the 
struggles over the baldios were located within this very context of a politicized 
personal conflict. I describe several examples of how control over the baldios 
became a resource and a stake in these local conflicts and how that impinged upon 
political party struggles. 
Vila Verde versus Parada de Pinhâo 
In the parish of Vila Verde in the municipality of Alijô, several villages created 
management commissions for their baldios: Fundôes, Balsa and Vale de Agodim 
had commissions with state representation (modality b), and Vila Verde, the 
parish's main village, had a commission without a state representative (modality 
a). I interviewed members of the last two commissions. 
7 In December 1993 he lost the elections to another person from Bragado (int 22 October 1994). 
8 At this point I should warn against generalizations: the PCP deputy in the Municipal Council of 
Mourto, in the Alentejo, ran as a PSD candidate, not because he thought that his former party was bad 
(in the interview he still named the PCP's former secretary-general, Alvaro Cunhal, as the best 
politician in the country), but because he wanted to stay in office: he believed that the PCP would 
certainly lose) (O Independente 15 July 1993). 
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In 1989, The villages of Balsa and Vale de Agodim created a joint management 
commission for their commons. The initiative received broad support. The con-
stituent assembly was attended by 86 of the 102 commoners. When I visited the 
hamlets for the first time, I hoped that a comparison of this modality (b) 
commission with a modality (a) commission in the village of Vila Verde would 
furnish important information about the role of the State and the possibilities of 
local rule in the parish (see also supra, p.52). Therefore I questioned the com-
missioners about their relations with the Forestry Service and their future plans for 
management. I also inquired about the application of revenues. During the first 
interview it appeared that the commission would not serve my aims. The commis-
sion had duly been recognized by local forestry administrator, so that it would not 
help to illuminate possible conflicts between commoners' communities and the 
Forestry Service. Furthermore, it would hardly provide a basis for a comparative 
Figure 10.1: Parade de Pinhao, Balsa and Vale de Agodim and the disputed baldios. 
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Forestry Service. Furthermore, it would hardly provide a basis for a comparative 
study as its only project was winning a court case against the Parish Council of 
neighbouring Parada de Pinhao, in the Municipality of Sabrosa. According to the 
villagers, that parish had illegally claimed 338 ha of baldio land and its revenues 
(for the situation of the disputed tracts, see the map in figure 10.1). If the case 
were won, the commission would immediately be dissolved and the commons 
handed over to the parish. During the conversation, it became clear that the court 
case was the last battle in a protracted war. This conflict had been triggered by two 
incidents. The first one occurred sometime in the late 1970s and can be seen as one 
of the many unintended consequences of the Carnations Revolution in 1974. 
Following the decolonization of Angola, Salgueiro, a resident from Balsa, 
returned to his home village where he, like many of his fellow retornados (returned 
colonists), had to build a new home 9. For the construction of the roof he needed 
timber. As there were pines growing on the village commons, he thought them 
would be unnecessary to buy some and asked his fellow-villagers what he had to 
do to obtain them. They told him that he should ask permission from the Parish 
Council of Parada de Pinhao, across the Pinhao River. Normally, permission 
would be granted without any difficulty. They also told him that of course nobody 
would make a great fuss if he would take the pines without authorization. Why 
bother to ask if it would only be granted anyway? Salgueiro, however, decided that 
it was more appropriate to ask the council president for permission. If it was true 
that he would receive the pines, why should he not respect law and authority and 
ask for them as procedure demanded? Just as he expected, the president told him 
that it would be all right. He only asked Salgueiro to wait until the trees had been 
resinated. It would be a waste to cut a tree without taking its resin first. Salgueiro 
agreed and waited. 
In the mean time two things happened. First, the parish priest of Parada de 
Pinhao worried about the dilapidated condition of the chapel and its precinct which 
were the destinations of an annual pilgrimage. He decided to raise funds for the 
sanctuary's improvement. The Parish Council sympathized with the idea and 
agreed to sell some of its timber. Trees were cut in several areas, not only within 
the parish of Parada de Pinhao itself, but also in some of the stretches east of the 
river, in Vila Verde. The people of Balsa and Vale de Agodim did not object to 
these fellings because the revenues would be spent on the church. Second, after 
elections in Parada de Pinhao, a new Parish Council entered into office. When Sal-
gueiro went to see the new president, the latter bluntly refused permission saying 
that he would never again give any pine to anyone. Salgueiro was enraged, 
especially since the Parish Council had just cleared several nice tree stands and had 
made a substantial amount of money from the timber growing on the land 
' Directly after decolonization, around 400,000 to 800,000 colonists returned (Serrao 1985:1001). In 
Campea, in November 1975, these retornados requested baldio land for the construction of housing 
(AJF 2 November 1975). In March 1976, the Parish Council conceded areas in Carvalheira do Baixo 
for this purpose (AJF 7 March 1976; supra, chapter 7, fh. 28). 
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belonging to his hamlet. Without the pines, he had no other choice than to alter the 
plan for his house and make a concrete roof. But from then on, relations between 
Salgueiro and the Parish Council of Parada de Pinhao were deeply disturbed. He 
started to ask himself how it was possible that outsiders from Parada de Pinhao 
could freely dispose of the pines growing in his parish, whereas he, an inhabitant 
of the parish of Vila Verde, did not get what he was entitled to. Salgueiro resolved 
to investigate the background of this strange situation and to disclose his results to 
officials. He even wrote the prime minister (int 21 October 1990) 1 0. 
The second incident dates from 1984. On 27 February, the Parish Council of 
Parada de Pinhao announced the public sale of some of its trees in a local 
newspaper, A Vdz de Trds-os-Montes. Although the advertisement did not refer to 
any trees standing on territory outside the parish, it soon appeared that some of the 
areas near Balsa and Vale de Agodim, east of the river, were included as well. As 
the trees were to be resinated before felling, a man came to the area in order to 
prepare resin collection and people soon became aware of what was happening. 
They contacted the Parish Council of Vila Verde, because they thought that it 
would be the right institution to defend the land against further intrusions. The 
Parish Council had to represent the people of Vila Verde as well as its own 
interests: the trees were parish property. Pressured by the population, the Parish 
Council brought the charge to court and sued its homologue of Parada de Pinhao 
in March 1985, claiming that the disputed land belonged to the property of the 
Parish of Vila Verde. Apparently the Vila Verde Parish Council was not very 
eager to pursue the action. Before a certain date, it needed to present the names 
and signatures of individuals who would testify that the grounds truly belonged to 
Balsa and Vale de Agodim. About twenty people from these hamlets offered to 
give a witness and defend their case. Salgueiro and another man, Morgado, who 
had also become engaged in the conflict, gathered the signatures and photocopies 
of the identity cards that the court required and handed these to Lopes, the 
president of the Parish Council, who promised to deliver them to the court house 
in Alij6. Some time later during a visit to Alijo, Salgueiro and Morgado ran into 
a court clerk who asked them whether they had given up their claim. He told them 
that the judges had not yet received the names and signatures of the witnesses and 
therefore intended to drop the case. The people from Balsa and Vale de Agodim 
were surprised and hurried to the town hall to ask the president of the municipality 
People from Parada de Pinhao presented a slightly different image. According to Ihem, the ceding 
president had warned Salgueiro that the parish council was going to change and that his successor was 
less likely to give him the pines. Nevertheless, Salgueiro waited, "because he wanted to fell the trees 
when the moon was right." People believe that trees felled at full moon in August or during the waning 
moon in February provide better timber. 
Salgueiro let the time pass and as predicted he did not get his trees. He then went to see the former 
president and asked him to mediate. The latter agreed and convinced his successor to hand over the 
trees. However, after their talk, Salgueiro claimed that he would have got them anyway as he possessed 
a document that proved that the villagers from Balsa and Vale de Agodim were fully entitled to the 
fruits of the baldios, the agreement was cancelled again and the conflict initiated (int 21 October 1994). 
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what was going on. There, they were soothed and told that everything would be 
all right (int 21 October 1990). However, in January 1989, the people of the 
hamlets were surprised by the news that both parties had arrived at an agreement 
and that the case had been dismissed. Vila Verde agreed to accept the property 
rights of Parada de Pinhao over the baldios of Lameiroes, Luvetia, and Esteval 
(337.75 ha; A, B and C in figure 10.1), whereas Parada de Pinhao acknowledged 
the rights of Vila Verde over the areas of Ervedeira and Castelhano (141.075 ha; 
D in figure 10.1) (dossier Alij6). 
The inhabitants of Balsa and Vale de Agodim were astounded by the compromise 
and felt betrayed by their own representatives, who had handed over most of the 
contested area to the enemy without even consulting them. The people's leaders, 
Morgado and Salgueiro, met and decided to continue the war in order to gain back 
the land the Parish Council of Vila Verde had surrendered by using a new weapon. 
They went to the Communist Party for advice, "because the communists know how 
to act in this kind of affairs." The PCP brought them in contact with the secretary 
of the commons' management commissions in Vila Real, who told them that if they 
really wanted to claim the commons of their villages, they should create a 
management commission. That commission would be able to claim ownership in 
terms of the 1976 bill over the commons against both the Parish Council of Vila 
Verde and Parada de Pinhao. Furthermore, he introduced them to Jaime Gralheiro, 
a lawyer who was a specialist in common property matters and an author of an 
extensive commentary on the baldios laws (Gralheiro 1990). The lawyer agreed to 
take up the affair and presented it again in court in Alij6. The villagers agreed to 
pay him the normal salary but in reality most of the cost of the litigation was paid 
by Salgeiro and Morgado. 
According to the villagers, since then, the Parish Council of Parada de Pinhao 
has tried to rob them of their property once more. In January 1990, a lumberjack 
appeared who had bought trees in the Balsa/Vale de Agodim area from the Parish 
Council of Parada de Pinhao. The population was furious and blocked the road. 
The police who had been sent by the authorities to protect him, had been stopped 
elsewhere. Salgueiro went to talk to the lumberjack and explained to him that the 
Parish Council of Parada de Pinhao had sold him something which it did not own, 
and the best thing he could do was to return to Parada de Pinhao and ask for his 
money back. A forest guard, who also arrived at the scene, intervened as well. The 
Parish Council did not have permission to fell the trees and as the trees were not 
yet fully grown, the guard refused to issue a licence (int 21 October 1990). 
The case of Balsa and Vale de Agodim remained pending in court until October 
1993, when, for the time being at least, the conflict was settled by mutual 
agreement between the parties. Parada de Pinhao recognized the claims of Balsa 
and Vale de Agodim on most of the baldios. The people from the hamlets 
acknowledged that the commons lying between the Pinhao River and the road 
connecting Balsa to Vilar de Macada belonged to the population of Parada de 
Pinhao. Finally, the Serra das Lameiras baldios would be split and the border 
would be marked by a firebreak (dossier Alijo). 
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Because it is neither my intention to reproduce all details of the litigation, nor 
to duplicate the court's work by elaborating on the verdict, I do not want to go into 
the juridical background of the case (see Brouwer 1993). It suffices to say that the 
claims were rooted in a complicated administrative reorganization and in differing 
definitions of property. Until their transfer to Vila Verde in 1913, Balsa and Vale 
de Agodim had ecclesiastically and civilly belonged to Parada de Pinhao. This 
explains why Parada de Pinhao still felt that it could exercise a certain authority 
over the villages 1 1. The Parish Council's claim to the disputed territories was 
based on a sales contract from 1892 in which the Parish Council bought these lands 
together with some other stretches from the heirs of a woman named Guimermina 
Magelhaes Miller. Hence, the parish argued that the land was not a common 
(baldio), but private property of the parish exploited communally by the 
parishioners. It was a maninho. The villagers did not agree with this interpretation. 
They argued that the sales contract had lost its practical value as the contract 
explicitly referred to the paramount ownership or dominium directum and not to the 
full property. With the abolition of feudal privileges, the concept of dominium 
directum had lost its legal basis. Even of one would still want to attribute a legal 
value to this contract, according to the administrative law, the hamlets' transfer to 
the Vila Verde parish included the transfer of the land lying across the new 
administrative borders. In this manner, according to either interpretation, the 
Parish Council of Parada de Pinhao could not have a say over the disputed 
stretches. 
What was the background of this inter-hamlet struggle? Although my research 
does not allow for an investigation of all plausible and active causes, it has pointed 
to one very important aspect. In the past, the hamlets of Balsa and Vale de Agodim 
had originally been single farms. They had never acquired the status of povos. This 
explains why the hamlets had never developed an independent administration of 
their baldios by a juiz de vintena or a zelador as was the case in the villages of 
" The administrative reorganization followed a rather tortuous trajectory: Parada de Pinhao and Vila 
Verde had originally belonged to the municipality of Vilar de Macada, which had been dissolved in 
1853. In that year, Parada de Pinhao and Vila Verde were included in Alij6 (Didrio do Governo (DdG) 
31 December 1853). Two years later, Parada de Pinhao was separated from Alijd and incorporated into 
the municipality of Sabrosa (DdG 24 October 1855). The Pinhao River became the border between the 
two municipalities, just as it is today. The hamlets of Balsa and Vale de Agodim, however, found 
themselves in a vague position. For religious affairs, the inhabitants of these hamlets had to turn to 
Parada de Pinhao, whereas civil affairs had to be dealt with in Vila Verde. This situation was 
particularly confusing as at that time State and Church were not yet separated. In 1878 the administra-
tive division was changed again, but this reform did not really solve the problems: the hamlets of Balsa 
and Vale de Agodim returned to the parish of Parada de Pinhao for both their religious and their 
administrative affairs, although they remained situated in the municipality of Alij6. Only in 1913, was 
the natural effect of the 1855 division in municipalities finally consummated: both hamlets were 
separated from their parish on the west side of the Pinhao River and included in Vila Verde on the east 
(DdGl August 1913). Ecclesiastically, however, this separation was never implemented: the inhabitants 
of Balsa and Vale de Agodim continued to go to mass in Parada de Pinhao, to pay their cdngrua to the 
priest over there, and they were buried in the graveyard of that parish (dossier Alijo). 
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Campea. It also explains the background to this conflict. The inhabitants of Parada 
de Pinhao, a former vila, saw the people from Balsa and Vale de Agodim as 
"uncivilized boors" and treated them as such. As the villagers told me once: "In 
the eyes of the people from Parada de Pinhao, we are even less than the dogs that 
they keep to guard their farms" (int 21 October 1990). The present conflict was a 
kind of revenge or, as the son of the Parada de Pinhao parish president put it to 
the dismay of his father, "an attempt by both hamlets to emancipate and become 
independent" (int 21 October 1990, 21 October 1994). 
The case of Balsa and Vale de Agodim versus Parada de Pinhao shows how the 
1976 law on the commons was used in local struggles. By turning to that law, the 
villagers could claim the land as their baldio when their claim to the land as part 
of their parish (maninho) had failed. In addition, the case illuminates the way in 
which local strife impinges on political party struggles. This point is particularly 
relevant in relation to the argument raised by the PSD that baldios management 
commissions were primarily created to divert votes from the PSD to the 
opposition, especially the PCP. The case shows that this argument severely 
overestimates the importance of political parties. In the local arena, these parties 
are instruments rather than players. 
The subordinate role which party politics and Weltanschauungen play in the local 
political arena can be illustrated by several occurrences. The Vila Verde president, 
Lopes, belonged to the PSD. His counterpart in Parada de Pinhao was an 
independent, but ideologically he was close to the PS. Yet in 1989, Lopes accepted 
a compromise which, at least at first sight, was disadvantageous to his parish. He 
and his counterpart from Parada de Pinhao had been close friends since they were 
boys and had decided to resolve in a friendly manner what they saw as a minor 
conflict (int 21 October 1994). At the municipal level, the presidents of the 
concelhos to which Vila Verde and Parada de Pinhao belong, Alijo and Sabrosa, 
were bom members of the PSD. Nevertheless, instead of trying to maintain party 
unity, they immediately sided with their respective parishes. The president of Alij6 
even ordered the disconnection of electricity to a few houses on the Sabrosa side 
of the Pinhao River which were connected to the Alij6 power network. His 
colleague from Sabrosa threatened to do the same with the town of Pinhao, located 
within Alij6 but connected to the Sabrosa network. Only then did the Alijo 
authorities give in and restore the power (int 21 October 1994). Obviously, at the 
level of the parishes, personal friendships could surpass administrative loyalties, 
whereas at the municipal level, administrative loyalties transcended those to the 
political party. Hence, party politics were subordinate to other loyalties. 
This did not mean that the conflict did not influence party politics. Because of 
Lopes's role in the dispute with Parada de Pinhao, the voters from Balsa and Vale 
de Agodim no longer supported the PSD in the 1989 election. The PSD lost Vila 
Verde to the PS and Lopes was replaced by a woman from Balsa. Apparently, 
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local disputes could have political-party consequences (int 21 October 1990, 21 
October 1994) 1 2. 
The potential role of political parties is also illustrated by the way in which the 
PCP got involved in the affair. The PCP, eager to acquire a foothold in the anti-
communist region of Vila Real, immediately stepped into the conflict on the side 
of the villagers against the ruling PSD council. However, the PCP did not engage 
itself openly; instead it went through an apparently neutral and non-party 
organization, the regional secretariat of baldios commissions. The secretary 
brought the villagers in contact with a lawyer who also happened to be associated 
with the party. In this manner, the dispute was politicized in party terms. 
At the national level, the PSD and the CDS in more or less overt statements, 
accused the PCP of dominating the commoners management commission. It is 
certainly true that the regional secretariat of baldios commissions was connected 
to the Communist Party. But it certainly was not merely a party organization. The 
secretariat consisted of an assembly of representatives of management commissions 
from the different municipalities in Tras-os-Montes and was headed by a salaried 
trade-union officer (obs 19 May 1991). Only the paid secretary was a party 
member. The assembly members were not selected on the basis of their political 
affiliation, but on the basis of their residence. The secretariat tried to enlist 
members from the entire region. The political views of the members did play a 
part in the selection of the secretariat's local basis, but in a different manner than 
the right-wing politicians declared. People were not so much selected on the basis 
of their party affiliation, but on their willingness to engage in political struggle. 
For example, the CDS president of Campea maintained relations with the 
secretariat (although he was never a member) because he had impressed the 
secretary by the way in which he had organized the farmers resistance against the 
exploitation of Campea's groundwater reserves. Moreover, he actively engaged in 
creating communal land management commissions in several villages in the parish. 
His relations with the secretary deteriorated only after a conflict related to the local 
farmers movement. This shows that the image given by the PSD spokesman in 
parliament - that the PCP controlled the local management commissions — was not 
only an exaggeration, but beside the point. The party, in looking to expand its 
electorate, tried to align itself with certain local leaders, whereas the local leaders 
attempted to profit from the party strategy by using the party's organizations for 
their own aims. Thus, the baldios "controlled" the PCP, rather than the reverse. 
The way in which the PCP was involved in the Vila Verde conflict suggests that 
the party tried to utilize the dispute as a way to gain entry into local communities 
and as a means to broaden its electoral base. The events in Vila Verde village 
show that the situation was more complicated and cannot be approached from the 
political party perspective alone. They also demonstrate that people running for the 
governing party, the PSD, used the baldios as a source of (personal) political 
1 2 In 1993, the woman was again elected, but she then ran for the PSD as a candidate (int 21 October 
1994). The interpretation in this chapter is a revision from my earlier account in Brouwer (1993). 
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capital. When president Lopes lost the elections in 1989 and had to leave the Parish 
Council, he called a meeting of the commoners in his home village and created a 
management commission of his own, with himself as secretary. Although the Vila 
Verde commons were not very large, they were valuable. (In 1939 the JCI found 
only 60 ha for the entire parish, but since there were 479 ha in Balsa and Vale de 
Agodim alone, it was a dramatic underestimation.) The value of the commons of 
Vila Verde was not derived from their forest cover (they were never submitted to 
the forestry regime) but from the presence of granite. In the parish, several 
quarries had been opened, and according to well-informed sources, Lopes did 
everything to keep the rents of these quarries low. When the commission's 
president wanted to raise the rent, at that time 50 contos per year, he was 
vehemently opposed by his secretary. This suggests that when Lopes lost the Parish 
Council presidency, he tried to create a management commission for the 
maintenance of his political clientele such as the quarrymen (int 3 October 1990, 
21 October 1990, 23 October 1990). The tension between Lopes's private political 
interests and the management commission president's view on the community in 
general soon led to additional conflicts. The commission controlled a financial 
reserve of two thousand contos. The president proposed to grant the request of 
village women, who demanded that the tank which they used for washing their 
clothes be repaired. The secretary wanted to use the money to finance the staffing 
of the village cultural centre which was in financial trouble. When Lopes refused 
to organize a commoners' assembly on the matter, the president resigned and the 
commission was dissolved (int 7 November 1991). 
These cases from the parish of Vila Verde point to the importance of the baldios 
in the local arena. Ambitious persons tried to use the revenues from these baldios 
to their own benefit. In local politics, these (potential) revenues from the commons 
constitute an important source of political capital. Furthermore, the case shows that 
political parties, looking for an opportunity to weaken their opponents in the 
struggle over the electorate, could latch onto the struggle over the commons. It is 
obvious that the PCP and the regional baldios secretary were easily tempted to step 
into a local conflict not only because they were interested in protecting the baldios, 
but also because, in this manner, they could increase their institutional capital in 
a certain locality. Thus, the baldios and their revenues became stakes in 
intertwined personal, inter-village, and political party struggles. 
Dornelas 
Another case that illuminates the role of the baldios in local struggles concerns the 
parish of Dornelas in the Municipality of Boticas. Here, Dionisio Alves had taken 
the initiative to create a management commission for the local baldios. Dionisio 
had been part of the parish's Commissdo Administrativa between 1974 and 1976, 
and in 1976 he was elected on behalf of the PCP to the Parish Council for a four-
year term. He always remained an active party member. 
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Immediately after the revolution, there had been a management commission for 
the commons. At that time, the trees were still young and the stands did not 
produce much revenue so the people were not yet very interested in them. When 
the commission's term ended, the villagers did not immediately elect a new one 
and the commission ceased to exist. But when they tried to create a new one a few 
years later, they were confronted with serious institutional resistance. The Forestry 
Service refused to recognize the newly elected commission. 
In 1986 a new attempt was made to create a legal management commission for 
the commons. This attempt was also unsuccessful because the parish refused to 
hand over a copy of the electoral register. The copy had to be sent to the Forestry 
Service to verify that the people voting at the elections were really inhabitants of 
the area and compartes of its baldio. As the new commission sent the minutes of 
the election to the Forestry Service without that register, the commission was not 
recognized. In September 1989, the villagers began a court case against the Parish 
Council president in which they accused him of negligence. Near Viseu, a Parish 
Council president had been convicted for this crime earlier that year. The Dornelas 
Parish President defended himself by saying that he had been willing to hand over 
the register, but had been unable to do so, because at that time, the register was 
in Boticas where the municipal offices were preparing elections. The court accepted 
his defense and in February 1990, he was acquitted13. Once again, the 
commission did not takeoff. 
Four years later, another attempt was made to start a management commission. 
A new election process was started which resulted in the election of a commission 
in May 1994. In July the Forestry Service refused to recognize this commission as 
the number of commoners present at the meeting was less than the 50% quorum. 
Thus, the meeting could not be accepted as a legal commoners' assembly. 
However, it appeared that somewhere between the commission and Lisbon, one 
page of the list of names of people present at the assembly had been lost. As a 
result, the number of registered attendants was below the legal limit. When the 
commission forwarded a complete copy, it was promptly acknowledged (int 26 
October 1994). 
According to my contacts, the difficulties met by the commission were primarily 
related to the interests of civil servants (forestry officials) and municipal authorities 
in controlling the commons not so much for their political advantage but rather for 
their personal benefit. The commons were a gateway to EC-subsidies. The Vice-
President of the Municipal Council of Boticas, Fernando Campos, was also the 
Administrador Florestal of the area. He allegedly had strong personal interests in 
the baldios as he used them for the formulation of afforestation projects with EC 
1 3 It is of course quite suspicious that the parish president had not given the management commission 
this explanation earlier. To put it mildly, it suggests that persons at the level of the municipality were 
indeed directly involved in trying to stop the management commission's recognition. 
The president of the parish of Queirà, Vouzela, was sentenced to seven months in prison in March 
1989 (Gralheiro 1990:129, footnote). 
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financing. He himself would receive a certain percentage from the total project 
sum. In 1993, these rumours were confirmed in the national press, and ajournalist 
of the Lisbon weekly Expresso publicly accused Campos of using his position 
within the Forestry Service to acquire a percentage of the EC funds made available 
through the Forestry Action Programme (PAF) (Rodrigues 1993) 1 4. 
According to my contacts, Campos used his position within the municipality and 
the PSD to pressure the president of the Parish Council of Dornelas to stop the 
creation of a management commission. The Parish Council president and Campos 
both belonged to the same party. Campos objected to the management commission 
because he saw it as a threat to his own additional income from afforestation 
projects (int 25 September 1990, 5 October 1990, 4 June 1993, 10 July 1994). 
When I first looked at the case in Dornelas, it appeared to be only a local 
politicized personal struggle similar to that in Vila Verde. The personal ambitions 
of Dionisio, the local parish president, and Campos, were translated into political 
terms as a dispute between the PSD and the PS. But in reality, the situation can be 
understood in at least two other ways. First, it relates to the way in which the 
private pockets of state forest administrators become filled with public funds. 
Second, it refers to the dependency of lower level politicians upon their seniors. 
(In this particular case, the president of the Dornelas Parish Council upon the vice-
president of the municipality.) Thus, this case shows how personal prestige within 
the parish, family ties, hierarchy within the administrative and political party 
structures, and the mixture of private interests and civil service all played a role 
in what looked like a simple conflict. 
1 4 Campos designed projects which were presented to the Forestry Service for approval through two 
enterprises with which he maintained strong personal ties: in one, Viveiros das Romanas, his wife was 
coowner and comanager, whereas the other belonged to one of the other shareholders of Viveiros, a 
lumberjack. Since the projects were located within the Boticas area, Campos himself was instrumental 
in their approval. Being the forestry administrator, he advised the official within the forestry 
circumscription's offices in Vila Real who was responsible for the attribution of the PAF funds in his 
administration. 
Campos was not the only official suspected of inappropriate use of his position within the Forestry 
Service. Within the Vila Real circumscription, of the thirteen administrators, five were subject to 
disciplinary investigations: those in Braganca, Boticas, Pedras Salgadas, and Vila Real. The 
Administrations of Pedras Salgadas and Vila Real were accused of maintaining the same type of ties 
to Viveiros das Romanas as Campos did (Expresso 8 May 1993, 12 June 1993). 
The practice that forest officials would formulate projects which they then would present to 
themselves or to befriended colleagues for approval, was widely known among the lower ranks of the 
service (int 5 September 1991). In July 1989 "the need to identify and correct some perversions" incited 
the director-general to forbid forestry officials to "formulate project proposals during their service or 
on the basis of means or professional information inherent to their function in the Forestry Service." 
(Despacho 25/89 of 6 July 1989). 
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Bragado 
In Bragado the case was also complicated. The parish consisted of four hamlets. 
Although some vague notions existed about certain ties between hamlets and 
communal areas, the parish's first management commission was responsible for all 
the baldios in the area. That commission disappeared many years ago when the 
commoners failed to elect a new one at the end of a term. In 1989 things changed. 
The inhabitants of the parish's main village, Bragado, created a new management 
commission, initially to succeed the discontinued one which had acted on behalf of 
the entire parish, but with the intention to divide the commons among the various 
hamlets. The initiators accused the Parish Council of selling granite cheaply to 
quarrymen from outside the parish and even from outside the country. As they 
argued, their village suffered from the noise and dust caused by the cutting of the 
rocks, and the roads leading to their hamlet were damaged by the heavy trucks 
which carried their wealth to other areas. Profit disappeared into the quarrymen's 
wallets and perhaps even into those of the parish councillors. In addition they 
accused the forestry administration of Pedras Salgadas of poorly supervising the 
the resin collection in their area. Whereas officially the resin concession included 
only 25,000 cuts or bicas for 67$50 each, they had counted at least 70,000 cuts. 
What happened to the difference was unclear. It could be that it disappeared 
entirely into the resin concession holder's purse, but they did not doubt that the 
Parish Council members and the officials of the Forestry Service had also benefited 
from the extra revenues. Finally, they stressed that, until the last elections, the 
president of the Parish Council had always been from Bragado. The new president 
lived in Vilella. To them, this was an unforgivable insult to the status of their 
village as the parish centre (int 17 May 1992). 
According to the initiators, the Parish Council did everything to stop their 
actions. It did not give them the documents that showed which parts of the baldios 
belonged to which village. It removed the public announcements for the constituent 
assembly, and wrote a letter to the forestry administration in Pedras Salgadas 
saying that the meetings had not been properly announced and that the obligatory 
number of meetings had not been held (int 6 October 1990). The forestry 
administrator forwarded the election records to his superiors in Vila Real, who in 
turn should have passed the records on to the central level in Lisbon. On the basis 
of the Parish Council's reports, the forestry administrator advised his superiors not 
to acknowledge the commission. In November, the villagers received an answer 
from the Vila Real forestry circumscription saying that in accordance with the 
director-general's decision, their commission would not be recognized. When this 
happened, the people from Bragado turned to the baldios secretariat in Vila Real. 
Working together, they found out that something strange had happened. The 
director-general's decision not to recognize the commission was not "available". 
This suggested to them that it had been taken at the level of the circumscription in 
Vila Real and not by the director-general in Lisbon. The secretariat and the 
villagers got the impression that within the regional organization of the Forestry 
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Service there were persons interested in blocking the commission's advancement 
(int 25 September 1990). In order to soothe the tension, the director of the 
circumscription and the baldios secretary summoned a meeting in a cafe1 in Vila 
Pouca de Aguiar, where the different parties arrived at an agreement (int 11 
January 1991). It was agreed that the people from Bragado would repeat the 
constituent process, but this time supervised by both the forestry administrator and 
the baldios secretary to ensure that the correct proceedings would be followed. As 
a result, on 21 July 1991, new elections were held in which 140 commoners 
participated and which were attended by both entities (obs 21 July 1991). The 
commission was officially recognized in September (int 17 May 1992) 1 5. 
The people from Bragado used three lines of argument for the creation of a 
baldios management commission in their parish. These were; the exploitation of 
a common resource (granite) by foreigners without fair compensation for the local 
people, the unlawful appropriation of common goods by private individuals, and 
the lack of representation by the Parish Council with its president living in the 
village of Vilella, the Council represented the interests of this secondary village 
more than those of Bragado, their hamlet and the parish centre. The Parish Council 
and the Forestry Service presented different versions of the story. The Parish 
Council president's argument consisted of four elements. The first concerned the 
quarries. The president claimed that the rents paid by the quarrymen were 
determined in strict accordance to the law 1 6. Requesting higher rents would have 
been unrealistic as such requests would be fought in court or result in deterring the 
quarrymen. The difficulty in raising the rent was substantiated by the fact that, 
although in some cases the commission had been able to raise the rent (from 60 to 
350 contos), in other cases it had failed. When I interviewed the commission, it 
admitted these difficulties (int 17 May 1992). The second argument concerned the 
resin collection. The Council president conceded that there had been a difference 
between the number of cuts sold and the number of cuts made, but he claimed that 
this difference had been much smaller than the number stated by the commission 
(45,000). Furthermore, he denied any accusation regarding any possible personal 
benefit from fraud. Instead, he argued that the concessionaire, as a good business 
man, had made the extra cuts to make resin collection more profitable, and that it 
1 5 When I observed the election process, I also became aware of why the creation of such a commission 
was so difficult. The 100 to 140 commoners who wanted to vote had to enter a terribly hot school 
building three times: first to sign their names, then to confirm their presence and cast their ballot, and 
finally to witness the counting. The entire process took more than two and one-half hours. But as the 
legal quorum was not met, another meeting had to be held, and if the quorum was not met then, a third 
would be necessary. If all assemblies demanded as much time and sweat as the this one and give such 
little result, it is a miracle that anybody attends them (obs 21 July 1991). 
" This assertion seems incorrect. Decreto-Lei 89/90 of 16 March 1990 did not fix any limits for rents 
of quarries. On the contrary, it determined that the quarrymen had to pay a fixed rent as well as a 
variable amount related to the quantity of material removed (art 6). None of the contracts I have heard 
of included such variable amounts. 
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was very difficult to sell concessions at the official price. As an illustration, he 
pointed out that the commission had not been able to auction off the resin 
concession that year. The commission told me that the resin collectors did not want 
to pay more than 40$00 per bica, almost 30$00 less than the normal price in the 
area (int 17 May 1992). Third, the president of the Parish Council accused the 
commission of a treacherous attempt to rob the wealth of other hamlets by laying 
claim to at least one quarry which was located within the territories of his own 
village. Fourth, he mentioned that the most important man behind the commission, 
Alfredo, had been treasurer of the previous Council. According to the president, 
after the latest elections, Alfredo had been forced to leave the Council because of 
his incompetence. Finally, he stated that Alfredo had a construction firm and if the 
benefits of the commons were used for the construction of amenities in his own 
village, Alfredo would benefit from the contracts (int 25 May 1993). This 
argument was also brought forward by the local forestry admimstrator (int 9 June 
1992). 
As in the case of Balsa and Vale de Agodim, it is not my intention to establish 
exactly which accusations were correct and which ones were false. My sole 
objective is to use this example as an illustration of the way in which conflicts 
about control over valuable natural common-pool resources, granite and resin, 
were translated into party politics. The fight over the baldios was part and parcel 
of wider conflicts which were fought on different battlegrounds. After being forced 
to leave the Parish Council, the commission's main initiator, Alfredo, stimulated 
the constitution of a management commission. This would allow him to keep 
control over part of the resources that determined one's political success or failure: 
the baldios. For this aim he mobilized his covillagers along four lines. The first 
line was membership of a certain community. The second was resentments against 
other villages that were considered to be less important or subordinate and yet had 
acquired political significance through controlling the Parish Council. Third, he 
mobilized his fellow villagers through their distrust of the State (Forestry Service). 
Finally he made use of the fear that the community's resources were used for the 
benefit of others and were not as profitable as they should have been. Party 
affiliation was a line which reinforced the division between the communities. Most 
people in Bragado voted PS like the movement's leader whereas the other villages, 
voted PSD like the parish president. Thus, the translation of the conflict in political 
party terms followed pre-existing divisions, but it also opened a new resource: the 
baldios secretariat. Eager to counter a Parish Council which was governed by the 
PSD, the secretary immediately stepped into the conflict on the side of the 
movement for the recuperation of the commons. Doing so, the secretary 
unwillingly corifirmed the allegations made by the PSD with respect to the role of 
political parties in the conflict over the commons. 
The case of Bragado is very illuminating with regarding the role of the baldios 
secretariat. The new commission wanted to divide the baldios among the four 
villages which constituted the parish. It believed that all of the problems between 
the hamlets would be resolved if each village benefitted only from what was its 
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own. As I have already said, the divisions between the territories of the hamlets 
were not very clear which gave rise to problems. Vilella and Bragado, for 
example, disputed one of the quarries. Each village claimed that the quarry was 
within its territory. In October 1994, the management commission organized a 
meeting to resolve the issue. This meeting was well attended by about 130 
commoners. The secretary of the baldios commissions in Tras-os-Montes was also 
present. The secretary proposed an alternative solution. The new baldios law had 
created the possibility to elect more than five people to a baldios management 
commission. He proposed that the parish maintain its commons undivided and elect 
a single seven-member commission in which all of the villages were represented. 
The commoners' assembly agreed and appointed a commission consisting of three 
members from Bragado itself, two from Vilella, and one from each of the other 
two villages (int 22 October 1994). 
The reasons for the secretary's intervention are obvious. First, he wanted to 
avoid a situation in which the baldios would become a bone of contention within 
the parish. This would not only harm the parish itself, but also the entire baldios 
movement which the secretary was trying to defend. A broadly composed 
management commission would act as a uniting rather than a dividing factor. As 
such, it would acquire more support among the parish population (int 22 October 
1994). Such a broad support would not only be helpful to the baldios and the 
secretariat of management commissions, but also to the secretary's broader political 
objectives. 
Conclusion 
The legal status attributed to the baldios in 1976 created new resources and 
contradictions. It moved a flow of funds from the Forestry Service to the local 
communities, where it became an object of local struggle. The emergence of this 
new contention had its repercussions on the national political level. In particular, 
the ruling PSD was convinced that the commoners' management commissions only 
served electoral aims and believed that they were primarily created in order to 
undermine its own power in the regular representative adrninistrative bodies. The 
party saw the œmmissions as something which would eat away at its electoral 
support. The cases which I presented in this chapter show that this image needs to 
be corrected: it assumes that political parties are the dominant agencies in the local 
arena. In reality, their actions are largely defined by feuds and ambitions of a 
different nature. Personal or inter-village struggles are translated into political party 
terms. 
The observation that personal and inter-village struggles and ambitions rather 
than ideological differences structure the political conflict over the commons, does 
not mean that local management commissions were not a target of party attention. 
It was quite clear that the PCP tried to repair its failure in the revolutionary period 
by knitting together all foci of revolutionary legitimacy into an alternative system 
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which could stand up against the bourgeois state. In reality, this ambition went far 
beyond the party's capabilities or perhaps even its present aspirations. By means 
of the regional secretariat of the baldios commissions, the PCP tried to use the 
commons as a gateway to local communities which had always remained 
inaccessible to the party. In doing so they tried to unite resentment against the 
government's policies, in particular its agricultural policies, into a broad 
oppositional movement. The goal was to eventually mobilize electoral support. In 
that respect, the PCP did not differ from the other political parties. 
At the national level the conflict over the baldios revolved around the discussion 
on the commons' legal status. In that respect, this chapter has confirmed that law 
is the condensation of specific balances of power between the different groups that 
compete within the state. The groups which I discussed in this chapter, were the 
different political parties and their affiliations in parliament, the Constitutional 
Court, and even the presidency. These actors and actor groups make rules (laws) 
which in political competition are both outcomes and instruments. The rules which 
are produced in political competition and which define legislating procedures and 
nominations can be used in the same competition to make or break modifications 
in a law and guide its (re-)formulation. 
The last point which has to be made, concerns the role of the Forestry Service. 
Until 1974 the baldios were the Forestry Service's exclusive domain. It is striking 
to see that with the change in the state form after 1976, the forestry officials not 
only lost their position as the precursors of a dynamic economic and social 
modernization of the countryside, but they also forfeited their dominant role in the 
political fight over the commons. Although the Forestry Service was consulted on 
the different enactments and tried to eliminate measures that would undermine its 
control over the baldios, the Forestry Service was unable to stop the 1993 law. 
This law maintained the commoners' commissions and common property. To that 
extent the Service's institutional interests were safeguarded. However, the law also 
opened the road to the alienation of the commons and enlarged the influence of 
parish councils. It eliminated the Service's direct control over the baldios 
commissions. The stipulations which determined that a commission should be 
recognized by the Forestry Service and enabled the Service's representation to 
these commissions, were abolished. In this manner, the 1993 law signified not only 
the defeat of those who together with the PCP, defended the 1976 legislation, but 
also the foresters' subjugation by the politicians. 
Chapter 11 
The Afforestation of the Baldios: An Evaluation of 
Its Impact on the Economy 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I outlined the political debate that followed the publication 
of Decreto-Lei 39/76. I further analyzed the way in which the baldios and then-
revenues were turned into political capital at the national and the local levels of 
administration. In this chapter I leave the specific political implications of the 
commons and their afforestation, turning towards a more general analysis of the 
entire afforestation project's impact from its onset in the 1930s until today, upon 
regions such as Vila Real. For it is obvious that the roles of those regions within 
the national and international economic systems has changed. From the producers 
of agricultural commodities, they have turned into the suppliers of raw material and 
labour for industries in other parts of the country and abroad. 
The issue of the impact of the afforestation of the commons upon the local, 
regional, and national economies has given rise to a deep controversy. In 
retrospect, some authors, like Baptista (1978a: 178-179, 1993:288), Estevfo 
(1983:1226-1229) and Monteiro (1985:215), saw the afforestation of the commons 
as the main, or at least an important, force behind the disappearance of traditional 
village communities. They argue that, compelled by the loss of their pastures to the 
Forestry Service, the shepherds abandoned animal husbandry and left their villages 
looking for better fortunes abroad. In that way, afforestation triggered emigration 
and initiated the abandonment of the countryside. 
Their critique is in response to the promises made by the proponents of 
afforestation. Those in favour of the project had predicted that afforestation of the 
baldios would bring about a profound change in the countryside. But they saw 
those changes as positive developments. The creation of forests (if carried out in 
correctly), would invigorate instead of impair animal husbandry, and it would bring 
important ecological and socio-economic benefits to the population. The planting 
of trees and the management of timber stands would create additional employment 
in the mountains where the baldios were located. The afforestation of bare waste 
lands would protect the soil from erosion, lead to the gradual increase of its 
fertility, raise its water-storing capacity, and prevent torrential flooding 
downstream. These ecological improvements would benefit the people living in the 
surrounding, lower-lying regions. The country as a whole would profit from the 
timber forests produce. This could serve as an alternative source of energy, boost 
exports, improve the balance of payments, and stimulate the emergence of a 
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national timber-processing industry1. This, in its turn, would create employment 
and stimulate the modernization of agriculture (Cimara Corporativa 1940:151; Min 
de Agr 1940:18-24; Gallo 1943; Mendia 1945:16; Mendonca 1961a:24-25, 
1961b:345-342; Gaio 1964:253) 2. Finally, the proponents of afforestation, or 
"reafforestation", as they would call at, presented their project as a form of 
healing. It would cure the wounds which the earth had suffered at the hand of man 
and restore the baldios to their original, afforested, stature (Mendonca 1961a:24). 
This disagreement about the economic impact of afforestation calls for an 
assessment of the afforestation of the Portuguese baldios. The importance of such 
an assessment, however, transcends the boundaries of this particular case. The 
arguments raised in Portugal against and in defense of afforestation are also widely 
used in many other countries and by international organizations such as the World 
Bank. They found a place in the 1978 and 1991 World Bank Forestry Policy 
Papers. 
Both the critics and proponents of afforestation overestimated its impact. They 
saw it as the prime mover of the social and economic development of the regions 
in which the afforestation took place. I argue that instead of according such an 
important role to the afforestation project, one should approach it as an element in 
a general rearrangement of the economic order and the formation of a national 
economic sphere and a transfiguration of public, common, and private domains 
within the forestry sector. In that sense, the economic component of afforestation 
is part of the process of state formation. 
This chapter consists of three parts. In the first part I discuss the impact of 
afforestation upon the existing national, regional, and local economies. I deal with 
the general arguments on forestry's effects upon animal husbandry, the wool 
industry, and emigration. In the second part I discuss the innovations brought about 
by forestry, in terms of exports, (new) industries, and employment at the national, 
regional, and local levels, i.e., the district of Vila Real and the parish of Campea. 
In this section, I also elaborate on the transformation of the forestry sector and the 
relations between the private and the public sub-sectors resulting from the 
emergence of and changes within the paperpulp industry. In the last part, I discuss 
the impact of the 1976 law upon the role of forests in the village economies and, 
in particular, the functioning of commoners' management commissions in Campea 
and Cidadelha de Aguiar. This discussion leads to the conclusion that forestry 
1 Almeida (1928) defended the use of gasified wood or charcoal as a fuel for automobiles in order to 
reduce the dependency upon the imports of fossil fuels. 
Afforestation was direcdy connected to the rising demand for energy that resulted from the increase 
in the number of cars. In the Vila Real newspaper O Povo do Norte of 19 May 1929 an article was 
published on research allegedly done by Renault to identify whether gasification of wood would provide 
a feasible way of producing fuel for cars. 
2 For a discussion of the value of these so-called service functions, see Madas (1984), Westoby 
(1989:13-32), and Ellefson (1992). These service functions continue to play an important role in the 
discussion on Portuguese forests (see Alves 1961:155; MAPA 1988:20-22). 
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would have brought little wealth to the local communities if the 1976 legislation 
had not channelled forest revenues to the villages. 
Forestry and the Decline of Pastoralism 
The first controversy between opponents and proponents of the afforestation of the 
commons, concerns the impact of afforestation on pastoralism and the exodus of 
rural inhabitants. Even the Ministry of Economy, concluded in 1941 that tree 
planting was causing the collapse of goat herding (Min de Econ 1941:L). Although 
the reclamation of 'waste lands' and baldios in the south of the country allowed for 
a substitution of goats with sheep (ibid:XLVII), people were afraid that the 
breakdown of sheep herding would even endanger the country's wool processing 
industry. In 1945, this industry employed about 15,000 people (Anonymous 1945). 
In mis section I assess whether these claims and worries were confirmed by facts. 
Thereto, I will compare figures on three levels: the country as a whole, the region, 
and the parish. 
The decline of livestock 
The first issue I want to discuss is whether the Ministry of Economy correctly 
attributed the decline of pastoralism to the afforestation of the commons. If one 
looks at the national statistics, the concern over the impact of the execution of the 
Piano de Povoamento Florestal upon sheep and goat herding, seems justified. The 
first dramatic reduction of livestock paralleled the beginning of the Piano de 
Povoamento Florestal. Between 1934 and 1940, the number of sheep in the country 
still increased by 21 %. But during the next fifteen years, it dropped by 8 %. During 
the same period, the number of goats, which already decreased by 19% between 
1925 and 1934, dropped another 41%. It was during this period, that the 
afforestation project began, and 56% of the commons were placed under the 
forestry regime (table 11.1). 
At the national level, statistics corroborate the thesis that afforestation caused the 
decline of sheep and goat herding. However, inspection of the district level figures 
shows that the situation is more complicated. In the district of Vila Real, about 
two-thirds of the total area of the commons, was submitted to the partial forestry 
regime between 1934 and 1940. At that time the number of goats diminished by 
10% but that of sheep increased by 38%. The stock of sheep grew while the 
grazing area became smaller. 
The paradox between the evolution of livestock and the size of its pasture could 
be related to the way in which the afforestation of the baldios was executed. When 
a certain area was submitted, this did not mean that it was afforested immediately. 
Although between 1934 and 1940, 64% of the commons in the district were 
submitted to the Forestry Service's administration, only 20% of the baldios was 
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actually covered with trees (table 11.1). The Forestry Service often permitted 
animal grazing in the areas where it had not yet developed planting activities. The 
mere submission of a certain area to the forestry regime, did not put an end to 
animal grazing. It was only when afforestation itself began, that grazing 
diminished. 
Table 11.1: The evolution of the numbers of sheep, goats and horned cattle in continental 
Portugal (Port.) and the district of Vila Real (VR) between 1920 and 1979 in percentages, 
and the evolution of the area of communal land submitted to the forestry regime, and the 
area actually afforested (EA1955, 1959:66-67; INE 1973:140-141, 1981,1988:17; Min de 
Agr 1925,1934; Min de Econ 1941). Total baldio area in Portugal is 507,372 ha according 
to Devy-Vareta (1993a: 161); total area of baldios in Vila Real is 129,005 ha (DGSFA1972; 
Devy-Vareta 1993a:161). 
——— ———— ——— —— 
Period % change in livestock between two censuses % baldios under forestry 
between 
two Horned cattle Sheep Goats Regime (ad.) Aff. (cum.) 
censuses 1 
Port. VR Port. VR Port. VR Por t . | VR Port. VR 
xx-1920 _ _ _ 8 0 
1920-25 + 3 - 1 - 4 - 13 + 4 - 6 0 0 
1925-34 + 1 - 1 - 12 -25 - 19 - 10 7 14 
1934-40 + 7 + 7 + 21 + 38 - 5 - 10 12 64 17 20 
1940-55 + 8 + 7 - 8 -28 -41 -57 56 9 58 57 
1955-72 + 20 - 0 -33 -51 + 4 -37 17 12 57 69 
1972-79 + 9 - 11 - 14 -25 - 1 + 40 0 0 59 62 
1920-79 + 58 - 0 -46 -75 - 5 1 -72 100 99 59 62 
Campea is one of the areas in which the Service closed the pastures only when it 
actually began afforestation. When the trees had reached a sufficient height, it 
reopened the area for grazing. The Service believed that in this manner, there 
would remain sufficient pasture for the continuation of animal husbandry (int 4 
September 1991). Parishioners told me that the grazing areas left to them were too 
small and that they still had to abandon pastoralism as a result (int 1 September 
1991, 28 May 1992, 8 June 1993). Sheep and goat herding came to an end in 
1958, two years after the imposition of the forestry regime and one year after 
afforestation works began. This was marked by the dissolution of the last vezeira 
in the parish, that of Cotorinho (int 8 June 1993). 
The idea that pastoralism declined because of the afforestation of the commons, 
is also evident in how the rural populations remember the chain of events. When 
I questioned people in Campea about the decline of sheep and goat herding, they 
always maintained that this directly followed the afforestation of the baldios (int 
19 May 1993, 28 August 1991, 1 September 1991, 10 October 1991). 
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The census data summarized in table 11.1 confirm this popular assertion. In Vila 
Real, between 1934 and 1940, 20% of the baldios were effectively lost to grazing, 
and during the next fifteen years another 37%. During the years 1940-1955 the 
number of sheep in the district diminished by 28 %, compared to 8 % at the national 
level, and during the next seventeen years it decreased by 51% compared with 
33% at the national level. The decline in goat stock in the district was even more 
dramatic. 
The census data at the level of the district, corroborate the hypothesis that 
afforestation of the commons (and not their submission to the forestry regime) 
coincided with, and hence possibly caused, the decline in sheep and goat herding. 
However, if one looks at the parish level, it appears that this coincidence is only 
apparent. In table 11.2,1 summarize the livestock census data for Campea between 
1934 and 1989. These data show that the number of small ruminants had already 
declined between 1934 and 1940, especially between 1940 and 1955, when 69% 
of the sheep and 50% of the goats disappeared. This means that sheep and goat 
herding practically vanished from the parish in 1955, one year before the 
submission of the parish's baldios to the forestry regime and two years before 
afforestation in the area began. Decline continued during the next two decades; the 
number of sheep decreased from 351 to 202, and the number of goats from 371 
to 45. 
Table 11.2: Animal husbandry in Campea in 1934,1940,1955, and 1972 (sources: Min de 
Agr 1925, 1934; Min de Econ 1941; Costa 1959; INE 1972, 1989). 
Year Homed catde Sheep Goats Sheep and goats 
Number «(%) Number S(%) Number «(%) Number | «(%) 
1934 608 _ 1,068 _ 988 _ 2,056 -
1940 567 -7 1,143 -7 742 -25 1,885 -8 
1955 804 +42 351 -69 371 -50 722 -62 
1972 932 + 16 202 -42 45 -88 247 -66 
1989 918 -2 138 -32 132 + 193 270 + 9 
The moment at which pastoralism collapsed can be determined more exactly by 
looking at the Parish Council's income. In 1946 the Parish Council of Campea 
ceded to the demands of the Camara Municipal and introduced a licensing system 
for the grazing of sheep and goats on the monte. The prices of these licenses were 
fixed at 0$30 for sheep and 0$50 for goats. The parish records mention the 
revenues from these licenses between 1946 and 1954. The amounts are summarized 
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in table 11.3 3 . They clearly show that pastoralism substantially subsided in 1954, 
when the Council's revenue from animal licences declined by almost 40% 
compared with the previous year. Afterwards the Parish Council no longer 
mentioned receiving money from sheep and goat herding. However, its 1963 
budget included an entry for grazing licenses totalling 200$00, suggesting that until 
then about 320 animals were still grazed on the parish commons. In 1964, this 
entry was 0$00 (AJF 31 December 1962, 31 December 1963). Hence, between 
1955 and 1972 the livestock numbers never recovered. 
Table 11.3: Income of the Campeä Parish Council from licences for sheep (0$30 per head) 
and goats (0$50 per head) between 1946 and 1954 and an estimation of the number of sheep 
and goats (assuming 0.65 goats for 1 sheep). 
Date of reference Money received Estimated numbers of livestock 
in the minutes from licences 
Sheep Goats Total 
07-04-1946 675$70 1,081 703 1,784 
06-03-1947 686$30 1,098 713 1,811 
04-04-1948 2,106$00 3,370 2,190 5,560 
xx-xx-1949a — — — 
05-02-1950 597$00 955 621 1,576 
Total 1951 b 722$00 1,115 751 1,906 
xx-xx-1952a — — — — 
Total 1953 c 656$00 1,050 682 1,732 
02-04-1954d 369$00 590 412 1,022 
a In the years 1949 and 1952 the minutes do not mention any income from grazing licenses. 
b References on 6 May 1951 and 7 October 1951. 
0 References on 1 February 1953 and 5 April 1953. 
d The minutes refer explicitly to the hamlets of Cotorinho, Montes, and Parada as the sole sources of 
license payments. 
Sheep and goat herding in Campea collapsed two years before the Forestry Service 
started to intervene in the area. Therefore, the afforestation of the commons of 
Campea could never have been its direct cause. But in that case, it is important to 
question what provoked the breakdown of pastoralism in the parish. I am unable 
to answer this question, but I suppose that at least until 1956, the year in which the 
Forestry Service intervened, important reasons for the breakdown included prices 
of meat and wool, diseases, or other contingencies or tendencies at the regional and 
national level. In addition, locally specific conditions such as the division of part 
of the baldios into glebas may have influenced the evolution of pastoralism. 
3 Because the parish minutes did not specify whether they were paid for sheep or for goats, I had to 
estimate the numbers of livestock. Therefore, the figures in the table can only be read as estimations, 
not as real livestock numbers. 
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First, afforestation close to but outside Campea may have adversely affected the 
development of livestock within the parish. Because their own areas were 
insufficient to support their herds, people in Cotorinho rented baldios in the 
neighbouring parish of Ansiaes (in the district and forestry circumscription of 
Porto). When the afforestation on that side of the Serra do Marao advanced, they 
lost this opportunity and decided to sell their herds (int 8 June 1993) 4. 
Table 11.4: The distribution of the population and cattle in the hamlets of Campea (sources: 
JCI 1941:152; Costa 1959; parish records; INE I960, 1970, 1981). 
Hamlet Number of inhabitants according to various 
censuses 
Heads of cattie in 
1940 a 
1911 1940 1950b 1960 1970 1981 Cows Sheep Goats 
AvecSo do Cabo 148 212 235 234 186 208 68 207 13 
Ave?ao do Meio 63 55 73 73 78 66 18 79 0 
Avecaozinho 169 156 242 226 173 146 82 7 4 
Balsa 21 n.s. 28 47 n.s. n.s. 2 9 0 
Chao Grande 94 91 100 100 68 80 23 30 6 
Cotorinho 116 152 171 169 176 129 11 502 0 
Montes 63 89 101 95 71 53 21 110 290 
Parada 102 88 129 120 71 71 18 110 25 
Pepe 243 262 386 384 340 338 88 0 2 
Pereira & Seixo 83 76 n.s. 73 57 38 c 12 13 2 
Pereiro 18 57 67 67 70 41 20 0 2 
Pousada & Boa. 38 75 144 144 87 191 20 9 2 
Vendas 159 203 221 234 213 258 45 27 42 
Viariz da Poca 113 119 173 173 139 130 37 108 7 
Viariz da Santa 175 204 203 222 202 184 50 37 11 
Vila Nova 214 266 293 279 175 148 92 344 98 
Dispersed 23 58 35 102 113 112 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Total CampeS 1,912 2,173 2,601 2,742 2,217 2,193 605 1,675 538 
a The figures on cattle are taken from JCI (1941) and not from Min de Econ (1941). This explains the 
differences with table 11.2. 
b The 1950 figures are taken from parish records related to the JCI directed division of the commons; 
exact date unknown; INE (1960) gives a figure of 2,416 inhabitants in 1950. 
0 Seixo only. 
n.s.: not mentioned separately. 
Second, the licensing system for sheep and goat herding created by the Parish 
Council in 1946, may have contributed to the decline of pastoralism. This system 
4 The fact that people from Cotorinho used pastures in Ansiaes was acknowledged by the 1956 
afforestation project, as the map of the area's communal pastures indicated that those of CampeS lay 
partly across the parish border (DGSFA 1956a). The possible impact of the afforestation of these areas 
upon herding in Campea was not taken into account. 
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was based upon Decreto 13,658 of 23 May 1927 which was aimed at restricting 
goat herding (Min de Econ 1941 :L). Third, factors at the level of the village may 
have been influential. I already pointed out in chapter 7 that pastoralism did not 
disappear in all hamlets at the same time. In 1940 the villages of Vila Nova, 
Avecao do Cabo and Viariz da Poca still had significant herds (table 11.4). But in 
1954 the Parish Council explicitly stated that the money raised through the 
licensing system originated only from Cotorinho, Montes and Parada. The 
regulation of sheep and goat holding formulated in 1955 was also specifically 
designed for these three hamlets. It is not impossible that in these hamlets 
afforestation gave the final blow to a trade already deeply in crisis and which had 
disappeared in the rest of the parish where people, because of local ecological and 
orographical conditions, could more easily turn to alternatives such as cattle 
holding. 
There is a widespread belief among the rural population that afforestation caused 
the collapse of sheep and goat herding. Ostensibly, that belief is corroborated by 
ariimal censuses. In the case of Campea, however, available information does not 
confirm a causal relationship between afforestation and the decline of pastoralism. 
People in the parish abandoned pastoralism before the Forestry Service intervened. 
That intervention merely compounded other factors which undermined the viability 
of herding. 
The Collapse of Pastoralism and Emigration 
In the memories of the people from shepherd communities such as Cotorinho and 
Montes in Campea, afforestation of the village's baldios remains an important 
reason for the departure of the population. When afforestation began, shepherding 
became less attractive and the wealthier farmers looked for alternative sources of 
income. When they had enough land of their own, they switched to horned cattle. 
This tendency was confirmed by the rise in the numbers of bovines between 1955 
and 1972 (table 11.2) 5 . Poorer shepherds did not have the same opportunity, and 
as local demand for labour decreased and the wages paid abroad were significantly 
higher, many people left. 
Between 1950 and 1970, the number of inhabitants in shepherd communities such 
as Parada and Vila Nova decreased by 40% (table 11.4). However, over the same 
period, the populations of Avecaozanho, Chao Grande, and Pousada and Boavista 
(where shepherding was unimportant), also diminished by between 30% and 40%. 
In Avecao do Meio and in Cotorinho, a shepherds' village, the population slightly 
increased. This large variation in the demography of the different hamlets casts 
new doubts over the assumed causal relationship between emigration and 
afforestation. In addition to the absence of a clear connection between afforestation 
5 The figures in table 11.2 show that this shift began before 1955. See also supra p. 148. 
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and the decline of animal husbandry, there is also no clear relation between the 
character of a community and the extent of its emigration. Shepherd and non-
shepherd communities alike suffered from a population decline, whereas one 
shepherd community, which according to its own inhabitants was severely 
prejudiced by afforestation, displayed a population growth. 
The large variation in the intensity of emigration from communities within 
Campea, suggests that the decline in pastoralism can only be one among many 
other causes of emigration. The uncertainty of employment, the difficulties in 
finding a job during the winter, the agricultural off-season, the low level of wages 
in Portugal compared to opportunities abroad, political insecurity, or even the 
desire to get better medical treatment could all be reasons why people departed (see 
Brouwer 1994:165). Afforestation could have pushed some to leave, but it may 
have been an incentive to stay for others who found employment in the planting 
phase (I will return to this issue later in this chapter). By no means can 
afforestation be seen as the central cause of emigration and the abandonment of the 
countryside. 
The Production of Wool and the Wool Industry 
The last issue I want to discuss is whether afforestation of the commons impaired 
domestic wool production, and if so, threatened the national wool-processing 
industry. The fear that the wool sector would suffer from the consequences of 
afforestation was fed by the observed decline in sheep holding. Between the 
censuses of 1940 and 1955, the number of sheep decreased by 8%, from almost 
3,890,000 to 3,593,000; and between 1955 and 1972, by 33% to 2,420,000 (table 
11.1). Despite this reduction of the number of livestock, wool production did not 
slow down. Data from the early 1950s show that after a sporadic growth until 
1943, wool production decreased to a more or less stable level, 30% below the 
1943 output, but still above pre-war production. Subsequent data even show an 
increase in wool production from 9.5 thousand tons in 1946, to 11.6 thousand tons 
in 1962 (EA 1962) 6. 
That the decline in livestock numbers did not lead to a parallel decline in wool 
production, resulted from an increase in the quantity of wool produced per animal. 
During the first half of the twentieth century, sheep owners argued in the Boletim 
da Associacdo Central da Agricultura Portuguesa (Bulletin of the National 
Farmers' Association), that the quality and the quantity of the wool produced per 
animal were insufficient. These problems were caused by the type of breeds used, 
6 In 1959, the Instituto National de Estattstica (National Statistics Institute, INE) changed its data-
gathering method. Until then, wool production had been inventoried by the regedores of the parishes. 
From 1959 on, the value was calculated from samples and from industrial consumption and export 
figures. The INE believed the results of its original method of data gathering were untrustworthy 
because not all producers would cooperate. 
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the grazing areas, and bad management practices. The animals were kept on poor 
pastures (the baldios), grazed without sufficient protection from cold winds, and 
at night kept in unhygienic stables (Braganca 1915; Morais 1945; Camara 
Corporativa 1940:159-160). A switch to improved breeds and management 
techniques in combination with a shift in sheep herding from the cold and infertile 
baldios to the more suitable pastures of the south of the country, enabled an 
increase in the production per animal (see EA 1959:98-99). 
Just as there was no abatement in wool production, the anticipated destruction 
of the wool industry did not occur either. In 1980, it employed 22,000 workers (EI 
1980), 7,000 more than in 1945. Thus, the decline of livestock did not endanger 
domestic wool industry. 
Implications 
It can neither be proven that afforestation endangered the domestic wool 
production, nor that it caused the deterioration of pastoralism and the intensification 
of emigration. If it played a role in these last two processes, it was at most, one 
among many other causes. Before I go on to examine whether the foresters kept 
their promises with respect to industrial development and job creation, I want to 
bring up two other points which follow from the previous discussion. 
The first point concerns the reason why the population of Campea connected the 
decline of pastoralism and the rise of emigration to the Forestry Service's 
intervention. The villagers presented afforestation as the main cause for the 
disappearance of their traditional way of living. This image was reflected in 
academic studies. In a 1959 monograph on the parish, the Service was even 
accused of having started planting in areas near the hamlets where it would have 
caused the largest damage to the shepherds, because the herds would have to cross 
a forbidden area in order to arrive on the still open higher ranges (Costa 
1959:115). In reality, however, the Service began to afforest on the Alto de 
Espinho, which is at the utmost border with Ansiaes and far from the inhabited 
areas. As I already mentioned and as my local informants admitted, the Service 
tried to take into account the interests of those herding sheep and goats throughout 
the planting. It is also striking that nobody seems to remember that the Parish 
Council played an important role in the suppression of pastoralism. The regulations 
it drew up in 1955 just as the fees the Council imposed in 1946 have been 
forgotten. People even deny that they ever had to pay the parish for keeping their 
livestock (int 1 September 1991, 8 June 1993). I believe that the constantly blaming 
the Forestry Service is not accidental, but plays a necessary function in the 
construction of the parish's collective memory. By exaggerating the Forestry 
Service's role in the demise of pastoralism, the role of the local administrators is 
obscured. In this manner, blaming the outsider, the Forestry Service, saves local 
innocence. 
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The second point concerns the way in which one should understand all the 
changes in the composition and geographical variation of livestock, land use, and 
labour power. Instead of focusing on the afforestation of the commons as an 
explanation for the decline in pastoralism and the increase in emigration in districts 
like Vila Real, one should broaden one's perspective and look at the overall 
changes in the national and international economic order. 
Even in the mid-nineteenth century, sheep and goat holding had started to move 
from the north to the south of the country. This shift was related to the emergence 
of one national economic system with a new regional division of labour. Until the 
mid-nineteenth century Portugal consisted of two economic systems, each with 
their own centres (Lisbon and Porto) and peripheries. These systems gradually 
integrated into one national economic sphere with Lisbon at its heart. This process 
was accompanied by a reshuffling of the existing division of labour within the 
peripheries of each subsystem, which among other things, meant that the north 
turned into a cattle holding area whereas the south specialized in sheep and goats 
(Justino 1986, 1988). 
Emigration should be seen as an element of the regional division of labour as 
well, not only within a national but also within an international context. The rise 
in emigration during the 1960s corresponded to the massive flow of migrant labour 
from the Mediterranean to the northwest of Europe, in particular to France and 
Germany (Rose 1969; Serrao 1970, 1985; Leeds 1983; Ribeiro 1987:30; Silva 
1985; Gregory and Perez 1985; Cepeda 1988) 7. Emigration was connected to the 
spatially differentiated development of the capitalist system in which some areas 
provided workers to others (Leeds 1983; Zolberg 1991; Anderson 1992). 
Regionally-differentiated migration was part and parcel of the spatial distribution 
of labour. 
The question is whether the afforestation of the baldios can be placed within the 
same perspective and can be understood as an element of the new spatial division 
of labour and the formation of a national economic sphere. Is it possible to say that 
the areas within the Porto system that had specialized in pastoralism, turned into 
the suppliers of timber and wage labour for domestic and foreign industrial areas? 
These issues are related to a more general discussion on the contribution of 
forestry to national and regional development. 
Forestry and the National Economy 
The impact of (public) forestry upon the national economy has at least two 
important aspects. On the one hand, it contributed to the development of a specific 
production capacity, namely of pines. On the other, it facilitated the emergence of 
a new industry, paperpulp production. 
7 For a discussion of European migration see the contributions in Rose (1985). 
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When the foresters began to afforest the baldios, they turned to pines. The 
choice to expand the pine forests was not only consistent with the natural 
characteristics of the baldios, it was also in accord with the international economic 
conditions during the first decades of the baldios' afforestation. However, after the 
second half of the 1950s, the economic conditions changed. In addition to the 
disappearance of the original sales market for pine timber, the mines, paperpulp 
production developed as a new forest industry. These developments influenced both 
the demand for timber and the structure of the forestry sector. The highly 
concentrated paperpulp industry turned increasingly to eucalyptus as a preferred 
raw material. These changes created new contradictions within the state apparatus 
and between State and private capital. The Forestry Service was confronted with 
a new form of private forest administration, which in terms of administered area, 
financial means, staffing, and output, showed that the planting of new forests was 
not necessarily a state enterprise. In addition, the consensus that forests were for 
the good of the public met new challenge: the environmental impact of the forests. 
The Role of Forests and Forestry in the National Economy 
The foresters justified the afforestation of the baldios as "modernization". The 
planting of trees would be followed by the development of timber-ttansforming 
industries, by exports, and by employment and better wages for the population. 
Did the endeavour bring these benefits? A look at the evolution of the Portuguese 
forests and forest industry suggests that the answer to this question is affirmative. 
As a logical consequence of the rapid growth of the forest area, timber production 
increased. In 1954, the first year recorded in the FAO yearbooks, total removals 
were estimated at 4,955,000 m 3 . Ten years later, they had increased to 5,900,000 
m 3 , and in 1974, to 7,190,000 m 3 . In 1990 the total output was estimated at 
11,181,000 m 3 (FAO 1965, 1977, 1991). A growing part of the timber output was 
processed industrially. Between 1954 and 1974, the share of industrial roundwood 
rose from 30% to 93%, and the portion marked for firewood and charcoal 
diminished from 70 % to 7 %. By 1990 almost 96 % of the removals were processed 
industrially (FAO 1965, 1977, 1991). The development of a wood-processing 
industry led to a tremendous increase in industrial employment both in absolute and 
relative terms. According to the 1917 industrial survey, the forest industry hired 
16,508 workers (Cabral 1977:79; Medeiros 1978:75). At that time there were 
about 2 million ha of forest, so that there was one industrial worker per 120 ha of 
forest. In 1986 the number of workers in the forest industry had increased to 
61,577. Given a forest area of about 3.1 million ha (IPF 1991), the average was 
50 ha of forest to each industrial labourer. Between 1917 and 1986 the spin-off 
industrial forestry employment more than doubled. Finally, after the conclusion of 
the Piano de Povoamento Florestal in 1968, forest exports increased more than 
twenty-folded (figure 11.2). 
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Figure 11.1: Exports of forest products (cork excluded), 1961-1991, in 10 s US dol-
lars. (Sources: FAO 1966, 1977, 1988, 1991, 1994.) 
The expansion of the forestry industry was accompanied by a change in the 
composition of its production and exports. In the decade prior to the Piano de 
Povoamento Florestal's initiation (1929-1938), pitprops, wood used in mines for 
supporting the shafts, contributed one-fifth of the total value of non-cork forest 
product exports (Min de Agr 1940:125; Themudo 1944:35). In 1954, Portugal was 
the world's seventh largest pit-prop exporter, after Finland, Sweden, France, 
Canada, Austria, and East Germany. During the second half of the 1950s, wooden 
props were gradually replaced by steel, pits were closed, and the demand for pine 
for pitprops declined (Calheiros e Meneses 1961:39; FAO 1965). 
Pinus pinaster was generally used as pitprops. This tree species was attractive 
to miners because of its "alarm capacity": the wood of Pinus pinaster breaks 
gradually and the sound of its cracking warns the miners that a corridor or shaft 
is coming down (Kools 1949; int 2 April 1991). In addition, it proved itself well 
adapted to the ecological conditions of the baldios. Therefore, it was the most 
important species used during the afforestation of the commons. 
When the demand from the mines for timber subsided, Portugal had to look for 
other applications of its forest products. Initially, pitprop exports were replaced by 
sawn wood. Later wood pulp became the most important export commodity (FAO 
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1965). Other wood processing activities, such as the production of fibre and 
particle board, evolved as well, but their expansion lagged behind the explosive 
surge in paperpulp and paper production (fig. 11.2). 
Paperpulp and paper production became the most important forest-related 
industries. These two branches were the most sigmficant sectors responsible for the 
rapid rise in forest-product exports (fig. 11.2). In 1986 both branches taken 
together contributed 44.2% of the sector's exported value. The paperpulp branch 
alone was responsible for almost half of the total timber demand (including 
imports) and about three-quarters of the total industrial demand for domestic 
timber. The branch distinguished itself from the other wood-processing activities 
by its high degree of concentration. It consisted of seven mills with an average size 
of 635.9 workers per mill, which made them by far the largest factories in the 
sector (table 11.5). 
The emergence of new forms of wood processing changed the demand for raw 
material. In the beginning, paperpulp mills relied primarily on pines, but because 
it was impossible to produce high quality white paper from pine pulp, the 
industries gradually turned to broadleaves, eucalyptus in particular. By the 1940s, 
one of the larger pulp mills, Caima, used pine only as a reserve in case other 
species were unavailable (Seabra 1944). In particular after 1975, the industry 
increasingly turned to hardwoods such as eucalyptus. Between 1975 and 1987, the 
share of softwood consumed by the paperpulp industry decreased from 47% to 
17% in relative terms and from 1,181,400 to 888,600 m 3 in absolute terms (IPF 
1991). 
Table 11.5: The composition of the forest-related industrial activity, and various 
characteristics of its branches in 1986 (for 1986: IPF 1991; for 1917: Cabrai 1977 and 
Medeiros 1978). 
Industry (by Number Number of Raw material Value forest 
principal product) of Workers (timber) exports 
factories 
Total Per Volume National 10fi % 
factory (106 m3) origin USD total 
Sawmills (pallets) 591 13.280 22.5 4.3 80% 120.68 11.7 
particle boards 9 1,867 207.4 0.4 97% 45.34 4.4 
fibre board 2 615 307.5 0.0 100% 5.55 0.5 
plywood 8 1,070 133.8 0.1 30% 1.63 0.2 
carpentry 783 7,641 9.8 0.2 52% ? • 
furniture 483 10,283 21.3 0.1 79% 16.06 1.6 
cooper work 28 192 10.1 ? 99% 7 7 
boxes & packages 19 345 18.2 ? 100% 7 7 
paperpulp 7 4,451 635.9 4.4 100% 341.42 33.0 
paper 75 6,551 87.3 - 82% 116.23 11.2 
cork 681 14,332 21.0 - 90% 252.69 24.4 
resin 42 950 22.6 - 100% 53.72 5.2 
Total 1986 2728 61,577 22.6 10.0 84% 1034.82 14.3 
Total 1917 1083 16,508 15.2 - - - -
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The paperpulp producers gradually reduced the volume of pines they used and 
increased mat of eucalyptus. This development, which had already been announced 
in 1944 by the Caima administrator Seabra, left a clear imprint on Portuguese 
forests. Between 1956 and 1985, the area covered by eucalyptus increased from 
60,000 ha to 405,000 ha, and today, eucalyptus is the third most important forest 
type in Portugal, after Pinus pinaster stands (93% of the pine forest) and the 
montados of Quercus suber and Quercus ilex (cork and stone oak) (table 11.6). 
This review of the Portuguese forestry sector demonstrates two points. First, the 
expansion of the forest area was accompanied by a rapid industrialization: between 
1917 and 1986 the spin-off industrial employment increased from less than 17,000 
to more man 61,000 jobs, and industrial labour per hectare of forest land more 
than doubled. In this sense, at least at the national level, the foresters kept their 
promise and contributed to the country's industrialization. However, one should 
keep in mind that with respect to the industrial spin-off of agriculture, a similar 
argument can be made. In 1917 the food and beverage industry employed 24,606 
persons. With a total agricultural area of about 3,200,000 ha, this corresponded to 
130 ha of farm land per industrial worker. In 1987 the food and beverage industry 
employed 77,511 workers. On a total agricultural area of 4,118,000 ha, this means 
that each industrial worker "lived off" 53 ha of farm land. Therefore, in 1917 and 
1987, the spin-off of forestry in terms of industrial employment was more or less 
equal to that of farming. 
Table 11.6: Evolution of area and the composition of Portuguese forests between 1874 and 
1991 in 103 ha (Martins 1991; Devy-Vareta 1993b:51; DGF 1989b; D?F 1991). 
Year Pines J Cork and 
stone oak 
Chestnut 
and oak 
Eucalyptus Total 
1874 210.0 370.0 60.0 0.0 640.0 
1902 1020.0 782.7 153.6 0.0 1956.5 
1928 1198.6 939.6 193.2 0.0 2331.4 
1956 1309.0 1264.0 132.0 58.0 2763.0 
1966 1287.6 1115.4 141.3 98.9 2834.2 
1972 1363.3 1166.8 138.6 165.5 2834.2 
1978 1457.1 1192.5 99.8 213.7 2963.1 
1985 1415.8 1141.1 112.4 405.0 3074.4 
1989 1338.3 1124.0 117.8 505.5 3085.6 
1991 1360 1221 118 509 3208 
The second point demonstrate here, is how the baldios and the forests on them fit 
into the changing national and international economic orders. When the State 
started afforesting the baldios it was primarily geared to the production of pitprops 
for the domestic and foreign mining sector. The sheep and goat pastures were 
transformed into producing a new industrial export commodity, timber. In this 
sense, one may claim that tree planting on the baldios was related to and 
consciously aimed at giving the commons a new position in the national and 
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international economic systems. However, when the mine owners shifted to steel 
props or closed their pits and the paperpulp producers turned to hardwoods, the 
commons lost that role. The paperpulp sector became the new most important 
timber consumer and forest-product exporter, but it utilized eucalyptus rather than 
pine wood. These eucalyptus stands are generally not located on the commons, but 
on private land. The State manages about 30% of the pine stands, but none of the 
eucalyptus forests8. Therefore, the result of the decline in the demand for pitprops 
and the shifting preferences for the raw material used by the paperpulp industry, 
was ultimately that the pine forests (and the baldios on which they were located) 
lost much of their economic relevance. Instead of carriers of a dynamic industrial 
sector, they became relics of a suspended development project, just like the 
abandoned mines 9. 
The "declassification" of the pine forests on the baldios as the motor of national 
forestry and forest industry development does not mean that there is no demand for 
pine wood. On the contrary, there is a fear that pine production will fall below 
demand. The pine forests are declassified in the sense that the demand for pines 
is concentrated in the less dynamic sections of the forest industry: saw mills, 
carpentry, and furniture. Unlike the paperpulp branch, these sections are 
characterized by numerous small enterprises which often use obsolete techniques 
and machineries. This declassification has certain consequences for how one should 
evaluate the historical and present position of the manager of the pine forests, the 
state Forestry Service, particularly in relation to the private forestry sector. These 
consequences are analyzed below. 
The State, the Forestry Service, and the Paper Mills 
Without doubt, since the mid-1970s the paperpulp industry has been the most 
dynamic branch within the forestry sector. This branch consumed half of the 
domestic timber production and contributed 33% to the value generated by the 
sector's exports. The political and economic power of this branch was reinforced 
by the fact that it was concentrated in only seven pulp plants owned by four 
corporations: Caima, Celbi, Soporcel, and Portucel. These companies differed in 
8 An estimation of the distribution of forest property and tree species (1000 ha) (TPF 1991): 
Owner Total area Pinus pinaster Other coniferous Eucalyptus Other broadleaves 
State 86 57 14 0 15 
Communities 380 333 27 0 20 
Cooperatives 40 0 0 0 40 
Private sector 2,497 832 67 349 1,249 
Industries 205 30 0 160 15 
Total 3,208 1,252 108 509 1,339 
' In the CampeS area there are three old mines which were shut down after the Second World War. 
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various ways such as size, relation to the Portuguese government (one was totally 
state-owned), and relation to foreign capital (a Swedish company had the majority 
in one ,and another was completely British). They did however have two important 
aspects in common: the first one was that they unified themselves in a pulp 
producers association, the ACEL (Associacao de Produtores de Celulose). This 
association was created for the promotion of the enterprises' common interests vis-
a-vis the State, civil society (the environmental movement vehemently protested 
against the pollution resulting from pulp production and the rapid proliferation of 
eucalyptus stands), other (wood-consuming) industries, and last but not least, 
timber producers. The second common feature was that all of the companies 
expanded their activities beyond the industrial processing of timber to timber 
production itself. As a result, in 1989 the four companies together possessed or 
rented almost 250,000 ha, or about 8% of the total forest area. These areas were 
generally covered by eucalyptus trees. 
The role of ACEL in the structuring of the eucalyptus market merits more 
extensive discussion. Beginning in the early 1970s, the government attempted to 
protect the wood producers by fixing minimum prices. In 1987 it abandoned this 
system because these prices tended to be used as maxima (int 9 April 1992) 1 0 . 
Since 1988, ACEL has negotiated timber prices with a farmers' organization, CAP 
(Conferincia de Agricultores de Portugal). CAP is the successor of the National 
Farmers Organization. It is largest organization within the sector, and until 1995, 
the only one the government accepted as an official representative of the farmers. 
Its members are predominantly larger farmers and membership is geographically 
concentrated in the south of the country. In political party terms, the CAP leans 
towards the Social-Democratic Party (PSD) and the Central-Democratic Party 
(CDS) (Expresso, (Lisbon), 22 June 1991, 9 July 1994; PUblico, (Lisbon), 30 June 
1994). The reason why the industry accepts negotiations with CAP on price 
regulations, was that it is afraid that foreign buyers would enter the market. In the 
late 1980s, about 10% of domestic eucalyptus wood was exported (IPF 1991). A 
further increase in the share of timber bought by foreign companies might make 
it more difficult for the national companies to meet their demand for raw material 
and jack up purchase prices. 
The CAP has its own interests in accepting price negotiations. First, the 
organization itself benefits considerably from its intermediary role: for each m 3 
acquired by the companies, it receives 50$00 from ACEL for the creation of forest 
producers associations (Revista do Agricultor, (Lisbon?), January 1990:53). The 
Socialist Party (PS) estimated that in this manner, CAP collected in one year 200 
1 0 Being united within one association did not mean that the different companies did not try to pursue 
their own interests at their partners' expense. The foreign companies believed that their national 
colleagues broke price regulations. Caima's spokesman accused Portucel and Soporcel of paying an 
extra bonus to their producers. He referred also to the "technical flexibility" built into a volume-based 
price: by manipulating piling at the woodyard, one can vary the real m 3 price by five percent or more 
(int 15 April 1992). 
270 Planting Power 
million escudos from the ACEL, and accused the organization of "selling its 
silence in eucalyptus matters" (Puolico 24 March 1991). A second reason is 
possibly that, by negotiating with the industry, CAP could substantiate its claim of 
being the sole, or at least most important, representative body of farmers and forest 
owners. 
The development of forestry activities by the paperpulp companies had at least 
four important consequences. First, the position of other producers in the pulp 
wood market than the industries and their subsidiaries weakened. The companies 
were able to satisfy a large portion of their own need for raw material through 
their own production. In 1991 their self-sufficiency rates varied between 25 and 
50%, and some enterprises, notably Caima, were heading for complete self-suffi-
ciency. As a result of these high self-sufficiency rates, the companies were able to 
manipulate the eucalyptus timber market by regulating their own production 
volumes or the volume brought or bought on the market. 
Second, the four enterprises united together in ACEL became the second largest 
forest administrator in the country (after the state Forestry Service itself) and 
increasingly assumed a public role. As a result, the Service lost its monopoly as 
the defender of forest interests. ACEL coorganized the 1987 forest inventory. 
ACEL also offered money to the Forestry Service for the prevention and combat 
of forest fires. In 1992, it threatened to withdraw this contribution and create a 
specific fund for the expansion of the eucalyptus forests (int 9 April 1992). Hence, 
the state Forestry Service became dependent upon the cooperation of the paperpulp 
sector for two essential activities: monitoring the evolution of the national forest 
in terms of area and composition and protecting the stands against fires. 
Third, the paperpulp companies and their subsidiaries employed over 400 staff 
members on a permanent basis and 200 to 400 seasonal forest labourers (int 9 
April 1992, 11 April 1992, 15 April 1992). Consequently, foresters no longer 
depended upon the state Forestry Service for a professional career. 
Fourth, the rapid expansion of the area covered by eucalyptus became a concern 
in terms of the forests' possible environmental and social impact. Specialists 
pointed to the possible danger for the hydrological balance caused by vast stretches 
of eucalyptus (Lima et al. 1990; Pereira 1990:2-4; Gurumurto and Rawat 1992). 
This meant that the consensus concerning the public benefit of forests was broken. 
After 1974 the movements contesting the Forestry Service's control over the 
baldios did not dispute the value of the tree stands, but only the control over these 
stands and their revenues. Later on, forests, and in particular eucalyptus stands, 
were no longer perceived as the best solution for the use of (marginal) land. This 
negative attitude towards eucalyptus was confirmed by my inquiries in the parish 
of Campea. When asked about new forms of exploitation of their baldios, of forty-
one respondents, twenty-eight objected to administration of the baldios by the 
paperpulp companies. This objection was always motivated by misgivings over 
possible environmental impact of the eucalyptus stands. State administration of new 
areas was less controversial: eighteen respondents were against it because "there 
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was not enough space left." In Campea, already more than half of the baldios had 
been submitted to the forestry regime (Brouwer and Kwakkenbos 1993). 
The emergence of the paperpulp industry also had important consequences for 
the State. It created new contradictions within the State around the issues of the 
country's national forest and industrial policies, because the State was heavily 
involved in the expansion of both the pulp industry and the eucalyptus area. 
The most important aspect of state involvement in the paperpulp sector was not 
related to forestry itself but to industrial production. The first true Portuguese pulp 
mill, the CPC (Companhia Portuguesa de Celulose), could only takeoff in 1949 
after having received financial support from the government. After the 1974 
nationalizations of the most important capital groups in the country, the State no 
longer limited itself to financial support, but became one of the paperpulp branch's 
directing forces. It directly or indirectly controlled shares in three of the four 
companies: 29% of Celbi through the state holding IPE (Investimentos e 
Participacoes Empresariais), 52 % of Soporcel through nationalized financial institu-
tions such the Caixa Geral de Depositos, Companhia de Seguros Imp6rio, and the 
Banco de Fomento Exterior, and 100% of Portucel. Only Caima, the smallest and 
oldest (and a one hundred percent British) enterprise, never became partially state 
owned (see also chapter 8, footnotes 7 and 14; appendix 14). Through its 
participation in three out of four pulp mills, the State went beyond the provision 
of facilitation and support, and became an economic agent itself. 
This involvement in production itself was complemented by the provision of state 
support for the transformation of Portuguese forests. Between 1965 and 1986, the 
State contributed to the establishment of 242,954 ha of private forests (table 4.5). 
The exact compositions of this forest area in terms of species is unknown, but data 
concerning the years 1978, 1980 and the period 1981-1986, show that during these 
years between 13 and 20% of the financed area was covered by eucalyptus1 1. 
Assuming that these figures are representative of the entire period, the State 
cofinanced the establishment of between 32,000 and 49,000 ha of eucalyptus forest 
by private landowners1 2. These landowners certainly included also the paperpulp 
" Areas of forests created with support by the FFFVDGFF and PAF to afforestation by private 
landowners and the percentage of the most important species in the total area (Azevedo Gomes and 
Quaresma 1988:17; Anonymous 1991, p.52 for PAF): 
Period (programme) Area (ha) B r o a d l e a v e s (%) C o n i f e r s (%) 
Eue. Cork Other P.pinaster Other 
1978 (PIDDAC) 12,237 20.3 - 9.5 29.4 40.6 
1980 (PIDDAC) 8,230 15.2 11.5 12.1 20.0 41.2 
1981-1986 (WB) 59,977 12.6 2.6 6.1 52.2 26.5 
1989 (PAF) 17,410 15.9 20.5 6.0 52.8 4.8 
1 2 Initially this trend was continued after Portugal's admission to the EC through the Forestry Action 
Programme, but came under pressure from heavy opposition to the species's expansion from the 
environmental movement (Fereirinha 1986:5; Diârio de Notfcias, (Lisbon), 19 April 1989, O Jomal, 
(Lisbon), 14 April 1989, 21 April 1989) and, because the government judged that financial support to 
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companies and their forestry subsidiaries. In addition, the State invested directly 
in the planting of eucalyptus stands by its own paperpulp enterprise, Portucel. This 
company received a large part of the fifty million dollar World Bank loan for the 
afforestation of 60,000 ha (most of it by eucalyptus) (see also supra, p.85). Of 
these 60,000 ha, one-third was private property and two-thirds were communal 
land. Taken together, the State helped to establish between 90,000 to 100,000 ha 
of eucalyptus, 30 to 40% of the total eucalyptus stands planted between 1966 and 
1989 (290,000 ha according to Devy-Vareta 1993b:51). 
The Forestry Service played a key role in this policy. Regardless of the origin 
of the money (government funds, World Bank loans, or European funds), the 
Service was always responsible for the allocation of subsidies to the individual 
forest owners. One might say that the Service itself was responsible for the rapid 
transformation of the Portuguese forests and the declassification of its own pine 
stands and in that manner helped to create the conditions that now lead to 
undermining of the Service's position within the state apparatus: it dug a hole 
which might well turn out to be its own grave. 
A final but not unimportant role played by the State and the state Forestry 
Service concerns the training of forest technicians. The emergence of the forest 
bureaucracy and its experiences during the afforestation of the commons, was 
certainly beneficial to the paperpulp companies when these embarked upon forest 
management themselves. The Service became a training ground, a "nursery", for 
professional foresters. Even at the highest level, forest officials switched between 
the public and the private sector. For example Joao Soares, in 1992 director of 
Emporsil (Soporcel's forestry division), was for instance the director-general of the 
Forestry Service between 1988 and 1991 (int 9 April 1992). His successor, 
Fernando Mota, started his career within the forestry circumscription of Vila Real. 
But before becoming director-general he moved to Emporsil where he headed the 
Tras-os-Montes division (Expresso 4 March 1989, 1 April 1989). 
These three elements in the State's activities in relation to the paperpulp industry, 
can be translated by what Jessop (1983:233-234; chapter 2 of this book) calls 
"forms of intervention" on behalf of capital. In Jessop's terms, the training of 
a highly lucrative activity such as eucalyptus production was unnecessary, it withdrew support in 1989 
(Portaria 512/89). According to this decree subsidizing planting eucalyptus stand with a planned 
rotation of less than fifteen years was subject to the following conditions: subsidy was only granted if 
(a) cork or stone oaks or species producing quality timber were also planted, (b) the plantation of 
eucalyptus did not exceed 25 % of the total area to be afforested and (c) the total area of the eucalyptus 
stands in the project did not exceed 100 ha. The subsidy to eucalyptus planting could never exceed 20% 
of the total investment. These restrictions only concerned areas which previously had not been occupied 
by eucalyptus and also did not concern areas smaller than 10 ha per project and applicant. In 1991, all 
subsidies to eucalyptus planted for pulp production were abolished (Expresso, (Lisbon), 17 February 
1990, art. 7 of Portaria 340-A/91 of 15 April 1991). 
The companies could of course still apply for subsidies for the planting of other species, which was 
now particularly relevant as the law forced them to reduce the share of eucalyptus to 25 % of a certain 
area. 
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experts and the subsidizing of tree planting should be considered examples of 
"substantial facilitation". The support granted to the paperpulp industry in its initial 
phase was an example of "formal support", whereas the nationalization of domestic 
capital implied a shift towards "direction". The State became an economic agent 
itself13. 
This last form of intervention created novel contradictions within the State. The 
State had to consent to the fact that its own plants, those of Portucel, did not 
satisfy the limits the State itself set on pollution (Publico 25 March 1991; Expresso 
13 July 1991, 20 July 1991, 16 May 1992). Moreover, the State facilitated the 
emergence of a private forestry organization capable of challenging its own 
Forestry Service, and it provided the just cause for an environmental opposition 
movement which challenged the consensus around forestry. As a result, in 1991, 
state support to the planting of eucalyptus, had to be abolished. 
Vila Real and Forestry 
The contribution of the Forestry Service to the development of the country's forest 
industry in terms of timber or forested acreage, was modest. The State 
administered only 15% of the total forest area and almost no eucalyptus stands. 
Due to the development of the paperpulp industry, the State became increasingly 
embedded in the initiatives of "private" capital14. At the regional and local levels, 
however, the situation could be quite different. In Vila Real, 128,300 ha or 30% 
of the district area was administered by the Service. Of this area, about 80,000 ha 
(62%) was actually covered by forest (pers. comm. of the director of the Vila Real 
forestry circumscription Victor Rego). Here, the Service managed about 115,000 
ha or 70% of the total forest area in the district (DGF 1991). Therefore, in Vila 
Real Obviously, in Vila Real, unlike in most of the country, the Forestry Service 
should have an important economic impact. This impact is this section's central 
issue. What was the influence of the afforestation of the baldios on the region's 
economy? Did it cause emigration? Did it offer jobs to the rural poor such as FAO 
(1953:173) would suggest was the case? Did it create industrial employment? 
Local Employment in Forestry 
When I interviewed a woman in Montes (Campea) she told me a story that was 
quite common: Forestry forced the shepherds to abandon their trade and look for 
1 3 Presently, the government is preparing privatization of the state's interests in these companies. 
Consequently, in the end state intervention will probably have helped to facilitate capital accumulation 
in the private sector (Semandrio Econdmico, (Lisbon), 15 March 1991, Expresso, (Lisbon), 6 April 
1991, 10 August 1991, 25 April 1992). 
1 4 1 put "private" between quotation marks because the capital was forcefully supported or even directed 
by the State. 
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other livelihoods, notably abroad. However, she added, that many of the men who 
were still living in die hamlet, had found a job with the Forestry Service. Some 
still worked with it, but as afforestation works in the parish had stopped in 1982 
(int 4 September 1992), they now had moved to Mondim de Basto, to the north of 
Campea. Apparently, the Forestry Service did offer employment. But how much? 
Forestry was labour intensive during its initial phase: the planting of new forests. 
During its next stage, management and exploitation, it required much less labour 
input. This is reflected in the national figures on the numbers of days paid to rural 
workers. The starting of the Piano de Povoamento Florestal led to an increase 
from on average of 337,663 paid jornais-homem (working days) during 1922-1926, 
to 1,158,232 paid working days in 1942 (Themudo 1940:64). In the 1950s, 
afforestation almost halted and the number of days worked decreased to 124,000 
(DGSFA 1956b). 
In the Serra do Mario, the 1956 afforestation proposal enables the calculation 
of a total labour input at about 87 man-days per hectare (592,000 man-days for 
6,770 ha of forests, DGSFA 1956a). Combining these figures with the afforestation 
rates mentioned in the Agricultural Statistics (EA 1955 to 1964), permits an 
estimation of the labour input during the first decade of afforestation. It appears 
that labour input varied between 56,376 working days (in 1959) and 5,655 (in 
1963). Assuming that the work took place during the agricultural off-season, 
January through March and October through December (FAO 1953:173), the 
Service employed between 348 workers in 1959 and 35 in 1963 during the six 
months when the afforestation works were carried out. Subsequent data no longer 
refer to the works in the Serra do Marao separately. These later data indicate, that 
during the sixties and seventies the annually afforested area in the circumscription 
of Vila Real decreased and hence the number of workers decreased also. 
The data on afforestation rates and numbers of workers reveal that in terms of 
employment, the Forestry Service's impact on regions like Campea was limited. 
From 1964 on, in the forest perimeter of the Marao, an area encompassing sixteen 
parishes with over 25,000 inhabitants (DGSFA 1956a:34), there were never more 
than about forty people employed in forestry during the agricultural off-season1 5. 
Apparently, the amount of labour created in the area by afforestation was 
negligible. 
As soon as planting was finished, the demand for labour in the forests declined. 
Lopes (1960:213) estimated labour input per hectare of existing forest between four 
and ten jornais-homem per year per hectare depending upon the species. For the 
maintenance of a stand of Pinus pinaster, he estimated seven and a half days. 
1 5 Costa (1959:77) recorded that in 1958,3,653 days were paid. (Actually, she wrote "persons" but this 
must be a misunderstanding: It would mean that in Campea more days were worked than in the entire 
country.) Her data indicate that the work continued throughout the entire year, including the agrarian 
season. This was confirmed by the former forest guard in the area. He told me that people would dig 
planting holes during summer and plant in winter and spring (int 5 September 1991). This would imply 
that only ten people had a more or less fixed job with the afforestation project. 
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Mendonca (1961b:353-354) estimated an annual labour demand of ten days per 
hectare. Since originally one hectare of baldio originally required two days of 
labour per hectare per year, afforestation meant an additional demand in labour of 
eight days per year per ha. 
In retrospect, these estimates appear too optimistic. In 1987, employment "on 
the ground" encompassed 10,000 permanent workers and 18,000 seasonal workers 
during nine months or 23,500 workers on an annual base (MAPA 1988). Devy-
Vareta (1993b:52) estimated that about 20,000 people were working directly in the 
forest. This means that labour input in forestry is about two days per hectare per 
year, much less than Lopes and Mendonca had calculated. If one looks at the 
number of workers employed by the Forestry Service in the Forestry 
Administration of Vila Real, forest management seems to have created even less 
employment. In 1991, the Forestry Administration of Vila Real employed nineteen 
people on a permanent basis (the administrator himself, his two secretaries, three 
foremen, ten forest guards and three day-labourers). The administration consisted 
of 12,129 ha of which 7,009 ha were covered by forest. During the summer, 
another twelve day labourers were hired to keep watch, whereas groups of twenty 
to forty day labourers were contracted for specific jobs (int 29 August 1991) 1 6. 
This means that in the area administered by the Forestry Service each hectare 
created little more than one half man-day per ha employment on a permanent basis. 
With an original labour input of two man-days per ha, one has to conclude that 
after the planting phase, forestry generated no additional local employment in 
comparison to the previous exploitation of the baldios. 
Wages 
The impact of the Service's intervention on the wages for the rural population was 
also negligible. In 1956, at the start of afforestation in Campea, the Service paid 
12$00 to women and 20$00 to men (DGSFA 1956a: 121). Two years later Costa 
(1959:76) recorded that women received 10$00 to 12$00; boys, 14$00 to 16$00; 
and men, 20$00. The wages which the forest workers received, differed hardly 
from those paid by farmer-employers. Agricultural labourers earned the same or 
a little more, 10$00 to 20$00 depending upon age, gender, and job (ibid). These 
salaries were more or less equal to those elsewhere in the district (EA 1955:171). 
In terms of income, industrial employment was a better alternative for the rural 
workers than working in agriculture or forestry. In the mine in Vila Cova, a 
labourer could make between 28$00 and 40$00, and in the lime stone factory about 
20$00 to 30$00. However, work within this factory was limited and less secure 
since the factory often functioned only three days a week (Costa 1959:68, 138), 
1 6 Pinto (1985) gives even a lower employment figure, and according to the director of the Department 
of Human Resources within the Forestry Service, Maria da Purificaçâo Pais, in March 1995 there were 
only eight guards working in the Vila Real forestry administration. 
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and the dangers of mining (lung diseases) made working in Vila Cova less 
attractive (int 16 May 1993). Industrial wages outside Campea averaged between 
4$33 (textile) and 11$38 (sugar) per hour or between 35$0O and 91$00 per day, 
depending on the type of industry. Outside the country wages were much higher. 
In France, for instance one could easily earn 16$61 to 24$64 per hour (1962 
figures, Leeds 1983:1057). 
Labour in Industry 
If forestry created so little employment on the ground, did it then result in jobs in 
industry? At the national level, forestry created at least as many jobs within the 
transformative sector as agriculture per hectare of farmed land: 62,000 on about 
3 million ha, or one job per 50 ha of farm land 1 7. At the regional level, however, 
the situation was completely different. Forest industry was highly regionally 
concentrated, particularly in the Porto, Coimbra, and Aveiro districts. In 1989 total 
industrial employment in the district of Vila Real comprised 5,065 workers, of 
which 4,361 were involved in processing industries. The wood sector consisted of 
189 enterprises with 641 workers (NERVIR 1989). This means that on a total 
forest area of 115,000 ha, each job in the industry corresponded to almost 180 ha 
of forest. In Vila Real, forestry created more than three times less employment 
than the national average. 
The district's forest industry was small. It was primarily composed of sawmills. 
Within the total timber branch, sawmills were the less rewarding in terms of wages 
(71% of the average in 1980, EI 1980:XXXIV, XLVI) and the least secure in 
terms of employment. In 1985, of the forty-two mills mentioned by IPF (1988:38), 
only half were actually working. The mills consumed about 29,250 m 3 (23,400 
tons) of timber. In 1989 total timber production in the circumscription of Vila Real 
(the districts of Braganca and Vila Real together) amounted to 173,000 m 3 , so that 
only 18% of the production in the state forests was processed within the 
circumscription18. The majority of the timber produced in the area was exported 
to other regions. The same was true for resin. In 1990, the district produced 3,714 
tons, all of which was exported to plants in other parts of the country, notably in 
the districts of Coimbra and Leiria (IPF 1991). 
1 7 Presently, the EU heads for the afforestation of farm land (e.g., Com (88) 255 final, p. 15) and 
formulated several regulations for that purpose (Regulations (EEC) 797/85, (EEC) 3828/85 (in 
particular art. 22), (EEC) 1609/89, and (EEC) 2080/92). 
The total impact on labour of the transformation of farm land into forests is probably negative as it 
is likely to destroy a lot of employment in the primary sector itself. Nowadays, about 20,000 people 
work in the forests. There are about 780,000 farms with at least as many workers. This means that 
agriculture employs much more people "on the ground" than forestry does. Because of the ongoing 
tendency to scale-up wood processing industries, the afforestation of farm land will probably not be 
accompanied by an increase in employment in the secondary sector. 
1 8 In Braganca, of the forty-one mills in the district only nine were active; these used 1,345 tons (TPF 
1991). 
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The present situation of the forest-related industry in Vila Real was already 
predicted in 1977. In a study prepared on behalf of the C&mara Municipal of Vila 
Real and offered to the president of the republic during a visit to the area, it was 
stated that "...this entire sector of industrial development is unable to benefit from 
the region's production potentials..." (Fonseca 1977:8). The study argued that the 
region could only benefit from its forest resources if investments were directed at 
the creation of a body of interlinked forest-related industries. Unfortunately, this 
body was never created and the single large-scale industry in the area, a particle 
board plant close to Vila Pouca da Aguiar which still existed in 1977, was closed 
down a few years later. Thus, Fonseca's concerns were confirmed. 
One result of the failure to develop a regional network of forest-related industries 
has been that the afforestation of the baldios did not bring Vila Real the promised 
benefits. It did not create significant employment, nor did it stimulate the district's 
industrialization. What it did bring was a new position in the national economic 
system. The district's forests served primarily the provision of raw material to 
other parts of the country. Ferrao & Jensen-Butler (1988), showed by analyzing 
the degrees of integration and marginalization (the presence of "dominant" or 
"obsolete" accumulation regimes) and the mode of "geo-economic insertion" (the 
aggregate of relations between a region and its exterior) that, between 1960 and 
1980, the district's development continuously lagged behind the national level. The 
district was increasingly "peripheralized", as they called it. In Vila Real, the 
afforestation of the commons did not result in the development of modern regimes 
of production and accumulation or technological innovation, instead the district's 
relations with the exterior was characterized by the provision of raw material for 
industrial processing. This was because of the developments in the national forestry 
industry. In that sense, the Forestry Service's intervention contributed to further 
peripheralization of the district. 
The Role of the Commons' Management Commissions 
To the rural population of Vila Real, forestry brought some jobs during the 
afforestation of the commons, but it never created the promised industrial develop-
ment. Does this mean that the afforestation was entirely unprofitable to them? The 
answer is no. After 1976, the afforestation of the commons led to a flow of funds 
to local communities: Decreto-Lei 39/76 forced the Forestry Service to give 60% 
or more of the gross forest revenues to local management commissions, or, in their 
absence, to the Parish Councils. This was a considerable amount of money. In 
1989 the share of revenues given to local communities and administrative bodies 
amounted to 933.3 million escudos, of which 436.2 million escudos went to the 
district of Vila Real. To communities with a small tax base of their own and with 
little financial support from administrative bodies higher in the administrative 
hierarchy, this money meant the opportunity to create amenities such as canalized 
drinking water, bridges, roads, community houses, medical posts, etc. (Rodrigues 
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1987:101-102). Without the income from the baldios, it generally would have been 
impossible to establish these often very basic services. Such improvements would 
make village life more attractive and thus, may have slowed down the population's 
exit from rural areas. 
Examples of these kind of investments can also be found in Campea. In Montes, 
the inhabitants received compensation for the construction of the new motorway 
between Vila Real and the coast over their baldios. They used the money for the 
construction of a road which, for the first time in history, made the hamlet 
accessible by car. Until then, it could only be reached by foot, horse, or cart over 
a steep mountain track. In Avecaozinho, the forests that had been planted on the 
upper part of the baldios burned down in the early 1980s. As a result, until now, 
the management commission never received money from its state-managed 
commons. From the lower part, it sold some pines to a lumberjack. It used the 
revenues to cover irrigation channels with iron grates where they crossed the road 
in the village. 
Table 11.7: Main investments made by the commons commission of Cidadelha de Aguiar 
1980-1991 (sources: int 6 October 1990, 17 September 1991, 16 October 1991; 
commission's accounts over 1986-1989; Paiva 1994:61-62). 
In Campea the local commissions took some but relatively small-scale actions. 
In Cidadelha de Aguiar, a hamlet 20 kilometres to the north of Vila Real, this 
situation was completely different. First of all, the commission administering the 
village commons consisted of people with training in forestry and agronomy. One 
of them was even employed within the regional service of the Ministry of 
Agriculture in the nearby town. Second, the hamlet possessed a vast baldio with 
an area of about 700 ha. This means that this village controlled a much larger 
forest wealth than any of the communities in Campea. 
The baldios of Cidadelha de Aguiar had been afforested by the State during the 
1950s. According to the local population, it was a heavy blow to the local 
economy, as the people depended almost totally upon sheep and goat herding. As 
a result, many inhabitants left to look for a living abroad. Whether this popular 
belief is justified or not, is not relevant. It is important that in the eyes of the 
Object of investment Invested Amount 
Irrigation works 
Community milking parlour 
Roads and two footbridges 
Water tank for the combat of forest fires 
Forest roads 
A community house 
Football field, cloak rooms and showers 
Total large projects 
Total investments 
9,748,262$00 
749,150$00 
2,165,595$00 
704,850$00 
4,784,196$00 
1,759,678$00 
5,172,810$00 
24,334,391$00 
28,882,049$00 
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population, since 1976, things have changed. The forests, which once chased the 
inhabitants away, now offered large profits to the village's population. Annually, 
the community of 143 commoners received about 1,645,000 escudos from the sale 
of resin alone. Furthermore, it got money from occasional thinnings, and it could 
expect the revenues of the first final cuts within a few years. Taken together, 
between 1986 and 1989, the commission administered an annual net revenue (that 
is after subtracting the 30% that the Forestry Service received from timber sales) 
of 4,180,000 escudos (Paiva 1994:60-61). 
The funds administered by the commoners' commission were relatively 
important. In 1979 the budget of the entire parish of Campea amounted 
203,000$00. That very year, the commission in Cidadelha received 503,000$00 
from timber from is baldio. This means that this particular commission could spend 
more than twice as much as the council in Campea. 
The revenues from the forests on the baldios enabled the commission to invest 
in living conditions in the village and in its agrarian infra-structure. The most 
important investments (85% of the total) are listed in table 11.7. It spent about ten 
million escudos for the improvement of the irrigation system and in building a 
milking parlour for the villagers. By the creation of a new, cemented nine 
kilometre water channel, and by the replacement of open secondary channels with 
concrete tubes, water losses caused by the transport of water from the source to 
the fields were reduced considerably. The milking parlour was constructed after 
an agreement with the most important milking cooperative in the north, Agros, in 
Vila do Conde, 30 km north of Porto. The villagers agreed to provide the building, 
and Agros would furnish the machinery. But because EC regulations regarding the 
rationing of milk production (the quota system) were implemented in the mean 
time, and the totality of the production quota assigned to the farmers in the village 
was rather small, Agros refused to keep its part of the deal and the building was 
transformed into a creche (int 17 September 1991, 25 May 1992, 20 October 
1994) 1 9 . Finally, the table demonstrates that the commission was well aware of 
the need to invest in its forests too. Almost 20% of the investments were geared 
towards improving access and fire protection for the forest. 
1 9 The process by which the village lost the parlour was rather complex. At the moment the project was 
started, the village counted thirty heads of milking cows. However, seventeen belonged to somebody 
who was temporarily abroad and had charged a tenant from another village with looking after his farm. 
When the milking quota were registered, this tenant put the quota in his own name. Then he took the 
quota with him to his own village. The consequent reduction of the available milk in the village by 
almost 60% made Agros lose its interest in the parlour (Paiva 1994:64; int 20 October 1994). 
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Conclusion 
The afforestation of the commons created a bitter controversy. Opponents accused 
the Forestry Service of triggering a mass exodus out of the countryside, while 
forestry supporters claimed that it offered extra income and employment to 
otherwise backward and deprived regions. The analysis presented above has shown 
that both assertions rest on an overestimation of the impact of the afforestation of 
the baldios. Both assertions were based on the idea that planting trees caused a 
radical change in the national, regional, and local economies. This assumption is 
incorrect. Afforestation did not cause that change, but was merely part of an 
overall transfiguration of the national and international economic systems. This 
transformation entailed the formation of a national economic sphere, and the role 
of Portugal in the international economic system. Portugal became one of the 
countries supplying (cheap) migrant labour to industrializing economies of 
northwestern Europe. The opponents of afforestation were correct in criticizing 
forestry's contribution to economic development. The conversion of Portugal's 
most dynamic forest industry, the paperpulp branch, from pine to eucalyptus turned 
the public and communal pine stands into second-rate forests which contributed 
little to the sector's expansion. Although this development took place outside the 
reach of the Forestry Service, the State as supporter and director of industrial 
development was definitely responsible. In 1944 it was clear that the pulpmills 
would eventually turn to fast-growing hardwoods instead of pines. Hence, at mat 
moment the State should have taken precautions and have, for instance, stimulated 
the development of particle board production. Had this been done, the particle 
board industry would perhaps not lag behind the pulp sector as it does today, and 
Portuguese forestry and timber industry would be more dynamic and diverse. 
Within the forestry sector, attention has shifted from the State as manager of the 
baldios, to the State as supporter and facilitator of the activities of private forest 
owners (individual farmers and industries). In chapter 4 , 1 summarized this change 
as a shift from a "service to the State" to a "service to the public". The corollary 
of this privatization of forestry as a public sector, is a specific collectivization of 
the private forest sector in the form of price agreements between the associations 
of timber producers and timber buyers, CAP and ACEL. 
At the national level, the concentration on paperpulp and paper production 
contributed to an increase in employment and income generated by forestry, but 
at the regional level, the effects were the opposite. In the district of Vila Real, vast 
spaces were submitted to the forestry regime and afforested, but here the promised 
industrial development never arrived. The region, falling victim to an advancing 
de-industrialization process, was turned into a producer of raw material for 
industries in other parts of the country. It was "peripheralized". 
The fact that forestry itself hardly contributed to the well-being of the local 
population, increased the social relevance of the 1976 law on the commons. 
Because of this law, the Service could no longer direct the forest revenues created 
within the district to the central State, but instead it was forced to allocate a large 
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share to the rural communities which owned the baldios. The commoners' 
management commissions spent these funds on amenities, which could make 
villages more comfortable, and in this manner, slow down de-population. In 
addition, the commissions' investments were aimed at the development of the local 
economy through improving irrigation systems or the mechanization of milking. 
However, the success of these efforts depended only to a limited extent upon the 
villagers. In the end, their destiny was decided elsewhere, i.e., in the offices of a 
dairy cooperative in Vila do Conde, or in EC buildings in Brussels. 
These concluding remarks echo the original question of this book: the role of the 
afforestation of the baldios in the process of integrating peripheral regions into the 
national political and economic systems, and the possible characterization of the 
State's Forestry Service as an outreach structure in this process of state formation. 

Chapter 12 
Planting Power: Forestry and State Formation 
Introduction: Research Questions and Methodology 
My research has sought to trace the role of the state Forestry Service in the 
process of state formation by analyzing the afforestation of the commons in 
northern Portugal from the perspectives of political economy and legal 
pluralism. I showed how the framework by which the state defined the baldios' 
legal status, changed from common property into land owned by parishes or 
municipalities. I portrayed also how certain institutional practices, such as the 
zonation of the use of the commons by the demarcation of so-called coutos, the 
apportionment of brush to the individual commoner households (the partilhas of 
estrume), the grazing of small ruminants in combined herds (vezeiras), and the 
regulation of the use of the baldios though by-laws (posturas), disappeared or 
were transformed as a result of specific state interventions. Afforestation of the 
baldios was one of these interventions. It was developed by a separate branch 
within the state bureaucracy, the Forestry Service. As a result of its actions on 
the commons, this bureaucracy was able to expand in terms of the number of 
staff employed and the size of the area under its control. Consequently, the 
control over the commons became an essential condition to the organization's 
survival in its present form. The realization of that interest guided the Service's 
actions in the national political arena. The baldios' afforestation was one of 
these interventions, but not the only one. I have also pointed to the role of the 
Internal Resettlement Board (JCI) and the introduction of new taxes. In addition 
to these interventions, general social changes such as mass emigration, the 
adoption of new farming technologies, and the substitution of milk for meat 
production, contributed to these transformations as well. These general changes 
were, just as the commons' afforestation itself, related to modifications in the 
position of the regions where the commons were located and of the commons 
themselves in the overall national and international economic systems. 
In the rest of this chapter, I develop the implications of these findings. I will 
start with a short elaboration on the research questions that I formulated in 
chapter 3. I will continue with a discussion of the research's implications for the 
three debates I analyzed also in chapter 3, the way in which one should look 
upon the state and state formation, and the role of law. Finally, I will address 
the indications this research has provided for possible future developments of 
both the Forestry Service, and the baldios. 
In chapter 3, I formulated several research questions. These questions can be 
summarized into three main queries. The first is: Can the abolition of common 
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property be seen as an element of the bourgeois revolution, which was aimed at 
the capitalist transformation of Portuguese society and economy? The second is: 
Can the restitution of the commons in 1976 be seen as a countertendency 
directed at the revitalization of local self-government and the decentralization of 
the State? And the third query is: What was the role of the Forestry Service in 
these processes? 
The answer to the first question, whether the abolishment of common 
property can be seen as an element of the bourgeois revolution, consists of two 
parts. At a concrete level, the bourgeois revolution entails the replacement of 
other forms of property with the dominium plenum form. The interventions of 
the state, partitioning and afforestation, transformed the baldios' legal form and 
turned it into dominium plenum, either in the hands of individual farmers or in 
the hands of public bodies such as the parish council and the Forestry Service. 
Hence, one has to conclude that, at least as far as the legal form of property is 
concerned, the interventions of the JCI and the Forestry Service were indeed 
part of a bourgeois revolution. On a more abstract level, the bourgeois 
revolution entails the transformation of a non-capitalist society into a capitalist 
society. Consequently, the existence of common property such as the baldios 
has been used as an indicator of the endurance of a non-capitalist social 
organization. In the case of Campea, however, common property coexisted with 
capitalist social relations. For although common property arrangements formally 
impeded full appropriation by the capitalists in the area, in reality, these 
capitalists were able to monopolize the use of the baldios to a large extent by 
the simple fact that they owned the necessary means needed to exploit them; 
cattle and land. This means that in Campea, the abolition of common property 
as a result of state interventions (partitioning and afforestation) did not involve 
the development or penetration of capitalism. Therefore, at a more abstract 
level, it does not make sense to understand this abolition as an element of a 
bourgeois revolution. 
The second question is whether the 1976 restitution of the commons 
represents a countertendency, directed at the revitalization of local self-
government. There is no definite answer to this question. First, the populations 
could only get their commons back by complying with the State's law. This law 
was rather complicated and specified in detail the way in which the commoners 
should organize their management. The pre-existing organization model was 
based on the election of one overseer or caretaker (zeladof) by the commoners. 
The new law abolished this model and replaced the single zelador with a 
commission consisting of five members. According to the law, and if the 
population did not choose otherwise, one of these members would be the local 
forest guard. In this way, the law safeguarded the Forestry Service's control 
over the management of the commons. Because of the substitution of a new, 
state-defined, organizational structure for the old model, which had been rooted 
in the commoners community's tradition of self-government, and because of the 
(formal) introduction of direct state supervision into the new management 
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organization, the restoration of the commons led to the expansion of state 
control. This expansion was even more ingenious than the model that the State 
followed prior to the revolution. Until the revolution, the people were 
confronted with a custodial-paramilitary apparatus. The guards who represented 
this apparatus in the rural areas, did not penetrate into the rural populations' 
own institutions, but resided far from the villages in dwellings in the middle of 
the forest. This was changed after 1976, when the Forestry Service officially 
became an advisory organization: a service to the public instead of a service to 
the State, and its officials formally became members of the commoners' 
management commissions. As a result, opposition and conflict between the 
commoners and the State and its officials became less obvious. The State, 
embodied in the forest officials, could become a part of the commoners' 
societies, instead of its alien enemy. 
The restoration of the commons implied the strengthening of state control 
over the countryside. But, together with the restoration of the commons, the 
State itself was changed. Until 1974, it was a dictatorship. After 1974, the 
political relations were democraticized. The people could criticize politicians 
and officials without being afraid of ending up in jail, and there were free 
multi-party elections. In such a context, the Forestry Service could no longer act 
as prepotently as it had done under the previous regime, even if it would have 
wanted to. In the forest, its guards met difficulties in mamtaining their authority 
and enforcing forest laws. Within the State, the Service had to take into account 
the new role of political parties. Thus, the submission of local communities to 
the State was accompanied by the strengthening of the power of the local 
population over the State through their democratically elected representatives. 
Contrary to in the past, today the population has the means to stand up against 
the Forestry Service and realize its own projects with its commons. 
The answers to the first research questions reveal the role of the Forestry 
Service. They indicate that one can understand public forestry as a means of 
politically and economically integrating largely autonomous rural areas into the 
state. The state Forestry Service can be conceived as an outreach structure. 
Through the Forestry Service, the central State could penetrate into, articulate 
with, and acquire control over local communities. The Service's success as an 
outreach structure depended partly upon the financial means it received for the 
expansion of its staff and the area under its control, the legal authority given to 
its guards, and the weapons these guards were entitled to carry and use. In 
addition, the Service's role in the establishment of state power over the rural 
population was contingent upon the fear and the consent its guards raised among 
the people. It depended upon the extent to which the population consented to the 
afforestation of their baldios, and whether they accepted that afforestation as 
something necessary and beneficial. The Service also depended upon the 
complicity from the population, or important parts of that population, such that 
they themselves would feel they could benefit from afforestation. These 
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elements, fear, consent, and complicity, redetermined the real authority the 
Forestry Service could exercise over the people. 
The formal legal attributes of the Service, and the fear, consent, and 
complicity it generated among the population, changed over time. These 
changes were related to modifications in the state form: the substitution of 
parliamentary democracy for the authoritarian regime of the Estado Novo, the 
development of parliamentarism as a form of representation, and the 
replacement of direction with various forms of facilitation and support as the 
predominant forms of intervention. With regard to the relations between local 
communities and the central State, this change in state form can be summarized 
by the substitution of politics for administration. After 1976 politicians and 
political parties ran the State, rather than the bureaucrats. This meant that after 
1976 the role of the Forestry Service as an outreach structure became less 
important. The mediation between the State and the rural communities now took 
place more through the political parties. The recent declassification of the 
Forestry Service as an outreach structure is also the result of the way in which 
the organization itself reacted to the 1976 reforms. In practice, forestry officials 
rarely attended meetings of commoners' commissions, although in most cases, 
they were formally entitled to do so. In that manner, the Service did not exploit 
the opportunities to enlarge its role as an outreach structure. 
This research has shown how the relations within and between the State and 
rural communities changed. These changes have not been described in a simple, 
one-dimensional and unilinear way. Instead, these descriptions were sensitive to 
the contradictory nature of these transformations. I have not presented the State 
as a monolith which invaded the countryside and forced the population to accept 
subjection. The communities and the people composing them were not portrayed 
as homogeneous societies, nor as victims of the State, but as active actors. The 
process of state formation was not delineated as a unilinear evolution. Instead, I 
have pointed to the oscillating and contradictory nature of this process, in which 
some elements point to the strengthening of state power vis-a-vis the society and 
others to its weakening. 
The drawing of a diversified image was possible because of the theoretical 
approach selected. I combined three different perspectives: an economic, a 
political, and a legal anthropological. This combination was sensitive to the 
importance of commodities and (natural) resources, the political nature of the 
social struggle over the control of these commodities and resources, and the role 
of actors and their normative frameworks in that struggle. I believe that this 
combination has enabled a portrayal of social reality without falling into the 
traps of stereotypes, evolutionism, or an instrumentalist account of the 
subjugation of the countryside to the State's political centre and economic elite. 
I also believe that it has resulted in a coherent image of state formation without 
obscuring its complexity. 
The book has presented the role of the afforestation of the commons in the 
process of state formation by looking at the way in which control over the 
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commons was transferred from the village communities to the State. Ideology is 
an important dimension of that process, as it provides the elements by which the 
state can legitimatize itself. The state exploits the claim that its existence and 
actions should be considered "good", "just", and "correct". For the purpose of 
this research, I elaborated on one aspect of that dimension: the ideological 
affirmations made by foresters. Foresters claimed that the afforestation of the 
commons transcended particular interests. I argued that, in doing so, the 
Forestry Service actually was promoting the acceptance of the State's specific 
perception of what the public's best interest was; they had defined what should 
be considered the public good. In that sense, the state Forestry Service could 
contribute to the suppression of differing beliefs and values about what is good 
for the people other than those of State. Consequently, it contributed to the 
state's ideological hegemony. In chapter 4, I mentioned the role of education 
and propaganda (through a bridled "independent" press) in mobilizing the 
population by claiming that planting trees on the commons would be a 
marvellous enterprise which in the end would benefit all. However, the extent 
to which this claimed public benefit nature of the afforestation of the commons 
was really internalized by the population of regions such as Tras-os-Montes, has 
remained largely in the dark. After the revolution, the people no longer objected 
to the forests, but rather they did object to the presence of the Forestry Service 
(see chapter 8). This suggests that a kind of consensus had been reached among 
the population concerning the value of forests. But the extent to which this 
acceptance of the forests on their commons is an indication that the people had 
actually come to accept the State's and foresters' ideology, remains a subject for 
future inquiries. 
Debates on Forestry, Common Property and Rural 
Communities 
In chapter 3, I pointed out that this book touched upon three different debates. 
These debates concern the nature of state forestry and the need to abandon a 
custodial-paramilitary approach, common-property regimes, and the nature of 
commoners' communities. 
With respect to the first debate, this book assumes that the custodial-
paramilitary approach should be abandoned. This research is a plea in favour of 
social forestry, i.e., an approach to forestry that involves local communities in 
the management and the revenues of the forests. My objections to the other 
approach, state-led forestry, are not only related to the Forestry Service's 
prepotent posture, but also to the obvious limitations of that model. In the cases 
described in this book, state-led afforestation brought few benefits to the 
population apart from insignificant opportunities for low-paid employment. 
After the revolution, the village communities regained their control over the 
management and revenues from the commons. The subsequent flow of funds to 
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villages has helped to improve the living conditions in the countryside. But 
benefits for the population and the Forestry Service would be much larger if the 
latter would really support the commoners in their use of the baldios. It is 
obvious that in many villages, experience with forest management is 
insufficient. The clarification of management practices would certainly improve 
the productivity of both the commoners' and the state-managed stands. 
The title of this book, Planting Power, expresses the double-edged character 
of afforestation. The act of tree planting is an implantation of state power. 
Planting trees is not merely technical but also political. By planting trees, the 
Portuguese State attempted to acquire control over the people. This implantation 
of state power should not be conceptualized in the same way as Baptista (1978a, 
1993), Monteiro (1985), and Rodrigues (1987) conceptualize it. These authors 
portray the history of the afforestation of the commons as a "military invasion" 
and "occupation" by a powerful forestry "army". The corollary of this image is 
that of a poor and helpless rural population. That population in their work was 
portrayed as the powerless victims of the overwhelming strength mustered by 
the State and its forest guards, armed with guns and legal dispositions that gave 
them sweeping policing authority. These officers and their organization drove 
the rural population, the original users and owners of the land, from their 
pastures, robbed them of their brush land, and in the end, stole their future. 
This book has shown that these images are naive. Both State and society (i.e., 
rural communities) are internally divided. 
This image of a homogeneous and harmonious commoners society can also be 
found in the literature on common property. Earlier in this book, in chapter 3 , 1 
criticized the idealization of closed corporate communities and communalist 
forms of social organization, and the tendency of students of common property 
to assume rural egalitarianism. The description of Campea in chapter 6 has 
shown that such a critique is justified. This parish was characterized by a sharp 
inequality between landowners and day labourers. I gave examples of rivalry 
within commoners' communities. In Campea, in the 1950s, the elite members in 
control of the Parish Council and the Comissao Politica defended the 
partitioning of the commons, whereas others petitioned its undoing (see chapter 
7). In chapter 10, I presented many more rivalries, for example, between 
families, villages, and political parties. These examples indicate that a simple 
populist approach to a common-property situation will easily neglect the fact 
that control over the commons can constitute an important resource in these 
intragroup struggles. 
This book has also highlighted the internal contradictory nature of the 
commons. In the cases described in this book, the use of the commons entailed 
the individual appropriation of the fruits of a resource which is exploited by a 
collective. As a result, the commons were particularly important for those 
individuals who had the means to use them, i.e., a lot of cattle, land, or both. 
Commons do not preclude social inequality, they may even enhance it. 
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State Formation and the Forestry Service: Capital, Coercion 
and Complicity 
One of the core concepts of this book is the state. Therefore, I dedicated a large 
part of chapter 2 to the discussion of its nature, how it should be delineated 
from its non-state environment, and how one should look at the process of state 
formation in relation to law and forestry. In that chapter, I developed several 
concepts: the distinction between States and states, sovereignty as the (S/s)tate's 
defining characteristic, and ideological hegemony. The first distinction was 
made in order to point out that, in this book, the State is an apparatus rather 
than a polity. The second concept was used to supplant law as a means of 
dividing the State from its Non-State environment. By referring to sovereignty 
rather than to law, it became possible to "de-digitalize" the State, and for 
instance put emphasis on the non-state characteristics of state apparatuses such 
as parish councils and municipal councils. The concept of hegemony was used 
in two manners. First, it was used to illuminate how States and state institutions 
mobilize social support or active consent from among their subjects by referring 
to hegemonic concepts, which claim to address the public need of the nation. In 
this manner, the state Forestry Service legitimated the forceful afforestation of 
the baldios. Second, it was used to show how certain factions inside or outside 
the State, may try to mobilize the State for their own aims. Foresters were a 
case in point. They constantly referred to forests as a societal good rather than a 
private enterprise of forest operators and owners in order to acquire support 
from the State for the afforestation of the baldios. 
State formation was defined as "giving form to the (S/s)tate". The concept 
was used to indicate both the expansion and contraction of the State's power 
over its subjects and the transformations in statehood and state form, i.e., 
changes in the form of intervention and representation. In my analysis of the 
concept of state formation, I used, among others, Tilly's book (1992) Coercion, 
Capital and European States AD 990-1990. As the title suggests, his key 
concepts are capital and coercion. In his book he shows how the success of a 
certain polity depends upon its relative strengths at the military and the 
economic levels. The most successful states were those which like France, 
Britain, and Germany combined the best of both. Tilly uses the terms "capital" 
and "coercion" in a rather loose manner. "Capital" refers mainly to finances 
and money in a mercantilistic or industrializing economy. "Coercion" refers to 
both military power and the coercive powers of the sovereign over his vassals 
and the agricultural population. As I argued in chapter 2, I believe that Tilly 
missed an essential feature of what power is. Power is a relational concept. 
Both parties are responsible for the existence of a certain power relation 
between a the superior and a subaltern. The latter has to accept his superior's 
power; he has to cooperate. This point is elaborated on in the next sections. 
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Capital 
Similar to Tilly, I equate capital to money or revenues or wealth. But I also 
approach it according to the Marxist tradition, as a means of production. 
The role of capital in the shape of money or revenues or wealth in state 
formation has been described in chapter 7. In that chapter, I demonstrated that 
together with the power over the regulation of the exploitation of the baldios, 
the villages in Campea lost control over the revenues to the State and its 
Forestry Service. After 1922, the hamlets had to pay a certain tax to the Parish 
Council, which also received half of the fines applied in the commons. From 
1946 on, a licensing system for sheep and goat herding, which was introduced 
under pressure from the municipal authorities, created a new flow of money 
from the users of the commons to the Parish Council. However, since the mid-
fifties the flow of money from the baldios into the parish's strongbox has 
dwindled. The flow of money from the licensing of sheep and goat herding 
dried up when pastoralism collapsed. After 1955 the municipality and the 
district extracted a share of these fines for the poor's asylum and for the 
industrial development fund. From 1956 on, the commons ceased to be a 
regular source of income as its division and afforestation put an end to the 
taxation system. Thus the parish lost all regular income from the commons 
apart from sales of (small) portions designated for this purpose by the JCI. 
Thus, the real riches on the baldios were controlled by the Forestry Service. 
This body administered the trees which, at least potentially, constituted an 
important source of wealth. In the end, the Parish Council was going to benefit 
from this new source, as well, but only to the limited extent of 10% of the 
gross revenues. But as most of the stands burned down before reaching 
maturity, the Council never received a cent. In short, until 1976, the real 
beneficiary of the various state interventions in the commons of Campea was the 
central State in the form of the Forestry Service. 
Approaching capital from a Marxist perspective involves the identification of 
changes in accumulation regimes or modes of production in connection to the 
process of state formation. Until the 1960s, the commons sustained a capitalist 
form of accumulation in the parish. Although all parishioners had access to 
them, the ones who profited most from the commons were the employer-
farmers. They held a large number of livestock and took most of the green 
manure. The intervention by the JCI particularly favoured this elite, enabling 
them to close off the commons to other users. The intervention by the Forestry 
Service constrained the wealthier landowners by reducing the area open to 
agriculture-related forms of exploitation (grazing, manure collection). But it did 
not put an end to the existing agrarian structure. This structure changed 
primarily due to the development of better-paid employment opportunities in 
countries in the northwest of Europe. Emigration became an option for the 
relatively poor working population of the countryside of northern Portugal. 
Abroad, the immigrants supported capitalist accumulation in the industries in 
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which they were employed. At home, lack of labourers, the increasing 
availability of new farming technologies, and the inflow of money led to the 
disappearance of capitalist farms and their replacement by family farms. 
The afforestation of the baldios did not trigger the transformation of the 
agrarian structure in Campeâ. It did, however, change the role of the commons 
in accumulation. The baldios turned into the suppliers of raw material to 
industries outside the parish. In this way, the baldios supported accumulation in 
the capitalist timber industries in other parts of the country. 
The 1976 partially changed the role of the commons. The villagers, when 
organized in management commissions, could claim a share of between 60% 
and 100% of the gross revenues of the tree stands. This money was invested in 
public amenities or in infrastructural works such as the irrigation system and the 
milking parlour in Cidadelha de Aguiar. In the case of these infrastructural 
investments, one should realize that they disproportionately benefitted the 
already advantaged farmers. Those with access to irrigation water had their 
irrigation capacity increased. Similarly, if it had been completed, the milking 
parlour would have been significantly beneficial to the few farmers with cattle. 
These improvements discriminated against the villagers without water and cattle. 
Even the villagers with larger shares and more livestock benefitted more than 
those with smaller shares or livestock. In this manner, the baldios, after their 
afforestation and under the conditions of the 1976 law, favoured the more 
prosperous producers in a community. 
Coercion 
There is great debate over the concept of power. Power emerges in a 
relationship between (at least) two oppositional parties in which both parts 
determine who is able to control the other and to what extent. Coercion is a 
form of power. It literally means "compulsion" or "intimidation". Tilly (1992) 
uses it for understanding the military power of the state in relation with other 
states and for the compulsory force of the State and its sovereign against its 
vassals and its subjects. In the second meaning, it is similar to the Marxist 
concept of primitive accumulation in non-capitalist modes of production. The 
coercive enclosure of the Campean commons on behalf of farmers and the state 
Forestry Service was an example of primitive accumulation, but in a capitalist 
context. 
During my research, I did not discover many instances of violent compulsion 
by or on behalf of the Forestry Service. I mentioned the sweeping legal powers 
held by the forest guards, who could accuse and arrest persons without the need 
of supportive testimonies, but I did not identify cases of guards acting 
accordingly. I quoted the events in Serpins, where the army intervened in order 
to enforce afforestation, and I mentioned the intervention of the police in Sao 
Tome do Castelo for similar reasons. In Campea, however, the Forestry Service 
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did not need to use force. It seems that in this parish, despite some misgivings, 
the afforestation of the baldios could proceed without the use of brute force. 
The absence of brute force does not mean that coercion was not used. When 
people in the parish objected to the partitioning of the commons by the JCI, the 
JCI threatened to hand the area over to Forestry Service if the population did 
not cooperate. This was clearly a form of coercion, also because on the same 
occasion, officials and institutions with access to coercive powers such as the 
regedor (charged with maintaining public order in the parish), the Comissdo 
Politico (charged with supervising political loyalty in the parish), and the 
district's governor became involved. In addition, coercion was exercised in a 
more indirect and subtle way; through the modifications of the parish by-laws. 
The main function of the parish by-laws was the codification of a normative 
framework, which could guide the exploitation of the baldios in the commons 
by the different village communities. Compliance with these rules was enforced 
by local overseers (zeladores), and, if they failed, by the military police (GNR). 
In that sense, these by-laws had a coercive component. During the 1950s, the 
Parish Council was forced to accept new regulations on the use of the commons 
and new restrictions on the grazing of sheep and goats. These new restrictions, 
which were formulated under the guidance of authorities higher up in the state 
hierarchy, on the one hand, implied a stricter supervision of the sheep and goat 
herders, and on the other hand, more control over the parish authorities. The 
parish authorities were forced to comply with demands coming from the central 
State, and apply the new rules to those concerned. In that manner, the 
reformulation of the parish by-laws was a subtle form of coercion which led to 
the subjection of the parish to the State. 
The power of the forest "troops", the guards charged with policing the forest 
perimeters, cannot be reduced to their formal authority as policemen or to their 
right to bear and use arms against poachers and other trespassers. The guard 
quoted in chapter 5 made clear that the effectiveness of these formal rights 
depended upon the extent to which (he believed that) the trespassers feared the 
guard. The fact that he thought that they would not respect him, made his 
authority merely cosmetic. Afraid that he would get hurt, he would led the 
poacher go instead of using his official powers to arrest him. 
Complicity 
Power is not only a matter of coercion, it is also a matter of complicity. Power 
points to the ability to change someone else's behaviour or thinking. Sometimes 
it is understood as the property of a person or institution. For instance, he (it) 
has power, because he (it) owns or controls the allocative and authoritative 
resources (Nagel 1976; Giddens 1981:4). Sometimes it is seen as the ability to 
choose. In such a perspective, anybody who can refuse to do what somebody 
else wants him or her to do, has power ("the freedom to act otherwise", 
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Giddens 1981:4) This position is defended by authors such as Foucault (1983), 
Scott (1985, 1991) and Karskens (1986). In either of these senses it is a 
relational concept. One always has power in relation to somebody else. And in 
either of these perspectives, power depends upon cooperation. The example of 
the guard shows that whether his authority became effective depended upon the 
"willingness" (even if achieved under severe threat) of those subjected to his 
power. 
The "willingness" of the objects of power to cooperate and accept that power, 
has been approached in different ways. One way has been the concept of 
hegemony. According to that concept, both parties involved in the power 
relation share (or believe to share) a notion of the legitimacy of that 
relationship. The subaltern accepts the normative grounds upon which his 
superior bases his power. In this manner, in a society, there exists active 
consent among the subalterns, which entails the acceptance of the rightfulness of 
the existing social relations. 
The problem of such an interpretation of hegemony and power is, that it 
blames the victim. The weaker party in a power relation obeys the stronger 
because he or she (correctly or incorrectly) believes that it is the right thing to 
do. Ultimately such a concept of power means that he or she oppresses his- or 
herself by accepting the subordinate position. This acceptance occurs through a 
misunderstanding of the actual social relations. Inequality and exploitation 
remain either unobserved, or are accepted as natural, necessary, or just. In 
short, the oppressed has a false consciousness. Unlike consent, the concept of 
complicity does not assume that the parties in a power relationship share a 
normative framework or ideology. It does not imply that the obedient have a 
false consciousness. Complicity rests on the assumption that people obey 
consciously, out of a certain interest. It can be applied to situations in which 
people within different social entities such as state bureaucracies and parish 
societies, understand that they have certain interests in common. It is based on 
the fact that these entities do not constitute a whole, but are internally 
differentiated. 
When the Forestry Service intervened, the local society was divided by 
cleavages along political and economic lines. Hence, it was hardly surprising 
that this society did not form a united front when the state entered. Some 
segments collaborated because they expected certain benefits for themselves. At 
the beginning of the century, municipal authorities like those in Lousa tried to 
employ the Forestry Service against insubordinate parishes in order to gain 
control over the latter's resources. In Campea, in the 1950s, parish councillors 
and other members of the local elite endorsed the intervention of the JCI 
because it would bring them personal benefits. 
The fact that a state agency such as the JCI could mobilize complicity was 
very important, for it triggered a chain of similar relations within the parish. If 
a sufficient number of parishioners could benefit from an intervention, they 
could mobilize their dependents and supporters, and so forth. In this manner, 
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through complicity, decisions could be taken which would undermine the 
autonomy of the parish as a whole and favour the interests of only a part of its 
population. 
The concept of complicity also helps to explain why, unlike the JCI, the 
Forestry Service had so many difficulties during the implementation of its 
afforestation project. The afforestation offered employment only to a small 
segment of the rural poor. It offered no benefits to the local elite. To the 
contrary, afforestation threatened the elite's grazing and brush land. It disturbed 
the labour market on which these employer-farmers relied, because it influenced 
the balance between the supply and demand for labour. The jobs it created were 
not suited to the local elite. On the one hand, they demanded hard manual 
labour which did not correspond to the elite's lifestyle, on the other hand, they 
required specific technical knowledge which went beyond the elite's capacities. 
Thus, the local elite had no reason to endorse the afforestation project and the 
Forestry Service found it much more difficult to do its job than the JCI. 
In the end, the Forestry Service was able to complete afforestation in Campea 
without any real problems. Contrary to earlier attempts in Serpins, the 
inhabitants of the parish did not boycott the afforestation works, but as far as I 
have been able to ascertain, were happy to join them and did not engage in 
sabotage or other oppositional activities. Yet the Service has never been able to 
win over the hearts of the population. The people continue to look upon it as the 
main cause behind the disappearance of their old way of life, pastoralism, and 
they see the consequence of this change as the main driving force behind 
massive emigration during the 1960s. 
In this manner, the concept of complicity helps to understand die 
contradictory nature of state formation and the role of the Forestry Service in 
that process. On the one hand, the afforestation of the commons was coercive; 
it entailed planting power. On the other, there was a lack of complicity among 
the population. The strata of the population the Forestry Service needed to 
enlist, were not supportive and their resentment of the Forestry Service's 
actions made the expansion of state control over the countryside more difficult. 
Through forestry, the State became more present and tangible in the 
countryside, but it also became more contestable. 
Law as a Political Construction: The Legal Status of the 
Baldios 
Law plays an important part in this book. It underlies most of the discussions in 
chapter 4, 5, and 7 and is central to chapters 8 and 10. The material I have 
presented leads to two conclusions regarding law in general and the legal status 
of the baldios in particular. The first conclusion is that law is socially 
constructed. Specifically, it is the product of political struggle. Conversely, 
political struggles are restated in terms of normative claims. Law is also a 
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resource in that struggle. The second conclusion is that statutory state law is 
only one of the normative frameworks that influence social action. There is 
legal pluralism. 
The forestry officials justified their actions with the statements made by 
politicians, and, in particular, with the laws into which these politicians had 
translated the foresters' projects. This type of legislation, e.g., the law that 
approved the Piano do Povoamento Florestal, is overtly political. It is nothing 
but the adornment of an administrative decision with the rubber stamp of 
parliamentary approval. But even more fundamental and less administrative 
edicts such as the regulation of property are ultimately political statements. 
Laws also have normative grounds. They are legitimated by references to an 
intangible (and socially and politically constructed) notion of justice. In 
particular, with respect to the relation between the State and the commoners and 
the consequent legal stature of the baldios, this basic notion of "what is right" 
plays an important political role. 
In the case of the commons, it is possible to observe two concrete positions 
with respect to what is just. The first position entails the claim that the 
commons belonged to the village communities desde o mundo e mundo, (ever 
since the world began; the phrase is by Aquilino Ribeiro), or since the 
beginning of time. This idea of original communal property can, for instance, 
be found in the work of anthropologists such as Dias (1948, 1953) and presently 
still underpins the actions of the Communist Party and the regional secretariat of 
baldios commissions in Vila Real. It is not typical in Portuguese discussions on 
common-property regimes, but can also be found in the work of authors such as 
Engels and Eckardt, and in many contemporary studies on communal land 
management (for example, Acharya 1989; Berkes et al. 1989; Bunyard 1994; 
Editors 1994; contrast with Fisher 1989). 
The second interpretation of what is just, is exactly the opposite. At the 
beginning of a nation's history, everything belonged to the king. He held the 
paramount ownership of all resources within his realm and could hand these 
rights to his vassals and subjects. This approach can be found in Buis's work. 
In Portugal, it has sustained the PSD's and the CDS's campaign against the 
1976 legislation. The present political relevance of both claims is obvious. 
Saying that the baldios originally belonged to the king means that the State, as 
the king's lawful successor, can take them back. If one assumes the opposite 
position, any claim made by a king or a State to the baldios is an act of 
robbery. 
There is no empirically motivated correct stand possible in this debate 
between "communists" and "statists". Both claims are mythical in the sense that 
they are presented as rooted in historical facts, although they cannot be 
sustained or falsified empirically. Basically, they are assumptions. There is no 
original owner, one can almost always identify a predecessor. In almost all 
cases, other people and other (S/s)tates occupied the area before the present 
ones. Thus, in a historical perspective, all property is theft. 
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Theft and appropriation are acts in an ongoing social struggle. The 
redefinitions of the legal status of the baldios should be seen within this 
perspective. They followed the shifts in the balance of power between the 
central state and rural communities. The present baldios began in the Middle 
Ages as formal property of the Crown (reguengos), the nobility or the Church 
(maninhos), or the municipalities or the communities (baldios). But their 
juridical status became increasingly nebulous as a result of a constant mixing of 
different forms of dominion and use. In the eighteenth century, Tomaz Vila 
Nova de Portugal reclassified the commons as private property (maninhos), as 
municipal property (bens do concelho), or as land which belonged to village 
communities (logradouros comuns or "true" baldios). In the nineteenth century, 
after the institution of the parish as an administrative body within the state 
hierarchy and the abolition of feudal rights, the concept of maninho lost its 
juridical significance, and the commons were divided into either land belonging 
to the municipalities or land belonging to the parishes. At the same time, the 
civil code attributed a separate legal status to communal property. Hence, even 
then, the baldios were neither public nor private property of these administrative 
bodies, although these entities were responsible for their administration. In 1966 
the juridical confusion over the legal status of the commons was resolved by 
erasing the concept of common property from the civil code. The commons 
officially became the private property of the local administrative bodies, the 
parishes and the municipalities. They remained, however, subject to certain 
communal exploitation rights. This situation changed again in 1976, when the 
constitution attributed a separate legal status to the commons as part of the 
sector of collective means of production and the 1976 law on the commons 
reinstalled the commoners as the rightful managers and users of the land. 
Although common property itself was not formally re-created, the subsequent 
jurisprudence confirmed that these legal formulas together resulted into the 
commoners' property rights. 
The persistence and re-creation of the baldios as a separate legal category 
within a context of capitalism indicates that Brandfto and Rowland (1980) and 
Hespanha (1980) were wrong when they assumed that there was a direct relation 
between the economy and law. This research has supported Renner's (1979:109-
110) postulate that such a relation does not exist. 
This review of the evolution of formal legal arrangements regarding the 
commons shows that under the ancien régime, the administrative and judicial 
arrangements were confusing because of the enlacement of communal, feudal, 
ecclesiastical, and royal (statal) responsibilities. This confusion was resolved 
only in 1911, when, after the abolition of feudal privileges with respect to 
judicial and admmistrative matters, State and Church were finally separated. In 
1976, it reemerged in a new form because of the so-called parallelism of 
powers between parish councils and commoners' assemblies. This new 
ambiguity was also the cause of new political struggles. Furthermore, the 
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ongoing process of change in the formal status of the commons has led to a 
situation in which actors appeal to different concepts from different epochs. 
This appeal to different normative frameworks can be understood by the 
concept of legal pluralism. The quintessence of legal pluralism is that within a 
society different groups develop their own normative frameworks. The state 
legislators form only one of these groups. Their norms are among many sets 
which influence human action. The case of Vila Verde shows that past institu-
tional arrangements still may influence present situations. The claims of the 
Parish Council of Parada de Pinhao over commons in Vila Verde were based 
upon the ancient concept of maninho, and the population of Balsa and Vale de 
Agodim's initial acquiescence was based on an incomplete secularization. 
Because they still accepted the authority of the ecclesiastical parish, they also 
consented to the civil parish's claims over their commons (see chapter 10). 
The concept of legal pluralism may suggest that the different normative 
frameworks can be separated empirically and analytically. Santos (1987) makes 
this very clear with his comparison of laws and mapping: different legal systems 
refer to different scales and forms of projection. In reality, however, the 
different legal systems are mutually dependent and shape each other. They are 
only distinguishable in the sense that they refer to different sources of authority. 
In daily life, to agents who are acting with and within these different normative 
sets, they may well appear as one system. The Vila Verde case is a case in 
point. It shows how in a certain setting rules are maintained which no longer 
correspond to the statutory state law, but are based on elements of previous 
legislation. Another example is the juiz de vintena, who was both a royal 
functionary installed at the local level, and a vizinho who looked after locally 
defined rules and customs. In the daily practice of village life, it did not matter 
whether the state or the community had created the caretaker's office. What 
really counted was that the office holder was a community member with a 
specific task and authority acknowledged by both the local community and the 
state. 
Until 1976, the evolution of the formal arrangements of the commons as they 
have been developed by the law, clearly pointed towards privatization and 
statization of the commons. This evolution was reflected in social reality. There 
was a gradual decrease in the area submitted to communal exploitation rights. 
Next to the usurpation of communal land by local proprietors, the parish and 
municipal councils sold parcels of land to inhabitants for growing brush, for 
cultivating, or for construction purposes. From the late nineteenth century on, 
this policy was accompanied by measures leading to the statization of the land 
through its submission to the forestry regime. The ownership (posse) of the 
commons was transferred to the state Forestry Service under the continuation of 
municipal or parish proprietorship (propriedade); the population's traditional 
usufructuary rights were to be respected as far as forest management permitted. 
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The Future of the Forestry Service 
The great tactical miscalculation that the Forestry Service committed, was that it 
did not effectively try to engage the local population in its programme. Hence, 
in 1974, the people from the Vouga area threatened to expel the Service from 
their baldios. Nevertheless, after 1976, the Forestry Service continued to 
operate in the same manner as before. Although it officially had members on 
the majority of the commoners' management commissions, the forest officials 
did not attend meetings except when there were specific conflicts such as the 
election in Bragado. The officials also failed to enlighten the commoners on the 
technical aspects of forest management. Instead, the Forestry Service stayed 
where it was, behind the protective borders of the forestry regime and continued 
to administer these areas without really involving the local population. 
This mistake was extremely significant as the Service did not bring tangible 
benefits to those living in the areas where it intervened. During the 
afforestation, it offered only a limited number of jobs, and employment 
decreased when tree planting was completed. Within the local social 
constellation, the Service had no official political affiliation representative of the 
class differences. If it had sided with the wealthy, it could have had more 
opportunities to mobilize support from the population by capitalizing on the 
existing traditional power relations and loyalties through which the elite 
controlled its subordinates. The Forestry Service would have avoided the 
opposition it met in places such as the Vouga area if it has obtained the 
complicity of the elite. The local elite played a key role in the opposition 
movement in that region. If the Forestry Service had sided with the poor by 
offering better wages or creating more jobs, it would have improved the living 
conditions of the destitute population of the areas in which it worked. In doing 
so, the Service would have obtained a better reputation. In that manner, the 
Service would have created broader support from the people. If the Service had 
sided with the elite or with the destitute strata, it might have avoided its near-
eviction from the baldios between 1974-1976. 
The Service's behaviour can be explained in several ways. One is related to 
the general political structure (state form), another concerns the particular 
character of the Service and of forestry itself. During the Estado Novo, popular 
participation was not encouraged. Salazar's power in the countryside rested 
primarily on the fact that he protected the elite and conserved the traditional 
loyalty structure within the parish. Hence, it was almost unthinkable that a state 
agency would undertake actions such as paying higher wages than employer-
farmers, thereby undermining that traditional loyalty structure. This is also why 
the Forestry Service, allegedly under the personal instructions of Salazar 
himself, would suspend its activities during the agricultural season. 
Afforestation was not to disturb the market for agricultural labour. Furthermore, 
the Service began as a paramilitary organization. Initially, its guards were 
former military servicemen with sweeping policing powers. In this respect, it 
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was a coercive state apparatus, and by its rigid, regulated nature unsuited to a 
more open attitude towards the local population. 
Although the Forestry Service's behaviour can be understood from its history, 
it is quite clear that its failure to adapt itself to new conditions can pose a 
serious threat to its future. Just as the baldios have been contested, the future of 
the Forestry Service is also debatable. The 1993 law on the commons was a 
defeat for the Service, since it lost the right to its primary role in baldios 
matters. This defeat was translated into changes in the Service's status. Also in 
1993, it lost its position as a Directorate-General within the Ministry of 
Agriculture and was turned into a semi-private institution, the lnstituto Florestal 
(Decreto-Lei 94/93 of 2 April 1993). Thus far, this change has had little effect 
except that some boundaries of circumscriptions were changed, and that forestry 
administrations were grouped into large sections and placed in a hierarchical 
order with a new administrative tier created between the circumscription and the 
ad^ninistration. Moreover, some additional administrations in the south were 
opened. The 1993 law on the baldios has created many more openings for 
commoners to concede (delegate) the administration of their baldios to third 
parties, e.g., the forestry subsidiaries of paperpulp companies. Consequently, in 
the future, the Service is likely to lose its monopoly on the management of the 
baldios to other forestry agencies and enterprises. The loss of that monopoly 
will necessarily lead to a qualitative change or even reduction in the Service's 
apparatus. 
The 1993 transformation of the forestry bureaucracy is part of these more 
general developments. It was correlated to its reorientation toward a service 
organization instead of an administrative apparatus. This reorientation could be 
beneficial to the commoners. It could imply that the Service will begin to 
consider the commoners as clients instead of as landlords. It is possible that in 
the future, the Forestry Service will do what it has failed to do in the past; help 
the commoners and make the population committed to forestry. However, it is 
more likely that the Service will orient itself more towards powerful and 
resource-rich patrons such as large landowners and industries, and to more 
lucrative forest species such as fast-growing broadleaves. This would not only 
lead to a further abandonment of the commons, but also result in a 
supplementary submission of the forests in Portugal to the interests of the pulp 
producers. As long as the paperpulp companies and their forestry subsidiaries 
do not succeed in cultivating eucalyptuses that are resistant to the cold of the 
higher mountain ranges, the people in Campea will hardly notice the difference. 
But if the industry succeeds in producing such new varieties, it is likely that 
areas such as Campea will also become the object of the pulp industry's 
intervention as well. 
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The Future of the Commons 
The commons have often been depicted as a relict of a primitive social and 
economic organization. My analysis of the evolution of the economy of Campea 
has shown that such an assumption is incorrect. Instead, the baldios were part 
and parcel of a commoditized and proletarianized economy and society. This 
point is not only relevant for understanding commoners' communities better, but 
also for seeing a future for the commons. If the commons could persist for the 
last two centuries within a capitalist society, one cannot dismiss them as 
obsolete or antiquated. It is true that traditional forms of exploitation such as 
shepherding and collecting brush have declined. However, modern forms of 
exploitation on a communal basis have proven viable and important. One is 
forest management. Communities such as Cidadelha de Aguiar prove that 
villages may well be able to use their tree stands in a expedient manner if 
expertise is present or can be called upon. Furthermore, other forms of 
exploitation such as niining, the exploitation of mineral water (for example, in 
Ansiaes), or commercial hunting may be developed. All these modern forms of 
exploiting the baldios involve a high degree of commoditization. The 
commoners thus collectively act as an entrepreneur. 
What will be the future of the baldios? Will they persist as a different 
category of property and organization of access to resources? This question calls 
for a brief enumeration of different factors that are likely to influence the 
development path that will prevail. These factors are general tendencies such as 
labour migration, the policies related to the commons themselves and to the 
economic (agricultural) development of the regions in which they are located, 
and the political struggles waged by the local people themselves. 
The most direct policy measure which affects the future of the commons is 
the legal status of the baldios. The 1993 law (Lei 68/93) maintains the commons 
and the management commissions but creates several obstacles for their 
persistence in the future. The new law, unlike earlier bills, leaves intact the idea 
of local administration in the hands of the commoners. The commissions are to 
consist of community members only, without a member appointed by the State 
(art. 20). However, all commissions in which the State and communities 
cooperate (modality b of art. 9 of Decreto-Lei 39/76) will continue to function 
as long as both parties agree to perpetuate their relationship (art. 37). The most 
important change in administration structure, is the creation of an auditing 
committee charged with supervising the management commission's financial 
administration (art. 11). This new element in the local organizational structure 
means that the burden on the community of managing the baldios is increased. 
Other important modifications concern the protection of communal property 
from privatization and control by state institutions. Whereas the previous law 
prohibited any alienation of communal land, the new law allows the delegation 
of acmiinistration to another entity, such as the parish council or a relevant state 
bureaucracy (for instance, the Forestry Service) (art. 22). The new law also 
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enables the expropriation of baldio land by the State for the public good, and 
privatization on behalf of housing or industries (art. 29). Finally, the new law 
allows a baldio to become extinct through a unanimous decision by the 
commoners themselves or after ten years of "unjustified abandonment" (art. 29). 
(The law does not define the contents of this notion.) 
However, the law does however also facilitate local management. The 
restriction that commission members may not be reelected is lifted. Now, 
enthusiastic baldios managers are not hindered by the formal obligation to step 
down. Of course, a drawback of this new regulation is that compared with the 
1976 edict, it becomes more easy for a few influential community members to 
monopolize the commons. 
Furthermore, the law is only one aspect of the policies which shape the future 
of the commons. The European Union's Agricultural Policy and the way in 
which this is translated at the national and regional levels is another and at least 
as important development which conditions the evolution of rural societies in 
northern Portugal and with them, the future of the commons. This policy is 
geared towards the gradual liquidation of so-called marginal farms. Farmers are 
encouraged to plant trees on their lands instead of cultivating crops such as 
maize and potatoes, or grazing cattle. The consequence of this policy is that the 
best farm land will be concentrated in the hands of a much smaller number of 
what according to European standards are modern and viable farms, whereas 
the majority of the land will be afforested. Consequently, "obsolete" farming 
practices will gradually fall into disuse, and the baldios will lose their role as 
supplier of green manure. As a result, the brushes on the baldios will continue 
to grow, and the area will become more prone to fire. Even today, this 
tendency is causing concern within the Forestry Service. Additionally, farmers 
willing to quit farming are likely to leave the rural areas. The countryside will 
increasingly become abandoned as the former farmers and present forest owners 
do not need to remain on their land in order to manage it. This development can 
already be seen in demographical statistics such as those presented in chapter 
11. The departure of the population will undermine the capacity of villages to 
manage their baldios. As a result, it is highly probable that eventually through 
delegation or extinction due to "unjustified abandonment", the baldios will be 
administered by parish and municipal authorities, and disappear as a separate 
form of ownership and social organization. 
There are, however, countertendencies to this process. As a strategy to 
counter the gradual depopulation of the countryside as a result of the liquidation 
of marginal farms, farmer movements try to develop quality production 
according to locally defined "traditional" production standards. In this manner, 
the farmers could find a new niche in the market, and sell their produce at 
higher prices than the bulk products produced by their modern and viable 
counterparts. An example of such a strategy is the promotion of local cattle 
varieties for meat, such as the maronesa and the barosd. This strategy also aims 
to protect these varieties through an association of farmers which looks after the 
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livestock's genetic purity, and checks whether the way in which the cattle are 
kept is sufficiently following tradition. Grazing the animals on the baldios is 
part of that tradition. At the political level, this strategy has obtained a certain 
amount of support. It has, for instance, become incorporated in the European 
agricultural policy (Reg(EEC) 2078/92, in particular art. l .c , 2.d and 4.2). 
It is too early to say which of these tendencies will prevail: the substitution of 
forestry for fanning, or the revival of traditional, quality-oriented, production 
systems. In the case that the liquidation of farming takes place, this will 
probably lead to a further depopulation of the countryside. Forest management 
is labour extensive, and because of the concentration of forest-related industries 
in other areas, rural employment in the district of Vila Real will likely decrease. 
In such a context, the administration of the (afforested) baldios by village 
communities may, in specific cases such as Cidadelha de Aguiar, help to slow 
down the depopulation process. In the cases of communities which, like those in 
Campea, control relatively small areas, the funds created through the 
management of the baldios will probably be insufficient to create the necessary 
infrastructure and amenities. As a result, the population will continue to depart 
from these communities. In the case that the development of the new traditional 
farming will be successful, the baldios will play a novel role in the economic 
system, not only as timber production areas, but also as the areas on which high 
quality meat is produced for the European market. 
The type of development path northern Portugal is going to witness in the 
future depends on the outcome of the struggle around the national and European 
agricultural policies. It also depends on the struggles within the country and the 
region itself. Local leaders, political parties as well as the district's secretariat 
of baldios commissions play an important part in this battle for alternative 
futures. In reaction to 1993 law, the secretary of baldios commissions doubled 
its efforts to create new management commissions. As a result, in 1994 the 
district of Vila Real had more commissions than in 1990. However, whether 
these efforts will have a lasting result depends largely upon who will prevail in 
the dispute over the European agricultural policy. That will determine whether 
the commons and commoners of northern Portugal survive into the twenty-first 
century, or, like Gesteira in Joao Manuel Grilo's motion picture, face the 
threshold of their end. 
Unit; circa 17 litres. 
The formal (legal) term for communal land. 
Municipal administrative body. Each Câmara exists of a president 
and members. The number of its members varies according to the 
status of the municipality (rural or urban) and t, art. 53). The size 
of its population between 2 and 6 members (Lei 79/77). Presently, 
all members are elected, but during the Estado Novo, the president 
and the vice-president were appointed by the central government 
(Administrative Code, art. 36). 
Land attributed to a household by the state for the establishment of 
a homestead. In order to acquire the land, the recipient had to 
satisfy certain conditions, such as to guarantee procreation; the 
land could not be sold nor divided upon inheritance. The legal 
basis for this type of homestead was created in 1920. 
Jurisdiction, area resorting under a court. 
Commission of parishioners. The lowest level of the Uniao 
National (UN, National Union), the single party during the Estado 
Novo 
The area administered by the Câmara Municipal. Each concelho or 
municipality consists of several freguesias or parishes. 
Literally: council. The word is used for the village councils held 
prior to 1976. During these councils among other things the 
management of the commons was arranged. 
One thousand escudos. 
A preserve. In this book the term is particularly used for the royal 
hunting preserves, the coutada real. 
An area reserved for a certain aim in which other forms of 
exploitation are forbidden. The term was particularly used for 
parts of the commons in which it was forbidden to collect brush. 
The present currency in Portugal; in 1995, 100 escudos (written 
as: 100$00) equalled circa Dfl. 1.00. 
Corporatist and autocratic regime ruling the country between 1933 
and 1977 under the leadership of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar (until 
1968) and Marcello Caetano (from 1968 till 1974). The official 
beginning is dated in 1933, when the corporatist constitution was 
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accepted. Salazar came however to power already in 1929. 
Autocratic rule had been installed three years earlier, after a 
military coup in May 1926. 
Estrume Fertilizer. Used for green and brown manure. 
Freguesia The present name for the secular parish. Several parishes together 
constitute a municipality or concelho 
Gleba Farm land, in the feudal system the land through which the serf 
was tied to his lord. The term was used for plots of baldio land 
which were attributed by the JCI to individual farmers. 
Jornaleiro Day labourer 
Juiz de Vintena Literally: 'judge of twenty'. The name stems from the royal 
regulation which determined that communities of over twenty 
households and more than one légua away from the capital of the 
concelho would elect a 'peace judge'. This peace judge would 
settle minor conflicts and crimes. 
Lavrador 
Légua. 
Leira 
Literally: ploughman, i.e. a farmer with enough land to sustain a 
pair of oxen which can pull a plough. In this book the term is used 
for 'agriculturalist' and for 'middle farmer'. 
Unit; varying between 5 and 6 kilometres. 
Land between two marks. Used for the strips of baldio land which 
during the partilhas were attributed to individual households for 
the collection of brush. 
Logradouro comum Land subjected to communal use; sometimes also for the 
communal use itself. 
Maninho 
Mato 
Monte 
Montado 
Literally: uncultivated area. Estate of which the private owner(s) 
held the dominium directum and on which a community had 
communal usufruct rights through the dominium util. 
Brushes, brush land. The brushes are used for green manure. 
Popular term for a common. 
An area covered by an open forest, generally of cork and stone 
oaks. Under the tree cover, often animals are grazed, or 
cultivation is practised. 
Mordomo An elected village official. In Rio de Onor this office was 
apparently similar to the zelador (Dias 1953). In Campea, 
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presently the term is applied for the commission of young men 
who are responsible for the organization of the parish's annual 
festa ('feast') in honour of Saint Ann and Saint Andrew. 
Division. The term is used for all kinds of apportionment, such as 
of inheritances. With regards to the commons, the term applied for 
the apportionment of brush to the individual commoners' 
households. Presently it is used in Avecaozinho for the allocation 
of fuel wood. 
By-laws. In Campea, these posturas regulated primarily which 
village was entitled to which baldio. 
Landowner, wealthy farmer. 
The reconquest of the Iberian peninsula from the Moor 'invaders' 
during the tenth until the fifteenth century. 
Plural of 'real': royal. Old currency unit. After the abolition of the 
monarchy in 1910, the real was supplanted by the escudo and 1000 
riis was equalled to one escudo. 
Official appointed by the municipality who was charged with 
looking after the public order. He also had to supervise the 
functioning of the parish council, but he was not a member of this 
body. 
Royal estate. 
Unit; circa 1.1 meter. 
Herds to which the different member households of a community 
contributed their individually owned animals. The animals were 
shepherded either by appointed (paid) persons, or by the owners 
themselves in turns (from: vez: turn). In Campea, each household 
had to take turns according to the number of animals it had in the 
herd. 
Literally: town. Normally it refers to the administrative of a 
concelho. 
Literally: neighbour. In practice, the term refers to a member of a 
village community and/or to whom was entitied to participate at 
village council meetings, i.e. the (generally male) head of 
households. 
Elected villager who until 1976 was responsible for the 
management of the commons in his village. 

Abbreviations 
ACM Minutes of the Municipal Council (of Vila Real). 
ADB Arquivo Distrital de Braga; Braga District Archive. 
AJF Minutes of the Parish Council (of Campeä). 
AJP Minites of the Parish Council (of Campeä). 
ANTdT Arquivo National da Torre do Tombo; National Archive. 
CDS Central-Social-Democratic Party. 
CFP Circumscripgäo Florestal do Porto, Forestry Circumscription of Porto. 
CFVR Forestry Cisrcumscription of Vila Real. 
DG Director-General. 
DGSFA Direcgäo-Geral dos Servigos Florestais e Aqutcolas, Forestry Service. 
EC European Community. Presently known as European Union (EU). 
ECU European Currency Unit (circa Dfl. 2.10). 
FFF Fundo do Fomento Florestal, Forestry Development Fund. Fund created in 
1945 to support forestry activities by private landowners. 
fh. Footnote. 
int Interview with one of the informants referred to below (followed by date). 
JCI Junta da Cobnizagäo Interna, Internal Resettlement Board. Organism 
created in 1937 to promote the reclamtion of the baldios for farming and 
forestry. 
JDF Junta da Freguesia, Parish Council. 
obs Observation of a certain event (followed by date). 
PCP Communist Party. 
PS Socialist Party. 
PSD Social-Democratic Party. 
UN Uniäo National, National Union, the ruling party during the Estado Novo. 
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Appendix 1: Communal Land Management Commissions in 
1990 According to the Forestry Circumscription of Vila Real 
The management commissions of modalities a and b are alphabetically ordered according 
to the Forestry Administration, the parish and the name of the village/commumty. The 
list reflects the situation as of 17 September 1990. 
Village or cluster of villages a/b Parish Remarks 
Forestry Administration ofBoticas 
Quintas e Serraos b Beça 
Torneiros b Beça 
Mosteirao b Curros 
Valdegas b Pinho 
Forestry Administration ofBraganga 
Vilarinho da Cova da Luz b 
Montesinho e Portelo b 
S. Miao de Palzeios b 
Martin b 
Espinhosela 
Franca 
S. Juliao de Palzeios 
Zoio 
Visited 
Forestry administration of Chaves 
Casteloes b 
Eiras b 
Pastoria b 
Aveleda b 
S. Juliao b 
Calvao 
Eiras 
Redondelo 
S. Vincente de Raia 
S. Juliao 
Forestry administration ofMondim de Basto 
Tijao b Campanhô 
Vilar de Viande b Vilar de Viande 
Forestry administration ofMontalegre 
Ferrai b Ferral 
Nogueirô b Ferral 
Sacoselo b Ferral 
Sta. Marinha b Ferral 
Lamas b Fervidelas 
Lamacha b Negroes 
Ladrugaes b Reigoso 
Reigoso b Reigoso 
Amiar b Salto 
Beços b Salto 
Corva b Salto 
Lodeiro d'Arqué b Salto 
Seara b Salto 
Visited 
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Antigo de Serraquinhos b 
Codeçoso b 
Padroes b 
Forestry administration of Mur ça 
Sarapie b 
Valonga de Milhais b 
Balsa e Valde de Agodim b 
Fundoes b 
Mascanho b 
Vila Verde b 
Forestry administration ofPedras Salgadas 
Rebordochao b 
Lagobom b 
Vila Meâ b 
Pensalves b 
Soutelo de Matos b 
Fontes b 
Teloes, Ponte e Castelo b 
Soutelinho de Monte b 
Cidadelhe de Aguiar a 
Sabrosa de Aguiar b 
Forestry administration ofRibeira da Pena 
Seirôs b 
Agunchos b 
Forestry administration of Vila 
Cidadela de Jales 
Moreira de Jales 
Tinhela de Cima 
Tinhela de Baixo 
Lagoa 
Valugas 
Bornes de Aguiar 
Parada de Aguiar 
Barbadaes de Baixo 
Eiriz 
Cerdeira de Jales 
Raiz do Monte 
Forestry administration of Vila Real 
Avecäozinho a 
Cotorinho b 
Montes b 
Justos a 
P6voa da Serra a 
Serraquinhos 
Venda Nova 
Venda Nova 
Valongo de Milhais 
Valonga de Milhais 
Vila Verde Visited 
Vila Verde 
Jou 
Vila Verde Contacted 
Bornes 
Bornes 
Bornes 
Pensalves 
Pensalves 
Soutelo 
Teloes 
Teloes 
Vila Pouca de Aguiar Visited 
Vreia de Bornes 
Canedo 
Cerva 
Campea Appeared to b. 
Campea 
Campea 
Fontes 
Fontes 
Pouca de Aguiar 
b Alfarela de Jales Visited 
a Alfarela de Jales Visited 
b Bornes 
b Bornes 
b Bornes 
b Bornes 
b S. Martinho de Bornes 
b Soutelo de Aguiar 
b Vreia de Bornes 
b Vreia de Bornes 
b Vreia de Jales 
b Vreia de Jales 
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Soutelo 
Paradela do Monte 
Fortinho 
Linhares 
Leirôs 
Galegos 
Vilarinha de Samardâ e Covêlo 
Ermida 
Forestry administration of Vinhais 
Prada 
b Fontes 
a Paradela do Monte 
b S. Tomé de Castelo 
b S. Tomé de Castelo Unclear status 
b S. Tomé de Castelo 
a Valnogeiras 
a Vilarinho de Samarda 
a Vinhôs 
b Vila Verde 
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Appendix 2: Legislation from the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Century with Respect to the Baldios 
Source: JCI (1939:1-12), Rodrigues (1987:32-48), Gralheiro (1990:32-36) and Nunes & 
Feij6 (1990:65-74). 
- a decree of 15-7-1744 which annulled illegal alienations of communal waste lands by 
Municipal Councils; 
- a decree of 23-7-1766 which enabled privatization after hearing the commoners and 
with approval by the crown; 
- a decree of 11-12-1804 which allowed partitioning of the commons without interference 
by the crown; 
- a law of 3-6-1822, which installed the municipalities as owners of the commons; 
- a decree of 1832, which in one of its clauses legalized the usurpation of communal 
land and protected the usurpators against usufruct by the original owning community; 
- a law of 28-8-1869 (lei da desamortizagao, published on 6-9-1869), which ordered the 
disentailment of the commons. 
- a law of 1893, which allowed the creation of agrarian colonies on the baldios. This law 
however had no effect. 
Until the military coup of 1926 the following decrees were published: 
- in 1918, a decree which allowed the pardoning of baldios by local authorities 
(municipalities and parishes) when requested by a majority of the commoners. In order 
to stimulate this programme, the central government offered a premium of 15$00 for 
each hectare which in this way was cultivated, 5$00 for the municipality or parish 
council concerned, and 10$00 for the cultivators. These also would receive seeds and 
fertilizer for half the price which as an extra incentive would be paid only at harvest. 
- in 1920, a decree which was directed at the creation of new settlements on baldios. 
- in 1922, a decree which enabled individual commoners to claim a share. Those baldios 
which remained unclaimed and were not necessary for communal use, would be sold in 
public sale by the municipalities. 
- in 1924, a decree which determined that 2/3 of the total area was to be dispensed from 
communal exploitation. 
- Decreto 10,522 of 14-2-1925 which changed some details in the earlier legislation. 
In the following eight years, about 16,000 hectares was divided among 7,336 families. 
Also, a considerable but not specified area was sold by the municipalities, mainly as a 
means of getting money for investments in infrastructure (roads, schools, water supply, 
etc.). 
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Appendix 3: Legislation with Respect to Reorganization of the 
Forestry Service and the Reclamation of the Baldios prior to 
and during the Estado Novo 
Based on Cardoso (1956). 
Date Subject 
01-07-1802 Forestation of the dunes in the Couto de Lavis near Aveiro and the margins 
of the river Vouga. 
27-07-1824 Creation of the Administragao Geral das Matas for the management of 
14,864 ha of state forest property under the responsibility of the Secretariat 
of Marines. 
07-07-1847 Reform of the Forestry Service. 
05-03-1857 All municipalities are ordered to afforest their baldios. The aim is to plant 
19,000 ha in 5 years: 1 ha in each of the 3800 parishes. 
16-07-1842 Last law in which reference is made to afforestation laws of 1623 and 1633. 
30-08-1853 Creation of the Ministry of Public Works, Commerce and Industry and the 
creation of the agrarian secondary education and a forestry discipline. 
02-01-1865 Creation of scundary forestry education within the Institute Superior de 
Agronomia. 
28-08-1869 Law of the Liquidation of the Baldios (published 6-9-1869). 
21-09-1869 Decree ordering a forest inventary. 
11-05-1872 It is decided to afforest for the public benefit the public areas belonging to 
the state, the municipalities, parishes and the Corporations of the Dead 
Hand; the task is delegated to foresters; reform of the forestry service. 
28-07-1881 Forestry Service's competencies are transferred to the Directorate-General 
of Agriculture. 
25-11-1886 The Forestry Service's new organisation structure is published. 
26-12-1888 Law regulating the afforestation of Gerez and Estrela. 
19-10-1892 Reorganization of the Forestry Service. 
01-12-1892 Reorganisation of the Forestry Service. 
09-12-1898 Reorganisation of the Forestry Service. 
28-12-1899 Reorganisation of the Forestry Service. 
24-12-1901 Reorganisation of the Forestry Service; description of forestry regime. 
24-12-1903 Regulation forestry regime 
25-04-1918 Creation of the Ministry of Agriculture and the integration of the Service in 
this Ministry. 
08-05-1918 Creation of the Direcgao-Geral dos Servigos Florestais. 
16-10-1920 Creation of the the so-called casal de familia. A casal de familia is land 
which is undividable and unalienable, and which cannot be morgaged. The 
recipient has to guarantee the continuation of the household into the next 
generation by procreation or child adoption. This concept was later applied 
on the division of the baldios by the JCI. 
14-02-1925 Regulation of the baldios's alienation for agricultural or forestry aims. Main 
conditions: approval by 2/3 of the adult population of the parish(es) 
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involved; costs of division are paid by those who receive a plot of the 
baldios; plots (glebas) are indivisible and can be attributed freely to one of 
the heirs. 
14-02-1925 Junta do Fomento Agrtcola assigned with the task of improving the 
exploitation of the waste lands. 
10-05-1926 Dissolution of the Ministry of Agriculture and transfer of the Forestry 
Service as Direccao-Geral dos Servicos Florestais e Aqulcolas to the 
Secretary of State for Agriculture in the Ministry of Economy. 
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Appendix 4: Forestry Legislation of the Estado Novo, 
Excluding the Decrees through which Areas Were Submitted to 
the Forestry Regime 
Based on Estêvâo (1983) and Azevedo Gomes (1988) 
Abbreviations 
L = Lei (Legislation by the Assembleia da Repdblica); 
DL = Decreto-Lei (Legislation by the govermment); 
D = Decreto (Government decree). 
Legislation with respect to the Forestry Service 
Date Number Subject 
03-11-1926 D 12,625 Reorganization of the forestry police; regulates duties and 
powers of forest guards, defines forest crimes, fixes fines, etc.. 
20-05-1927 D 13,658 Restrictions on fellings in order to stop the decrease of the 
forest area. A licensing system is introduced. Certain 
restrictions are put on planting of eucalyptus trees; felled trees 
have to be re-placed (art. 13). 
23-05-1927 D 13,658 Restriction of fellings, and on goat keeping: "goat keeping is 
only allowed if the goat herder possesses or rents enough land to 
graze them and only with a municipal licence" (art. 23). After a 
fire on a baldio the area may not be used for grazing during two 
years (art. 19). 
13-11-1929 D 17,714 Statements of forest guards are trustworthy; witnesses not 
needed; capturing trespassers allowed. 
18-11-1931 D 20,526 The regencias florestais are renamed administragdesflorestais. 
24-04-1937 D 27,667 "Approves the afforestation plan. 
24-05-1938 L 1,971 Lei do Povoamento Florestal; legal basis for the execution of the 
Piano do Povoamento Florestal. 
19-09-1942 DL 32,271 Regulating the economy during war time; allowing for compul-
sory requisition of wood and fuel wood from private forest 
owners. 
27-01-1945 DL 34,394 Creation of the Fundo de Fomento Florestal in compensation of 
forest owners who suffered from requisitions under DL 32,271. 
24-11-1954 DL 39,931 Revision simple forestry regime on private property. 
24-04-1954 L 2,069 Compulsory afforestation of private land in cases of severe 
erosion. 
06-06-1959 L 2,097 The Forestry Service and Forestry Development Fund are 
charged with the development of in-land fishery. 
02-08-1956 DL 40,721 Reorganization of the Forestry Service. 
16-12-1964 DL 45,443 Reorganization of the Fundo de Fomento Florestal. 
06-07-1964 DL 45,793 dem. 
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06-07-1964 DL 45,795 Regulation of subsidies to afforestation by private landowners 
through the Fundo de Fomento Florestal. 
Some relevant legislation with respect to the baldios 
Date Number Subject 
07-03-1927 D 13,229 Municipalities enabled to sell baldios which are not strictiy 
necessary for the logradouro comum in order to raise funds for 
the construction of dwellings for judges. Alienation of baldio 
land has to proceed in public sales. 
20-05-1927 D 13,663 Repeats décréta 10,552 of 14-2-1925 which had never been 
implemented. Parish and municipal councils allowed to sell 
baldios which are (a) too small to be subdivided in plots, (b) 
cannot be reclaimed for agricultural aims (conform D 10,552 
and D 10,553 of 14-2-1925) and (c) which cannot be easily 
afforested. The sale's revenues are to be used for objectives 
with "a social character". 
18-11-1931 D 20,526 Creation of a baldios, waste lands and colonization division with 
the tasks to divide and exploit these lands and promote new 
settlements. 
28-02-1932 D 20,968 Demands a list of the baldios by parish and municipal councils. 
08-12-1932 D 21,956 All alienations of parish or municipal baldios are suspended. 
01-04-1933 D 22,390 The inquiry following décréta 20,526 results in an inventory of 
140,000 ha of baldios. 
16-11-1936 DL 27,207 Creation of the Junta da Colonizaçâo Interna. 
03-04-1937 DL 27,620 Parish councils may alienate 300 m 3 of baldio land for the 
building of a house for the guarda fiscal (fiscal border police). 
12-05-1959 DL 42,258 Regulates the alienation of baldios. The JCI has to grant 
dispensation of the logradouro comum (hearing the DGSFA) and 
the land has been sold in a public sale in one part or in plots 
larger than 1 ha. Land that has been freed of the logradouro 
comum enters into the dominion of available private property of 
the municipality or parish. 
Appendix 5: Results of a survey in the village of Avecaozinho (with thanks to Carmen Maio) 
HH 
nr. 
HH 
size 
Ages of the 
household members 
Land (ha) Emigration At least 
one 
member 
drawing 
a 
pension 
Cattle Sex 
farmer 
Off-farm 
employment 
farm land brush rented 
or 
"leased 
child brother 
or 
sister 
self milk labour 
or 
meat 
nr. in 
dry wet 
01 4 50,50,20,18 0.5 2.5 2 0 - - - - 4 4 9 - -
02 2 67,64 0.0 1.0 0.5 0 - - - yes 0 0 6 + 9 - -
03 4 47,45,17, 12 1.0 1.0 n.a. 2.0 - - - - 2 4 9 - -
04 1 59 0.5 1.5 0.5 0 - yes - - 2 0 9 - -
05 4 29,27,6,3 0 1.5 0 1.5 - yes - - 4 0 cJ+9 1 VR 
06 3 52,57,23 0.5 3.5 0.5 2.5 - yes - - 6 0 cJ+9 1 VR 
07 4 29,27,10,3 0 0 0 0 - - - - - -
08 2 64,60 0.5 2.5 0.5 0 - - - yes 4 0 cJ+9 - -
09 7 42,36,15,4,12,10,5 1.0 9.0 0.5 10.5 - yes - - 25 0 9 2 VR 
10 5 47,37,19,16,14 0 1.5 0.5 0.5 - - yes - 4 0 9 1 VR 
11 3 63,56,20 0 2.0 0.5 0 - yes - yes 0 4 <J+9 1 VR 
12 5 50,42,19,15,12 0 0 0 0 - - - yes - - - - -
HH 
nr. 
HH 
size 
Ages household 
members 
Land (ha) Emigration Drawing 
a 
pension 
Cattle Sex 
farmer 
Off-farm 
employment 
farm land brush rented 
or 
"leased 
child brother 
or 
sister 
self milk labour 
or 
meat 
nr. in 
dry wet 
13 5 48,44,21,14,10 0 0 0 0 - - - yes - - - 2 Port. 
14 3 29,29,5 0 0 0 0 - yes - - - - - 2 VR 
15 3 66,64,22 0 1.5 1 2 - - - yes 2 0 3 + 9 1 Camp. 
16 1 69 0 0 0 0 yes - - yes - - - - -
17 3 70,68,13 0 0.5 0 0.5 yes - - yes - - 3 - -
18 2 68,46 0 0.5 0.5 0 - - yes yes 0 0 3 1 VR 
19 3 63,64,8 0 1 1 0 yes yes yes - 3 0 3 + 9 - -
20 4 34,30,6,3 0 0 0 0 - yes yes - - - - 1 EU 
21 2 67,60 0 2 2 1 yes - - yes - . - - - -
22 1 60 0 1 1 1* - yes yes yes - - - - -
23 2 73,73 0.5 2.5 2 2.5* - yes yes yes - - - - -
24 2 61,63 0 0.5 2 0.5' - yes yes yes - - - - -
25 3 62,62,33 1.0 1.0 0 0 - yes yes yes - - 3 + 9 - -
26 1 78 0.5 3.5 1.0 5.0' - yes - yes - - - - -
27 7 79,43,42,17,15,13,9 2.0 3.0 3.0 1.5 - yes - yes 5 4 3 + 9 - -
28 1 75 0 0.5 1 0 - yes - yes - - - - -
29 5 50,45,20,6,4 0 2.0 0 2.0 yes yes yes - 3 1 9 2 Camp. 
30 3 75,75,42 0 1.5 1 1.5* yes yes - yes - - - - -
31 5 40,37,14,10, V4 0 2 1 n.a. - yes - - 4 0 9 1 Camp. 
32 5 30,28,2,30,65 0 3 1 n.a. - - - yes 6 0 9 1 Camp. 
33 4 53,50,23,17 0.5 3.0 1.0 2.0 - yes yes yes 3 3 ( Î+9 2 VR 
34 4 44,28,6,4 0 2.0 0.5 2.5 - - - - 6 0 9 1 Swits. 
35 4 46,43,20,16 0 1.5 0.5 2.0 - yes - yes 4 0 9 2 Camp. 
36 1 69 - - . - yes - - yes - - - - -
37 5 44,46,14,10,8 - 0.5 0 0 - yes yes - - - 9 - -
38 3 50,43,20 - - - - - yes yes - - - - - -
39 4 67,60,24,17 2.0 6.0 3.0 3.0 - yes - yes 5 o_ J 2 Camp. 
40 2 ??,?? 0 1.5 1.0 1.5* yes yes - yes - - -
41 6 99 99 99 99 99 99 - - - - - yes yes - - - - 1 Camp. 
42 2 69,71 - - - - - - - yes - - - - -
43 4 50,45,22,14 0.5 2.5 0.5 3.5 yes - - - 2 0 9 2 Port. 
HH = Household; leased areas are marked with an asterix; Camp. = Campeâ; EU = Europe; Port. = Portugal; Swits. = Switserland; VR = the 
concelho of Vila Real 
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Appendix 6: Landlords and Tenants, and the Number of Heads 
of Cattle Owned by the Same in Avecaozinho in 1991 (based on 
appendix 5). 
Tenants Landlords 
House-
hold 
Age 
chief 
Percent 
rented 
# cattle House-
hold 
Age 
chief 
Percent 
leased 
# cattle 
05 29 100 4 22 60 50 0 
09» 42 100 25 24 63 20 0 
34 44 100 6 23 73 60 0 
35 46 100 4 30 75 60 0 
03 47 100 6 26 78 100 0 
10 47 25 4 40 ?? 60 0 
43 50 100 2 
29 50 100 4 
06 52 56 6 
33 53 44 6 
15 66 so 2 
39 67 27 5 
17 70 100 0 
27» 79 19 0 
Average 53.0 69.8 
" The estate of the household head's deceased father had not yet been divided and was still managed 
by his brother, his sister and her husband. Partitioning of the inheritance would imply mat he would 
acquire some land of his own. 
h This family consists of a elderly mother, her daughter Joana, her son-in-law and their children. It 
was not the 79 old grandma but rather her 43 year old son-in-law who had acted as the household's 
chief. I have put the family on the last ranking as the division of the inheritance had not yet taken 
place. This partitha was to be executed in 1992, and implied the division of the landed property by 
the three daughters, so that the house would loose two third of its property. The percentage of 
rented land thus would increase to 40% (ceteris paribus) and it would be located between 09 and 
34. 
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Appendix 7: Tax Payment in Avecäozinho in 1831 (in Riis) 
Name Rustico 
Anna Maria Valeria 500 
Antonio Alves 600 
Antonio Alves Carujo 200 
Antonio Lourenco 100 
Antonio Teixeira de Avecäozinho 400 
Eleulerio Ramalho 1500 
Emigracia Alves Valeria de Joao de Torgueira 300 
os Filhos de Manuel Goncalves da Fonte 120 
Feliciano Pires 700 
Francisco Gaspar de .... 240 
Francisco Martins Granado 100 
Joaquim Miguel 1000 
Joaquim Ondas 50 
Joaquim de Sequeira 500 
Joaquim Dinis 100 
Captain Jose da Costa 1000 
Jos6 Dias 300 
Jos6 do Oiteiro (?) 300 
Jose de Sequeira do Pereiro 80 
Jos6 Mateto (?) de Mascosello 400 
Lourenco Martins (Rebello) 700 
Luis Rodrigues Bernardino Gaspar 300 
Luis (Dinis) da Fonte 500 
Manuel Martins Granado 1000 
Manuel Rodrigues 700 
Manuel Dinis & Francisco Alves 500 
Maria Martins Rabica 700 
Maria Dinis Valeria 42 
Joao Folha 
Francisco Alves Ondas 
Manuel Goncalves 
Josefa Valeria 
Maria Alves Valeria 
Joao Peixoto 
Jos6 Alves Ondas 
Urbano Maneio 
40 
Juros 
100 
80 
100 
100 
50 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
40 
50 
120 
120 
400 
120 
273 
586 
383 
117 
120 
200 
257 
Averages 475 85 180 323 
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Appendix 8: Crimes Mentioned in the Campea Parish Records 
between 1922 and 1974 
Date Crime 
09-04-1922 Inhabitants of Pepe and Avecaozinho caught on baldio of Viariz da Poca. 
04-02-1923 People from Chao Grande and Viariz da Santa fined for cutting brush on 
common of Vendas. 
18-02-1923 Illegal construction on baldio. 
03-06-1923 Inhabitant of Viariz da Santa grazes cattle on baldio of Pousada. 
17-06-1923 Inhabitants of Ansiaes (neighbouring parish in the municipality of 
Amarante caught preparing charcoal on the baldios of Vila Nova, Viariz 
da Poca en Viariz da Santa. 
17-06-1923 Somebody from Parada caught with 40 goats and 40 sheep on the common 
of Montes. Fine of 20$00. 
21-06-1923 Robbery of charcoal; fines of 10$00, 30$00 and 50$00. 
05-07-1923 Fine for unknown offence of 21$15. 
04-04-1926 A shepherd with 3 goats and 2 sheep in monte Avecao do Cabo fined with 
4$00. 
04-04-1926 A fine of 5$00 for selling firewood outside of the village. 
04-04-1926 A fine for of 5$00 for ordering the cutting of firewood outside the monte 
of one's own village. 
05-09-1926 Inhabitant of Fontes (neighbouring parish) made charcoal in monte of 
Cotorinho. 
21-11-1926 By an adult and some children. The parents have to pay for their children. 
Later (5-12-26) it appears that there was no trespassing at all. 
19-12-1926 Cutting half a cart of brush; fined by 2$50. 
17-06-1928 Grazing of five sheep on monte Avecaozinho. 
17-06-1928 Cutting of brush and driving against a tree. 
02-12-1928 Discussion about fining baker from Avecaozinho: had he collected fuel 
wood for industrial or domestic use? 
02-12-1928 People seen in Vila Nova cutting brush and collecting fuel wood; the man 
cutting brushes proved to be unguilty on 16-11-28, the others each paid 
1$00. 
19-01-1930 Collecting fuel wood in Cotorinho. 
16-02-1930 Goats from Cotorinho grazed in Parada; inhabitant of Parada committed 
another unspecified crime; total fines: 30$00 of which half goes to the 
zelador. 
20-12-1931 People punished for tearing heather out (for charcoal?) in Cotorinho. 
17-01-1933 Illegal collection of fuel wood in Cotorinho: 2$50 fine. 
19-03-1933 Wood cut in Traz do Val (Pousada) by someone from Viariz da Santa. 
21-02-1937 Somebody from Vendas collected a cart of wood in the monte of Vila 
Nova. Later he proves to be innocent. 
07-03-1937 Someone from Parada fined 12$50 for illegal wood gathering. 
06-06-1937 Illegal collection of brush in Pousada, fine 63$00. 
06-02-1937 Illegal brush and oak cutting in Viariz da Poca. 
03-03-1940 Fine for collecting brush (2$50) and grazing goats and/or sheep (5$00) in 
Pousada. The latter proves himself innocent. 
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Date Crime 
07-12-1941 Inhabitants of Cotorinho accuses three men from the village of collecting 
brush which had been reserved for grazing; the involved only pay the 
costs. 
01-02-1942 Illegal cutting of brush in Aveçao do Cabo. 
05-04-1942 Illegal gathering of wood in Cotorinho. 
07-06-1942 Illegal collection of fuel wood in Aveçao do Meio. 
01-11-1942 Fines paid for unspecified crimes by inhabitants of Montes: 30$50 
07-02-1943 People from Montes on the monte of Parada with 25, 20 and 19 heads of 
goats and/or sheep. They are fined with 10$00, 9$00 and 7$50. Also in 
Parada 6 persons from Viariz da Santa collecting fuel wood. These are 
fined with 2$50 each. There were witnesses. 
04-04-1943 Two times illegal gathering of fuel wood in Parada. 
01-08-1943 Felling of an oak in Aveçâozinho: 20$00 fine; three times grazing in 
Lagoa de Pepe; collecting fuel wood in Cotorinho: 2$50; and cutting fuel 
wood in monte coutado of Aveçâozinho: 20$00. 
05-12-1943 Three persons gathered fuel wood illegally; fines of 5$00, 5$00 and 2$50, 
respectively. 
03-06-1945 Two persons from Cotorinho gathered fuel wood on the common of 
Montes. 
03-02-1946 Two persons from Aveçao de Cabo gathered fuel wood in a zona coutada 
for industrial aims. 
05-01-1947 Thirty goats from Montes on the commons of Parada; fined with 30$00. 
02-05-1948 Someone from Cotorinho gathered fuel wood in Montes, others cut 
brushes in Viariz da Poça. 
01-05-1949 Illegal gathering from brushes in Vila Nova and Viariz da Poça; the fine 
(85$00) was ind by the GNR. 
05-06-1949 Inhabitant of Cotorinho collected fuel wood in Montes. 
01-07-1951 Unauthorized cutting of pines on the commons of Aveçâozinho. 
02-09-1951 Unauthorized cutting of fuel wood in Aveçao de Cabo: fine of 20$00. 
04-11-1951 Illegal felling of pines in Aveçâozinho; fine of 200$00. 
03-02-1952 Sheep and goats spotted on the baldio of Vila Nova. 
06-07-1952 Sheep on the commons of Châo Grande and Vendas. 
06-06-1954 Sheep and goats on the monte of Vila Nova. 
05-12-1954 GNR fines people who washed clothes in animal drinking basins. 
1954-1958 MISSING 
07-12-1958 A fine of 10$00, 25% is paid to the contribuiçao industrial. 
01-02-1959 Payment of 8$00 to the state, 7$50 albergeria districtal, 15$00 GNR. 
Reason and exact size of the fines unknown. 
05-06-1960 Four sheep on the monte of Vendas: fine: 30$00. 
31-12-1961 In 1961 95$00 was paid to the albergaria districtal. This indicates that the 
total amount of fines over 1961 was 380$00. 
04-03-1962 Payment of 25 % of the fines to the albergaria districtal: 22$50. 
02-05-1965 GNR asked to intervene after cutting of pines in Aveçâozinho. 
07-08-1966 Cutting of pines on the leiras of Pepe; GNR informed. 
03-12-1967 Changes in the Côdigo de Posturas because of water supply problems; 
grazing of sheep and goats prohibited "because these affect the 
valorization of the losradouro". 
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Date Crime 
02-03-1969 Inhabitants of Montes complain about inhabitants of Cotorinho who 
trespass; Montes gets a zelador, 
03-05-1970 Illegal house building in the baldio Tapada Nova, Pepe. 
04-07-1971 Inhabitants of Montes accused of collecting fuel wood in Cotorinho. 
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Appendix 9: Sales of baldios mentioned in the Campea parish 
records between 1922 and 1974. 
Source: minutes of the Campea parish council 
Date Area (m2) 
11-10-22 100 m 2 
03-08-24 
20-09-25 
21-08-27 
04-03-28 
05-12-37 
07-03-43 
04-07-43 
02-04-44 
12-11-44 
16 m 2 
80 m 2 
Price 
5$00 
0$00 
10$00 
18-03-28 10$00 
04-11-28 40 m 2 24$00 
20-01-29 
25-05-30 1500 m 2 
20$00 
500$00 
15-06-30 
02-12-30 144 m 2 
2$00 
86$40 
05-04-31 eira 10$00 
17-01-31 330 m 2 10$00 
17-05-31 • • 10$00 
06-12-31 1000 m 2 10$00 
17-03-32 576 m 2 15$00 
21-07-35 300 m 2 100$00 
50$00 
220$00 
150$00 
Description 
Bought by parish councillor for the construction of 
a water well. 
Alignment. 
Alignment. 
Alignment by a landowner in Pepe. 
Area for the construction of a house in Trâz do 
Val, Viariz da Santa. 
Land for the construction of an eira (threshing 
floor). 
Bought by a landowner in Pepe; alignment of a 
road. Effect on the public good and the value of the 
land is established by a commission of two experts. 
Correction of road in Montes. 
Public sale in Viariz da Santa, but with only one 
bidder. 
Alignment. 
Trâz do Val for cultivation (value estimated by a 
commission of experts). 
A threshing floor (value estimated by commission 
of experts). 
Because of better passage of cattle; condition is 
enclose within one year. 
Alignment in Vila Nova (value estimated by 
commission of experts). 
For state-appointed road guard for horti- and 
agriculture. 
Border correction benefiting an inhabitant of 
Montes who got the land because of the fact that is 
was located between other fields he owned under 
the condition of cultivation within one year. 
Land bought by medical doctor A.A. Barria Maio 
for the construction of a school after public sale 
organized at his request but for the price set by the 
parish council. 
Alignment. 
Alignment, adjoining to the house, in Boavista. 
Alignment. 
Sale for construction of a house in Cruz. 
Alfredo Antonio de Conceiçao Costa from Vila 
Nova, receives a plot for the construction of a 
house with yard in the limite of Aveçâozinho. 
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Date Area (m2) Price 
12-11-44 200$00 
10-12-44 .. 
10-12-44 • • 
11-03-45 • • 210$00 
11-03-45 20$00 
06-0545 260$00 
02-0945 20 m 2 50$00 
02-0945 124 m 2 300$00 
05-0845 
07-1148 16771$00 
06-0249 
31-12-54 1000 m 2 80$00 
1954-1958 MISSING 
07-04-57 9676 m 2 33490$00 
07-09-58 186 m 2 
05-04-59 1200 m 2 gift 
05-02-61 23000 m 2 46000$00 
03-09-61 285 m 2 570$00 
07-06-63 21600 m 2 18350$00 
01-05-66 5.1 ha 360150$00 
05-03-67 50 m 2 100$00 
02-07-67 4428$00 
3*270 m 2 3240$00 
1*247 m 2 988$00 
200$00 
11-01-70 300 m 2 
01-03-70 270 m 2 1080$00 
07-08-72 250 m 2 1875$00 
05-11-72 0$00 
Description 
Manuel Mourao from Pepe, housing. 
Proprietdrio Freixo, several lots. 
Dr. Julio da Fonte (through his tenant) an 
alignment. 
Albino Jorge Correia in Viariz da Santa for 
cultivation. 
Land for a water captation in Carvalhal de Baixo. 
Anibal Augusto Diniz in Viariz da Santa for a 
house and a garden. 
Albino Barria Maio from Pepe, alignment. 
Dr. dos Santos from Balsa, alignment with a 
property in Viariz da Poca. 
Joaquim Ribeiro Peixoto from Pereiro 
Brush (torgo) on a baldio called Monte de 
Nogueiras; the text seems to refer only to the 
heather, but because of the price and because one of 
the conditions is the cleaning of the land for 
cultivation in order to meet a conditions set by the 
JCI, I assume that the land was sold as well. 
Manuel Diniz Machedo, alignment. 
Manuel Joao Paredes from Viariz da Santa. 
Parts of the Lagoa de Pepe; the buyers were at least 
14 proprietdrios. 
Landowner and merchant from Pousada. 
For the construction of a Casa do Povo. 
'public sale' to the mining company Vicominas for 
the construction of dwellings for its labourers, a 
bairro operdrio. 
Traz do Vale, for the construction of a house. 
Alberto Barria Maio, Joaquim Jorge Alexandre and 
another unknown proprietdrio buy parts of 0.78 ha, 
0.345 ha, and 1.035 ha respectively of Carqueijedo 
and Chao Velho in Avecaozinho at a public sale. 
Lagoa de Pepe, by Alberto Barria Maio, 
proprietdrio from Pepe. 
Alingment in Viariz da Poca. 
In Traz do Val & Viariz da Poca, housing. 
In Traz do Val, for housing. 
In Traz do Val, for housing. 
In Viariz da Poca, for housing. 
Proprietdrio from Pepe, Tapada Nova. 
In Traz do Val. 
Jornaleiro from Viariz da Santa in Traz-do-Val. 
Exchange of leiras in Pepe for the building of a 
house for a man who had emigrated to Germany. 
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Date Area (m2) Price Description 
05-05-73 345 m 2 2587$00 People from the 'poorer classes' buying land in 
Traz do Val for the construction of a house. (Paid 
at the meeting!) 
01-07-73 500 m 2 7500$00 Public sale of baldio land in Viariz da Santa to 
somebody from Vila Real for housing. 
05-08-73 3*350 m 2 10500$00 Poor people (one emigrated) in Cotorinho, by 
baldio land for housing. 
02-09-73 310 m 2 3100$00 Traz do Vale, sale of land for a house for a man 
who was working in France. 
07-10-73 leira 0$00 Gift of a leira to a poor inhabitant of Pepe for 
housing. 
04-04-73 600 m 2 6000$00 Traz do Val for construction; conditions set by 
Camara Municipal. 
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Appendix 10: Review of Parish Income from the Exploitation 
and Alienation of Baldios in Comparison with The Parish 
Council's Income and Expenditures from 1927 until 1974 
Book-
vear Income 
1927 559$25 
1928 285$75 
T o t a l v a l u e s i n e s c u d o s 
Expenses Specification 
332$50 Last years balance: 328$20 
Taxas of use baldios: 46$00 
Fines related to baldios: 2$50 
Privatizations: 10$00 
Specified: 386$70 
98$20 Last years balance: 226$75 
Taxes over use baldio: 40$00 
Specified: 266$75 
'28/29 480$55 215$50 
'29/30 3138$05 311$80 
'30/31 3183$25 
Last years balance: 187$55 
Taxas: 80$00 
Fines: 4$00 
Sales from fruits of baldios: 20$00 
Privatizations: 152$00 
Specified: 443$50 
last years balance: 265$05 
Money for forestation: 2165$00 
Fines: 30$00 
Privatization: 502$00 
Specified: 2962$05 
396$60 Last years balance: 2826$25 
Taxas 12$00 
Fines: 125$00 
Privatizations: 106$00 
Specified: 3069$25 
'31/32 3375$15 1208$50 
'32/35 2376$25 
Last year's balance: 2786$65 
Taxas: 0$00 
Fines: 2$50 
Privatizations: 35$00 
Specified: 2824$15 
729$00 Last year's balance: 2071$65 
Taxas: 0$00 
Privatizations: 100$00 
Specified: 2171$65 
01 
69 
% (see below) 
Qà fil m 
57 83 17 
93 79 100 0 
92 39 41 59 
94 8 81 19 
96 89 56 44 
84 83 7 93 
91 87 0 100 
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Book-
vear 
'35/36 
Income 
2557$25 
until 
1-1-37 
1937 
1939 
1941 
389$65 
740$15 
T o t a l v a l u e s i n e s c u d o s % (see below) 
Expenses Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
2167$60 Last year's balance: 1647$25 99 64 44 0 
Taxas: 0$00 
Sale of torgo (heather): 390$00 
Subsidy Câmara Municipal: 500$00 
Specified: 2537$25 
265$00 
544$30 
Last year's balance: 389$65 100 100 0 
Specified: 389$65 
0 
Last year's balance: 124$65 
Taxas: 190$00 
Fines: 80$00 
Privatizations: 50$00 
Specified: 444$65 
1938 1107$35 1063S45 Last year's balance: 95$85 
Taxas: 536$0O 
Fines: 10$25 
Sale of torgo (heather): 108$00 
Sale of estrume (brush/dung) of Feira: 31$00 
Specified: 808$ 10 
455$80 307$50 Last year's balance: 43$90 
Taxas: 179$50 
Specified: 223$40 
1940 1031$80 920$90 Last year's balance: 148$30 
Taxas: 268$00 
Fines: 2$50 
Subsidy from Cdntara Municipal: 350$00 
Specified: 768$80 
611$40 580$50 
1942 1700$40 1057$05 
Last year's balance: 110$90 
Taxas: 101$00 
Specified: 211$90 
Last year's balance: 30$90 
Taxas: 144$50 
Fines on baldios: 55$75 
Other fines: 30$00 
Sale of fruits baldios: 94$00 
Specified: 355$15 
60 17 84 16 
73 9 100 0 
49 10 100 0 
75 14 33 0 
35 18 100 0 
21 2 91 
332 Planting Power 
Book- T o t a l v a l u e s i n e s c u d o s % (see below) 
year Income Expenses Specification £1} {31 {4} 
1943 3056$35 1606$20 Last year's balance: 643$35 76 21 84 13 
Taxas: 267$00 
Fines: 93$50 
Rent part of arable baldio: 1000$00 
Sale fruits from baldios: 40$00 
Privatizations: 220$00 
Subsidy Cûmara Municipal: 50$00 
Specified: 2313$85 
1944 5113$15 3648$00 Last year's balance: 1450$15 77 28 94 6 
Taxas: 326$00 
Rent from baldios: 2000$00 
Privatizations: 150$00 
Specified: 3926$15 
1945 6072$65 5665$30 Last year's balance: 1467$15 65 24 66 34 
Taxas: 623$00 
Sale of fruit from baldios: 623$00 
Rent from baldios: 600$00 
Fines: 170$50 
Privatizations: 840$00 
Specified: 3952$65 
1946 1823$68 1124$30 Last year's balance: 407$35 78 22 100 0 
Taxas: 40$00 
Licenses of sheep and goats: 675$50 
Sale of brushes (estrume): 301$00 
Specified: 1423$85 
1947 1475$28 1190$50 Last year's balance: 699$38 55 47 86 0 
Taxas: 40$00 
Auction of one leira of brush: 30$00 
Licenses of sheep and goats: 568$30 
Unknown: 16$50 
Specified: 815$88 
1948 22091$58 18080$90 Last year's balance: 284$78 79 1 2 98 
Taxas: 310$00 
Fines: 83$00 
Sale of Torgo' a: 16771$00 
Specified: 17448$78 
1949 4615$68 3506$20 Last year's balance: 4010$68 98 87 100 0 
Taxas: 450$00 
Fines: 85$00 
Specified: 4545$68 
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Book- T o t a l v a l u e s i n e s c u d o s % (see below) 
Year Income Expenses Specification {1) {2} {3} (4) 
1950 32121$48 31835$50 Last year's balance: 1109$48 24 3 0 100 
Taxas: 0$00 
Privatizations (glebas): 6451$00 
Specified: 7560$48 
1951 2594$68 2114$70 Last year's balance: 286$18 52 11 28 3 
Fines: 200$00 
Sales of fruits from baldios (estrume): 102$00 
Privatizations (gleba): 35$00 
Subsidy Câmara Municipal: 728$00 
Specified: 1351$18 
1952 2689$48 1824$00 Last year's balance: 479$98 56 18 76 0 
Taxas: 10$00 
Licences for sheep and goats: 671$00 
Fines (not related with baldios): 20$00 
Subsidy Câmara Municipal: 230$00 
Specified: 1503$98 
1953 2371$48 1465$65 Last year's balance: 865$48 91 36 98 0 
Taxas: 103$00 
Licences sheep, goats and bovines: 856$00 
Sale of pines: 315$00 
Fines (not related with baldios): 25$00 
Specified: 2161$48 
1954 4859$63 2226$20 Last year's balance: 906$48 51 19 49 5 
Licences for goats, sheep and bovines: 639$50 
Fines: 31$00 
Fines (not related with baldios): 30$00 
Privatizations: 80$00 
Specified: 2414$98 
1960 78527$00 4859$00 Last year's balance: 65462$00 85 83 100 0 
Sale of fruits from baldios: 1135$00 
Fines: 30$00 
Specified: 66627$00 
1961 133844$10 17503$20 Last year's balance: 73668$00 93 55 1 94 
Sale of fruits from baldios: 350$00 
Privatizations: 46883$00 
Subsidy from C&mara Municipal: 3000$00 
Specified: 123901$00 
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Book- T o t a l 
vear Income Expenses 
1962 125513$20 81979$70 
v a l u e s i n e s c u d o s 
Specification 
Last year's balance: 116340$90 
Fines: 600$00 
Income from grazings: 200$00 
1963 72098$10 63539$50 Last year's balance: 43583$50 
Rent (Lagoa de Pepe) 5267$00 
Privatizations: 18350$00 
Specified: 672005$50 
1964 25829$80 10088$40 Last year's balance: 8538$60 
Fruits from baldios: 1070$00 
Specified: 8608$760 
1965 
1966 379752$60 13240$70 Last year's balance: ?? 
Privatizations (sale Lagoa de Pepe): 360150$00 
Sale of brush: 340$00 
Fines: 585$00 
Gifts: 1677$00 
Specified: 362752$00 
1967 380716$20 16925$50 Last year's balance: 366427$90 
Sale of brush: 700$00 
Privatizations (incl. glebas): 4545$08 
Specified: 371672$98 
1968 389I16$60 15343$40 
1969 388295$15 85088$35 
1970 319987$90 244626$90 
Last year's balance: 363790$70 
Last year's balance: 374273$40 
Last year's balance: 303206$30 
Sale of firewood: 100$00 
Privatizations: 1080$00 
Specified: 3043863$00 
1971 
1972 37312$70 13789$20 Last year's balance: 6468$20 
Privatizations: 1875$00 
Specified: 8343$20 
1973 85407$50 63432$40 Last year's balance: 23523$50 
Sale of fruits from baldios: 8573$00 
Privatizations: 29687$00 
Specified: 61783$50 
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Remarks 
(1) Percentage of the income covered by the specification in this appendix. 
(2) Percentage of the income covered by the last year's balance. 
(3) Percentage of the specified income realized in a financial year (i.e. minus the last 
year's balance) originating from 'rents' of baldios disregarding whether after the JCI's 
intervention they had been transferred to the parish council's private domain or whether 
they had remained within its public domain. 
(3) Percentage of the specified income realized in a financial year (i.e. minus the last 
year's balance) originating from the sales of baldio land. 
Comparison with coeval data demonstrates that during the Estado Novo the parish 
councils were hardly equipped with financial means. In 1930, parish council budget 
amounted 3183$25 as a result of the 2165$00 the inhabitants had contributed for 
afforestation. Its expenditures amounted circa 400$00. In the same year, the municipal 
authorities could spend 543,000$00, of which 80,000$00 was distributed over the 26 
rural parishes (ANTdT, Arquivo Salazar, AOS/CO/IN-2A). In 1937, the parish council 
spent 740$15. In that year, the salary of the president of the Internal Resettlement Board 
(JCI) was 4,000$00 (DL 27,207 16-11-1936). 
Between 1955 and 1958 there are no minutes available and the information for 1959 is 
incomplete. However, the part of the records about the sale of Lagoa de Pepe have been 
kept seperately. These records show that in 1957 the parish council raised 33490$00 by 
sale of parts of the Lagoa de Pepe, and in addition raised 30500$00 by a six years lease 
of the remainder of the Lagoa; these arrangements together (value: 63990$00) probably 
explain most of the 1959 balance of 65462$00 (98%, of which 53% by privatization and 
47% by rent). 
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Appendix 11: proposal for a New Legal Status of the Commons 
as Elaborated by the Forestry Service on 15 November 1974 
and Presented to the Population in December 1974 
Preamble 
The mountain population's economy had as an essential support the baldios where 
under difficult conditions grain could be cultivated, cattle could be grazed, the pastures 
were rejuveniled by burning, and brush was cut. These activities were executed without 
any rule and in the majority of the cases provoked accelerated impoverishment of soil, 
flora and fauna. 
With the execution of the Piano de Povoamento Florestal on the baldios, which 
were obligatory submitted to the partial forestry regime, the mountain economy was 
forcefully shocked because, inevitably, in the face of the pronounced environmental 
degradation which had previously occurred, the benefits resulting from the Forestry 
Service's acting compensated only part of the prejudices caused by the forestry 
intervention. 
However, in a impartial balance one will have to recognize that the material 
prejudices were not as high as has been claimed. But nobody will dare to deny that there 
have been psychological, sometimes really dramatic, traumas. 
Today it becomes easy to comprehend that the principal fault of the Piano de 
Povoamento Florestal was that it was not integrated in whatever regional or local policy. 
In fact, it was restricted to activities in the field of territorial planning, and only very 
marginally identified with the social problems it was going to determine. 
Lei 1971 of 15-6-1938 was written in very general terms, at times imprecise or even 
contradictory: certain clauses allow for wider interpretations, while others put on an 
extremely rigid corset. Perhaps for these motives, it has been never possible to promote 
its regulation, which passing the years has obviously conveyed successive and inevitable 
difficulties. 
The law is particularly unsatisfactory with respect to the definition of the relations 
between the Forestry Service and the local authorities and it is absolutely impracticable 
concerning the division of the revenues between the state and the administrative bodies. 
Under these conditions the complete revision of the law of concern and the 
promulgation of a new legal statement capable of solving the pending problems impose 
themself. 
Attempts have been made to see that the new text takes into consideration the 
aspirations of the village communities participating in the administration of the baldios 
and that it defends their legitimate interests in a concrete and dynamic way. 
The indicated spectre of options is large because the role of the state can vary 
between the simple preparation of projects and the superintendence of undertakings, and 
the direct administration of particularly those baldios which have been classified as 
reserves or protection zones or zones producing predominantly services of collective 
interest. 
And, if it is decided to maintain state intervention in a certain case, this is done 
because of imperatives of a geographical nature. The majority of the baldios are located 
in areas that are extremely sensible to destructive activities by erosive agencies. For the 
rest, as soon as the circumstances make it necessary, expansion of the obligatory forestry 
intervention zone is foreseen, — this is, the subordination of the utilization of the soil 
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and vegetation to state inspection - in the entire territory, whatever be its juridical 
status, in case the physical implications recommend so. 
Art. 1 
1. The baldios are areas collectively used by a community, according to consuetudinary 
rights and unsusceptible to individual appropriation. 
2. Any parcel of a baldio can only pass to public or private property through 
acknowledgement by the Government, in request of the interested local 
administrative body, if the majority of its legitimate users agrees. 
Art. 2 
1. The reserves decreed legally in terms of nr. 4 of article 173 of Decreto-Lei 27207 of 
16-11-1936 concerning the destiny of the baldios are revoked. 
2. The appropriation of baldios, done in any form and under any tide since 28-5-1926, 
can be declared nullius and without any effect, by force of a judicial action by the 
Public Prosecutor in request of the interested local administrative body as the 
mandate holder of the legitimate users of the baldios. 
Art. 3 
1. The communal lands with silvo-pastoral aptitudes are obligatory grouped in 
conveniently sized intervention units submitted to utilization forms according to the 
norms established in this law. 
2. The Direcgao-Geral dos Servigos Florestais e Aqulcolas will immediately proceed 
with the revision of the afforestation and forest management plans in order to adapt 
these to the present conjuncture, bearing in mind the reconciliation of local and 
regional interests with those of the Country. 
Art. 4 
The legitimate users of baldios of one or more communities will have the faculty of 
organizing themselves in associations for the defense of their interests and the 
participation in the management of the intervention units. The relations of these 
associations with the administrative bodies will be object of Government legislation. 
Art. 5 
Each intervention unit of baldios with silvo-pastoral aptitude can be administered 
according to one of the following modes, to be chosen by the interested village 
communities: 
a) by the village communities through users' associations; 
b) by representatives of the village communities and of the State; 
c) by the State. 
Art. 6 
1. The administration of baldios by village communities is executed by means of a 
Management Commission in which will be represented all communities interested in 
the areas that constitute an intervention unit defined in the respective project, with 
legal personality and responsible in front of the State Secretary of Agriculture 
according to the norms established in this law. 
2. It is incumbent on the commission to: 
338 Planting Power 
a) look after the safeguarding of the rights and regalia of the village communities; 
b) resolve problems derived from the delimitation of baldios, use and captation of 
water, exploration of rocks, gravel and minerals, use of communal grazings 
foreseen in the project, resorting to the Permanent Arbitration Commission 
foreseen in this law, ever when necessary; 
c) resolve problems caused by the existence of private property engraved in or 
bordering on the baldio; 
d) promote relations with administrative bodies; 
e) mandate, in the terms of nr 2 of article 2, local authorities to start processes for 
the recuperation of baldios; 
f) direct the application of funds for the concretization of plans; 
g) elaborate budgets for the application of rents and revenues and submit these for 
approval to the intervening associations; 
h) establish exploitation norms for improved pastures; 
j) resolve minor problems related to the execution of approved projects and plans. 
3. After approval by competent entities and subject to superintendence it is also 
incumbent to the management commission to: 
a) elaborate annual working programmes related to the installation and management 
of tree stands, the construction and conservation of infrastructures, the 
improvement of pastures, game management and pisciculture; 
b) request credits for the implementation of working programmes; 
c) promote the execution of tasks necessary for the implementation of the utilization 
plans; 
d) promote the sale of the products of the exploitation. 
4. The Management Commission is responsible for paying the state the amortization of 
investments already made for the afforestation, depositing in the financial 
departments the value equal to three per cent of the gross revenues of the sale of 
woody material until the end of the exploration. 
Revenues generated by the sale of woody material from stands installed before the 
date of submission to the forestry regime are free from the payment of any 
percentage to the State. 
Art. 7 
1. The administration of baldios by representatives of the village communities and the 
state is done by means of a Management Commission in which are represented the 
communities that are interested in the areas constituting the intervention unit in the 
respective project and the State with legal personality and responsible in front of the 
Secretary of State of Agriculture for the compliance with the norms established in 
this law, in particular with respect to the competencies attributed through the 
numbers 2 and 3 of article 6. 
The representatives of the village communities are elected by the users' associations 
or by representatives of the administrative bodies of the respective administrative 
units in the case the associations do not exist or when these delegate this task to the 
former. 
The representatives of the state are proposed by the Direcgao-Geral dos Servicos 
Florestais e Aqutcolas and appointed by the Secretary of State of Agriculture. 
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2. It is essentially incumbent to the representatives of the State to support and promote 
the execution of the tasks mentioned in the sections f), i), and j) of nr 2 and a), b), 
and d) of nr 3 of article 6 of this law. 
3. For the calculation of the rents and revenues and their distribution, the Direcgao-
Geral dos Servigos Florestais e Aquicolas will define in each nucleus the following 
strata: 
A young stands in which management interventions do not result in marketable 
products; 
B stand in the age of exploitation or in full growth, in which management 
intervention generates products with commercial value; 
C stands with as their mean function the production of services: protection of 
recreation; 
D unforested areas which are in need of protection. 
4. The State will pay a rent for the following areas: 
a) Areas included in section A of the previous number, starting from the year 
following the start of the installation works of the stand. The rent is calculated 
according to the potential value of the soil from the perspectives of its use for 
forestry and the locally dominant species. The rent is paid as advance to the 
future revenues and amortized when these stands become included in the stratum 
defined in section B. 
b) The rent of areas included in the stratum defined in section C is calculated on the 
basis of the revenues obtained if the exploitation were solely directed to wood 
production. 
c) The rent of areas included in the stratum defined in section D is calculated in 
accordance with previous utilizations. 
The appraisals for the calculation of these rents are executed by technicians of the 
state and by delegates of the Management Commission, and are subject to periodical 
revision. 
5. Of the revenues obtained by the exploitation of forest stands that constitute the 
stratum defined in section B of number 3 of this article the users' association will 
receive: 
a) 60% of the gross revenues from the sales of trees of thinnings and final cuts; 
b) 60% of the gross revenues from sales of trees of extraordinary fellings; 
c) 80% of the gross revenues from sales of thinnings, extraordinary and final cuts of 
stands existing previously to the date of submission to the forestry regime; 
d) the value of this percentages will be revised periodically. 
6. The users' associations receive the net revenue of the other products, resin and other 
secondary products, improved pasture, quarries, gravel-pits or the exploitation of 
minerals, game, fish and other additional products. 
7. The surpluses of gross revenues which are not distributed in the terms of number 5 
of this article, are deposited in the State Treasury except for those referred to in 
section b which will be used to support the respective burdens. 
Art. 8 
1. The administration of the baldios included in intervention areas is the exclusive 
responsibility of the State in the cases that the village communities are not interested 
in any of the modalities foreseen in the articles 6 and 7. 
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2. The administration of baldios not included in intervention units managed in the terms 
of article 7 is obligatory the responsibility of the State when, in harmony with the 
Ordenamento do Territôrio, these baldios are classified as reserve or protection zones 
of as zones predominantly producing services of collective interest. 
3. The rents paid to the village communities by the State will be: 
a) under the conditions foreseen in nr 1 of this article a percentage of the gross 
revenues from sales of primary, secondary and additional products, which is 
calculated for each case according to the conditions of the tenancy, always 
augmented by the rent foreseen in section a) of nr 4 of article 7 in the terms 
established there; 
b) under the conditions foreseen in nr 2 of this article the rents defined in the 
sections b) or c) of article 7. 
4. The state obliges itself to rigorously pay attention to the existing geographic and 
sociological conditions, to respect the consuetudinary rights of the village 
communities, without neglecting the directories imposed by a forest policy defined 
for the totality of the territory, while creating and defending the agro-silvo-pastoral 
equilibrium which is particularly relevant for the restoration and protection of the 
environment. 
Art. 9 
1. All privately owned areas with silvo-pastoral aptitude, afforested or not, which are 
located in areas included in intervention areas as referred to in the articles 6 and 7 
can be integrated in these areas for management reasons. 
2. The owners of the areas to which apply the conditions mentioned in the previous 
number have to create production cooperatives and have to agree with the 
management commission of the intervention units or with the State about the terms 
and process of joint administration. 
Art. 10 
In order to resolve possible disputes about land limits or divisions of revenues, in each 
intervention unit a Arbitration Commission will be created which is constituted by 
representatives of the users' association of the parishes, of the Câmaras Municipals and a 
representative of the State without the right to vote. 
Art. 11 
1. The law obliges the publication of new decrees which rectify old decrees of the 
submission to the partial forestry regime and in which are explicitly established the 
norms to be applied to baldios included in each intervention unit. These decrees have 
to contemplate the entire intervention unit which means that one has to wait until 
agreement has been achieved among all interested entities. 
2. In the decrees will be considered the following: 
a) the characterization of the baldio and an indication of the communities that 
usufruct it; 
b) definition of the traditional rights and regalia of the village communities; 
c) administration modality of the silvo-pastoral intervention unit; 
d) approval of the respective management project; 
e) creation of the Management Commission and the Arbitration Commission. 
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Art. 12 
The service of forestry development and exploitation and of the protection of the public 
and private silvo-pastoral patrimonium is incumbent to a corps of specialized guards and 
to the administrative staff necessary for its functioning. 
Art. 13 
The burden resulting from the application of the norms of this law for the modalities 
foreseen in the articles 7 and 8 will be supported by the General Budget of the State. 
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Appendix 12: Decreto-Lei n.° 39/76 of 19 January 1976 
The handing over the baldios to the communities which were robbed of them by the 
fascist State corresponds to an old and continuous demand of the village communities 
(povos) and will concretize intentions which have been repeatedly announced by the 
various Governments that have followed after 25 April 1974. 
At the moment that one puts in practice the foundations of a agrarian reform policy 
directed towards necessary social goals - destruction of the power of the large farmers 
and of the various mechanisms by which this power is affirmed; support to the small 
farmers and agrarian workers; stimulation of local and direct forms of expression and 
democratic organization which permit the rural workers to increase their control over the 
productive process and natural resources - , it becomes important to ensure that the 
transfer of the baldios is integrated in the framework of that policy. 
In this way, one has tried to concretely associate the institutionalization of local 
democratic organisation to the restitution of the baldios. To these organisations are 
acknowledged vast decision making powers and wide responsibilities in the choose of the 
model of admfoistration. And one has also adopted a more open and anti-bureaucratic 
orientation, through the admission of an independent form of administration in which the 
limits set to the competencies of the local assemblies are reduced to a minimum. 
In the cadre of this law, the numerous questions following the appropriation of 
baldios by private individuals have remained to be resolved. The varieties of situations 
and beneficiaries and the complexity of the factors with which one has to work, in some 
cases decades have past since these areas were appropriated, make that this material has 
been left for a later law text, in order to be able to have the local assemblies which in 
the mean time have been created through this law look after these problems themselves. 
In these terms, using the faculties conferred by article 3, nr 1 section 3 of the 
Constitutional law n° 6/75 in order to make value as law, the following: 
Art. 1 
Land tracts used and fruited communally by inhabitants of a certain parish or parishes or 
part of it are called baldios. 
Art. 2 
Baldios are excluded from commercial law; they cannot be object as a whole or in part 
or any form of private appropriation by whatever form or title, including usucaption. 
Art. 3 
In the terms of this law are returned to the use, usufruct and administration of the 
respective commoners the baldios submitted to the forestry regime according to nr 4 of 
article 173 of Decreto-Lei 27207 of 16 November 1936, to which the Junta da 
Colonizagao has not attributed a destination or exploitation. 
Art. 4 
Commoners of baldios are the inhabitants who execute their activities in the locality and 
who according to the usages and costumes recognized by the community have the right 
to its fruits. 
Appendices 343 
Art. 5 
1. The commoners have equal rights to use and fruits of the baidios. 
2. In order to facilitate the implementation of the disposition of the previous number, 
the services of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries can elaborate projects for 
regulating of the use and usufruct of the various types of baidios which will serve as 
a basis for the work of the commoners' assemblies in harmony with the terms of 
section a) of the next article. 
Art. 6 
The commoners are obliged to constitute an assembly to which it is incumbent to: 
a) Regulate and discipline the use and usufruct of the baldio; 
b) Decide about the form of administration; 
c) Elect and demit a management commission or the members elected to it, depending 
on the selected form of administration; 
d) Discuss and approve the plan of utilization of the resources of the baldio and the 
application of the revenues; 
e) Superintend the activities of the management commission. 
f) Discuss and vote the report and financial account of the management commission. 
g) Decide about the appeals made against decisions of the management commission. 
h) Deliberate about the resort to credits; 
i) Establish the criteria for sales and yielding of products; 
j) Deliberate about the litigation of any judicial act to the benefit of the community , in 
particular those that are aimed at the recuperation of baidios which have been 
illegally occupied or passed into private property; 
k) Resolve, upon proposal of the management commission, question related to the 
delimitation of baidios, their occupation for hydrological exploitation, the existence 
of private property bordering on or enclosed in baidios, the exploration of rocks, 
gravel and minerals, the exploitation of water captations, and the regulating of 
grazing and use of the communal lands; 
1) Assure in general the defense of the communitarian interests. 
Art. 7 
The assembly's presidium (mesa) will be composed by a president and two secretaries, 
who are elected during the assemblies first meeting. It is incumbent to the president to 
direct the assembly's proceeding. 
Art. 8 
Entitled to summon an assembly always with a minimal of five days before hand are: 
a) The management commission; 
b) Ten or more commoners; 
Art. 9 
The baidios can be administered in one of the next forms, to be selected by the 
commoners' assembly: 
a) Exclusively by the commoners through a management commission composed of five 
commoners who are elected by the assembly. 
344 Planting Power 
b) The commoners in association with the State, through a management commission 
composed of four commoners elected by the assembly and one representative of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
Art. 10 
1. Commoners holding the right to vote according to general legislation can be elected 
to the management commission. 
2. The mandates of the members elected to the management commission are three 
years. Incumbents cannot be reelected for the next three years term. 
Art. 11 
It is incumbent to the management commission to administer the baldio in the terms and 
within the limits defined in the following articles: 
a) Look after the observance of the baldio regulation; 
b) Execute the assembly's decisions and considerations; 
c) Effectuate the ceding of products according to the criteria established by the 
assembly; 
d) Present to the assembly a report and financial account of its activity; 
e) Propose to the assembly a plan for the application of revenues; 
f) Look after the contacts between the assembly, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries and other public entities; 
g) Represent the commoners if mandated by the assembly; 
h) Summon the commoners' assembly, look after the elaboration of minutes and the 
execution of all administrative work; 
i) Elaborate yearly and maintain up-to-date the register of the baldio's commoners 
according to the terms of article 4 and proceed to its placarding. The management 
commission is entitled to ask for the collaboration of the parish councils, Câmaras 
Municipals and the regional services of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
Art. 12 
In the cases in which the commoners' assembly chooses the administration modality 
foreseen in section a) of article 9: 
a) The management commission has the full powers of administration of the baldio, 
without prejudice of the disposition in the next section; 
b) The State, through the competent services of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries, assures the necessary technical support, proposes and looks after the 
observance of the plan for the utilization of the resources and verifies the application 
of convenient techniques for the installation and management of tree stands. 
Art. 13 
In the cases in which the commoners' assembly chooses the administration modality 
foreseen in section b) of article 9: 
a) The management commission will exercise the administrative powers which are not 
included or prejudiced by the dispositions in the next section; 
b) It is incumbent to the State, through the respective services of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries to manage the forests after having discussed and approved 
the plan for the utilization of resources: 
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The execution of annual working programmes related to the installation, management 
and exploitation of tree stands, the construction and maintenance of infrastructures, 
the improvement and exploration of pastures, game and fisheries and the exploitation 
of the other existing resources; 
Manage the application of funds, arrange credits for the concretization of the plans 
and execute the sale of products; 
Direct the forest personnel; 
Inform the management commission in all cases that this is requested about the 
management of the forest patrimony; 
Present the reports and financial accounts of its activities. 
Art. 14 
Interested persons may always appeal the acts and decisions of the management 
commission with the commoners' assembly. 
Art. 15 
The compensation for the costs supported by the State in the afforestation and 
management of the forest patrimony will be done according to the form defined in the 
next sections: 
a) In the case the commoners' assembly has chosen for the administration modality 
foreseen in section a) of article 9, the management commission will deposit to the 
State 30% of all gross revenues obtained by the sale of wood produced at fellings in 
stands installed by the state; 
b) In the case the commoners' assembly has chosen for the administration modality 
foreseen in section b) of article 9 the State will collect 40% of the gross revenues 
obtained by the sale of wood coming from fellings in stands installed by the state and 
20% of the gross revenues obtained by the sale from wood coming from fellings in 
naturally regenerated stands or stands that existed already before the date of 
submission to the forestry regime. The remainder is made available to the 
management commission; 
c) In the case the commoners' assembly has chosen for the administration modality 
foreseen in section b) of article 9 and if the commoners' assembly decides so the 
distribution system established in the previous section can be substituted for an 
annual rent accorded by the State. The State will make the rent available to the 
management commission one year after the start of the afforestation. 
d) If in baldios areas classified as reserves, protection or producers of services to the 
public interest exist, the State will pay an annual rent accorded by the management 
commission independetly from the chosen administration modality. 
Art. 16 
The choice of one the administration modalities foreseen in article 9 can be changed if 
the commoners' assembly decides to do so through an agreement with the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, which will include the restitution of anticipated revenues, in 
particular those related to the application of the previous article. 
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Art. 17 
1. The deliberation of the commoners' assembly which approves the annual plan for the 
application of revenues cannot be executed if the Governo Civil and the regional 
services of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries have not homologated it. 
2. The homologation is conceded if after twenty days after having received the minutes 
of the meeting in which this deliberation is made, no message of the opposite has 
been emitted. 
Art. 18 
1. The transfer of the use, usufruct and administration of the baldios to the commoners 
has to be executed in each case separately through the reception at the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries of an authentic copy of the minutes of the meeting of 
meetings of the commoners' assembly in which the administration form is chosen 
and the members of the management commission are elected. 
2. Hereto the parish councils in cooperation with the regional services of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Câmaras Municipals have elaborate and placate 
in the customary sites a provisional list of the commoners of each baldio according 
to the determinations in article 4 within sixty days after the promulgation of this law. 
3. The entities mentioned in the previous number have to look after the convocation of 
the commoners' assembly. 
4. The choice of the administration form and the election of the management 
commission can only be effectively valid if the assembly is attended by at least 50% 
of the commoners included in the provisional list. 
Art. 19 
If the baldios are not restored according to the terms foreseen in the previous article, 
60% of the revenues of the sales of the products of the exploitation of tree stands 
installed by the state and 80% of those coming from existing or spontaneous stands will 
be provisionally transferred to the local authorities. 
Art. 20 
The norms that will appear necessary for the execution of this law will be established 
through portaria of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, the Ministry of Finances 
and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (redaction 12 March 1976). 
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Appendix 13: Lei 68/93 of 4 September 1993 
Chapter 1. General Dispositions. 
Art. 1: Concepts 
1. Baldios are terrains possessed and managed by local communities. 
2. For the effect of this present law, a local community is the universe of commoners 
[compartes]. 
3. Commoners [compartes] are the inhabitants of one or more parishes or a part of 
these who, according to uses and custom, have the right to the use and usufruct of 
the baldio. 
Art. 2: The sphere of action 
1. The dispositions of the present law are applicable to the baldios, even if these consist 
of discontinuous areas, in particular of they satisfy the following conditions: 
a. Grounds considered baldios and as such communally possessed and managed by 
the inhabitants of one or more parishes or part of these, even if these grounds 
occasionally are not the object, entirely or partly, of exploitation by these 
inhabitants, or if the lawfully constituted organs for the baldios' administration 
are lacking. 
b. Grounds which can be used by a local community, but which, being previously 
used and exploited as baldios, were submitted to the forestry regime or to a non-
used reservation under the conditions of Decreto-Lei 27,207 dd. 16-11-1936, and 
of Lei 2,069 dd. 24-4-1954, and were not yet returned [to the population] under 
the conditions of Decreto-Lei 39/76 dd. 19 January. 
c. Grounds which have been occupied by private individuals, even if later 
transferred, to which the dispositions of Decreto-Lei 40/76 of 19 January can be 
applied. 
d. Grounds which can be used by a local community and which have been licidy 
occupied by such a community and which have been included in that community's 
communal area [logradouro comum]. 
2. The dispositions of this present law are applied with the necessary adaptations and in 
the terms which still have to be defined, to other communal equipments, such as 
threshing floors, ovens, and mills, which are used and exploited and managed by a 
local community. 
Art. 3: Objectives. 
The baldios constitute, normally, a communal resource (logradouro comum), in 
particular for the grazing of cattle, the collection of fuel wood or brush, for cultivation 
and other forms of exploitation videlicet of a agricultural, silvicultural or apicultural 
nature. 
Art. 4: Appropriation. 
1. The acts or negotiations of appropriation of baldios, and the successive transmission 
are void in terms of the law, except for in the cases which are explicitly mentioned 
by this present law. 
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2. The declaration of invalidity can be required by the Public Ministry, by a 
representative of the central, the regional and the local administrative authorities, by 
the organs managing the baldio, or by any commoner. 
3. The entities referred to in the previous number also have the legitimate power to 
require the baldio's restitution, in all or in part, to the respective community or 
entity which legitimately exploits the baldio. 
Chapter 2. Use and Exploitation. 
Art. 5: General rule. 
1. The baldios are used and exploited according to the deliberations of the competent 
organs of the commoners, or, in the case these organs do not exist, in harmony with 
the usages and traditions, as far as the following articles allow. 
2. It is assured that all commoners enjoy and exercise equal rights with respect to the 
use and exploitation of the baldio. 
Art. 6: Exploitation plan. 
1. The baldios are used and exploited according to 'exploitation plans' which are 
approved and actualized in harmony with this present law, except for tradition or 
decision to the contrary by the commoners, in particular in the case of baldios of a 
small dimension. 
2. The 'exploitation plans' have to be elaborated in direct cooperation with the 
adnuhistrative entities which superintend spatial planning and the defense of the 
environment; the present law obliges these entities to cooperate. 
Art. 7: Objectives and sphere of action 
1. The objectives of the 'exploitation plans' are the programming of the rational 
exploitation of the effective and potential natural resources in coordination with 
social-economic and environmental demands and policies at the local, regional and 
national levels. 
2. The 'exploitation plans' can concern only one baldio or a group of baldios, either 
close to each other or far from each other, which are susceptible to the construction 
of planning units, in particular because of the demands of scale set by the 
development of multiple and integrated uses, by the necessary infrastructure, or by 
economies of scale with respect to the acquisition and utilization of equipment. 
3. In the case envisaged in the previous number, the management regime will be 
adapted, in particular by recurring to the figure of 'joint management'. 
Art. 8: Standard 'exploitation plans' 
1. The competent services of the Public Administration, elaborate on proposals for 
standard 'exploitation plans' which are suitable for specific situations. The 
formulation of these plans does not discharge them of the service's obligation to 
cooperate with the commoners as defined in number 2 of article 6. 
2. The standard 'exploitation plans' are elaborated on the basis of the technical 
expertise of the services and the experience of the commoners' representative bodies. 
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Art. 9: Cooperation with the public services. 
In the cases that the execution of the exploitation plans requires continuous cooperation 
of the specialized public services and the local communities, the plans have to contain 
rules which regulate that cooperation. 
Art. 10: Cessation of the exploitation of baldios 
1. It is possible to discontinue the exploitation of an entire baidio or a part of a baldio, 
particularly on behalf of the development of forestry, except for the parts of a baidio 
which are suitable for agricultural exploitation. 
2. The assembly of commoners can decide to assign the exploitation of limited parts of 
such a baidio to the commoners for agricultural aims, if the principle of equal 
treatment of the proposed assignees is safeguarded. 
3. The cessation of the exploitation has to be implemented, without hurting the 
traditional utilization of baidio by the commoners as far as possible, and taking into 
account the environmental impact. 
4. The cessation of the exploitation according to the rules established in the previous 
numbers, can continue for periods until 20 years, which can be successively 
prolonged for the same period. 
Chapter 3. Organisation and Functioning 
Section 1. Management. 
Art. 11: The administration of the baldios 
1. The baldios are administered by their own right, by the respective commoners, 
according to the applicable usages and customs or, in the absence of these, by one or 
more democratically elected organs. 
2. The local communities organize themselves into an assembly of commoners, a 
management commission, and an auditing committee. 
3. The members of the presidium of the commoners' assembly, the management 
commission, and the auditing committee are elected for a period of two years. They 
can be reelected and stay in function if they are not replaced. 
Art. 12: Meetings 
1. Except for the cases which have been specially regulated by law, a meeting of the 
local community's organs is valid when a majority of its members is present. 
Decisions are made by a simple majority vote. The president has a qualified vote. 
2. Representatives of the local administrative bodies in whose area the baidio is located, 
or a representative of the Forestry Service - if the silvicultural administration baidio 
is superintended by this Service, are entitled to officially attend the meetings of these 
organs. These representatives are entitled to expose the standpoints of their 
respective groups, in particular with regard to issues which concern the general 
interest of the local population and are mentioned in the agenda of that meeting. 
These representatives do not have the right to vote. 
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Art. 13: Minutes 
1. The meetings of the community's organs are minuted. The minutes are read and 
approved and then signed by the presidium of the commoners' assembly, or by the 
members of the management commission or auditing committee. 
2. In case of well justified urgency, these organs may delegate the approval of the 
minutes. 
3. Only the minutes certify the discussions and decisions taken during the meeting. 
4. The minutes mentioned in the previous numbers can be freely consulted by anybody 
who is interested. 
Section 2. The Commoners' Assembly. 
Art. 14: Composition 
The commoners' assembly consists of all commoners. 
Art. 15: Powers. 
1. The commoners' assembly has the power to 
a. elect its presidium. 
b. elect and discharge the members of the management commission and the auditing 
committee. 
c. decide about to update the census of the commoners. 
d. regulate and discipline the use and exploitation of the baldio, after proposals by 
the management commission. 
e. discuss and approve the 'exploitation plan', after proposals by the management 
commission. 
f. decide on loans and set the limit to which the management commission is 
allowed to obtain a loan without requiring the assembly's approval. 
g. establish the preconditions for the commercialization of the fruits and products of 
the baldio. 
h. discuss and vote, if necessary with changes, the report and financial accounts of 
the management commission. 
i. discuss and vote, with the right to its modification, the way in which the 
management commission proposes to spend the revenues from the baldio. 
j . decide on the alienation or cessation of the exploitation of rights over baldios as 
regulated in this present law. 
1. decide on the delegation of administrative powers as determined in the articles 22 
and 23. 
m. superintend the activities of the management commission and the entities to 
which administrative powers have been delegated. 
n. decide on the appeals made against the acts of the management commission. 
o. ratify the appeal to the judge by the management commission, as well as the 
respective legal representation, in order to defend the community's rights and 
legitimate interests with regard to the respective baldio, in particular to defend 
the respective dominions, possession and usufruct against acts of occupation, 
demarcation and illegal exploitation or exploitation going against the tradition by 
which the baldios is administered and used. 
p. decide on the extinction of the baldio, in the terms of the present law and after 
hearing the management commission. 
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q. decide on all other affairs to the community's interest with regard to the baldio 
which are not the management commission's the proper competency. 
r. exercise the other powers which follow from the law, usages and custom, or 
contract. 
2. Decisions with respect to the sections j . , 1. and p. depend on a qualified majority of 
two thirds of the members present at the meeting. 
3. In case the management commission does not exist, the commoners' assembly 
assumes all powers. 
Art. 16: Composition of the presidium 
1. The presidium of the commoners' assembly consists of a president, a vice-president 
and two secretaries, who are elected by the commoners through a 'full list' system. 
2. The president represents the commoners" assembly, and chairs its meeting. 
Art. 17: Frequency of the assembly 
The commoners' assembly normally meets once a year, before March 31, in order to 
appreciate the issues mentioned in sections a., b., c , h., and i., of number 1 of article 
15. It meets extraordinarily ever when it be summoned. 
Article 18. Summoning 
1. The commoners' assembly is summoned according to the traditional rules, and, in 
case that these rules do not exist, summons is by public notices which are placed at 
the usual sites, and if necessary by an advertisement in the local press. 
2. The commoners assembly's meetings are summoned by the president of the 
presidium, by his or her own initiative, or at the request of the management 
commission or the auditing committee, or by 5% of the commoners. 
3. If the president does not summon a meeting within 15 days after the reception of a 
request, those who requested the meeting can summon it by themselves. 
4. The call for the meeting has to contain the day, the time and the locality in which the 
meeting is held, and the meetings agenda; it has to be made public at least 8 days in 
advance. 
5. In the case of urgency or lack of time and under the condition of ratification ex post, 
the commoners' assembly can delegate the composition of the agenda to the 
commoners commission as far as it does not concern the judgement of the 
commission's activities and its proposals. 
Art. 19: Functioning 
1. The assembly validly meets on the day and hour mentioned in the summoning, if a 
majority of the commoners is present. 
2. Sixty minutes after the hour indicated in the summoning, the assembly's meeting is 
valid if at least one-fifth of the commoners is present. 
3. In case the quorum mentioned in the previous number is not attained, the presidium's 
president will immediately call a new meeting within 5 to 14 days, which will 
function irrespectively of the number of commoners attending. 
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Section HI. Management Commission 
Art. 20: Composition 
1. The management commission consists of three, five or seven members, who are 
elected by the commoners' assembly from among its members through the 'full list' 
system. 
2. The management commission elects a president and a vice-president. 
3. The president represents the management commission, chairs the commission's 
meetings; in case of his absence he is substituted by the vice-president. 
4. The commission's ordinary members function as secretary and elaborate the minutes. 
5. It is possible to elect substitute members who replace members in the case of 
vacancies or absence. These substitutes are in the order of appearance on the list 
requested by the president. 
Art. 21: Powers 
The management commission has the power to 
a. execute the decisions taken by the commoners' assembly; 
b. propose the actualization of the census of commoners to the assembly; 
c. propose the instruments for the regulation and disciplining of the use and 
exploitation by the commoners of the baldios to the assembly; 
d. propose the plans for the exploitation of the resources in the baldto and the 
actualization of these plans to the assembly; 
e. approve and submit its report and accounts and its proposal for the application of 
the revenues to the assembly; 
f. propose to the assembly or give written advice about the proposals to alienate or 
cease the exploitation of the rights over the baldios, with the terms of the law; 
g. propose to the assembly or give a written advice about the proposals to delegate 
administrative powers, in the terms of the present law; 
h. tarn to the judge and constitute a mandatory for the defense of the rights and 
legitimate interests of the community with respect to the baldio and submit these 
acts to the commoners assembly for ratification; 
i. represent the universe of commoners in relations with public and private entities; 
j . execute in general all administrative acts in respect to the law, the usages and 
custom, and the applicable regulations; 
1. look after the execution of the regulations and the plans for the exploitation of 
the baldio's resources; 
m. look after the defense of the ecological values in the space of the baldio; 
n. propose to the president of the presidium the convocation of a commoners' 
assembly; 
o. exercise the other powers following from the law, usage, custom, regulation or 
convention. 
Art. 22: Powers of delegation 
1. The commoners can delegate their powers to administer the entire or part of the 
baldio, or one or more modalities of the exploitation of the baldio to the parish 
council in whose area the baldio is located, or to the service of the Public 
Administration which superintends the concerned modality or modalities of 
exploitation. 
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2. In case the area of the baldio of which the administration is delegated is located 
within the territorial limits of more than one parish, the delegation can be made to 
one or to the totality of the respective parish councils. 
3. When the number of parishes mentioned in the previous number is very huge, or 
when these parish are unable to cooperate, or when the baldio is relevant at the level 
of the municipality, the delegation mentioned above can be made to the respective 
municipal council. 
4. In the delegation contract the terms and conditions and in particular the rights and 
obligations related to the exercise of the delegated powers, are formalized. 
5. The delegation of powers foreseen in the previous numbers, as well as the 
contractual responsibilities which cover that delegation, can be revoked at any time 
within the general terms of the law. 
Art. 23: Delegation with preserve 
1. The commoners can delegate the powers foreseen in the previous article while 
preserving the co-exercise by the commoners of the effectively delegated powers, in 
a direct manner or indirectiy through their respective management organs. 
2. The regime of co-management which follows from the previous number will be 
object of agreement, in each separate case, while respecting the principle of 
contractual freedom. 
Section IV. Auditing Committee 
Art. 24: Composition 
1. The auditing committee consists of five elements, who are elected by the 
commoners' assembly among its members, whh preference to persons who ate 
acquainted with book keeping. 
2. The auditing committee's members will elect a president and a secretary from among 
themselves. 
Article 25. Powers 
The auditing committee has the power to: 
a. inform itself about the financial accounts of the baldio, give written advice about 
the accounts and verify the regularity of the documents stating income and 
expenditures; 
b. superintend the execution of the 'exploitation plans' of the baldio and the 
regularity of the collection and application of revenues and the justification of 
expenditures; 
c. communicate to the competent authorities the violations of the law and the 
breaking of contracts which have as their object the baldio; 
d. look after the rules for the protection of the environment. 
Chapter 4. Extinction ofbaldios 
Art. 26: Causes for extinction 
Baldios are extinct entirely or partially: 
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a) If extinction was decided unanimously by the commoners during a meeting of their 
assembly attended by at least two-thirds of the respective members. 
b) If the baldios, entirely or partially, have been objects of expropriation or voluntary 
alienation within the terms of this present law. 
Article 27. Precarious utilization 
1. After three years of the legally declared ostensive abandonment of the use and 
exploitation of a baldio, the council or councils of the parish or parishes in whose 
area the baldio is located can use it directly, without a significative change of its 
normal composition, or cede its precarious exploitation to a third party for a period 
of not longer than two years; this period can be renovated if in the mean time the 
commoners have not expressed their wish to return to the normal exploitation. 
2. In the case foreseen in the last part of the previous number, the parish council or 
councils have to present an account of the exploitation, and to cede to the 
commoners the value of the rendering of the exploitation or of the net revenues, 
reduced by 50% as a compensation, if the parish councils had exploited the area 
directly. 
Art. 28: Consequences of extinction. 
Total or partial extinction of a baldio leads to: 
a) In the cases of section a) of article 26 and of number 6 of article 29, the extinct (part 
of the) baldio is integrated in the private dominium of the parish or parishes in 
whose area the baldio is situated. 
b) In the case of section b) of article 26, the entitlements affected by the expropriation 
or alienation are transferred to the expropriating entity or to the beneficiary of the 
expropriation, or to any acquiring entity. 
Art. 29: Expropriation 
1. The baldios can, entirely or partially, be object of expropriation for reasons of public 
utility or for unjustified abandoning. 
2. The expropriation for public utility will be preceded by a proposal for the acquisition 
of the baldio in which the reasons, the price and other offered compensation are 
mentioned; the commoners' assembly has to respond within 60 days. 
3. In the case both parties come to an agreement, the transfer is made within the 
general terms of the law. 
4. The expropriation has to be limited to what is strictly necessary for the realization of 
the objectives which justify the expropriation, with the right of reversal of goods 
which remain or which were not used according to the objectives specified in the act 
of expropriation. 
5. The lawful compensation is calculated within the terms of the law that addresses 
these issues, but its valuation is also based on the intensity of the effective utilization 
of the baldios and the advantages the local community will have from the realization 
of the public utilities. 
6. The expropriation because of unjustified abandonment, as such judicially declared, 
can take place at the request of the parish council or councils in whose area the 
baldio is located, if the baldio has ceased to be the object of significative acts of 
dominion, possession, management and exploitation during a period of not less than 
10 years. 
Appendices 355 
Art. 30: Constitution of servitudes. 
It is possible to constitute servitudes over parcels of baldios, within the general terms of 
the law, in particular for reasons of public interest. 
Art. 31: Alienation for reasons of local interest. 
1. The commoners' assembly can decide to alienate limited areas of baldios by public 
auctions, with the market price as a basis, 
a) if the baldios confront with the border of the village and the alienation is 
necessary for the expansion of the urban area; 
b) if the alienation is necessary for the installation of industries, infra-structures, 
and other enterprises of collective interest, in particular to the local community. 
2. The parcels which can be alienated can not have an area superior to what is strictiy 
necessary for the objective for which they are alienated, and, if sold for the 
construction of houses, they cannot exceed 1500 m 2 per habitation. 
3. The property title cannot be transfer without the local authorities having approved the 
construction of the enterprises or dwellings on the planned locations. 
4. The alienation of parts of baldios for the installation of amenities without the aim of 
making profit can take place for free and without the conditions mentioned in the 
previous numbers, given that such a decision be taken by the commoners assembly, 
by a two-thirds majority. 
5. In the situation referred to in the previous number, it is not permitted to alienate 
afterwards the terrains to a third party, if that transfer is not made under the same 
conditions and for the same objectives. 
Chapter 5. Final and transitory dispositions 
Art. 32: Rule of jurisdiction. 
1. It is the power of the normal courts to deal with litigations which have directly or 
indirecdy baldios as their object, in particular those litigations which concern 
dominium, delimitation, utilization, occupation or appropriation, cessation contracts, 
decisions of its organs, or failures to keep to the law. 
2. The organs and members of local communities, including the entities to which the 
management has been delegated, do not have to pay judicial costs. 
Art. 33: Census 
1. A census of the commoners identifies and registers the inhabitants of the local 
communities who have rights over the baldio. 
2. In the terms of this law, the provisional censuses foreseen in nr. 2. of article 22 of 
Decreto-Lei 39/76 of 19 January 1976, or the censuses taken as final (...), if 
validated by unequivocal traditional practices, are recognized as valid until their 
substitution or actualization. 
3. In the event that a census of the commoners of a certain baldio does not exist, the 
commoners' assembly has the power to take the initiative to its elaboration, if 
summoned for this reason. In the case such an assembly does not exist or has not 
been summoned, our if it does not undertake actions within six months after this law 
having entered into action, groups of 10 members of the community who are usually 
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recognized as commoners, have the power to elaborate a census. In case more than 
one group is functioning, these groups have to cooperate. 
4. If after one year after the day on which this law has entered into action none of the 
initiatives mentioned in the previous numbers has taken place, the legal obligation to 
execute the census is automatically transferred to the Parish Council in whose 
territory (the largest part of) the baldio is located. The Parish Council has to execute 
this census within six months. 
5. The Parish Council mentioned in the previous number has in any case the obligation 
to cooperate with the entities mention in number one, under the penalty of loosing 
the right to administer the respective baldio through delegation by the commoners 
during a period of 10 years starting from the semester mentioned in the previous 
number. 
6. In the case of a continuing absence of a census of the commoners, because of the 
inactivity of all the entities mentioned in the numbers 3 and 4 and until the moment 
this is resolved, the traditional rules - if unequivocal - are applied. If this rules do 
not exist, the electoral register will be used as a census of the compartes, with the 
adaptions and corrections approved by the meetings of the commoners' assembly 
which has been summoned on the basis of this register. 
Art. 34: Devolution is not effectuated 
1. The baldios which, by the force of the dispositions of article 3 of Decreto-Lei 39/76 
of 19 January 1976, were lawfully returned to the use, exploitation and 
administration of the respective commoners, and which were de facto not returned, 
will be returned to the commoners immediately after the respective commoners' 
assembly takes the initiative to effectuate the restoration of its commons. 
2. The aspects of the restoration which are not regulated by this present law and by 
subsequent regulation, will be presented to the ordinary court according to the 
dispositions of article 32. 
Art. 35: Leases and transitional transfers of exploitation 
1. The leases and transfers of exploitation of baldios, in particular for forestry aims, 
which exist at the moment this law enters into action and which have been object of 
settlement with the local community's representative body or legal disposition, will 
continue according to the agreed terms or prescriptions until the end of the fixed or 
conventional term. This term can never exceed the time restriction fixed in nr. 4 of 
article 10. 
2. The leases and transfers of exploitation which lack the formal regularity mentioned 
in the previous number, will be subject to renegotiate with the respective local 
community's representative body, under the penalty of annihilation [of the existing 
situation] in the third year after this law has entered into action. 
3. In the case foreseen in the final part of the previous number, the dispositions 
mentioned in the nrs. 2 and 3 of article 36 will be applied with the necessary 
adaptations. 
Art. 36: Transitional administration 
1. The administration of baldios, which has in its totality or in part been transferred de 
facto to one or more than one Parish Council, and which continues in this situation at 
the date the present law enters into action, this administration is considered 
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'delegated' with the corresponding powers and obligations and the inherent rights, by 
force of this present law. This situation is maintained, with the adaptions which 
follow from this present law, until the delegation is explicitly confirmed or revoked 
according to the new formulae prescribed now. 
2. At the end of the administration referred to in the previous number, the 
administrating entity will present the financial accounts. 
3. The net revenues will be distributed according to the terms set in the contract of 
transfer or in equal parts between the administrating entity and the commoners' 
community. 
Art. 37: Administration under the regime of co-management 
1. The baldios which at the date this present law enters into action are being 
administered under the regime of co-management by the commoners and the State as 
foreseen in section b. of article 9 of Decreto-Lei 39/76 of 19 January, will continue 
to be administrated according to this regime until one of the following facts occurs: 
a) The agreed term expires; 
b) The commoners' assembly communicates to the State, in the person of entity 
which represents the State for this effect, that it should consider the regime to 
have ended starting not earlier than the latest date mentioned in nr. 4 of article 
10, without renewal, counting from the date of communication. 
2. Upon its end, the regime of co-management to which the previous number refers, 
can be substituted by the delegation of powers as defined in the articles 22 and 23. 
3. If the regime of co-management mentioned in number 1 does not end at the span 
mentioned above, the parties will regulate the compensations by agreement, or, if 
agreement is not achieved, this will be pursued through court. 
Art. 38: Prescription of the receipts 
1. The local communities are entitled to receive the share of the revenues from the 
exploitation of the baldios as defined by Decreto-Lei 39/76 of 19 January, deposited 
by the competent services of the central administration and not yet received by any 
baldio administrating entity, within the term of three years starting from the date this 
present law enters into action, if the dispositions of the next nr. 2 have been 
satisfied. 
2. Within ninety days from the date this present law enters into action, the 
Administrative services will communicate to the Parish Council or Councils the sums 
referred to in the previous number, the entity where this amount has been deposited, 
and the account numbers. Subsequently the Parish Council or Councils will put an 
announcement at the traditional locations in which the commoners are told what they 
have at their disposal and that they can demand the sums, within the terms fixed 
above. The Council or Councils will publish the same announcement in a local 
newspaper or, in the absence of such a paper, in the newspaper mostly read in the 
locality. 
3. In the event that the amounts of money have been deposited by the competent 
services of the Administration in any bank at the order of the local communities, the 
banking institution has to hand over the money to the community's representative 
body with the terms of 90 days counting from the date this present law enters into 
action. 
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4. In the case foreseen in nr. 1, the services of the Administration which possess the 
amounts will hand these amounts over the Parish Council or Councils of the baldlo 
within the term mentioned in the previous number, for the aims expressed in the 
following number. 
5. The Parish Councils mentioned in the previous number will elaborate, within 90 days 
starting at the date they receive the money, a plan for the utilization of the funds 
they have received. These plans have to be submitted for approval to the 
commoners' assembly, or, in the case this assembly does not exist or function, to the 
respective Parish Assembly or Assemblies. In die plans the funds have to be used for 
projects and improvements in the area corresponding to the respective baldio, or in 
the territory of the respective community. 
Art. 39: Irregular constructions 
1. Parts of baldio upon which, until the date of publication of this law, durable 
buildings for habitation or for economic exploitation or for social use have been 
constructed, can be alienated by the commoners' assembly through a two-thirds 
majority decision, if the situations correspond to those foreseen in article 31. In these 
cases, public auctions are not necessary, and the price can be established by direct 
negotiation. 
2. If the conditions set by the previous number and by article 31 are not satisfied, the 
owners of the concerned constructions can acquire property of the parcel of baldio 
strictly necessary for the aims of the construction concerned, by tarning to the 
acessao industrial imobildria in the general terms of the law. If they do not do so 
within the terms of two years starting with the date this present law enters into 
action, the respective communities may acquire all the necessary and useful 
improvements incorporated in the terrain against the value set by mutual agreement 
or by judicial valuation. 
Art. 40: Mandate of the existing organs 
The present members of the presidium of the commoners' assembly and the management 
comity complete the term of their mandate according to the terms of Decreto-Lei 39/76 
of 19 January, without consequences for the immediate application of the dispositions of 
this present law, in particular those which concern the auditing committee. 
Art.41: Regulation 
Without affecting the entering into action of the dispositions of this present law which 
can be applied immediately, the Council of Ministers will proceed with the regulation 
necessary for a good execution within the term of 90 days counting from the date this 
present law enters into action. 
Art. 42: Revocatory norm 
All the legal norms which can be applied to baldios, in particular the Decretos-Leis 
39/76 and 40/76, are revoked. 
Approved on 29 June 1993 
Promulgated on 28 July 1993. 
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Appendix 14: The Paper Pulp Industry in Portugal 
The main features of the companies (1989 figures) (LUSA 1990, Celbi 1965-1988, 
Semandrio Econdmico 16-3-1991; O Jornal 194-1991, p.13; Publico 13-5-1991, p.43; 
IPF 1988, Expresso 27-10-1989. 
Name 
Company 
Nr. 
empl. 
Production 
(1000 tons) 
Net 
result 
(106 
esc) 
Rank Number of 
plants 
Social 
capital 
(10* esc) 
Owned 
or rented 
area (ha) 
pulp paper 
Caima 600 120.7 4.2 86 2 0 4.3 35,540 
Celbi 698 239.6 7.0 35 1 0 15.5 40,739 
Portucel 4,600 400.0 6.0 8 3 4 50.0 100,000 
Soporcel 582 387.0 13.7 23 1 1 23.5 70,000 
Caima, the oldest paper pulp industry, was created in 1888 by British entrepreneurs as 
a timber company but rapidly shifted towards pulp production. Its first plant was built in 
Albergaria near Aveiro, on the Caima river bank, from where the firm has derived its 
name. Caima was the first (in 1928) enterprise to shift from pine to eucalyptus as its 
principal raw material. In 1945, pine pulp production was stopped. The Albergaria 
factory has a production capacity of 50,000 tons per year. In 1960, a second plant was 
built in Constincia, at the confluence of the Zezere and the Tagus rivers. Apart from the 
abundance of water, its good road and rail connections and the availability of a labour 
force attracted the enterprise. The present production capacity is 80,000 tons of pulp per 
year, so that total production capacity is 130,000 tons. Its main product is chlorine free 
pulp. The enterprise still is British; it controlled by Eucalyptus Pulp Mills (EPM). Caima 
administers its forests by a daughter company, Silvacaima, which employs about 75 
people on a permanent basis and upto 100 temporal workers (hit 15 April 1992). Its 
potential self sufficiency in wood supply amounts 50%. In 1989, the self-sufficiency rate 
of Caima was 20% of its needs, in 1990 it seemed to have gone up to 25%, and in 1991 
it reached even 37% (CAIMA 1991). Some observers expect that the enterprise intends 
to reach full self-sufficiency (Didrio de Noticias 19 November 1990; Semandrio 
Econdmico 2 February 1991). 
Celbi is the second oldest company. It was founded in 1965 by a Swedish corporation, 
Billerud in cooperation with several important Portuguese financial groups, such as the 
Sociedade Geral Financeira, Companhia de Seguros Impirio, and the Companhia Uniao 
Fabril (CUT). Billerud, controlled 71% of the shares, whereas the main Portuguese 
stockholders was CUF with 22% (Martins 1973). After their nationalization in 1975, 
their portfolios were transferred to JPE (Invesdmentos e Participacoes Empresariais), so 
that today, the state (29% of the shares) and Billerud, presentiy a subsidiary of 
Wallenberg's Stora, control the enterprise. Celbi's factory was built in Figueira da Foz 
in 1965 and entered production two years later. Since then, the production steadily 
increased from 25,000 tons of pulp in 1967 to 240,000 tons in 1989. Celbi has always 
been interested in primary production. Immediately after its take-off, it started to buy 
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and rent land in order to guarantee its supply of raw materials. The exact size of the 
area under its direct control is unknown, but in 1986, it owned or rented approximately 
41,000 hectares. Self-sufficiency rose from 7% in 1979 to 24% in 1985, and probably 
has increased further (Celbi 1965-1988), as probably has also the area it controls. 
According to a spokesman of the enterprise, presenfly its self-sufficiency lies higher than 
is actually needed as Celbi intends to invest in the doubling of its production capacity. 
When in 1991 this project was suspended, Celbi sold wood to Portucel because its stocks 
were too high (int 11 April 1992). Celbi's interest in primary production is also reflected 
in the company's research activities. During its early years, under the influence of CUF, 
Celbi investigated the possibilities of the use of fertilizers in eucalyptus plantations. It 
did also some work on the influence of planting distances (IFF 1988). Recendy it has 
been working on the bio-technological improvement of eucalyptus in order to double the 
cellulose production per tree (Semanario Economia 9 March 1990; Publico 27 May 
1991). 
Portucel was created in 1976 after the nationalization of four paper pulp companies 
that had belonged to the country's major pre-1974 capital groups (CUF, Espirito Santo, 
etc). The oldest of these four companies, the Companhia Portuguesa de Celulose had 
used pine as its raw material, but already in 1953 it started to use eucalyptus, as well. 
Presentiy, Portucel is Portugal's largest paper pulp company, and number 9 in the 
overall national ranking (Expresso 27 October 1989). Internationally, it is one of the 70 
major paper pulp companies in the world (Diârio de Notfcias 11 June 1990). The 
company owns more than 100,000 hectares or 3% of the national forest area, mainly in 
the Castello Branco district. At the moment, its stands produce about one third of the 2.1 
million stères of eucalyptus it consumes (int 11 April 1992). Through the expansion of 
its forest area and the improvement of eucalyptus stands and by genetic engineering, the 
enterprise wants to achieve a self-sufficiency degree of 50% (Portucel 1990a). The 
forestry section employs about 230. Related to the forestry section, other activities are 
developed in separate firms. One of these activities is hunting through the participation 
in the Sociedade Agricola Vale do Lucriz (2,500 ha) (since 1988), production hazel nuts, 
aquiculture (Ria-Mâe) and tourism. 
Soporcel is the youngest paper pulp producing enterprise. It was created in 1973 under 
the name of Celangol in Angola, but left that country after the revolution, hi 1979, the 
company decided to invest in Portugal. Two years later, a plant was built in Lavos 
(Figueira da Foz) just a few miles away from Celbi's. In 1985, the enterprise found an 
international partner in the British paper company Wiggins Teape Appleton, which 
obtained 43% of the shares. The start of Soporcel distressed the other corporations as 
they feared for the increased demand for eucalyptus. According to a spokesman of 
Caima, they were able to have Soporcel's take-off made dependent on the promise that it 
would only use pines as its raw material (int 15 April 1992). Soporcel itself declared that 
the precondition was that Soporcel would create its own plantations (int 9 April 1992). 
In any case, like the other enterprises, Soporcel is actively engaged in eucalyptus wood 
production. Through its in 1983 established daughter Emporsil Soporcel controls 70,000 
hectares of forest lands, of which 42,000 ha is covered by eucalyptus, Its self-sufficiency 
rate is around 40% (int 9 April 1992). Today, Emporsil is Portugal's largest forestry 
enterprise, employing a staff of 72 employees and some 200 to 300 temporal labourers. 
In 1991 it has created another daughter, Soporpap which is going to transform half of 
the enterprise's pulp in to paper. It is also engaged in agriculture (5,400 ha farm land), 
animal husbandry (6,500 heads of cattle) and hunting (Emporsil 1990). 
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Samenvatting 
Tot aan het eind van de negentiende eeuw was het communaal bezit van grond 
in veel landen in Europa een algemeen verschijnsel. Deze gemeenschapsgronden 
vervulden een belangrijke rol in de toenmalige rurale economieen: zij 
fungeerden als weidegronden, leverden plaggen en struikgewas die vermengd 
met dierlijke mest werden gebruikt voor het handhaven of verbeteren van de 
vruchtbaarheid van de akkers, zij verschaften brandstof, en ze dienden als een 
strategische reserve voor ontginning en voor de bouw van huizen voor de 
opvang van de bevolkingsgroei. In de meeste landen zijn deze communale 
gronden grotendeels verdwenen. In Portugal bestaan zij nog wel. De 
zogenaamde baldios zijn eigendom van dorpsgemeenschappen en worden 
beheerd en door het collectief van de gemeenschapsleden. 
In het verleden was het bestaan van de baldios omstreden en ook nu is hun 
toekomst onzeker. In de periode 1938-1974, toen het land werd geregeerd door 
een autoritair regime (de Estado Novo), voerde de centrale overheid een actieve 
politiek die was gericht op het nationaliseren en privatiseren van de baldios. 
Deze politiek werd gecoordineerd door een onderdeel van het Ministerie (later: 
Staatssecretariaat) van Landbouw: de Junta da Colonizagao Interna (JCI, Raad 
voor de Binnenlandse Kolonisering). Deze Raad hield zich hoofdzakelijk bezig 
met de begeleiding van het privatiseringsproces. Hij droeg de genationaliseerde 
terreinen voor bebossing over aan een ander onderdeel van het 
I^dbouwministerie, de Staatsbosdienst. Als gevolg van deze politiek verloren 
de dorpsgemeenschappen hun zeggenschap over de baldios. In 1966 werd deze 
ontwikkeling voltooid door het schrappen van communaal eigendom als aparte 
categorie binnen het burgerlijk recht. Het autoritaire bewind werd in 1974 door 
een militaire staatsgreep, de Anjer-revolutie, omvergeworpen. Na de 
machtswisseling werd de politiek ten aanzien van de baldios herzien en het 
dorpsbestuur over de communale gronden in ere hersteld. De door de 
Staatsbosdienst beheerde communale gronden herkregen een eigen wettelijke 
status die werd gegarandeerd door de grondwet. De organisatie van het gebruik 
en beheer werd geregeld door een aparte wet, Decreto-Lei 39/76 van 19 januari 
1976. In September 1993 werd de wettelijke status nogmaals herzien. De positie 
van de dorpsgemeenschappen als eigenaar en beheerder van de gronden bleef 
echter ongewijzigd. 
De hierboven samengevatte geschiedenis van de baldios roept een aantal 
vragen op die de kern vormen van dit boek. Waarom wilde de overheid een 
eind maken aan het bestaan van communale gronden? Waarom speelde in die 
pogingen juist de bosbouw zo'n belangrijke rol? En hoe moet men in het licht 
van de antwoorden op deze eerste twee vragen de teraggave de baldios in het 
midden van de jaren zeventig begrijpen? 
In dit boek wordt betoogd dat de overheidspolitiek ten aanzien van de baldios 
moet worden begrepen als een onderdeel van een veel algemener proces van 
staatsvorming. Staatsvorming wordt dan opgevat als het vormgeven van de 
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relatie tussen Staat en burger en, daarmee samenhangend, aan de Staat zelf. 
Totdat het overheidsingrijpen in de gemeenschapsgronden zijn beslag kreeg, 
waren de boerengemeenschappen relatief autonoom ten opzichte van de Staat. 
Zij waren vergelijkbaar met wat Elias (1974) dorpsrepublieken noemt. Door te 
intervenieren in het beheer van de communale gronden en de zeggenschap van 
boerengemeenschappen over deze gronden probeerde de centrale overheid een 
meer directe greep te krijgen op het leven van de boerenbevolking. 
Bosbouw was om verschillende redenen een geschikt medium voor het 
vestigen van de Staatsmacht. E6n daarvan werd gevormd door het feit dat de 
baldios vanwege hun relatief geringe bodemvruchtbaarheid, hun ligging en relief 
siecht geschikt waren voor ontginning ten behoeve van de landbouw. Een 
andere betraf de aard van bosbouw. Hout is geen voedingsmiddel maar een 
grondstof voor industriele verwerking. De bebossing van de baldios leidde 
derhalve tot een verandering in de positie van de regio's waarin deze baldios 
waren gelegen in de regionale arbeidsdeling en bevorderde de integratie van 
deze regio's in de nationale economie als grondstofproducenten. Een derde 
dement was dat de aanplant van bos door de overheid ging gepaard met de 
vestiging van een specifiek overheidsapparaat op het platteland. Met de aanleg 
van bos vestigde de Staat zieh in het platteland in de personen van 
administrateurs en boswachters. Dezen onderwierpen de bewoners aan een 
speciale boswetgeving, die in plaats kwam van de oorspronkelijke, door de 
dorpelingen zelf ontworpen, regels met betrekking tot het beheer van de 
communale gronden. In die zin implieeerde de aanplant van bos ook het 
implanteren van Staatsmacht. 
Gegeven het feit dat bosaanplant gepaard ging met de aanpassing en 
onderschikking van lokaal geformuleerde regels aan de regel- en wetgeving van 
de Staat speelt het recht een belangrijke rol in dit onderzoek. Het fungeert als 
indicator voor de onderwerping van lokale gemeenschappen aan diezelfde Staat. 
Verder geldt dat het recht het mogelijk maakt de meer algemene politieke en 
economische verhoudingen te begrijpen. De strijd over het recht en zijn 
toepassing drukt de ontwikkeling uit van de politiek-economische verhoudingen. 
De politiek van de Estado Novo ten aanzien van de gemene gronden vormde 
een voortzetting van een veel ouder proces. Vanaf het begin van de negentiende 
eeuw werd de Staat in toenemende mate "burgerlijk" of "kapitalistisch". De adel 
werd in toenemende mate uit het staatsapparaat verdreven en vervangen door de 
burgerij. Daarnaast steunde de Staat kapitalistische accumulatieprocessen ten 
koste van andere, zoals feodale of communale, organisatievormen van de 
economie. De transformatie van de juridische status van de baldios die gepaard 
ging met de bebossing, weerspiegelde de pogingen van de Staat om 
produktiemiddelen die opgesloten waren in niet-kapitalistische juridische 
vormen, daarvan te bevrijden en ze te integreren in de kapitalistische economie. 
Door auteurs als Hespanha (1980) wordt daarom betoogd dat deze politiek moet 
worden gezien als een onderdeel van een zogenaamde burgerlijke revolutie. 
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Bovenstaande laat zien dat de bebossing van de baidios als onderdeel van de 
veranderingen in de politieke verhouding tussen de plattelandsbevolking en de 
staat een politieke en een economische dimensie heeft. In dit boek worden beide 
dimensies onderzocht aan de hand van een aantal gemeenschappen in het 
noorden van Portugal. De meest belangrijke van deze gemeenschappen is 
Campeä, een kerspel in het district Vila Real. 
Het onderzoek in Campeä en in andere, soortgelijke gebieden waarin de 
Staatsbosdienst intervenieerde, laat zowel zien dat deze schets in grote lijnen 
correct is, als dat de werkelijkheid ingewikkelder en genuanceerder is geweest. 
In het concrete geval van Campeä moet bijvoorbeeld de these van de burgerlijke 
revolutie worden gecorrigeerd. AI in de achttiende eeuw was dit kerspel een 
centrum van commerciele activiteiten. Het vormde een schakel in de handel 
tussen de haven het kustgebied van Porto en het binnenland rond Vila Real. Het 
kerspel was 6eh van de weinige gemeenschappen op het platteland met een eigen 
markt. Deze markt was hoofdzakelijk bekend vanwege het daar aangeboden 
lokale runderras, de maronesa. Blijkbaar speelde de commerciele veehouderij 
destijds een belangrijke rol in de lokale economie. De agrarische structuur van 
het kerspel was gekenmerkt door het bestaan van (land-)bezittende boeren-
werkgevers en een groot aantal landarbeiders. Deze verhoudingen veranderden 
pas in de jaren zestig van de twintigste eeuw, toen, aangetrokken door de 
industrialisatie in noord-west Europa, vele landarbeiders emigreerden. Sindsdien 
is het gezinsbedrijf de dominante organisatievorm in de landbouw. 
Deze interpretatie van de geschiedenis van Campeä laat zien dat communaal 
eigendom verbonden niet noodzakelijk is verbonden aan een gesloten boeren-
economie. Dit betekent dat het niet zinvol is de staatsgeleide privatisering en 
nationalisering van de meenten van dit kerspel op te vatten als een 
kapitalistische transformatie. Dat kapitalisme was er al. Het is echter wel waar 
dat deze interventies correspondeerden met de ontwikkeling van kapitalistische 
produktieverhoudingen. Beide leidden in principe tot versterkte accumulatie in 
de private landbouw en de publieke bosbouw ten koste van de communale 
sector. 
In de literatuur zijn de invloed van de interventies in de meenten op de 
ontwikkelingen op het platteland en die van meer algemene processen vaak 
verward. Men analyseert het uiteenvallen van de oorspronkelijke agrarische 
samenleving bijna uitsluitend als gevolg van de privatisering en nationalisering 
van de baidios. Deze zouden er toe hebben geleid dat agrarische regio's zoals 
Campeä leveranciers werden van goedkope (migrerende) arbeidskrachten en 
grondstoffen (hour) voor industrieen elders in Portugal en Europa. Deze 
tendensen zijn zeker reeel en hun gevolgen met name sinds de jaren tachtig 
goed waarneembaar: het platteland raakt in hoog tempo ontvolkt. Het is echter 
onjuist deze veranderingen volledig te verklaren uit de bebossing van de 
gemeenschapsgronden. Deze bebossing maakte deel uit van een globaler proces 
en moeten begrepen worden als onderdeel van de ruimtelijk gedifferentieerde 
ontwikkeling van de nationale en europese economische Systemen. 
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Hoewel deze ontwikkeling het niveau van de beperkte sectorale en nationale 
overheidspolitiek te boven ging, mag, mede gezien de prominente rol die de 
staat tot 1974 speelde in de Portugese économie, het belang van die staat niet 
worden ontkend. Een analyse van die rol dwingt echter tot een nuancering van 
het bestaande beeld. In de literatuur wordt de Portugese Staatsbosdienst veelal 
geschetst als een paramilitaire organisatie die met geweld de meenten bezette en 
de plattelandsbevolking onderwierp aan haar politieke macht. Hoewel de 
bevolking zich soms zelfs met geweld probeerde te verzetten, was zij in de 
gevallen weerloos tegen zoveel overmacht. In de door mij onderzochte gevallen 
was van gewelddadig verzet nauwelijks sprake. Wei was er "klein verzet", dat 
zich met name uitte door het stemgedrag bij verkiezingen. Als gevolg van de 
interventies van de Staatsbosdienst en de JCI kreeg een oppositie-kandidaat 
zoveel électorale steun op het platteland rond Vila Real dat dit zelfs op centraal 
niveau aanleiding gaf tot bezorgdheid. Verder werden de activiteiten van deze 
lichamen in hoge mate werd beïnvloed door de lokale strijd om politieke en 
economische zeggenschap over de baldios tussen gemeentelijke en kerspel-
overheden, tussen verschillende facties binnen de lokale elite, en tussen de elite 
en de onderste lagen van de samenleving. Deze lokale strijd verklaart ook 
waarom men in Campeâ de interventie van de bosdienst als ingrijpender ervoer 
dan die van de JCI. Doordat de JCI land privatiseerde, was zij beter dan de 
bosdienst in staat een alliantie aan te gaan met belangrijke individuen uit het 
kerspel. Dezen slaagden er namelijk in delen van de meent in handen te krijgen 
en profiteerden zo van de privatisering. Met andere woorden: naast pressie (en 
het daarmee samenhangende verzet) was er ook sprake van medeplichtigheid. 
De dwang werd gecompleteerd door collaboratie. 
Het jaar 1974 vormde een breukvlak: tot dat jaar was het overheidsbeleid 
gericht op de ontmanteling van gemeenschapsgronden, en daarna werden (in 
1976) de meenten in ere hersteld. Deze wending was een direct gevolg van de 
Anjer-revolutie. Na die revolutie kwamen linkse politici aan de macht, die het 
herstel van de gemeenschappen opvatten als een logische consequentie van de 
door hen voorgestane democratisering van de samenleving en transitie naar het 
socialisme. Een analyse van de toenmalige politieke processen maakt echter 
duidelijk dat de restauratie van de baldios als onderdeel van een revolutionaire 
stratégie was gedoemd te mislukken. Ze berustte op een aantal gebrekkige en 
tegenstrijdige vooronderstellingen met betrekking tot de aard van de agrarische 
gemeenschappen en hun economieën en de staat. Een dergelijke analyse maakt 
tevens duidelijk dat de restauratie van de baldios ook in het belang was van de 
Staatsbosdienst. De bosdienst vreesde dat hij de zeggenschap over de meenten 
zou verliezen aan lokale overheden. Een dergelijke ontwikkeling zou niet alleen 
het bos maar vooral ook de dienst zelf in zijn bestaan hebben bedreigd. De 
dorpsgemeenschappen werden niet zozeer als een bedreiging gezien, omdat deze 
niet over de middelen beschikten om de macht en ambities van de bosdienst te 
weerstaan. De teruggave van de meenten maakte dus deel uit van twee 
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tegenstrijdige ambities: revolutionaire democratisering, en de contmuering van 
het project van de bosbouw-bureaucratie. 
Na 1976 vond de wederopbouw van gemeenschapscontrole over de baldios 
slechts schoorvoetend plaats. Mede als gevolg van de eerdere 
overheidsinterventies was de draagkracht van dorpsgemeenschappen voor de 
instituties voor het beheer van communale gronden afgenomen. Daarenboven 
stelde de nieuwe wet hoge eisen aan de marner waarop de gemeenschappen zich 
moesten organiseren dan in het verleden. Tenslotte was het revolutionaire 
project, waarvan de restauratie van de meenten deel uitmaakte, een exogène 
overheidsonderneming en niet iets wat rechtstreeks voortkwam uit de rurale 
bevolking zelf. 
De twintig jaar die inmiddels zijn verstreken verplichten tot een analyse van 
de economische en politieke betekenis van het herstel van de gemene gronden. 
In economische zin vormde de restauratie in de eerste plaats de tegenhanger van 
de algehele marginalisering van rurale gebieden zoals Campeâ. Tot 1974 had de 
nationalisering en bebossing de lokale bevolking weinig baat gebracht. Zij werd 
nauwelijks gecompenseerd voor het verlies van haar gemeenschapsgronden en 
de bebossing leverde weinig lokaal profijt op in de vorm van werkgelegenheid. 
Dit veranderde als gevolg van het herstel van de communale contrôle. Nu bleef 
het merendeel van-de bruto opbrengst van de bossen in handen van de dorpen in 
plaats van weg te vloeien naar de centrale staat. In dorpsgemeenschappen die 
over grotere meenten beschikken, vormden deze gelden een belangrijke 
inkomstenbron, die soms in omvang het budget van een kerspel als Campeâ als 
geheel overtrof. De dorpen gebruikten deze gelden vooral voor de bouw van 
infrastructure^ voorzieningen zoals wegen, bruggen, en dergelijke. Deze 
investeringen vergrootten de leefbaarheid van het platteland en droegen zo 
mogelijk bij aan het afremmen van de ontvolking. 
Op het politieke vlak leidde de restauratie van de communale gronden tot een 
versterking van de positie van dorpen in relatie tot de lokale en andere 
overheden. Door de recuperatie van gemeenschapscontrole over de baldios en 
daarenboven over de financiële opbrengsten van deze gemeenschapsgronden 
ontstonden nieuwe mogelijkheden van politieke macht en van conflict. Onder de 
conditie van de sinds 1976 gevestigde parlementaire démocratie kreeg de 
zeggenschap over de meenten partij-politieke implicaties. Niettegenstaande de 
retoriek die vooral refereerde aan het zogenaamde socialistische karakter van de 
in 1976 gecreëerde organisatie-structuur, waren het vooral deze partij-politieke 
implicaties die in 1993 leidden tot de herziening van ôaW/as~wetgeving. 
Het boek besluit met een blik op de toekomst. Het beheer van de herstelde 
meenten vindt plaats in een context van Europese integratie. Deze integratie 
heeft grote gevolgen voor de bevolking van het Noord-Portugese platteland. 
Boereninkomens dalen, zodat de revenuen uit de baldios ten spijt men in groten 
getale wegtrekt naar de industriële centra langs de kust of elders in Europa. 
Voor de achterblijvende boeren lijkt vanwege de modernisering van de 
landbouw enerzijds en de subsidiëring van bosaanplant op landbouwgrond door 
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de Europese Unie anderzijds bosbouw op communale en priv6-gronden in 
toenemende mate de enige toekomstmogelijkheid. Gegeven de concentratie van 
de (houtverwerkende) industrie in andere delen van het land lijkt derhalve een 
verdere ontvolking van de regio onvermijdelijk. Deze ontwikkeling zal ook 
consequenties hebben voor het voortbestaan van de baldios. Naar alle 
waarschijnlijkheid zullen deze met de dorpsgemeenschappen verdwijnen. 
Echter, maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen zijn geen autonome Processen maar 
inzet en uitkomst van sociale strijd. Door de boerenbewegingen.in de regio 
wordt gepleit voor een andere Strategie voor landbouwontwikkeling. Zij 
verdedigen het stimuleren van de produktie van regio-specifieke, "traditionele", 
kwaliteitsprodukten. Hiermee zou het voortbestaan van een agrarische bevolking 
kunnen worden gegarandeerd. Aangezien het agrarisch gebruik van de 
gemeenschapsgronden een essentieel onderdeel van deze Strategie vormt, zou 
daarmee het voortbestaan van deze gronden worden gewaarborgd. 
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